EN BANC
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
G.R.
No.
145993
June 17, 2003
-versus-
RUFINO MALLARI Y
ILAG,
Appellant.
D E C I S I
O N
DAVIDE,
JR., C.J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In its Decision of 16 June
2000, in Criminal Case No. 9621-B, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25,
of Biñan, Laguna, convicted appellant Rufino Mallari y Ilag of
murder
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death for having fatally
bumped
Joseph Galang with an Isuzu Canter Elf truck.
On 12 December 1996,
an Information[1]
for Murder was filed against Rufino, the accusatory portion of which
reads:
That on or
about July 7, 1996, in the Municipality of Sta. Rosa,
Province
of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable
Court, accused Rufino Mallari y Ilag, with intent to kill,
with evident premeditation, treachery and with the use of motor
vehicle,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously hit
and
bump with his driven Brand New Isuzu Canter Elf with conduction
sticker
number 33 LAB one Joseph Galang, thereby inflicting [on] him mortal
wounds
on the head which directly cause[d] his death, to the damage and
prejudice
of his surviving heirs.
That the crime was
committed
by means of a motor vehicle as a qualifying circumstance.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
At his arraignment,
Rufino
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. At the trial on the merits,
the
prosecution presented as witnesses Liza Galang, Edgar Bawar, and Dr.
Erwin
Escal; while the defense presented Rufino himself, Myrna Mallari, Dr.
Divina
Palarca, and Dr. Escal.
Liza Galang testified
that on 7 July 1996 at around 4:00 p.m., her common-law husband Joseph
admonished Rufino and his brothers Ino and Felix Mallari not to drive
fast
while passing by Joseph’s house. Rufino and his brothers, who were then
hot-tempered, challenged Joseph to a fight. The latter just ignored the
challenge; and, instead he and his own brothers Radi and Manny asked
apology
from Rufino.[2]chanrobles virtual law library
Later that afternoon,
while Joseph and Liza were watching a basketball game at the barangay
basketball
court, Rufino and his brothers, who were then carrying bladed weapons,
arrived and attempted to stab Joseph; but Joseph was able to run away.
When they were not able to catch up with him, Rufino boarded and drove
the truck parked near the basketball court and continued chasing Joseph
until the truck ran over the latter, which caused his instantaneous
death.[3]
Liza further testified
that at the time of his death, Joseph was 37 years old. He was a
foreman in a construction firm with a daily income of P350 and also a
carpenter
and mason with a daily income of P250. She spent less than
P20,000
for the coffin, tomb, funeral, and other expenses during the wake
of Joseph.[4]
Edgar Bawar, a friend
of Joseph, testified that at 6:24 p.m. on 7 July 1996, while Joseph was
watching a basketball game, Rufino and his brothers Ino and Felix, who
were carrying bladed weapons, arrived and chased Joseph. Joseph ran
away,
and Rufino pursued him with the truck. Upon catching up with him,
Rufino bumped Joseph, as a result of which the latter died on the spot.[5]
Dr. Erwin Escal testified
that the cause of death of Joseph, as stated in the Medico-Legal Report,[6]
was "[c]rushing injury on the head secondary to vehicular accident."
Joseph’s
head was deformed with multiple skull fractures and lacerations and
brain
tissue evisceration.[7]
The defense had a different
story. Rufino testified that on 7 July 1996 at around 6:30
p.m., while he was driving a truck at a speed of eighty
kilometers
per hour, with his wife Myrna seated on the passenger side, he
saw
Joseph on the road about four meters away from him. Rufino,
who was then on his way to the garage to park the truck, blew thrice
the
horn. But Joseph went to the middle of the road and threw stones, which
went through the windshield and hit Rufino on the chest. As a
result
thereof, Rufino lost control of the truck, and ran over Joseph. Because
of fear, Rufino did not alight from the truck; instead, he proceeded to
the municipal hall of Sta. Rosa, Laguna, where he surrendered and was
immediately
detained.[8]
Myrna Mallari testified
that prior to the incident in question, she saw Joseph at the
basketball
court. He was apparently drunk and was carrying a "balisong."
Much
to her consternation, he gave her a dagger look. Myrna reacted by
simply crying and going inside her house. She corroborated Rufino’s
testimony
that while Rufino was driving the truck, Joseph threw stones, which
went
through the windshield and hit the chest of Rufino.[9]
As a result of which, Rufino had chest pains and vomited blood while in
detention.chanrobles virtual law library
Dr. Divina Palarca testified
that she examined Rufino on 29 October 1996 and found him to be
suffering
from pulmonary tuberculosis, which possibly could have afflicted him
six
months prior to its discovery.[10]
Dr. Escal confirmed the testimony of Dr. Palarca, as in fact, it was he
who diagnosed the illness of Rufino.[11]
The trial court gave
full credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Liza Galang
and
Edgar Bawar that Rufino deliberately bumped Joseph. Appreciating
the qualifying circumstance of use of motor vehicle, it convicted
Rufino
of murder and sentenced him to suffer the death penalty and to pay the
victim’s heirs P100,000 as compensatory damages; P75,000 as moral
damages;
P50,000 as exemplary damages; and costs.[12]
The case is now before
us on automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal
Code,
as amended.cralaw:red
In his Appellant’s Brief,
Rufino imputes to the trial court the following errors:
I
IN FINDING
THAT
THE INCIDENT WHICH KILLED JOSEPH GALANG WAS DONE BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT
WITH
CRIMINAL INTENT AND MALICE.
II
IN CONSIDERING
THE USE OF A MOTOR VEHICLE AS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE IN THE
IMPOSITION
OF THE DEATH PENALTY.
III
x x x IN
NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.[13]
We note that in his
prayer in the Appellant’s Brief, Rufino seeks his acquittal of the
crime
of murder, or in the alternative, his conviction for homicide
only.
In his discussion of his first and second assignments of error,
however,
Rufino does not seek his acquittal but merely the
downgrading
of his crime from murder to homicide on the grounds that no
evident
premeditation was proved and that the motor vehicle
was
merely incidental to the commission of the crime. In his third
assignment
of error, Rufino argues that voluntary surrender should have been
appreciated
as a mitigating circumstance in his favor, considering that after the
bumping
incident, he proceeded to the municipal hall of Sta. Rosa, Laguna,
where
he was immediately detained.cralaw:red
In its Appellee’s Brief,
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeks the affirmance of
Rufino’s
conviction but argues that the penalty to be imposed on him should be
reclusion
perpetua only because of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.cralaw:red
In view of the diametrically
opposed versions of the prosecution and the defense, the resolution of
the present case hinges on the credibility of the witnesses who had
come
forward to testify. We have long recognized that the assessment
of
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies lies within the
province
and competence of the trial court because it has the direct opportunity
to observe the witness’ attitude, demeanor, deportment, and manner of
testifying,[14]
all of which aid in determining whether the witness is telling the
truth
or merely prevaricating. Thus, the trial court’s evaluation of
the
credibility of witnesses is accorded great weight and respect and even
finality by appellate courts[15]
unless some fact or circumstance of weight and substance which could
affect
the result or disposition of the case was ignored, misapplied,
misunderstood,
or overlooked by the trial court or when the finding of fact was
reached
arbitrarily or capriciously.[16]
We find no cogent reason to disturb the trial court’s assessment
of the credibility of the witnesses and its
factual
findings as to what actually happened, the same being amply
supported
by evidence.cralaw:red
Neither the prosecution
nor the defense disputes two important facts: one, Joseph died
instantly
after he was hit by the truck; and second, the truck was driven by
Rufino.
There being no question on the identity of the person responsible for
Joseph’s
death, what is left to be resolved is whether Rufino deliberately
bumped
Joseph with the truck he was driving.chanrobles virtual law library
The antecedent events
show that, indeed, Rufino deliberately ran over Joseph. At around
4:00 p.m. of 7 July 1996, when Rufino passed by Joseph’s house while
driving
the truck, he got angry when Joseph admonished him not to drive at high
speed in front of Joseph’s house. Rufino, already in a fighting mood,
challenged
Joseph to a fight, but the latter just ignored it. To put an end to the
argument, Joseph and his brothers apologized to Rufino.cralaw:red
Apparently, Rufino was
not appeased by the apology and continued to harbor ill-feelings
against
Joseph. Rufino got the chance to vent his anger not long
thereafter.
At around 5:30 p.m., while Joseph was watching a basketball game at the
basketball court located beside Rufino’s house, Rufino and his brothers
Ino and Felix, carrying with them bladed weapons, attempted to stab
Joseph.
But before they could do it, Joseph was able to run away. They chased
Joseph,
but were unable to catch up with him. Instead of giving up on his evil
design, Rufino went back to the basketball court, boarded the truck
parked
nearby, and resumed his pursuit of Joseph. Upon seeing Joseph on the
road,
Rufino hit him with the truck.cralaw:red
We note that the testimonies
of Liza and Edgar were consistent with their respective sworn
statements,[17]
which they gave to the police investigator in the morning of 8 July
1996.
Considering that less than twenty-four hours had elapsed from the time
of the bumping incident, Liza and Edgar could not have concocted a
story
to pin down Rufino for the death of Joseph. Thus, there is no reason to
doubt the veracity of the sworn statements and the testimonies of Liza
and Edgar.cralaw:red
Moreover, the defense
has not shown any reason why Edgar, who corroborated Liza’s testimony
about
the incident, would perjure himself to pin down Rufino. Absent any
evidence
showing any reason or motive for the prosecution witnesses to perjure,
the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and
their
testimonies are thus worthy of full faith and credit.[18]chanrobles virtual law library
In comparison, Rufino
and Myrna gave inconsistent testimonies. Myrna wanted the court to
believe
that her husband was in no way at fault by stating that Rufino
was
driving at a slow pace,[19]
while Rufino himself declared that he was driving at a speed of eighty
kilometers per hour.[20]
Myrna’s attempt to cover up the misdeed of her husband is obvious;
hence,
the integrity of her declarations becomes questionable.cralaw:red
Rufino himself made
inconsistent statements. At first, in the course of the direct
examination,
Rufino declared that prior to the bumping incident he saw Joseph pass
by
his house, walking in a zigzag manner.[21]
This testimony was an attempt to give credence to his allegation that
Joseph
was drunk, which was why he threw stones at the truck for no reason at
all. But when he was asked during his cross-examination about his
altercation
with Joseph earlier that fateful day, Rufino made a complete turnaround
and declared that he saw Joseph for the first time at the
place
where he was run over.[22]
Moreover, the testimonies
of Rufino and Myrna do not inspire belief for being improbable and not
in accord with human experience. It is axiomatic that for testimonial
evidence
to be credible, it should come not only from the mouth of a credible
witness,
but should also be credible, reasonable, and in accord with human
experience.[23]
According to Rufino,
he saw Joseph when the truck was four meters away from the latter and
he
blew his horn three times. This is altogether unbelievable. At a speed
of eighty kilometers per hour, a four-meter distance could easily be
covered
by the truck in a split second, and there would be no time for the
driver
to blow the horn before the impact. Much less could there be time for a
person on the road to pick up a stone and hurl the same to an oncoming
truck. Thus, it is simply impossible that Joseph was able to hurl
a stone at the truck before he was run over.cralaw:red
Neither can we believe
Rufino’s testimony that he first saw Joseph on the road when the truck
was just four meters away from him. According to Rufino, the road was
clear
because only Joseph and the truck he was driving were on the road. He
testified
as follows:chanrobles virtual law library
Q
Mr. Witness, when you saw for the first time Joseph Galang along the
road,
there was no other vehicle from [the] opposite direction where
you
were heading?
A
None, sir.cralaw:red
Q
So that your driven vehicle and Joseph Galang were the only [ones] in
that
road?
A
Yes, sir.cralaw:red
Q
And the road could accommodate two (2) ten wheeler trucks?
A
Yes, sir.cralaw:red
Q
And you said likewise that when you first saw Joseph
Galang,
he was about four (4) meters away from your driven vehicle?
A
Yes, sir.[24]chanrobles virtual law library
From Rufino’s own testimony,
it appears that his view was unobstructed. He could have seen Joseph
from
afar and could therefore have avoided bumping the latter had he really
wanted to.cralaw:red
Obviously, the stone-throwing
incident was concocted by the defense as a last ditch effort to have
Rufino
absolved from his criminal act. Unlike the prosecution witnesses
who executed their sworn statements on the morning after the subject
incident,
Rufino’s sworn statement[25]
was executed only on 15 August 1996, or more than one month after the
incident.
Thus, Rufino had enough time to reflect and come up with a plot.
Unfortunately
for him, the story he concocted is so incredible that we are not
inclined
to believe it.cralaw:red
To prove that Rufino’s
driving ability was adversely affected by his illness, the defense
presented
a medical certificate[26]
stating that Rufino was treated at the Sta. Rosa Community Hospital for
"Minimal PTB, Bilateral with partial collapse of Right Upper Lobe" on 1
November 1996, or almost four months after the bumping incident. That
certificate
is not competent evidence to prove that at the time, Rufino was already
suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis. But even granting arguendo
that Rufino was already suffering from said illness at the time of the
incident, there is no evidence that it had affected his driving ability
to the extent that Rufino was no longer able to control the vehicle he
was driving.cralaw:red
In view of the foregoing,
we affirm the trial court’s finding that Rufino deliberately bumped
Joseph
with the truck he was driving.cralaw:red
Rufino’s culpability
having been resolved, we now come to the penalty to be imposed. The
trial
court imposed the death penalty on the ground that the qualifying
circumstance
of use of motor vehicle is present. Rufino, however, argues that
the use of a motor vehicle was only incidental, considering that he
resorted
to it only to enable him to go after Joseph after he failed to catch up
with the latter. The fallacy of this argument is obvious.cralaw:red
The evidence shows that
Rufino deliberately used his truck in pursuing Joseph. Upon
catching
up with him, Rufino hit him with the truck, as a result of which Joseph
died instantly. It is therefore clear that the truck was the
means
used by Rufino to perpetrate the killing of Joseph.chanrobles virtual law library
The case of People v.
Muñoz[27]
cited by Rufino finds no application to the present case. In the
said case, the police patrol jeep was merely used by the accused
therein
in looking for the victim and in carrying the body of the victim to the
place where it was dumped. The accused therein shot the victim,
which
caused the latter’s death. In the present case, the truck itself was
used
to kill the victim by running over him.cralaw:red
Under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, a person who kills another "by means of a motor
vehicle" is guilty of murder. Thus, the use of motor vehicle qualifies
the killing to murder.[28]
The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the
penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, we shall apply
Article
63(3) of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
3. When the
commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances and
there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be
applied.
In the present case,
the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery, which
were alleged in the information, were not proved. What was proved was
the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender through the testimonies
of Rufino and Myrna, which were not rebutted by the prosecution.
We have held that for
voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the offender had not been
actually
arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority
or to an agent of a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was
voluntary.[29]
A surrender is considered voluntary if it is spontaneous and shows the
intention of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the
authorities
because he either acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save the
government
the trouble and expense necessarily included for his search and capture.[30]
All these requisites are present in this case.cralaw:red
In view of the absence
of an aggravating circumstance and the presence of one mitigating
circumstance,
reclusion perpetua, not death, should be the penalty to be imposed on
Rufino.cralaw:red
We now discuss the damages
to be awarded.cralaw:red
The trial court’s award
of P100,000 compensatory damages is erroneous because it was without
basis.
The records show that the prosecution presented only two receipts, for
the amounts of P9,000[31]
and P200[32]
representing payment for the casket and funeral services,
and
the niche, respectively, or a total of P9,200. Only expenses supported
by receipts and which appear to have actually been expended in
connection
with the death of the victim should be allowed for actual damages.[33]
Hence, the award of P100,000 should be reduced to P9,200.chanrobles virtual law library
We sustain the court’s
award of moral damages but at a reduced rate of P50,000, consistent
with
recent jurisprudence. In cases of violent death, moral damages is
awarded
even in the absence of proof because an untimely and violent death
invariably
brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s
family.[34]
In addition, the amount of P50,000[35]
as indemnity for the death of Joseph should be awarded to his heirs.cralaw:red
The award of exemplary
damages is proper in view of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of
use of a motor vehicle. However, the amount of P50,000 awarded by
the trial court should be reduced to P25,000 pursuant to current case
law.cralaw:red
Finally, we note that
the prosecution offered the testimony of the victim’s widow on the age
and daily income of her husband, without supporting the same with
documentary
evidence.cralaw:red
The rule is that documentary
evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for damages for
loss
of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages therefore may
be
awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence provided that there
is testimony that the victim was either (1) self-employed earning less
than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may
be taken of the fact that in the victim’s line of work no documentary
evidence
is available; or (2) employed as a daily-wage worker earning less than
the minimum wage under current labor laws.[36]
There is no showing
that the victim was self-employed or employed as a daily-wage worker
with
an average daily income of less than the minimum wage provided under
the
labor laws in force at the time of his death. In the absence of
such
proof, the exception cannot be applied to this case. Hence, no
award
for loss of earning capacity can be granted in favor of the victim’s
heirs.chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the appealed
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, of Biñan,
Laguna,
in Criminal Case No. 9621-B convicting appellant RUFINO MALLARI y ILAG
of the crime of murder is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
modifications:
1. The penalty
is reduced from death to reclusion perpetua;
2. The award of
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000 is reduced to P25,000,
and the awards of actual and moral damages are reduced to P9,200 and
P50,000,
respectively; and
3. Appellant Rufino
Mallari y Ilag is further ordered to pay the heirs of Joseph Galang an
indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P50,000.cralaw:red
Costs de oficio.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Original Record (OR), Vol. 1, 1; Rollo, 9.
[2]
TSN, 27 May 1997, 14-15.
[3]
TSN, 27 May 1997, 7-9.
[4]
Id., 11-13.
[5]
TSN, 8 July 1997, 9-14.
[6]
Exhibit "E," OR, 90.
[7]
TSN, 21 July 1997, 5-6.
[8]
TSN, 29 July 1997, 10-15; TSN, 22 September 1997, 5-8, 18-20.
[9]
TSN, 22 October 1997, 4-7, 10-11.chanrobles virtual law library
[10]
TSN, 17 May 1999, 4-5.chanrobles virtual law library
[11]
TSN, 14 March 2000, 4.chanrobles virtual law library
[12]
OR, Vol. 2, 49-57; Rollo, 20-28. Per Judge Hilario F. Corcuera.
[13]
Rollo, 54-55.chanrobles virtual law library
[14]
People v. Bolivar, G.R. No. 130597, 21 February 2001, 352 SCRA 438,
451;
People v. Barnuevo, G.R. No. 134928, 28 September 2001, 366 SCRA 243,
250;
People v. Rama, G.R. No. 144386, 23 January 2002.chanrobles virtual law library
[15]
People v. Abella, G.R. No. 127803, 28 August 2000, 339 SCRA 129, 144.
[16]
People v. Cachola, G.R. No. 135047, 16 March 2001, 354 SCRA 577,
584; People v. Pacantara, G.R. No. 140896, 7 May 2002.
[17]
Exhibits "A" and "B," OR, 2-5.chanrobles virtual law library
[18]
People v. Barnuevo, supra note 14; People v. Fernandez, G.R. No.
137647,
1 February 2001, 351 SCRA 80, 90.
[19]
TSN, 22 October 1997, 7-8.chanrobles virtual law library
[20]
Id., 18.chanrobles virtual law library
[21]
TSN, 29 July 1997, 15.chanrobles virtual law library
[22]
TSN, 22 September 1997, 20-21.chanrobles virtual law library
[23]
People v. Atad, G.R. No. 114105, 16 January 1997, 266 SCRA 262, 275-276.
[24]
TSN, 22 September 1997, 18.chanrobles virtual law library
[25]
Exhibit "1," OR, Vol. 1, 12-13.
[26]
Exhibit "2," OR, Vol. 1, 117.
[27]
194 Phil. 300 [1981].chanrobles virtual law library
[28]
People v. Soriano, G.R. No. L-57575, 25 February 1985, 134 SCRA 542,
552;
People v. Enguito, G.R. No. 128812, 28 February 2000, 326 SCRA 508, 524.
[29]
People v. Hanasan, 140 Phil. 148 (1969); Estacio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 75362, 6 March 1990, 183 SCRA 12, 24.
[30]
People v. Abella, supra note 15, at 148.chanrobles virtual law library
[31]
Exhibit "D," OR, Vol. 1, 83.chanrobles virtual law library
[32]
Exhibit D-1," OR, Vol. 1, 82.chanrobles virtual law library
[33]
People v. Cual, G.R. No. 131925, 9 March 2000, 327 SCRA 623, 648.chanrobles virtual law library
[34]
People v. Panado, G.R. No. 133439, 26 December 2000, 348 SCRA 679, 690;
People v. Caboquin, G.R. No. 137613, 14 November 2001, 368 SCRA 654,
659-660;
People v. Caraig, G.R. Nos. 116224-27, 28 March 2003.chanrobles virtual law library
[35]
People v. Cual, supra note 33, at 647; People v. Castillo, G.R. No.
139339,
19 January 2001, 349 SCRA 732, 744.
[36]
People v. Pajotal, G.R. No. 142870, 14 November 2001, 368 SCRA 674,
689;
People v. Caraig, supra note 34. |