Republic of the
Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
CARLO A. TAN,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
146595
June 20, 2003
-versus-
KAAKBAY FINANCE
CORPORATION,DENNIS
S. LAZARO
AND ROLDAN M. NOYNAY,
Respondents.
R E S O L U
T I O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner seeks the review
and reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 22,
2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58379,[1]
which affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37,
Calamba, Laguna, dated February 8, 2000 and March 29, 2000 in Civil
Case
No. 2881-2000-C entitled "Carlo A. Tan v. Kaakbay Finance Corporation,
Dennis S. Lazaro and Roldan M. Noynay"[2]
for declaration of nullity of the Promissory Note purportedly attached
to the Real Estate Mortgage, the usurious and unlawful or exorbitant
and
unconscionable rates of interest and fees therein, and the Deed of Sale
Under Pacto de Retro. Likewise, assailed is the appellate court’s
resolution[3]
dated December 20, 2000, denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The facts, as culled
from the records, are as follows:
In the latter part of
1995, petitioner Carlo[4]
A. Tan applied for and was granted a loan of four million pesos
(P4,000,000.00)
by private respondent Kaakbay Finance Corporation (Kaakbay), as
represented
by its president, private respondent Dennis S. Lazaro. As
collateral,
a real estate mortgage[5]
on petitioner Tan’s parcel of land with the improvements therein all
covered
by Transfer Certificate Title No. T-207125[6]
located along Rizal St., Calamba, Laguna was executed. Petitioner
alleged that the stipulated interest was 12% per annum until fully
paid,
which amount however, was not stated in the mortgage when he signed it
on November 16, 1995. The amount loaned was released to him in
two
installments of P2,500,000.00 and P1,500,000.00 on November 23, 1995
and
December 23, 1995, respectively.cralaw:red
As of November 22, 1996,
petitioner failed to pay his obligation. He claimed that Kaakbay
never furnished him a copy of the real estate mortgage; that, according
to Kaakbay, his obligation had now reached P5,570,000.00 because the
actual
interest was 0.3925% for a period of less than one year instead of the
agreed-upon interest of 12% per annum; and that he was made to issue
two
postdated checks to guarantee his obligation, namely: UCPB Check
No. CBA 052985 in the amount of P5,570,000.00 postdated to November 5,
1996; and UCPB Check No. CBA 095215 in the amount of P6,175,000.00
postdated
to January 31, 1997.[7]
Petitioner further alleged
that he negotiated with Kaakbay for a further extension of time to pay
his obligation, which the latter agreed to. It was agreed that
petitioner
and Kaakbay would sign, execute, and acknowledge a Deed of Sale Under
Pacto
de Retro upon the expiration of a two-year period starting January 8,
1998
to January 8, 2000. Petitioner was then given a blank Deed of
Sale
Under Pacto de Retro on January 8, 1998 which he signed.[8]
His suspicions that Kaakbay was charging him usurious rates of interest
were confirmed when he obtained a Statement of Account stating that his
obligation had now reached P13,333,750.00.[9]
On October 21, 1999,
petitioner learned of the existence of an accomplished Deed of Sale
Under
Pacto de Retro, which appeared that the same was signed by him and his
wife Maria Rosario Delmo Tan, on one hand, and private respondent
Lazaro
on the other, and was allegedly notarized by private respondent Atty.
Roldan
M. Noynay on February 5, 1998,[10]
when in truth and in fact, he, his wife, and their witness Charito
Morales
did not sign it on said date, nor did they execute it before Atty.
Noynay
or any other notary public on said date.chanrobles virtual law library
On January 5, 2000,
petitioner filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity, Invalidity and
Unenforceability or Annulment of the Promissory Notes purportedly
attached
to the Real Estate Mortgage dated November 16, 1995, the usurious and
void
rates of interest and other fees therein appearing, and the Deed of
Sale
Under Pacto De Retro purportedly dated February 5, 1998, and damages,
with
prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
against
respondents Kaakbay Finance Corporation, Dennis S. Lazaro and Roldan M.
Noynay,[11]
with the RTC Calamba, Laguna, and docketed as Civil Case No.
2881-2000-C.
The complaint essentially prayed that herein petitioner’s obligation to
Kaakbay Finance Corporation in the amount of P4,000,000.00 be subject
to
interest of only 12% per annum from November 23, 1995; that the
promissory
notes attached to his Real Estate Mortgage dated November 16, 1995 be
declared
null and void; that the Deed of Sale Under Pacto de Retro dated
February
5, 1998 be declared unenforceable; and that respondents pay moral and
exemplary
damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and P50,000.00, respectively, as
well
as attorney’s fees.cralaw:red
On the same date, petitioner
filed a Notice of Lis Pendens with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba,
Laguna,
which was annotated on TCT No. 207125.[12]
On January 17, 2000,
respondents, through their counsel, Atty. Roldan M. Noynay, filed their
‘Consolidated Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim And Opposition To
Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction.’[13]chanrobles virtual law library
During the hearing of
petitioner’s application for the issuance of a TRO, the parties agreed
in open court that petitioner would withdraw his application for a TRO,
while respondents in turn would hold in abeyance the registration of
the
Deed of Sale Under Pacto de Retro until the case was terminated.
The trial court issued an order to that effect, dated January 17, 2000.[14]
Later, the law firm
of Ortega, Del Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio, Calma, and Carbonell entered
its appearance as counsel for respondents.[15]
Said counsel requested for an extension of time to file an Answer, and
also moved for the withdrawal of the ‘Consolidated Answer’[16]
filed by Atty. Noynay insofar as respondents Kaakbay and Lazaro are
concerned.[17]
Respondents also filed a ‘Supplemental Opposition To The Prayer For
Preliminary
Injunction Or To Temporary Injunction.’[18]
On February 3, 2000,
respondents, through the new counsel, filed their Answer with
Counterclaim,[19]
praying that petitioner pay them four million pesos (P4,000,000.00)
representing
the principal amount of the loan, nine million three hundred thirty
three
thousand seven hundred fifty pesos (P9,333,750.00) representing the
‘compounded
monthly interest and annual penalty interest’, two hundred fifty
thousand
pesos (P250,000.00) as litigation expenses, and five hundred thousand
pesos
(P500,000.00) as attorney’s fees.cralaw:red
In addition, respondents
filed a Motion for Admission of Counterclaim Without Payment of Fees,
on
the ground that their counterclaim is compulsory in nature, hence it
may
be admitted without payment of fees.[20]chanrobles virtual law library
On February 21, 2000,
petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Expunge Motions and Pleadings
Filed
by Defendants Kaakbay Finance Corporation and Dennis S. Lazaro,
Particularly
Their Answer with Counterclaim and Motion for Admission of Counterclaim
both Dated February 3, 2000 and/or Comment/Opposition (To Said
Defendants’
Manifestation and Supplemental Opposition to their Prayer for
Preliminary
Injunction and to Temporary Injunction Dated January 24, 2000 and
February
3, 2000 Respectively.)[21]
In this motion, petitioner pointed out that the respondents were being
represented by their counsel, the law firm of Ortega, Del Castillo,
Bacorro,
Odulio, Calma, and Carbonell without stating if said law firm is in
collaboration
with or in substitution of their previous counsel, respondent Atty.
Roldan
M. Noynay. Petitioner argued that the procedure laid down in the
rules concerning the change or substitution of counsel of a party
litigant
had not been properly complied with by the respondents, and thus the
motions
filed by the said law firm should be expunged. In addition,
petitioner
argued that respondents’ Answer with Counterclaim should not be
admitted,
as it partook of the nature of a permissive counterclaim, which
required
the payment of the prescribed filing fees; and since the fees were not
paid, the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over said Answer.cralaw:red
In its order of February
8, 2000, the trial court granted respondents’ motion for admission of
counterclaim
without payment of fees.[22]
Petitioner then filed
a "Supplemental Motion by Way of Motion for Reconsideration" but this
was
denied.cralaw:red
Petitioner seasonably
appealed to the Court of Appeals where he maintained that the trial
court
committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting the answer with
counterclaim,
which contains a permissive counterclaim the correct filing fees of
which
have not been paid by respondents Kaakbay and Lazaro to the trial
court.
Thus, petitioner insisted that the trial court had not acquired
jurisdiction
over the said answer with counterclaim. Alternatively, petitioner
urged that said answer be expunged from the record of the case a quo.chanrobles virtual law library
On August 22, 2000,
the appellate court promulgated its decision, decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE,
the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and accordingly,
DISMISSED.[23]
Petitioner then moved
for
reconsideration, but the appellate court denied it in the resolution
dated
December 20, 2000.
Hence, this instant
petition, where petitioner now contends that the Court of Appeals
committed
the following errors, in:
(a)
ITS HOLDING THAT "XXX THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION
IN DECLARING THE COUNTERCLAIM OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS KAAKBAY FINANCE
CORPORATION
AND DENNIS S. LAZARO AS COMPULSORY, REQUIRING NO PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES
XXX" WHEN EVEN THE YULIENCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS CASE (G.R. NO. 131692,
JUNE 10, 1999, 308 SCRA 206) IT CITED IN ITS DECISION FAVORABLY
SUPPORTS
THE ASSERTION OF PETITIONER THAT THE COUNTERCLAIM IN RESPONDENTS’
ANSWER
IN THE CASE A QUO IS A PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIM.chanrobles virtual law library
(b)
ITS FAILURE TO RULE IN THE ASSAILED DECISION THAT HON. JUDGE JUANITA T.
GUERRERO HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ISSUING
THE ORDERS OF FEBRUARY 8, 2000 AND MARCH 29, 2000 CONSIDERING THAT THE
COLLECTION OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF P14,083,750.00 REPRESENTING UNPAID
LOAN
AND ACCRUED INTEREST THEREIN BY WAY OF COUNTERCLAIM IS COMPULSORY AND
THAT
THE ANSWER MAY BE ADMITTED WITHOUT NECESSITY OF PAYING THE DOCKET FEES.chanrobles virtual law library
(c)
ITS FAILURE TO DECLARE IN THE ASSAILED DECISION THAT THE MOTION FOR
ADMISSION
OF COUNTERCLAIM WITHOUT PAYMENT OF FEES IS A MERE SCRAP OF PAPER AND
VIOLATIVE
OF SECTIONS 4, 5 AND 6, RULE 15 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.[24]
The basic issue for
resolution
in this case is whether the counterclaim of respondents is compulsory
or
permissive in nature.
Petitioner assails the
Court of Appeals for affirming the trial court’s order that the
counterclaim
of respondents is compulsory in nature, thus requiring no payment of
legal
fees. Petitioner contends that his complaint against the
respondents
is predicated on the unauthorized application of usurious,
unconscionable
and exorbitant rates of interest and other fees by respondents Kaakbay
and Lazaro to petitioner’s loan without the latter’s knowledge, as well
as the approval and the falsification of the promissory note supposed
to
be attached to the Real Estate Mortgage and the Deed of Sale Under
Pacto
de Retro.chanrobles virtual law library
According to petitioner,
he did not attempt to prevent the foreclosure of the mortgage because
what
he questions is the validity of the promissory note and the void rates
of interest. He insists that these were falsified. He
likewise
assails the genuineness of the deed of sale in dispute. Since the
evidence to be presented by the respondents to support the genuineness
and due execution of the questioned promissory note and the Deed of
Sale
Under Pacto de Retro as a ground for the specific performance thereof,
is not the same as the evidence to be presented by the petitioner as
plaintiff
in the case below to support his claim of fraud employed by
respondents,
petitioner asserts the counterclaim cannot be deemed compulsory.
He adds that since the respondents demand the payment of the loan and
the
interests pursuant to the contract of loan, completely inconsistent
with
his claim that subject documents were a nullity, what respondents had
filed
is not a compulsory counterclaim.cralaw:red
For their part, respondents
contend that their counterclaims are for payment of the unpaid loan of
the petitioner in the amount of P4,000,000.00, the compounded interest
with annual penalty equivalent to P9,333,750.00, litigation expenses of
P250,000 and attorney’s fees of P500,000. The respondents say
these
are all compulsory and not permissive counterclaims. Petitioner
admitted
in his complaint his indebtedness to respondent Kaakbay Finance
Corporation
in the amount of P4,000,000.00 and his liability for interest at the
rate
of 12% per annum only. These admissions arise out of, or are
necessarily
connected with, or have a logical relation to the transaction or
occurrence
forming the subject matter of the petitioner’s claim.
Consequently,
respondents conclude that the trial court did not err in ruling that
payment
of the docket fees is no longer necessary as their counterclaims are
compulsory
in nature.cralaw:red
In Intestate Estate
of Dalisay v. Hon. Marasigan,[25]
we held that a counterclaim is compulsory where: (1) it arises out of,
or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim; (2) it does not
require
the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction;
and (3) the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, we have
devised
the following tests: (1) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the
claim
and the counterclaim largely the same? (2) Would res judicata bar
a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims absent the compulsory
counterclaim
rule? (3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiff’s
claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim? and (4) Is there any
logical
relation between the claim and the counterclaim?[26]chanrobles virtual law library
In Quintanilla v. Court
of Appeals, we said a "compelling test of compulsoriness" is whether
there
is "a logical relationship between the claim and counterclaim, that is,
where conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the
parties
would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the
parties
and the court."[27]
Tested against the abovementioned
standards, we agree with the appellate court’s view that respondents’
counterclaims
are compulsory in nature. Petitioner’s complaint was for
declaration
of nullity, invalidity or annulment of the promissory notes purportedly
attached to the Real Estate Mortgage dated November 16, 1995 and the
usurious
and void interest rates appearing therein and the Deed of Sale Under
Pacto
De Retro. Respondents’ counterclaim was for the payment of the
principal
amount of the loan, compounded monthly interest and annual penalty
interest
arising out of the non-payment of the principal loan, litigation
expenses
and attorney’s fees. There is no dispute as to the principal
obligation
of P4,000,000, but there is a dispute as to the rate and amount of
interest.
Petitioner insists that the amount of interest is only 12% yearly until
fully paid, while respondents insist on 3.5% monthly. Also,
respondents
allege that petitioner owes them P9,333,750.00 representing the
compounded
monthly interest and annual penalty, which is disputed by
petitioner.
Petitioner further seeks the nullification of the Deed of Sale Under
Pacto
de Retro for being falsified, while respondents aver the deed is
valid.
It thus appears that the evidence required to prove petitioner’s claims
is similar or identical to that needed to establish respondents’
demands
for the payment of unpaid loan from petitioner such as amount of
interest
rates. In other words, petitioner’s claim is so related logically
to respondents’ counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials for
the claim and the counterclaim would result in the substantial
duplication
of the time and effort of the court and the parties. Clearly,
this
is the situation contemplated under the "compelling test of
compulsoriness."
The counterclaims of respondents herein are obviously compulsory, not
permissive.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals, the issues of fact and law
raised
by both the claim and counterclaim are largely the same, with a logical
relation, considering that the two claims arose out of the same
circumstances
requiring substantially the same evidence. Any decision the trial
court will make in favor of petitioner will necessarily impinge on the
claim of respondents, and vice versa. In this light, considering
that the counterclaims of respondents are compulsory in nature, payment
of docket fees is not required. The CA did not err in holding
that
the trial court had acquired jurisdiction on the matter.[28]chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the petition
is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed decision of the
Court
of Appeals dated August 22, 2000 and its resolution dated December 20,
2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 58379, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as
to costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Bellosillo, J., (Chairman),
and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J.,
on official leave.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 24-32.
[2]
CA Rollo, pp. 32, 53.
[3]
Supra, note 1 at 34.chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
Also referred as "Carlos" in other parts of the record.
[5]
Supra, note 2 at 75-77.chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
Id. at 70-72.chanrobles virtual law library
[7]
Id. at 78-79.
[8]
Id. at 80-81.
[9]
Id. at 82.chanrobles virtual law library
[10]
Id. at 83-84.
[11]
Id. at 54-66.
[12]
Id. at 85-86.
[13]
Id. at 88-95.
[14]
Id. at 100.chanrobles virtual law library
[15]
Id. at 101-102.
[16]
Id. at 88-95.
[17]
Id. at 107-108.
[18]
Id. at 109-115.
[19]
Id. at 116-129.
[20]
Id. at 145.
[21]
Id. at 33-46.
[22]
Id. at 32.
[23]
Rollo, p. 31.
[24]
Id. at 8-9.chanrobles virtual law library
[25]
327 Phil. 298, 301 (1996).chanrobles virtual law library
[26]
Financial Building Corporation v. Forbes Park Association, Inc., G.R.
No.
133119, 17 August 2000, 338 SCRA 346, 352.
[27]
344 Phil. 811, 819 (1997).chanrobles virtual law library
[28]
See Cabaero v. Cantos, 338 Phil. 105, 116-117 (1997). |