THIRD DIVISION
CENTRAL
PANGASINAN
ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
145800
January 22, 2003
-versus-
GERONIMA MACARAEG
and MARIBETH DE VERA,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO,
J.:
In this petition for
review on certiorari, petitioner Central Pangasinan Electric
Cooperative,
Inc. challenges the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
55128 affirming the decision of the voluntary arbitrator in
NCMB-RBI-PM-VA-5-03-99
ordering the reinstatement of respondents to petitioner’s employ and
payment
of their backwages.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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Petitioner is an
electric
cooperative duly organized and existing under Philippine laws.
Respondent
Geronima Macaraeg and Maribeth de Vera are employees of petitioner at
its
office in Area V, Bayambang, Pangasinan. Respondent de Vera was
employed
as teller whose primary duty was to accept payments from petitioner’s
consumers
in Bayambang and remit her collections to the cashier, herein
co-respondent
Geronima Macaraeg. Respondent Macaraeg’s duty was to deposit the daily
collections of the office to petitioner’s account at the Rural Bank of
Central Pangasinan in Bayambang.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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From January 1998 to
January 1999, respondent de Vera accommodated and encashed the crossed
checks of her sister, Evelyn Joy Estrada. Evelyn issued two hundred
eleven
(211) crossed checks amounting to P6,945,128.95 payable to petitioner
cooperative
despite the absence of any transaction or any outstanding obligation
with
petitioner. In turn, respondent de Vera, with the knowledge and consent
of respondent Macaraeg, paid the full value of these checks from the
cash
collections of petitioner. At the end of the day, respondents credited
the checks as part of their collection and deposited the same together
with their cash collection to the account of petitioner at the Rural
Bank
of Central Pangasinan.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sometime in January
1999, petitioner, through its Finance Department, noticed that several
checks payable to petitioner from the collections in the Area V office
were returned due to insufficiency of funds.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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On January 19, 1999,
Josefina Mandapat, Sandra Frias and Marites Radac, petitioner’s Finance
Manager, Chief Accountant and Legal Assistant, respectively, confronted
respondents with their discovery. Respondent de Vera admitted that the
checks were issued by her sister and that she encashed them from the
money
collected from petitioner’s customers.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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On January 21, 1999,
Mrs. Josefina Mandapat submitted a memorandum to petitioner’s General
Manager,
Salvador M. de Guzman, detailing their findings about the bounced
checks.
On February 2, 1999, she submitted an addendum to her memorandum.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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On February 4, 1999,
petitioner, through de Guzman, issued a memorandum to respondents
placing
them under preventive suspension and requiring them to explain in
writing
within forty-eight (48) hours why they misappropriated cooperative
funds.
In the same communication, a hearing was set on February 13, 1999 at
9:30
a.m. at the Board Room of petitioner before Atty. Teodoro Fernandez.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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In their respective
Answers/Explanations, respondents denied having misappropriated the
funds
of petitioner cooperative. They alleged that: (1) the checks that
bounced
were redeposited with the Rural Bank of Central Pangasinan; (2) the
amount
representing the face value of the checks had been used by petitioner
as
of December 15, 1998; (3) there was never any shortage in the
cooperative
money or funds in their possession; and (4) they never violated any
policy
of the cooperative and on the contrary, they have been very religious
in
remitting the funds and money of petitioner.[1]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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At the scheduled
hearing
on February 13, 1999, respondents, with assistance of counsel, appeared
before Atty. Teodoro Fernandez. Respondent de Vera testified and
admitted
that she encashed the checks of Evelyn Joy Estrada because the latter
is
her older sister and that she has a soft spot for her; that Mrs.
Estrada
owns a sash factory and that she merely wanted to help her sister meet
her business obligations; that sometime in November 1998, Mrs. Marites
Radoc, Chief Accountant of petitioner, called her attention to one
check
which bounced thrice; that this check was eventually replaced by her
sister
with cash; that despite the bouncing of some other checks, all checks
were
eventually funded and paid to petitioner, hence, petitioner incurred no
losses in its collections; that she has worked for petitioner for
nineteen
(19) years and this is the first time she has been charged
administratively
by petitioner.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondent Macaraeg
admitted that she knew of the accommodations given by respondent de
Vera
to her sister; that she allowed her subordinate to do it because
respondent
de Vera is her kumare, and that she knew that Mrs. Estrada’s checks
were
sufficiently funded. She worked for petitioner for twenty-two (22)
years
and has never had an administrative charge.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Mrs. Josefina Mandapat,
Finance Manager of petitioner, testified as petitioner’s witness. She
stated
that she prepared a report on the findings of their accountant
regarding
the encashment of Evelyn Joy Estrada’s checks, and that the encashment
of said checks is prohibited under an office memorandum.
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On March 10, 1999,
Atty. Fernandez submitted his findings to the General Manager of
petitioner.
On March 19, 1999, on the basis of said findings and recommendation,
the
General Manager issued to respondents separate notices of termination,
effective April 9, 1999, for "serious misconduct, and breach of trust
and
confidence reposed on them by management."[2]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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Respondents, with the
help of the President and representative of the Union, Central
Pangasinan
Electric Cooperative (CENPELCO) Employees’ Association-Tupas Local
Chapter
No. R01-0012, questioned their dismissal before the National
Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB). They claimed that their dismissal was
without
just cause and in violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA),
which requires that the case should first be brought before a grievance
committee. Eventually, the parties agreed to submit the case to a
voluntary
arbitrator for arbitration.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On August 12, 1999,
the voluntary arbitrator rendered a decision in favor of respondents,
viz.:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"WHEREFORE, in view
of the foregoing, the undersigned arbitrator finds and so holds:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(1) That the parties
failed to comply with the provisions of the GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(2) Reinstate immediately
upon receipt of the Decision complainants GERONIMA MACARAEG and
MARIBETH
DE VERA to their former positions without loss of seniority rights;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(3) Pay complainants
their backwages to be reckoned from the time their employment has been
[sic] illegally terminated up to their actual reinstatement based on
their
last salary.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Parties are hereby
enjoined to be faithful with their commitment to abide by this Decision
which under their Collective Bargaining Agreement is final, executory
and
not subject to appeal.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED."[3]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioner appealed
to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review. On August 17, 2000,
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition and
affirming
the decision of the voluntary arbitrator. Hence, the present course of
action.
Petitioner claims that:
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"(1) The Honorable
Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in finding that the
procedure
leading to the termination of respondents Maribeth de Vera and Geronima
Macaraeg was in violation of the provisions of the Collective
Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) particularly Steps 1-4, Article XIII of the said
Agreement.
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(2) The Honorable Court
of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in holding that petitioner
illegally
terminated the services of herein private respondents."[4]
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The petition is
impressed
with merit.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
At the outset, we hold
that the first issue raised in the petition pertaining to the alleged
violation
of the CBA grievance procedure is moot and academic. The parties’
active
participation in the voluntary arbitration proceedings, and their
failure
to insist that the case be remanded to the grievance machinery, shows a
clear intention on their part to have the issue of respondents’ illegal
dismissal directly resolved by the voluntary arbitrator. We therefore
find
it unnecessary to rule on the matter in light of their preference to
bring
the illegal dismissal dispute to voluntary arbitration without passing
through the grievance machinery.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
This leads us to the
next issue of whether respondents were validly dismissed. To constitute
a valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must be met, namely:
(1) it must be for a just or authorized cause, and (2) the employee
must
be afforded due process.[5]
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We hold that there
exist a valid reason to dismiss both employees. Article 282(c) of the
Labor
Code allows an employer to dismiss employees for willful breach of
trust
or loss of confidence.[6]
Proof beyond reasonable doubt of their misconduct is not required, it
being
sufficient that there is some basis for the same or that the employer
has
reasonable ground to believe that they are responsible for the
misconduct
and their participation therein rendered them unworthy of the trust and
confidence demanded of their position.[7]
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To be sure, the acts
of the respondents were clearly inimical to the financial interest of
the
petitioner. During the investigation, they admitted accommodating
Evelyn
Joy Estrada by encashing her checks from its funds. They did so without
petitioner’s knowledge, much less its permission. These inimical acts
lasted
for more than a year, and probably would have continued had it not been
discovered in time. All along, they were aware that these acts were
prohibited
by the Coop Checks Policy.[8]
Clearly, there was willful breach of trust on the respondents’ part, as
they took advantage of their highly sensitive positions to violate
their
duties.
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Moreover, the acts
of the respondents caused damage to the petitioner. During those times
the checks were illegally encashed, petitioner was not able to fully
utilize
the collections, primarily in servicing its debts. In her memorandum[9]
dated January 21, 1999, Finance Manager Josefina Mandapat reported how
petitioner is prejudiced, thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Though the checks were
funded, it constitutes a violation of Coop Policy. Checks that are
covered
even by local clearing only take three days to be converted to cash and
when returned another three (3) days to retry clearing. The cooperative
is deprived of the privilege to maximize use of its collections
primarily
in servicing its debts considering the state of calamity and even at
the
moment wherein we worry every time if we can payoff (sic) our NAPOCOR
power
bill."[10]
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It is not material
that they did not "misappropriate any amount of money, nor incur any
shortage
relative to the funds in their possession."[11]
The basic premise for dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence is
that the employees concerned hold positions of trust. The betrayal of
this
trust is the essence of the offence for which an employee is penalized.[12]
In the case at bar, the respondents held positions of utmost trust and
confidence. As teller[13]
and cashier,[14]
respectively, they are expected to possess a high degree of fidelity.
They
are entrusted with a considerable amount of cash. Respondent de Vera
accepted
payments from petitioner’s consumers while respondent Macaraeg received
remittances for deposit at petitioner’s bank. They did not live up to
their
duties and obligations.
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Nor is there any doubt
that petitioner observed procedural due process in dismissing the
respondents.
In separate memoranda dated February 4, 1999 and signed by the General
Manager (de Guzman), the respondents were both appraised of the
particular
acts or omissions constituting the charges against them. They gave
their
own "answer/explanation" to the charges. They participated in the
investigation
conducted at petitioner’s board room on February 13, 1999 at 11:30 a.m.
They were represented by counsel during the investigation. Finally,
notices
were sent to them on March 19, 1999, informing them of the basis of
their
termination. In fine, private respondents were given due process before
they were dismissed. Time and again, we have stressed that due process
is simply an opportunity to be heard.[15]
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We are aware that the
respondents Macaraeg and de Vera have been employed with the petitioner
for 22 and 19 years of continuous service, respectively, and this is
the
first time that either of them has been administratively charged.
Nonetheless,
it is our considered view that their dismissal is justified considering
the breach of trust they have committed. Well to emphasize, the longer
an employee stays in the service of the company, the greater is his
responsibility
for knowledge and compliance with the norms of conduct and the code of
discipline in the company.[16]
Considering that they have mishandled the funds of the cooperative and
the danger they have posed to its members, their reinstatement is
neither
sound in reason nor just in principle. It is irreconcilable with trust
and confidence that has been irretrievably lost.[17]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the
petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 55128 (affirming the decision of the voluntary
arbitrator
in NCMB-RBI-PM-VA-5-03-99) are reversed and set aside.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Panganiban,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.chan
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____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 69-70.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Rollo, pp. 85-86.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Decision, p. 11; Rollo, p. 133.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Petition, p. 9; Rollo, p. 16.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Lagatic v. NLRC, 285 SCRA 251 (1998).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
"Art. 282. Termination by the Employer. An employer may terminate an
employee
for any of the following causes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
x x xchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him
by his employer or duly authorized representative;
x x x."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Auxilio, Jr. v. NLRC, 188 SCRA 263 (1990).
[8]
Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 127.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Detailing the result of the reconciliation of bank account under the
custodianship
of petitioner Cashier Geronima Macaraeg.
[10]
Memorandum, p. 2; Rollo, p. 51.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
See Answer/Explanation of Geronima Macaraeg, Rollo, p. 35; See also
Answer/Explanation
of Maribeth de Vera, Rollo, p. 38.
[12]
See Quezon Electric Cooperative v. NLRC, 172 SCRA 88 (1989).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
See Allied Banking Corporation v. Castro, et al., 156 SCRA 789 (1987),
and Galsim v. Philippine National Bank, 29 SCRA 293 (1969), where we
held
that the position of a teller is one of utmost confidence.
[14]
See Metro Drug Corporation v. National Labor Relations, 143 SCRA 132
(1986),
where we held that the position of a cashier is one of utmost trust.
[15]
Maranaw Hotel & Resort Corporation (Century Park Sheraton Manila)
v.
NLRC, 244 SCRA 375 (1995).
[16]
Citibank, N.A. v. Gatchalian, 240 SCRA 212 (1995).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Galsim v. Philippine national Bank, supra at 13.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |