SECOND DIVISION
ADELFA S. RIVERA,
CYNTHIA S. RIVERA, AND
JOSE S. RIVERA,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
144934
January 15, 2004
-versus-
FIDELA
DEL ROSARIO
(DECEASED AND SUBSTITUTED BY HERCO-RESPONDENTS)
AND HER CHILDREN, OSCAR, ROSITA,VIOLETA, ENRIQUE
JR., CARLOS, JUANITO AND ELOISA,ALL SURNAMED DEL
ROSARIO,
Respondents. |
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Before us is a petition
for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals’ decision[1]
dated November 29, 1999, in CA-G.R. CV No. 60552, which affirmed the
judgment[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 17, in
Civil
Case No. 151-M-93. The RTC granted respondents’ complaint for nullity
of
contract of sale and annulment of the transfer certificates of title
issued
in favor of petitioners.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The facts, as found
by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Respondents Fidela (now
deceased), Oscar, Rosita, Violeta, Enrique Jr., Carlos, Juanito and
Eloisa,
all surnamed Del Rosario, were the registered owners of Lot No. 1083-C,
a parcel of land situated at Lolomboy, Bulacan. This lot spanned an
area
of 15,029 square meters and was covered by TCT No. T-50.668 (M)
registered
in the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.cralaw:red
On May 16, 1983, Oscar,
Rosita, Violeta, Enrique Jr., Juanito, and Eloisa, executed a Special
Power
of Attorney[3]
in favor of their mother and co-respondent, Fidela, authorizing her to
sell, lease, mortgage, transfer and convey their rights over Lot No.
1083-C.[4]
Subsequently, Fidela borrowed P250,000 from Mariano Rivera in the early
part of 1987. To secure the loan, she and Mariano Rivera agreed to
execute
a deed of real estate mortgage and an agreement to sell the land.
Consequently,
on March 9, 1987, Mariano went to his lawyer, Atty. Efren Barangan, to
have three documents drafted: the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage,[5]
a Kasunduan (Agreement to Sell),[6]
and a Deed of Absolute Sale.[7]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Kasunduan provided
that the children of Mariano Rivera, herein petitioners Adelfa, Cynthia
and Jose, would purchase Lot No. 1083-C for a consideration of
P2,141,622.50.
This purchase price was to be paid in three installments: P250,000 upon
the signing of the Kasunduan, P750,000 on August 31, 1987, and
P1,141,622.50
on December 31, 1987.[8]
It also provided that the Deed of Absolute Sale would be executed only
after the second installment is paid and a postdated check for the last
installment is deposited with Fidela.[9]
As previously stated, however, Mariano had already caused the drafting
of the Deed of Absolute Sale. But unlike the Kasunduan, the said deed
stipulated
a purchase price of only P601,160, and covered a certain Lot No. 1083-A
in addition to Lot No. 1083-C.[10]
This deed, as well as the Kasunduan and the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage,[11]
was signed by Mariano’s children, petitioners Adelfa, Cynthia and Jose,
as buyers and mortgagees, on March 9, 1987.[12]
The following day, Mariano
Rivera returned to the office of Atty. Barangan, bringing with him the
signed documents. He also brought with him Fidela and her son Oscar del
Rosario, so that the latter two may sign the mortgage and the Kasunduan
there.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Although Fidela intended
to sign only the Kasunduan and the Real Estate Mortgage, she
inadvertently
affixed her signature on all the three documents in the office of Atty.
Barangan on the said day, March 10, 1987. Mariano then gave Fidela the
amount of P250,000. On October 30, 1987, he also gave Fidela a check
for
P200,000. In the ensuing months, also, Mariano gave Oscar del Rosario
several
amounts totaling P67,800 upon the latter’s demand for the payment of
the
balance despite Oscar’s lack of authority to receive payments under the
Kasunduan.[13]
While Mariano was making payments to Oscar, Fidela entrusted the
owner’s
copy of TCT No. T-50.668 (M) to Mariano to guarantee compliance with
the
Kasunduan.cralaw:red
When Mariano unreasonably
refused to return the TCT,[14]
one of the respondents, Carlos del Rosario, caused the annotation on
TCT
No. T-50.668 (M) of an Affidavit of Loss of the owner’s duplicate copy
of the title on September 7, 1992. This annotation was offset, however,
when Mariano registered the Deed of Absolute Sale on October 13, 1992,
and afterwards caused the annotation of an Affidavit of Recovery of
Title
on October 14, 1992. Thus, TCT No. T-50.668 (M) was cancelled, and in
its
place was issued TCT No. 158443 (M) in the name of petitioners Adelfa,
Cynthia and Jose Rivera.[15]
Meanwhile, the Riveras,
representing themselves to be the new owners of Lot No. 1083-C, were
also
negotiating with the tenant, Feliciano Nieto, to rid the land of the
latter’s
tenurial right. When Nieto refused to relinquish his tenurial right
over
9,000 sq. m. of the land, the Riveras offered to give 4,500 sq. m. in
exchange
for the surrender. Nieto could not resist and he accepted. Subdivision
Plan No. Psd-031404-052505 was then made on August 12, 1992. Later, it
was inscribed on TCT No. 158443 (M), and Lot No. 1083-C was divided
into
Lots 1083 C-1 and 1083 C-2.[16]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
To document their agreement
with Feliciano Nieto, the Riveras executed a Kasulatan sa Pagtatakwil
ng
Karapatan sa Pagmamay-ari ng Bahagi ng Isang Lagay na Lupa (Written
Abdication
of Rights over a Portion of a Parcel of Land)[17]
on November 16, 1992. Four days later, they registered the document
with
the Registry of Deeds. Two titles were then issued: TCT No. T-161784
(M)
in the name of Nieto, for 4,500 sq. m. of land, and TCT No. T-161785
(M)
in the name of petitioners Adelfa, Cynthia and Jose Rivera, over the
remaining
10,529 sq. m. of land.[18]
On February 18, 1993,
respondents filed a complaint[19]
in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, asking that the Kasunduan be
rescinded
for failure of the Riveras to comply with its conditions, with damages.
They also sought the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the
ground
of fraud, the cancellation of TCT No. T-161784 (M) and TCT No. T-161785
(M), and the reconveyance to them of the entire property with TCT No.
T-50.668
(M) restored.[20]
Respondents claimed
that Fidela never intended to enter into a deed of sale at the time of
its execution and that she signed the said deed on the mistaken belief
that she was merely signing copies of the Kasunduan. According to
respondents,
the position where Fidela’s name was typed and where she was supposed
to
sign her name in the Kasunduan was roughly in the same location where
it
was typed in the Deed of Absolute Sale. They argued that given Fidela’s
advanced age (she was then around 72 at the time)[21]
and the fact that the documents were stacked one on top of the other at
the time of signing, Fidela could have easily and mistakenly presumed
that
she was merely signing additional copies of the Kasunduan.[22]
They also alleged that petitioners acquired possession of the TCT
through
fraud and machination.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In their defense, petitioners
denied the allegations and averred that the Deed of Absolute Sale was
validly
entered into by both parties. According to petitioners, Fidela del
Rosario
mortgaged Lot No. 1083-C to their predecessor in interest, Mariano
Rivera,
on March 9, 1987. But on the following day Fidela decided to sell the
lot
to petitioners for P2,161,622.50. When Mariano agreed (on the condition
that Lot No. 1083-C will be delivered free from all liens and
encumbrances),
the Kasunduan was consequently drawn up and signed. After that,
however,
Fidela informed Mariano of the existence of Feliciano Nieto’s tenancy
right
over the lot to the extent of 9,000 sq. m. When Mariano continued to
want
the land, albeit on a much lower price of only P601,160, as he had
still
to deal with Feliciano Nieto, the parties drafted the Deed of Absolute
Sale on March 10, 1987, to supersede the Kasunduan.cralaw:red
Petitioners likewise
argued that respondents’ cause of action had been barred by laches or
estoppel
since more than four years has lapsed from the time the parties
executed
the Deed of Absolute Sale on March 10, 1987, to the time respondents
instituted
their complaint on February 18, 1993.cralaw:red
Petitioners also filed
a counterclaim asking for moral and exemplary damages and the payment
of
attorney’s fees and costs of suit.cralaw:red
After trial, the RTC
ruled in favor of respondents:
WHEREFORE, in the light
of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated March 10, 1987 as null and void;
2. Annulling TCT No.
T-158443 (M) and TCT No. T-161785 (M) both in the names of Adelfa,
Cynthia
and Jose, all surnamed Rivera;
3. Declaring the plaintiffs
to be the legitimate owners of the land covered by TCT No. T-161785 (M)
and ordering defendant Adelfa, Cynthia, and Jose, all surnamed Rivera,
to reconvey the same to the plaintiffs;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
4. Ordering the Register
of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel TCT No. T-161785 (M) and to issue in its
place a new certificate of title in the name of the plaintiffs as their
names appear in TCT No. T-50.668;
5. Declaring TCT No.
T-161784 (M) in the name of Feliciano Nieto as valid;
6. Ordering the defendant
Riveras to pay the plaintiffs solidarily the following amounts:
a) P191,246.98 as balance
for the 4,500 square-meter portion given to defendant Feliciano Nieto
b) P200,000.00 as moral
damages
c) P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages
d) P50,000.00 as attorney’s
fees
e) costs of the suit.cralaw:red
7. Dismissing the counterclaim
of the defendant Riveras;
8. Dismissing the counterclaim
and the crossclaim of defendant Feliciano Nieto.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.[23]
The trial court ruled
that Fidela’s signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale was genuine, but
found
that Fidela never intended to sign the said deed. Noting the peculiar
differences
between the Kasunduan and the Deed of Absolute Sale, the trial court
concluded
that the Riveras were guilty of fraud in securing the execution of the
deed and its registration in the Registry of Deeds.[24]
This notwithstanding, the trial court sustained the validity of TCT No.
T-161784 (M) in the name of Feliciano Nieto since there was no fraud
proven
on Nieto’s part. The trial court found him to have relied in good faith
on the representations of ownership of Mariano Rivera. Thus, Nieto’s
rights,
according to the trial court, were akin to those of an innocent
purchaser
for value.[25]
On the foregoing, the
trial court rescinded the Kasunduan but ruled that the P450,000 paid by
petitioners be retained by respondents as payment for the 4,500 sq. m.
portion of Lot No. 1083-C that petitioners gave to Nieto.[26]
The trial court likewise ordered petitioners to pay P191,246.98 as
balance
for the price of the land given to Nieto, P200,000 as moral damages,
P50,000
as exemplary damages, P50,000 as attorney’s fees, and the costs of suit.[27]
On appeal to the Court
of Appeals, the trial court’s judgment was modified as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated March 10, 1987 is declared null and void only
insofar
as Lot No. 1083-C is concerned, but valid insofar as it conveyed Lot
No.
1083-A, that TCT No. 158443 (M) is valid insofar as Lot No. 1083-A is
concerned
and should not be annulled, and increasing the amount to be paid by the
defendants-appellants to the plaintiffs-appellees for the 4,500 square
meters of land given to Feliciano Nieto to P323,617.50.cralaw:red
Costs against the defendants-appellants.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.[28]
Petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
While this petition
was pending, respondent Fidela del Rosario died. She was substituted by
her children, herein respondents.cralaw:red
In this petition, petitioners
rely on the following grounds:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS, GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AWARDING
LOT 1083-A IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS AND FELICIANO NIETO WHICH IS
ADMITTEDLY
A PART AND PORTION OF THE EXISTING NORTH LUZON EXPRESSWAY AND AS SUCH
ACTED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION, OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
JUDICIAL
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.
II
RESPONDENTS FAILED
TO
PAY THE CORRECT DOCKET, FILING AND OTHER LAWFUL FEES WITH THE OFFICE OF
THE CLERK OF COURT OF THE COURT A QUO (RTC, MALOLOS, BULACAN) AT THE
TIME
OF THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT IN 1993 PURSUANT TO THE SIOL[29]
DOCTRINE.
III
[THE] TRIAL COURT
AWARDED
RELIEFS NOT SPECIFICALLY PRAYED FOR IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT
REQUIRING
THE PAYMENT OF THE CORRECT DOCKET, FILING AND OTHER LAWFUL FEES.
IV
THE COURT A QUO HAS
NO JURISDICTION OVER THE RESPONDENTS’ CAUSE OF ACTION AND OVER THE RES
CONSIDERING THAT FELICIANO NIETO IS AN AGRICULTURAL TENANT OF THE
RICELAND
IN QUESTION.
V
RESPONDENTS[’] MAIN
CAUSE OF ACTION [IS] FOR RESCISSION OF CONTRACT WHICH IS SUBSIDIARY IN
NATURE[,] AND ANNULMENT OF SALE[,] BOTH OF WHICH HAVE ALREADY
PRESCRIBED
UNDER ARTICLES 1389 AND 1391 OF THE CIVIL CODE.[30]
Petitioners’ assignment
of errors may be reduced into three issues: (1) Did the trial court
acquire
jurisdiction over the case, despite an alleged deficiency in the amount
of filing fees paid by respondents and despite the fact that an
agricultural
tenant is involved in the case? (2) Did the Court of Appeals correctly
rule that the Deed of Absolute Sale is valid insofar as Lot 1083-A is
concerned?
(3) Is the respondents’ cause of action barred by prescription?
On the first issue,
petitioners contend that jurisdiction was not validly acquired because
the filing fees respondents paid was only P1,554.45 when the relief
sought
was reconveyance of land that was worth P2,141,622.50 under the
Kasunduan.
They contend that respondents should have paid filing fees amounting to
P12,183.70. In support of their argument, petitioners invoke the
doctrine
in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion[31]
and attach a certification[32]
from the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Quezon City.cralaw:red
Respondents counter
that it is beyond dispute that they paid the correct amount of docket
fees
when they filed the complaint. If the assessment was inadequate, they
could
not be faulted because the clerk of court made no notice of demand or
reassessment,
respondents argue. Respondents also add that since petitioners failed
to
contest the alleged underpayment of docket fees in the lower court,
they
cannot raise the same on appeal.[33]
We rule in favor of
respondents. Jurisdiction was validly acquired over the complaint. In
Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion,[34]
this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory
pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fee vest a trial
court
with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. If
the
amount of docket fees paid is insufficient considering the amount of
the
claim, the clerk of court of the lower court involved or his duly
authorized
deputy has the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment. The
party
filing the case will be required to pay the deficiency, but
jurisdiction
is not automatically lost.cralaw:red
Here it is beyond dispute
that respondents paid the full amount of docket fees as assessed by the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch
17, where they filed the complaint. If petitioners believed that the
assessment
was incorrect, they should have questioned it before the trial court.
Instead,
petitioners belatedly question the alleged underpayment of docket fees
through this petition, attempting to support their position with the
opinion
and certification of the Clerk of Court of another judicial region.
Needless
to state, such certification has no bearing on the instant case.cralaw:red
Petitioners also contend
that the trial court does not have jurisdiction over the case because
it
involves an agricultural tenant. They insist that by virtue of
Presidential
Decree Nos. 316 and 1038,[35]
it is the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) that
has jurisdiction.[36]
Petitioners’ contention
lacks merit. The DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases
involving
the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the management,
cultivation
and use of all agricultural lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law.[37]
However, the cause of action in this case is primarily against the
petitioners,
as indispensable parties, for rescission of the Kasunduan and
nullification
of the Deed of Sale and the TCTs issued because of them. Feliciano
Nieto
was impleaded merely as a necessary party, stemming from whatever
rights
he may have acquired by virtue of the agreement between him and the
Riveras
and the corresponding TCT issued. Hence, it is the regular judicial
courts
that have jurisdiction over the case.cralaw:red
On the second issue,
contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the Deed of
Absolute
Sale is void only insofar as it covers Lot No. 1083-C, we find that the
said deed is void in its entirety. Noteworthy is that during the oral
arguments
before the Court of Appeals, both petitioners and respondents admitted
that Lot No. 1083-A had been expropriated by the government long before
the Deed of Absolute Sale was entered into.[38]
What’s more, this case involves only Lot No. 1083-C. It never involved
Lot 1083-A. Thus, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to
adjudicate
on Lot 1083-A, as it was never touched upon in the pleadings or made
the
subject of evidence at trial.[39]
As to the third issue,
petitioners cite Articles 1383,[40]
1389[41]
and 1391[42]
of the New Civil Code. They submit that the complaint for rescission of
the Kasunduan should have been dismissed, for respondents’ failure to
prove
that there was no other legal means available to obtain reparation
other
than to file a case for rescission, as required by Article 1383.
Moreover,
petitioners contend that even assuming respondents had satisfied this
requirement,
prescription had already set in, the complaint having been filed in
1992
or five years after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in March
10, 1987.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondents counter
that Article 1383 of the New Civil Code applies only to rescissible
contracts
enumerated under Article 1381 of the same Code, while the cause of
action
in this case is for rescission of a reciprocal obligation, to which
Article
1191[43]
of the Code applies. They assert that their cause of action had not
prescribed
because the four-year prescriptive period is counted from the date of
discovery
of the fraud, which, in this case, was only in 1992.cralaw:red
Rescission of reciprocal
obligations under Article 1191 of the New Civil Code should be
distinguished
from rescission of contracts under Article 1383 of the same Code. Both
presuppose contracts validly entered into as well as subsisting, and
both
require mutual restitution when proper, nevertheless they are not
entirely
identical.[44]
In countless times there
has been confusion between rescission under Articles 1381 and 1191 of
the
Civil Code. Through this case we again emphasize that rescission of
reciprocal
obligations under Article 1191 is different from rescissible contracts
under Chapter 6 of the law on contracts under the Civil Code.[45]
While Article 1191 uses the term rescission, the original term used in
Article 1124 of the old Civil Code, from which Article 1191 was based,
was resolution.[46]
Resolution is a principal action that is based on breach of a party,
while
rescission under Article 1383 is a subsidiary action limited to cases
of
rescission for lesion under Article 1381 of the New Civil Code,[47]
which expressly enumerates the following rescissible contracts:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
ART. 1381. The following
contracts are rescissible:
(1) Those which are
entered into by guardians whenever the wards whom they represent suffer
lesion by more than one-fourth of the value of the things which are the
object thereof;
(2) Those agreed upon
in representation of absentees, if the latter suffer the lesion stated
in the preceding number;
(3) Those undertaken
in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any other manner
collect
the claims due them;
(4) Those which refer
to things under litigation if they have been entered into by the
defendant
without the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of competent
judicial
authority;
(5) All other contracts
specially declared by law to be subject to rescission.cralaw:red
Obviously, the Kasunduan
does not fall under any of those situations mentioned in Article 1381.
Consequently, Article 1383 is inapplicable. Hence, we rule in favor of
the respondents.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
May the contract entered
into between the parties, however, be rescinded based on Article 1191?
A careful reading of
the Kasunduan reveals that it is in the nature of a contract to sell,
as
distinguished from a contract of sale. In a contract of sale, the title
to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing
sold;
while in a contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved in
the
vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the
purchase
price.[48]
In a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive
suspensive condition,[49]
the failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but a
situation
that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from
acquiring
an obligatory force.[50]
Respondents in this
case bound themselves to deliver a deed of absolute sale and clean
title
covering Lot No. 1083-C after petitioners have made the second
installment.
This promise to sell was subject to the fulfillment of the suspensive
condition
that petitioners pay P750,000 on August 31, 1987, and deposit a
postdated
check for the third installment of P1,141,622.50.[51]
Petitioners, however, failed to complete payment of the second
installment.
The non-fulfillment of the condition rendered the contract to sell
ineffective
and without force and effect. It must be stressed that the breach
contemplated
in Article 1191 of the New Civil Code is the obligor’s failure to
comply
with an obligation already extant, not a failure of a condition to
render
binding that obligation.[52]
Failure to pay, in this instance, is not even a breach but an event
that
prevents the vendor’s obligation to convey title from acquiring binding
force.[53]
Hence, the agreement of the parties in the instant case may be set
aside,
but not because of a breach on the part of petitioners for failure to
complete
payment of the second installment. Rather, their failure to do so
prevented
the obligation of respondents to convey title from acquiring an
obligatory
force.[54]
Coming now to the matter
of prescription. Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, we find that
prescription
has not yet set in. Article 1391 states that the action for annulment
of
void contracts shall be brought within four years. This period shall
begin
from the time the fraud or mistake is discovered. Here, the fraud was
discovered
in 1992 and the complaint filed in 1993. Thus, the case is well within
the prescriptive period.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the matter of damages,
the Court of Appeals awarded respondents P323,617.50 as actual damages
for the loss of the land that was given to Nieto, P200,000 as moral
damages,
P50,000 as exemplary damages, P50,000 as attorney’s fees and the costs
of suit. Modifications are in order, however.cralaw:red
Moral damages may be
recovered in cases where one willfully causes injury to property, or in
cases of breach of contract where the other party acts fraudulently or
in bad faith.[55]
Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public
good,[56]
when the party to a contract acts in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive
or
malevolent manner.[57]
Attorney’s fees are allowed when exemplary damages are awarded and when
the party to a suit is compelled to incur expenses to protect his
interest.[58]
While it has been sufficiently
proven that the respondents are entitled to damages, the actual amounts
awarded by the lower court must be reduced because damages are not
intended
for a litigant’s enrichment, at the expense of the petitioners.[59]
The purpose for the award of damages other than actual damages would be
served, in this case, by reducing the amounts awarded.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondents were amply
compensated through the award of actual damages, which should be
sustained.
The other damages awarded total P300,000, or almost equivalent to the
amount
of actual damages. Practically this will double the amount of actual
damages
awarded to respondents. To avoid breaching the doctrine on enrichment,
award for damages other than actual should be reduced. Thus, the amount
of moral damages should be set at only P30,000, and the award of
exemplary
damages at only P20,000. The award of attorney’s fees should also be
reduced
to P20,000, which under the circumstances of this case appears
justified
and reasonable.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED. The Deed of Absolute Sale
in question is declared NULL and VOID in its entirety. Petitioners are
ORDERED to pay respondents P323,617.50 as actual damages, P30,000.00 as
moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and P20,000.00 as
attorney’s
fees. No pronouncement as to costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, J., (Chairman),
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ.,
concur.cralaw:red
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 98-111. Penned by Associate Justice Hector L.
Hofileña,
with Associate Justices Omar U. Amin and Jose L. Sabio, Jr., concurring.
[2]
Id. at 158-189; Records, pp. 1080-1121.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Records, pp. 386-387.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Rollo, pp. 99-100.
[5]
Records, pp. 395-396.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 115-116; Records, pp. 11-12.
[7]
Records, p. 100.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Rollo, p. 100.
[9]
Annex "C", Id. at 115.
[10]
Annex "D", Id. at 117-118.
[11]
Records, pp. 395-396.
[12]
Rollo, pp. 100-101.
[13]
Rollo, pp. 101-102.
[14]
Id. at 165.
[15]
Id. at 102.
[16]
Id. at 103.
[17]
Records, pp. 211-214.
[18]
Rollo, p. 103.
[19]
Records, pp. 3-8.
[20]
Rollo, p. 103.
[21]
See Rollo, p. 428.
[22]
See Annexes "C" and "D", Id. at 115-118.
[23]
Rollo, pp. 188-189.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
Records, p. 1104.
[25]
Id. at 1107-1108.
[26]
Id. at 1109.
[27]
Id. at 1121.
[28]
Rollo, p. 110.
[29]
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 79937-38, 13
February 1989, 170 SCRA 274.
[30]
Rollo, p. 66.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[31]
G.R. Nos. 79937-38, 13 February 1989, 170 SCRA 274.
[32]
Annex "V", Rollo, p. 370.
[33]
Rollo, p. 380.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
Supra, note 31 at 285.
[35]
P.D. No. 316, "Prohibiting the Ejectment of Tenant-Tillers from their
Farmholdings
Pending the Promulgation of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
Presidential
Decree No. 27". P.D. 1038, "Strengthening the Security of Tenure of
Tenant-Tillers
in Non-Rice/Corn Producing Private Agricultural Lands".
[36]
Rollo, pp. 285-312.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[37]
Section 1, Rule II, 2002 DARAB Rules of Procedure.
[38]
CA Rollo, pp. 219-251.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[39]
De Ysasi v. Arceo, G.R. No. 136586, 22 November 2001, 370 SCRA 296,
303,
citing Lazo v. Republic Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., No. L-27365,
30 January 1970, 31 SCRA 329, 334.
[40]
Art. 1383. The action for rescission is subsidiary; it cannot be
instituted
except when the party suffering damages has no other legal means to
obtain
reparation for the same.
[41]
Art. 1389. The action to claim rescission must be commenced within four
years.
[42]
Art. 1391. The action for annulment shall be brought within four years.
This
period shall begin:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In
cases of intimidation, violence or undue influence, from the time the
defect
of the consent ceases.
In
case of mistake or fraud, from the time of the discovery of the same.
And
when the action refers to contracts entered into by minors or other
incapacitated
persons, from the time the guardianship ceases.
[43]
Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal
ones,
in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent
upon
him.
The
injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of
the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also
seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter
should
become impossible.
x
x x
[44]
Ong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97347, 6 July 1999, 310 SCRA 1, 9.
[45]
Iringan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129107, 26 September 2001, 366
SCRA
41, 49.
[46]
Supra, note 44.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[47]
Supra, note 45.
[48]
Chua v. CA, G.R. No. 119255, 9 April 2003, p. 17.
[49]
Heirs of Spouses Remedios R. Sandejas and Eliodoro P. Sandejas, Sr. v.
Lina, G.R. No. 141634, 5 February 2001, 351 SCRA 183, 195.
[50]
Cheng v. Genato, G.R. No. 129760, 29 December 1998, 300 SCRA 722, 734.
[51]
Rollo, p. 12.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[52]
Padilla v. Paredes, G.R. No. 124874, 17 March 2000, 328 SCRA 434, 445.
[53]
Villaflor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95694, 9 October 1997, 280 SCRA
297, 339.
[54]
See Ong v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 11.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[55]
Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Young, G.R. Nos. 140964 &
142267,
16 January 2002, 373 SCRA 626, 642; Article 2220, Civil Code.
[56]
BPI Investment Corp. v. D.G. Carreon Commercial Corp., G.R. No. 126524,
29 November 2001, 371 SCRA 58, 70; Article 2229, Civil Code.
[57]
Aurillo, Jr. v. Rabi, G. R. No. 120014, 26 November 2002, p. 22;
Article
2232, Civil Code.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[58]
Bañas, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102967, 10 February
2000,
325 SCRA 259, 283; Article 2208, Civil Code.
[59]
Northwest Airlines v. Laya, G.R. No. 145956, 29 May 2002, 382 SCRA 730,
739; Insular Life Assurance Company Ltd. v. Young, |