Republic of the
Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
EDGAR COKALIONG
SHIPPING
LINES, INC.,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
146018
June 25, 2003
-versus-
UCPB GENERAL
INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC.,
Respondent.
D E C I S I
O N
PANGANIBAN,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The liability of a common
carrier for the loss of goods may, by stipulation in the bill of
lading,
be limited to the value declared by the shipper. On the other
hand,
the liability of the insurer is determined by the actual value covered
by the insurance policy and the insurance premiums paid therefor, and
not
necessarily by the value declared in the bill of lading. The Case
Before the court is
a petition for review[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the August
31,
2000 decision[2]
and the November 17, 2000 resolution[3]
of the Court of Appeals[4]
(CA) in CA-GR SP No. 62751. The dispositive part of the decision
reads:
"IN THE
LIGHT
OF THE FOREGOING, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision appealed
from
is REVERSED. [Petitioner] is hereby condemned to pay to
[respondent]
the total amount of P148,500.00, with interest thereon, at the rate of
6% per annum, from date of this Decision of the Court.
[Respondent’s]
claim for attorney’s fees [is] DISMISSED. [Petitioner’s]
counterclaims
are DISMISSED."[5]
The assailed Resolution
denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
On the other hand, the
disposition of the Regional Trial Court’s[6]
Decision,[7]
which was later reversed by the CA, states:
"WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
"No cost."[8] The Facts
The facts of the case
are summarized by the appellate court in this wise:
"Sometime
on
December 11, 1991, Nestor Angelia delivered to the Edgar Cokaliong
Shipping
Lines, Inc. (now Cokaliong Shipping Lines), [petitioner] for brevity,
cargo
consisting of one (1) carton of Christmas décor and two (2)
sacks
of plastic toys, to be transported on board the M/V Tandag on its
Voyage
No. T-189 scheduled to depart from Cebu City, on December 12, 1991, for
Tandag, Surigao del Sur. [Petitioner] issued Bill of Lading No.
58,
freight prepaid, covering the cargo. Nestor Angelia was both the
shipper
and consignee of the cargo valued, on the face thereof, in the amount
of
P6,500.00. Zosimo Mercado likewise delivered cargo to
[petitioner],
consisting of two (2) cartons of plastic toys and Christmas decor, one
(1) roll of floor mat and one (1) bundle of various or assorted goods
for
transportation thereof from Cebu City to Tandag, Surigao del Sur, on
board
the said vessel, and said voyage. [Petitioner] issued Bill of
Lading
No. 59 covering the cargo which, on the face thereof, was valued in the
amount of P14,000.00. Under the Bill of Lading, Zosimo Mercado
was
both the shipper and consignee of the cargo.
"On December 12,
1991,
Feliciana Legaspi insured the cargo, covered by Bill of Lading No. 59,
with the UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc., [respondent] for brevity,
for
the amount of P100,000.00 ‘against all risks’ under Open Policy No.
002/91/254
for which she was issued, by [respondent], Marine Risk Note No. 18409
on
said date. She also insured the cargo covered by Bill of Lading
No.
58, with [respondent], for the amount of P50,000.00, under Open Policy
No. 002/91/254 on the basis of which [respondent] issued Marine Risk
Note
No. 18410 on said date.
"When the vessel
left
port, it had thirty-four (34) passengers and assorted cargo on board,
including
the goods of Legaspi. After the vessel had passed by the
Mandaue-Mactan
Bridge, fire ensued in the engine room, and, despite earnest efforts of
the officers and crew of the vessel, the fire engulfed and destroyed
the
entire vessel resulting in the loss of the vessel and the cargoes
therein.
The Captain filed the required Marine Protest.
"Shortly
thereafter,
Feliciana Legaspi filed a claim, with [respondent], for the value of
the
cargo insured under Marine Risk Note No. 18409 and covered by Bill of
Lading
No. 59. She submitted, in support of her claim, a Receipt, dated
December 11, 1991, purportedly signed by Zosimo Mercado, and Order
Slips
purportedly signed by him for the goods he received from Feliciana
Legaspi
valued in the amount of P110,056.00. [Respondent] approved the
claim
of Feliciana Legaspi and drew and issued UCPB Check No. 612939, dated
March
9, 1992, in the net amount of P99,000.00, in settlement of her claim
after
which she executed a Subrogation Receipt/Deed, for said amount, in
favor
of
[respondent]. She also filed a claim for the value of the cargo covered
by Bill of Lading No. 58. She submitted to [respondent] a
Receipt,
dated December 11, 1991 and Order Slips, purportedly signed by Nestor
Angelia
for the goods he received from Feliciana Legaspi valued at
P60,338.00.
[Respondent] approved her claim and remitted to Feliciana Legaspi the
net
amount of P49,500.00, after which she signed a Subrogation
Receipt/Deed,
dated March 9, 1992, in favor of [respondent].
"On July 14, 1992,
[respondent],
as subrogee of Feliciana Legaspi, filed a complaint anchored on torts
against
[petitioner], with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, for the
collection
of the total principal amount of P148,500.00, which it paid to
Feliciana
Legaspi for the loss of the cargo, praying that judgment be rendered in
its favor and against the [petitioner] as follows:chanrobles virtual law library
‘WHEREFORE, it is
respectfully
prayed of this Honorable Court that after due hearing, judgment be
rendered
ordering [petitioner] to pay [respondent] the following.
1. Actual
damages
in the amount of P148,500.00 plus interest thereon at the legal rate
from
the time of filing of this complaint until fully paid;
2.
Attorney’s
fees in the amount of P10,000.00; and
3. Cost of
suit.
‘[Respondent]
further
prays for such other reliefs and remedies as this Honorable Court may
deem
just and equitable under the premises.’
"[Respondent]
alleged,
inter alia, in its complaint, that the cargo subject of its complaint
was
delivered to, and received by, [petitioner] for transportation to
Tandag,
Surigao del Sur under ‘Bill of Ladings,’ Annexes ‘A’ and ‘B’ of the
complaint;
that the loss of the cargo was due to the negligence of the
[petitioner];
and that Feliciana Legaspi had executed Subrogation Receipts/Deeds in
favor
of [respondent] after paying to her the value of the cargo on account
of
the Marine Risk Notes it issued in her favor covering the cargo.chanrobles virtual law library
"In its Answer to
the
complaint, [petitioner] alleged that: (a) [petitioner] was cleared by
the
Board of Marine Inquiry of any negligence in the burning of the vessel;
(b) the complaint stated no cause of action against [petitioner]; and
(c)
the shippers/consignee had already been paid the value of the goods as
stated in the Bill of Lading and, hence, [petitioner] cannot be held
liable
for the loss of the cargo beyond the value thereof declared in the Bill
of Lading.
"After
[respondent]
rested its case, [petitioner] prayed for and was allowed, by the Court
a quo, to take the depositions of Chester Cokaliong, the Vice-President
and Chief Operating Officer of [petitioner], and a resident of Cebu
City,
and of Noel Tanyu, an officer of the Equitable Banking Corporation, in
Cebu City, and a resident of Cebu City, to be given before the
Presiding
Judge of Branch 106 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.
Chester
Cokaliong and Noel Tanyu did testify, by way of deposition, before the
Court and declared inter alia, that: [petitioner] is a family
corporation
like the Chester Marketing, Inc.; Nestor Angelia had been doing
business
with [petitioner] and Chester Marketing, Inc., for years, and incurred
an account with Chester Marketing, Inc. for his purchases from said
corporation;
[petitioner] did issue Bills of Lading Nos. 58 and 59 for the cargo
described
therein with Zosimo Mercado and Nestor Angelia as shippers/consignees,
respectively; the engine room of the M/V Tandag caught fire after it
passed
the Mandaue/Mactan Bridge resulting in the total loss of the vessel and
its cargo; an investigation was conducted by the Board of Marine
Inquiry
of the Philippine Coast Guard which rendered a Report, dated February
13,
1992 absolving [petitioner] of any responsibility on account of the
fire,
which Report of the Board was approved by the District Commander of the
Philippine Coast Guard; a few days after the sinking of the vessel, a
representative
of the Legaspi Marketing filed claims for the values of the goods under
Bills of Lading Nos. 58 and 59 in behalf of the shippers/consignees,
Nestor
Angelia and Zosimo Mercado; [petitioner] was able to ascertain, from
the
shippers/consignees and the representative of the Legaspi Marketing
that
the cargo covered by Bill of Lading No. 59 was owned by Legaspi
Marketing
and consigned to Zosimo Mercado while that covered by Bill of Lading
No.
58 was purchased by Nestor Angelia from the Legaspi Marketing; that
[petitioner]
approved the claim of Legaspi Marketing for the value of the cargo
under
Bill of Lading No. 59 and remitted to Legaspi Marketing the said amount
under Equitable Banking Corporation Check No. 20230486 dated August 12,
1992, in the amount of P14,000.00 for which the representative of the
Legaspi
Marketing signed Voucher No. 4379, dated August 12, 1992, for the said
amount of P14,000.00 in full payment of claims under Bill of Lading No.
59; that [petitioner] approved the claim of Nestor Angelia in the
amount
of P6,500.00 but that since the latter owed Chester Marketing, Inc.,
for
some purchases, [petitioner] merely set off the amount due to
Nestor
Angelia under Bill of Lading No. 58 against his account with Chester
Marketing,
Inc.; [petitioner] lost/[misplaced] the original of the check
after
it was received by Legaspi Marketing, hence, the production of the
microfilm
copy by Noel Tanyu of the Equitable Banking Corporation;
[petitioner]
never knew, before settling with Legaspi Marketing and Nestor Angelia
that
the cargo under both Bills of Lading were insured with [respondent], or
that Feliciana Legaspi filed claims for the value of the cargo with
[respondent]
and that the latter approved the claims of Feliciana Legaspi and paid
the
total amount of P148,500.00 to her; [petitioner] came to know,
for
the first time, of the payments by [respondent] of the claims of
Feliciana
Legaspi when it was served with the summons and complaint, on October
8,
1992; after settling his claim, Nestor Angelia x x x executed the
Release
and Quitclaim, dated July 2, 1993, and Affidavit, dated July 2, 1993 in
favor of [respondent]; hence, [petitioner] was absolved of any
liability
for the loss of the cargo covered by Bills of Lading Nos. 58 and 59;
and
even if it was, its liability should not exceed the value of the cargo
as stated in the Bills of Lading.
"[Petitioner] did
not
anymore present any other witnesses on its evidence-in-chief. x x x"[9]
(Citations omitted) Ruling of
the
Court of Appeals
The CA held that petitioner
had failed "to prove that the fire which consumed the vessel and its
cargo
was caused by something other than its negligence in the upkeep,
maintenance
and operation of the vessel."[10]chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner had paid
P14,000 to Legaspi Marketing for the cargo covered by Bill of Lading
No.
59. The CA, however, held that the payment did not extinguish
petitioner’s
obligation to respondent, because there was no evidence that Feliciana
Legaspi (the insured) was the owner/proprietor of Legaspi
Marketing.
The CA also pointed out the impropriety of treating the claim under
Bill
of Lading No. 58 -- covering cargo valued therein at P6,500 -- as a
setoff
against Nestor Angelia’s account with Chester Enterprises, Inc.cralaw:red
Finally, it ruled that
respondent "is not bound by the valuation of the cargo under the Bills
of Lading, x x x nor is
the value of the cargo under said Bills of Lading conclusive on the
[respondent].
This is so because, in the first place, the goods were insured with the
[respondent] for the total amount of P150,000.00, which amount may be
considered
as the face value of the goods."[11]
Hence this Petition.[12]
Issues
Petitioner raises for
our consideration the following alleged errors of the CA:
"I
"The Honorable Court
of Appeals erred, granting arguendo that petitioner is liable, in
holding
that petitioner’s liability should be based on the ‘actual insured
value’
of the goods and not from actual valuation declared by the
shipper/consignee
in the bill of lading.
"II
"The Court of
Appeals
erred in not affirming the findings of the Philippine Coast Guard, as
sustained
by the trial court a quo, holding that the cause of loss of the
aforesaid
cargoes under Bill of Lading Nos. 58 and 59 was due to force majeure
and
due diligence was [exercised] by petitioner prior to, during and
immediately
after the fire on [petitioner’s] vessel.
"III
"The Court of
Appeals
erred in not holding that respondent UCPB General Insurance has no
cause
of action against the petitioner."[13]
In sum, the issues are:
(1) Is petitioner liable for the loss of the goods? (2) If it is
liable, what is the extent of its liability?
This Court’s
Ruling
The Petition is partly
meritorious.cralaw:red
First Issue:
Liability for Loss
Petitioner argues that
the cause of the loss of the goods, subject of this case, was force
majeure.
It adds that its exercise of due diligence was adequately proven by the
findings of the Philippine Coast Guard.chanrobles virtual law library
We are not convinced.
The uncontroverted findings of the Philippine Coast Guard show that the
M/V Tandag sank due to a fire, which resulted from a crack in the
auxiliary
engine fuel oil service tank. Fuel spurted out of the crack and
dripped
to the heating exhaust manifold, causing the ship to burst into
flames.
The crack was located on the side of the fuel oil tank, which had a
mere
two-inch gap from the engine room walling, thus precluding constant
inspection
and care by the crew.cralaw:red
Having originated from
an unchecked crack in the fuel oil service tank, the fire could not
have
been caused by force majeure. Broadly speaking, force majeure
generally
applies to a natural accident, such as that caused by a lightning, an
earthquake,
a tempest or a public enemy.[14]
Hence, fire is not considered a natural disaster or calamity. In
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[15]
we explained:
"x
x x This must be so as it arises
almost invariably from some act of man or by human means. It does
not fall within the category of an act of God unless caused by lighting
or by other natural disaster or calamity. It may even be caused
by
the actual fault or privity of the carrier.cralaw:red
"Article 1680 of the
Civil Code, which considers fire as an extraordinary fortuitous event
refers
to leases or rural lands where a reduction of the rent is allowed when
more than one-half of the fruits have been lost due to such event,
considering
that the law adopts a protective policy towards agriculture.cralaw:red
"As the peril of fire
is not comprehended within the exceptions in Article 1734, supra,
Article
1735 of the Civil Code provides that in all cases other than those
mentioned
in Article 1734, the common carrier shall be presumed to have been at
fault
or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it has observed the
extraordinary diligence required by law."chanrobles virtual law library
Where loss of cargo
results from the failure of the officers of a vessel to inspect their
ship
frequently so as to discover the existence of cracked parts, that loss
cannot be attributed to force majeure, but to the negligence of those
officials.[16]
The law provides that
a common carrier is presumed to have been negligent if it fails to
prove
that it exercised extraordinary vigilance over the goods it
transported.
Ensuring the seaworthiness of the vessel is the first step in
exercising
the required vigilance. Petitioner did not present sufficient evidence
showing what measures or acts it had undertaken to ensure the
seaworthiness
of the vessel. It failed to show when the last inspection
and
care of the auxiliary engine fuel oil service tank was made, what the
normal
practice was for its maintenance, or some other evidence to establish
that
it had exercised extraordinary diligence. It merely stated that
constant
inspection and care were not possible, and that the last time the
vessel
was dry-docked was in November 1990. Necessarily, in accordance
with
Article 1735[17]
of the Civil Code, we hold petitioner responsible for the loss of the
goods
covered by Bills of Lading Nos. 58 and 59.cralaw:red
Second Issue:
Extent of Liability
Respondent contends
that petitioner’s liability should be based on the actual insured value
of the goods, subject of this case. On the other hand, petitioner
claims that its liability should be limited to the value declared by
the
shipper/consignee in the Bill of Lading.cralaw:red
The records[18]
show that the Bills of Lading covering the lost goods contain the
stipulation
that in case of claim for loss or for damage to the shipped merchandise
or property, "[t]he liability of the common carrier
x
x x shall not exceed the value of the
goods
as appearing in the bill of lading."[19]
The attempt by respondent to make light of this stipulation is
unconvincing.
As it had the consignees’ copies of the Bills of Lading,[20]
it could have easily produced those copies, instead of relying on mere
allegations and suppositions. However, it presented mere
photocopies
thereof to disprove petitioner’s evidence showing the existence of the
above stipulation.chanrobles virtual law library
A stipulation that limits
liability is valid[21]
as long as it is not against public policy. In Everett Steamship
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[22]
the Court stated:
"A stipulation in the
bill of lading limiting the common carrier’s liability for loss or
destruction
of a cargo to a certain sum, unless the shipper or owner declares a
greater
value, is sanctioned by law, particularly Articles 1749 and 1750 of the
Civil Code which provides:
‘Art. 1749. A
stipulation that the common carrier’s liability is limited to the value
of the goods appearing in the bill of lading, unless the shipper or
owner
declares a greater value, is binding.’
‘Art. 1750. A
contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or shipper
for
the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is
reasonable and just under the circumstances, and has been freely and
fairly
agreed upon.’
"Such limited-liability
clause has also been consistently upheld by this Court in a number of
cases.
Thus, in Sea-Land Service, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, we
ruled:
‘It seems clear that
even if said section 4 (5) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act did not
exist, the validity and binding effect of the liability limitation
clause
in
the bill of lading here are nevertheless fully sustainable on the basis
alone of the cited Civil Code Provisions. That said stipulation
is
just and reasonable is arguable from the fact that it echoes Art. 1750
itself in providing a limit to liability only if a greater value is not
declared for the shipment in the bill of lading. To hold
otherwise
would amount to questioning the justness and fairness of the law
itself,
and this the private respondent does not pretend to do. But over
and above that consideration, the just and reasonable character of such
stipulation is implicit in it giving the shipper or owner the option of
avoiding accrual of liability limitation by the simple and surely far
from
onerous expedient of declaring the nature and value of the shipment in
the bill of lading.’
"Pursuant to the afore-quoted
provisions of law, it is required that the stipulation limiting the
common
carrier’s liability for loss must be ‘reasonable and just under the
circumstances,
and has been freely and fairly agreed upon.chanrobles virtual law library
"The bill of lading
subject of the present controversy specifically provides, among others:
'18. All claims for
which the carrier may be liable shall be adjusted and settled on the
basis
of the shipper’s net invoice cost plus freight and insurance premiums,
if paid, and in no event shall the carrier be liable for any loss of
possible
profits or any consequential loss.cralaw:red
‘The carrier shall not
be liable for any loss of or any damage to or in any connection with,
goods
in an amount exceeding One Hundred Thousand Yen in Japanese Currency
(¥100,000.00)
or its equivalent in any other currency per package or customary
freight
unit (whichever is least) unless the value of the goods higher than
this
amount is declared in writing by the shipper before receipt of the
goods
by the carrier and inserted in the Bill of Lading and extra freight is
paid as required.’
"The above stipulations
are, to our mind, reasonable and just. In the bill of lading, the
carrier made it clear that its liability would only be up to One
Hundred
Thousand (Y100,000.00) Yen. However, the shipper, Maruman
Trading,
had the option to declare a higher valuation if the value of its cargo
was higher than the limited liability of the carrier. Considering
that the shipper did not declare a higher valuation, it had itself to
blame
for not complying with the stipulations." talics
supplied)
In the present case,
the stipulation limiting petitioner’s liability is not contrary to
public
policy. In fact, its just and reasonable character is
evident.
The shippers/consignees may recover the full value of the goods by the
simple expedient of declaring the true value of the shipment in the
Bill
of Lading. Other than the payment of a higher freight, there was
nothing to stop them from placing the actual value of the goods
therein.
In fact, they committed fraud against the common carrier by
deliberately
undervaluing the goods in their Bill of Lading, thus depriving the
carrier
of its proper and just transport fare.cralaw:red
Concededly, the purpose
of the limiting stipulation in the Bill of Lading is to protect the
common
carrier. Such stipulation obliges the shipper/consignee to notify
the common carrier of the amount that the latter may be liable for in
case
of loss of the goods. The common carrier can then take
appropriate
measures -- getting insurance, if needed, to cover or protect
itself.
This precaution on the part of the carrier is reasonable and
prudent.
Hence, a shipper/consignee that undervalues the real worth of the goods
it seeks to transport does not only violate a valid contractual
stipulation,
but commits a fraudulent act when it seeks to make the common carrier
liable
for more than the amount it declared in the bill of lading.cralaw:red
Indeed, Zosimo Mercado
and Nestor Angelia misled petitioner by undervaluing the goods in their
respective Bills of Lading. Hence, petitioner was exposed to a
risk
that was deliberately hidden from it, and from which it could not
protect
itself.chanrobles virtual law library
It is well to point
out that, for assuming a higher risk (the alleged actual value of the
goods)
the insurance company was paid the correct higher premium by Feliciana
Legaspi; while petitioner was paid a fee lower than what it was
entitled
to for transporting the goods that had been deliberately undervalued by
the shippers in the Bill of Lading. Between the two of them, the
insurer should bear the loss in excess of the value declared in the
Bills
of Lading. This is the just and equitable solution.cralaw:red
In Aboitiz Shipping
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[23]
the description of the nature and the value of the goods shipped were
declared
and reflected in the bill of lading, like in the present case.
The
Court therein considered this declaration as the basis of the carrier’s
liability and ordered payment based on such amount. Following
this
ruling, petitioner should not be held liable for more than what was
declared
by the shippers/consignees as the value of the goods in the bills of
lading.cralaw:red
We find no cogent reason
to disturb the CA’s finding that Feliciana Legaspi was the owner of the
goods covered by Bills of Lading Nos. 58 and 59. Undoubtedly, the
goods were merely consigned to Nestor Angelia and Zosimo Mercado,
respectively;
thus, Feliciana Legaspi or her subrogee (respondent) was entitled to
the
goods or, in case of loss, to compensation therefor. There is no
evidence showing that petitioner paid her for the loss of those
goods.
It does not even claim to have paid her.cralaw:red
On the other hand, Legaspi
Marketing filed with petitioner a claim for the lost goods under Bill
of
Lading No. 59, for which the latter subsequently paid P14,000. But
nothing
in the records convincingly shows that the former was the owner of the
goods. Respondent was, however, able to prove that it was
Feliciana
Legaspi who owned those goods, and who was thus entitled to payment for
their loss. Hence, the claim for the goods under Bill of Lading No. 59
cannot be deemed to have been extinguished, because payment was made to
a person who was not entitled thereto.chanrobles virtual law library
With regard to the claim
for the goods that were covered by Bill of Lading No. 58 and valued at
P6,500, the parties have not convinced us to disturb the findings of
the
CA
that compensation could not validly take place. Thus, we uphold
the
appellate court’s ruling on this point.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the Petition
is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision is MODIFIED in
the sense that petitioner is ORDERED to pay respondent the sums of
P14,000
and P6,500, which represent the value of the goods stated in Bills of
Lading
Nos. 59 and 58, respectively. No costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, J., (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 10-34.
[2]
Id., pp. 36-60.
[3]
Id., p. 62.
[4]
First Division. Penned by Justice Romeo J. Callejo Sr. (now a member of
this Court) and concurred in by Justices Salome A. Montoya (Division
chair)
and Martin S. Villarama (member).
[5]
Assailed Decision, p. 7; rollo, p. 36.chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
Branch 146, Makati City.
[7]
Penned by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan.
[8]
RTC Decision, p. 4; rollo, p. 66.
[9]
Assailed Decision, pp. 1-5; rollo, pp. 36-40; emphases in original.
[10]
Id., pp. 12 & 47.
[11]
Id., pp. 23 & 58.chanrobles virtual law library
[12]
The case was deemed submitted for decision on September 24, 2001, upon
receipt by this Court of respondent’s Memorandum, which was signed by
Atty.
Bernard D. Sy. Petitioner’s Memorandum, signed by Atty.
Melvyn
S. Florencio, was received by this Court on August 31, 2001.
[13]
Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 12-13; rollo, pp. 134-135. Original
in upper case.chanrobles virtual law library
[14]
Pons y Compañia v. La Compañia Maritima, 9 Phil. 125,
October
26, 1907.chanrobles virtual law library
[15]
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA
463, May 29, 1987, per Melencio-Herrera, J.
[16]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[17]
"Art. 1735. In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4,
and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or
deteriorated,
common carriers are presumed to have [been] at fault or to have acted
negligently,
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
required
in Article 1733."chanrobles virtual law library
[18]
See the Deposition dated September 30, 1996 of Chester C. Cokaliong,
petitioner’s
vice president and chief operating officer. Deposition, p. 16; records,
p. 276.
[19]
Exhibit 7-A-2; id., p. 233.chanrobles virtual law library
[20]
TSN, August 8, 1996, p. 4.chanrobles virtual law library
[21]
Article 1749 of the Civil Code. See also St. Paul Fire &
Marine
Insurance Co. v. Macondray & Co., Inc., 70 SCRA 122, March 25, 1976.
[22]
358 SCRA 129, 135-136, October 8, 1998, per Martinez, J.chanrobles virtual law library
[23]
188 SCRA 387, August 6, 1990. |