SECOND DIVISION
DR. MARCELO M.
ALMANZOR
AND VIENNA
NANNY L. ALMANZOR,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
144935
January 15, 2004
-versus-
DR. BENITO S. FELIX,
Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O
N
QUISUMBING,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This petition for review
assails the decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 56936, dated July 26, 2000,
affirming the decision[2]
of the Ombudsman, in OMB-ADM-0-99-0533, dated November 10, 1999. Both
decisions
declared the petitioners guilty of simple misconduct and ordered their
suspension for 6 months without pay.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The facts, as found
by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
The petitioners-spouses
are officials of the Technological University of the Philippines (TUP)
in Taguig, Metro Manila. Dr. Marcelo Almanzor is the Program Director
and
Civil Security Officer of the school, while Vienna Nanny Almanzor holds
the position of Administrative Officer V. Both their signatures are
needed
as a prerequisite to the collection by TUP employees of their
proportionate
vacation pay (PVP).cralaw:red
The respondent, Dr.
Benito Felix, is a Professor III in the same institution. He filed a
complaint-affidavit[3]
before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Sec. 3(e) of the
Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Law[4]
against the petitioners. Dr. Felix alleged that they maliciously
refused
to sign his clearance, which was necessary to collect his PVP for the
months
of April and May 1999. He claimed that because of their unjustified
refusal,
he was able to receive his PVP only on June 9, 1999, thereby delaying
his
pay for one month. He said that he even sought the assistance of
Director
Federico Ramos to expedite his case, to no avail. Allegedly, the
petitioners
released his clearance only after he sought the intervention of Dr.
Federick
So Pada, the TUP president, on June 7, 1999, and only after the latter
issued a memorandum on June 9 directing the petitioners to sign his
clearance.
Dr. Felix averred that the delay of the release of his PVP seriously
dislocated
his family expenses, constraining him to borrow money from friends in
order
to defray those expenses.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In their counter-affidavit,
the petitioners denied refusing to sign his clearance. Dr. Almanzor
claimed
he merely requested respondent to first meet him to clarify a security
report, to the effect that respondent supposedly entered the campus on
March 24, 1999 at around 11:17 p.m. in an inebriated state and uttered
threatening words addressed to the guards as well as the petitioners.
Dr.
Almanzor honestly believed that, as Chairman of the Security Committee,
a clarificatory meeting was necessary before he could act upon the
respondent’s
clearance for PVP. However, the respondent twice ignored the request
for
a dialogue. Also, although the respondent had sought the intervention
of
Director Federico Ramos to release the clearance of his PVP as early as
April 30, 1999, it was only on June 8, 1999 that Director Ramos
dispensed
with the required signature of Dr. Almanzor. Hence, the delay in
signing
the clearance was not petitioners’ fault.[5]
For her part, co-petitioner
Vienna Nanny Almanzor claimed that her signature was merely ministerial
and the PVP in question might be released even without it. This was
pursuant
to a verbal agreement with the institution’s Human Resource Management
Office, which had been in force for the past eight years.[6]
The Ombudsman found
the petitioners guilty of slight misconduct. He held that the evidence
adduced from the records clearly showed their refusal to sign the
clearance.
The petitioners refused to sign it when it was first presented on April
5, 1999. On May 3, 1999, after the respondent sought Director Ramos’s
intervention
and the latter returned the clearance for petitioners to sign, the
petitioners
wrote separate notes, maintaining that the issue of the security report
should first be resolved. On June 1, 1999, Director Ramos again ordered
the petitioners to sign the clearance, which they again ignored. The
Ombudsman
concluded that:
On the bases [sic] of
all the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the respondents
[herein
petitioners] acted in bad faith in not signing the complainant’s
clearance
for which we find them guilty of Simple Misconduct.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, in the light
of the foregoing considerations and pursuant to the Civil Service
Rules,
respondents Marcelo Almanzor and Vienna Almanzor are hereby meted the
penalty
of suspension for six (6) months without pay.cralaw:red
Pursuant to law and
the policy of the Office as enunciated in the case of Felipe Melchor
vs.
Gerty R. Gironella, et al. in OMB-ADM-1-97-0075, this Decision is
immediately
executory.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The TUP President is
hereby tasked to implement this Decision informing this Office of the
action
taken thereon strictly within ten (10) days upon receipt hereof.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.[7]
The petitioners appealed
the decision to the Court of Appeals via Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules on
Civil
Procedure, with an ex-parte application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order. The Court of Appeals granted the application for a
restraining
order, but later affirmed the decision of the Ombudsman, to wit:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the
petition is dismissed and the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. The
temporary restraining order previously issued is lifted.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.[8]
The petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration was denied.[9]
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, which poses the
following
issues:
1) WHETHER
OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING THE ISSUE
OF WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN IS
IMMEDIATELY
EXECUTORY PENDING APPEALchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2) WHETHER OR NOT
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE FACTS AND
EVIDENCE
SHOWING EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERSchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3) WHETHER OR NOT
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF THE
PETITIONERS
FOR SIMPLE MISCONDUCT.[10]
Two issues are for
resolution:
first, whether the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the finding
that the petitioners are liable for simple misconduct; and second,
whether
the decision of the Ombudsman in administrative cases is immediately
executory
pending appeal.
On the first issue,
the petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the
decision of the Ombudsman. They stress that they did not refuse to sign
the clearance. They merely wished to clarify the security report
through
a dialogue with the respondent, but the latter snubbed the opportunity
twice. They deny harassing the respondent, and assert it is really the
respondent who harassed them. They cite an occurrence on August 13,
1999
at about 10:30 in the evening, where respondent accosted petitioner
Vienna
Almanzor while thrusting a dirty finger sign at her, uttering, "Putang
ina, ano gusto mong mangyari? (Daughter of a whore, what do you want to
happen?)" Petitioner Vienna Almanzor could have fallen on the concrete
three-step stairs during the occurrence had not co-petitioner Dr.
Marcelo
Almanzor supported her on her back. In fact, it was the cause for the
filing
of a case for grave threats against the respondent.cralaw:red
Respondent argues that
the CA and the Ombudsman both found substantial evidence showing both
petitioners
liable for the offense. He stresses that factual findings of
administrative
bodies should be accorded not only respect but even finality even if
not
overwhelming or preponderant. He asserts that the petitioners’ open
defiance
of higher authority clearly demonstrate unwarranted arrogance and
disrespect
against their lawful superior. Their persistent disregard of the
pertinent
instruction prejudiced his right to an early payment of PVP.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Contrary to petitioners’
assertions, the Ombudsman found that petitioners refused to sign the
clearance
report not once but three times. They did not sign the clearance on
April
5, when it was first presented to them, on May 3, after respondent
sought
Director Ramos’ intervention, and on June 1, 1999 when Director Ramos
again
ordered the petitioners to sign it but they adamantly refused. Finally
Director Ramos just decided to dispense with their signatures on June
8,
and on June 9, TUP President Frederick So Pada issued a memorandum
directing
Director Ramos to immediately release the PVP.[11]
The Ombudsman found that petitioners took this stance even if they had
been informed that the resolution of any personal conflict or the
administrative
complaint is not a pre-requisite to the issuance of a PVP clearance.[12]
The claimed harassment of the petitioners, which happened on August 13,
or two months after the acts complained of constituting slight
misconduct,
is obviously irrelevant to the present case.cralaw:red
The Court of Appeals
agreed with the findings of the Ombudsman. Absent a clear showing of
grave
abuse of discretion, we shall not disturb such findings.[13]
The Supreme Court cannot weigh once more the evidence submitted not
only
before the Ombudsman but also before the Court of Appeals. Under Sec.
27
of Republic Act 6770, findings of fact by the Ombudsman are conclusive
as long as it is supported by substantial evidence. No error has been
committed
by the appellate court in sustaining the penalty of suspension imposed
on petitioners.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The issue on improper
execution of the penalty consisting of petitioners’ suspension is moot.
There is sufficient basis for the penalty, which we sustain.
Considering
the fact that the petitioners are indeed liable for simple misconduct,
and that they have served out the penalty as affirmed by TUP Office
Order
No. 452, s.2000,[14]
this Court is constrained from considering an issue that has become
academic.[15]
Suffice it to stress that no temporary restraining order (TRO) has been
issued by this Court, while the appellate court itself had lifted the
TRO
it issued earlier, paving the way for compliance with the suspension
order.
As a general rule, courts should not take cognizance of moot and
academic
questions.[16]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the decision
of the Court of Appeals dated July 26, 2000, and resolution dated
September
15, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 56936, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, J., (Chairman),
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ.,
concur
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 85-91. Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, with
Associate
Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr., and Remedios Salazar-Fernando,
concurring.
[2]
Id. at 46-51.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Id. at 25-27.
[4]
Rep. Act No. 3019, Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In
addition
to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law,
the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
x
x xchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(e)
Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions
through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Rollo, pp. 29-32.
[6]
Id. at 32.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Id. at 50-51.
[8]
Id. at 91.
[9]
Id. at 102-103.
[10]
Id. at 8-9.
[11]
See Rollo, pp. 49-50.
[12]
See Rollo, pp. 90-91.
[13]
See Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 135775, 19 October
2000,
343 SCRA 744, 754.
[14]
Rollo, p. 123, Annex "A."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Gonzales v. Narvasa, G.R. No. 140835, 14 August 2000, 337 SCRA 733,
739-740.
[16]
Ticzon v. Video Post Manila, Inc., G.R. No. 136342, 15 June 2000, 333
SCRA
472, 482-483. |