FIRST DIVISION
AGUSTINA M.
ENEMECIO,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
146731
January 13, 2004
-versus-
OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN
(VISAYAS)
AND SERVANDO
BERNANTE,
Respondents.
D E C I S I
O N
CARPIO,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The
Case
Before us is a petition
for review on certiorari[1]
assailing the Resolution[2]
dated 31 May 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58875. The
Court of Appeals dismissed for being an inappropriate remedy the
petition
for certiorari filed by petitioner Agustina M. Enemecio against
respondents
Office of the Ombudsman and Servando Bernante. The present petition
also
assails the Court of Appeals’ Resolution dated 7 December 2000 denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Agustina
M. Enemecio ("Enemecio") is a utility worker at the Cebu State College
of Science and Technology, College of Fisheries Technology
("CSCST-CFT"),
Carmen, Cebu. Private respondent Servando Bernante ("Bernante") is an
Assistant
Professor IV of CSCST-CFT.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On 30 March 1998, Enemecio
filed an administrative complaint for gross misconduct, falsification
of
public documents, malversation, dishonesty and defamation against
Bernante
before the Office of the Executive Dean of CSCST-CFT.[3]
Dr. Severino R. Romano, CSCST-CFT Executive Dean, indorsed the
complaint
to the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas ("Ombudsman").cralaw:red
Enemecio also filed
with the Ombudsman a criminal complaint against Bernante for
falsification
of public document.[4]
The Ombudsman ordered Enemecio to submit her affidavit and the
affidavits
of her witnesses. After Enemecio submitted the required affidavits, the
Ombudsman ordered Bernante to submit his counter-affidavit. The
administrative
complaint was docketed as OMB-VIS-ADM-98-0201, while the criminal
complaint
was docketed as OMB-VIS-CRIM-98-0286. The Ombudsman jointly tried the
two
cases.cralaw:red
Enemecio alleged that
Bernante had caused the spray-painting of obscene and unprintable words
against her on the walls of the CSCST Carmen Campus. Enemecio claimed
that
Bernante also shouted defamatory words against her while she was inside
the school premises. Enemecio further asserted that Bernante made it
appear
in his leave application that he was on forced leave from 15 May 1996
to
21 May 1996 and on vacation leave from 22 May 1996 to 31 May 1996. In
truth,
Bernante was serving a 20-day prison term, from 14 May 1996 to 2 June
1996,
because of his conviction of the crime of slight physical injuries in
Criminal
Case No. NR-1678-CR. Bernante was able to receive his salary during his
incarceration since then CSCST-CFT Superintendent Andres T. Melencion
approved
Bernante’s application for leave. Enemecio contended that Bernante was
not entitled to receive salary for that period because of his
"falsified
leave applications."[5]
For his part, Bernante
did not deny that he was in prison from 15 May 1996 to 31 May 1996. He
maintained that he received his salary for that period because of his
duly
approved leave applications. Bernante also alleged that Enemecio filed
the criminal and administrative complaints against him in retaliation
for
the case he filed against Enemecio’s friends, Dean Severino Romano and
Bernadette Mante. Bernante denied he was behind the spray-painting of
obscenities
against Enemecio on the walls of the school campus.[6]
On 13 January 2000,
the Ombudsman rendered a decision dismissing the administrative
complaint
against Bernante in OMB-VIS-ADM-98-0201. The Ombudsman explained:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the issue of the
alleged falsification of respondent’s application for leave by making
it
appear that he was on vacation when in truth and in fact he was serving
a sentence for a criminal conviction, we have determined that there is
no regulation restricting the purpose or use of an employee’s earned
leave
credits. Considering that the application for leave filed by the
respondent
was duly approved by the appropriate official concerned, it matters not
how he utilizes his leave for it is not a requirement that the
specifics
or reasons for going on leave be spelled out in such application.cralaw:red
On the issue of the
spray painting of obscenities on the walls of the school, the evidence
is insufficient to prove that respondent was the person responsible for
such as there were no eye witnesses to such activity. The testimony of
Bernadette Mante merely identifies the respondent as allegedly having a
drinking session with security guard Estanislao Lavaria at around 11:00
on the night of March 29, 1998. Furthermore, witness Mante states that
there are about ten (10) to twelve (12) families living inside the
dormitory
facing the school walls where the grafitti appeared. Despite this
number,
not one single person appeared to have witnessed respondent spray
painting
the questioned grafitti on the walls of the campus (TSN, April 19,
1999).
While it may be probable that the only person or persons who could have
had the opportunity to spray paint the said grafitti on the night of
March
29, 1998 or in the early morning hours of March 30, 1998 were the
respondent
and security guard Lavaria, this is not sufficient justification to
directly
blame them for such event.cralaw:red
Regarding the complainant’s
allegation that on March 10 and 25, 1998, the respondent defamed the
former
by uttering slanderous words, it appears that only the incident
occurring
on March 10, 1998 was corroborated by the testimony of witness Delfin
Buot
(TSN, April 7, 1998). Witness Buot testified that he was about (3)
meters
from the respondent when the latter shouted the words ‘buricat’ (whore)
‘putang ina’ and ‘maot’ (snob) to the complainant. However, the
circumstances
of the utterance, particularly the time and the relation of the
protagonists
involved, leads us to conclude that the same is removed from the
official
functions of the respondent as a professor of the school. Stated
otherwise,
the act of the respondent was not in relation to his official
functions.
In the case of Palma vs. Fortich, et al., 147 SCRA 397, the Supreme
Court
ruled that:
In administrative actions
against municipal officers, the Supreme Court in Festijo v. Crisologo,
et al. (17 SCRA 868, 869 [1966]), classified the grounds for suspension
under two categories, namely: (1) those related to the discharge of the
functions of the officer concerned (neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption
or other forms of maladministration of office and (2) those not so
connected
with said functions. Under the second category, when the crime
involving
moral turpitude is not linked with the performance of official duties,
conviction by final judgment is required as a condition precedent to
administrative
action.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Therefore, inasmuch
as the oral defamation charge is now pending before the Municipal
Circuit
Trial Court in Catmon, Cebu under Criminal Case No. 30006-CR, the
matter
of respondent’s administrative culpability is still premature to be
determined
herein.[7]
On the same date, the
Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint against Bernante in
OMB-VIS-CRIM-98-0286[8]
finding no probable cause to indict Bernante for falsification of
public
document. The Ombudsman explained thus:
It is well established
by documentary evidence that the applications for leave filed by the
respondent
for the period from May 15 to 31, 1996 were duly approved by the head
of
office, which in this case is Mr. Andres T. Melencion, Vocational
School
Superintendent. All these leaves were with pay indicating that the
respondent
availed of his leave credits which are undeniably due to him by law. It
matters not how the respondent utilizes the days where he is on leave,
be they enjoyed as a vacation or, in this case, incarceration for a
crime.
There appears to be no regulation or law against the utilization of
leave
credits
for purposes other than recreation. As such, there could be no
falsification
where nothing is being misrepresented in the official leave forms which
the respondent prepared and submitted.[9]
The Ombudsman denied
Enemecio’s motion to reconsider the dismissal of the criminal complaint
in its Order of 28 February 2000. In denying the motion, the Ombudsman
stated:
We find the complainant’s
arguments untenable. There is no dispute that the leave forms are
public
documents. What is in dispute is whether or not the failure of the
respondent
to indicate therein the reasons for his leave amounts to a crime of
falsification.
It is submitted that it does not, for the simple reason that the form
itself
does not require stating the reasons for going on leave. An employee
simply
indicates through check marks the nature of the leave he is availing
of,
which in the case at bar, respondent chose to avail of his forced and
vacation
leave credits. Nevertheless, the omission does not affect the validity
of its approval. What is indicated in the leave forms is only the need
to specify the whereabouts of the employee who goes on leave. However,
it is not a requirement that specifics must be provided. In any case
the
omission to state the location of a vacationing employee is not a
condition
sine-qua-non for its approval.cralaw:red
To sum it up, there
is no falsification of leave forms where there is no requirement for
the
indication of reasons for going on leave. Regardless of such a
requirement,
the need to indicate the whereabouts of a vacationing employee is not a
necessity for its approval.[10]
Enemecio filed a special
civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, assailing the
resolutions which dismissed the criminal complaint and denied the
motion
for reconsideration in OMB-VIS-CRIM-98-0286. Applying the ruling in
Fabian
v. Desierto,[11]
the appellate court dismissed Enemecio’s petition for having been filed
out of time. The appellate court also stated that the proper remedy
available
to Enemecio was a petition for review under Rule 43 and not a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.cralaw:red
In her motion for reconsideration,
Enemecio argued that the appellate court should not have relied on
Fabian.
Enemecio contended that Fabian declared void only Section 27 of
Republic
Act No. 6770 ("RA 6770") and Section 7, Rule III of Administrative
Order
No. 07 ("AO No. 07") insofar as they provide for appeals in
administrative
disciplinary cases from the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court. Enemecio
asserted
that the other provisions of Section 27 of RA 6770 and Section 7 of AO
No. 07, including the "final and unappealable character" of orders,
resolutions
or decisions exonerating a respondent from any criminal liability,
still
stand. Enemecio stated that she filed the petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals because she considered Bernante’s
absolution
from the administrative complaint in OMB-VIS-ADM-98-0201 as already
final
and unappealable. As there was no adequate remedy of appeal, Enemecio
claimed
that her only recourse was a petition for certiorari before the
appellate
court under Rule 65.[12]
The Court of Appeals
denied Enemecio’s motion for reconsideration in its Order of 7 December
2000.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Hence, this petition
for review.
The Ruling of the
Court of Appeals
In dismissing the petition,
the Court of Appeals stated that in Fabian, the Supreme Court held that
appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Ombudsman to the
Court of Appeals must be brought by petition for review under Rule 43.
The appellate court stated that a petition for review must be filed
within
15 days from notice of the assailed final order or resolution. Since
Enemecio
received on 22 March 2000 a copy of the Ombudsman’s Order denying her
motion
for reconsideration, the appellate court ruled that Enemecio had only
until
6 April 2000 to file a petition for review. Enemecio filed her petition
only on 8 May 2000. The appellate court further stated that Enemecio’s
allegation in the petition that there is no appeal or other plain,
speedy
or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is false. The proper
remedy
available to Enemecio is a petition for review.[13]
In denying Enemecio’s
motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals clarified that Fabian
does not apply to Enemecio’s petition assailing the dismissal of the
criminal
complaint against Bernante. The appellate court stated that what Fabian
declared void was Section 27 of RA 6770, which authorized appeals to
the
Supreme Court from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary
cases. Under the Fabian ruling, the appellant should take such appeal
in
administrative disciplinary cases to the Court of Appeals under Rule
43.
The Court of Appeals added that it follows that the power to review
decisions
of the Ombudsman in criminal cases is retained by the Supreme Court
under
Section 14 of RA 6770. Thus, the appellate court dismissed the petition
for lack of jurisdiction.[14]
The Issues
Enemecio contends that:
1. The Court of Appeals
gravely abused its discretion in refusing to assume jurisdiction over
the
petition.cralaw:red
2. The Court of Appeals
gravely erred in failing to appreciate that a petition for certiorari
under
Rule 65 was the appropriate course of action considering the
circumstances
obtaining.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3. The Court of Appeals
gravely erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari under Rule 65
filed
by petitioner by misinterpreting the ruling of the Supreme Court in
Fabian
vs. Desierto.[15]
The issues boil down
to whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed before the
Court
of Appeals is the proper remedy to question the dismissal of a criminal
complaint filed with the Ombudsman.
The Court’s Ruling
We resolve to dismiss
this petition.cralaw:red
Enemecio filed before
the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65[16]
questioning the Ombudsman’s Resolution dated 13 January 2000 and Order
dated 28 February 2000 dismissing the criminal case against Bernante.[17]
Thus, the Prefatory statement of Enemecio’s Petition in the Court of
Appeals
states:
This is a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the
Resolution
dated 13 January 2000 and the Order dated 28 February 2000 both issued
by the Public Respondent in the Ombudsman Case docketed as
OMB-VIS-CRIM-98-0201
and entitled, "Agustina Enemecio vs. Servando Bernante, Asst. Professor
IV, CSCST- College of Fisheries Technology, Carmen, Cebu", for being a
manifest and grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.
The Resolution dated 13 January 2000 dismissed the criminal complaint
for
malversation and falsification of public documents filed against herein
Private Respondent while the Order dated 28 February 2000 denied herein
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Certified machine copies of
the
aforesaid Resolution and Order are hereto appended as Annexes "A" and
"B"
respectively. (Emphasis supplied)
The appellate court
dismissed Enemecio’s petition and denied her motion for
reconsideration.
Enemecio now comes to this Court via this petition for review, claiming
that "what was involved in the petition before the appellate court was
the administrative, not the criminal case."[18]
Enemecio thus stresses that "there is no reason for the Court of
Appeals
to say that the petition concerned the criminal case."[19]
We cannot countenance
the sudden and complete turnabout of Enemecio and her counsel, Atty.
Terence
L. Fernandez. Atty. Fernandez’s conduct has fallen far too short of the
honesty required of every member of the Bar.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is clear from the
records that Atty. Fernandez filed with the Court of Appeals a
certiorari
petition assailing the Ombudsman’s Resolution and Order dismissing the
criminal case, not the administrative case against Bernante. For this
reason,
the appellate court in its 7 December 2000 Resolution rectified itself
and stated that Fabian does not apply to Enemecio’s petition as the
Fabian
ruling applies only to administrative disciplinary actions. Atty.
Fernandez’s
attempt to mislead this Court in a last ditch effort to secure a
decision
favorable to his client’s cause does not escape our attention. As an
officer
of the court, Atty. Fernandez is duty bound to uphold the dignity and
authority
of the court to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has
taken
as attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice.
He must always bear in mind that good faith and honorable dealings with
judicial tribunals are primary obligations of an attorney. He must
always
remember to deal with courts with truthfulness and not to trifle with
court
proceedings.[20]
For this, Atty. Fernandez should be admonished not to commit similar
acts
again.cralaw:red
Even if we consider
Enemecio’s petition before the Court of Appeals as questioning the
dismissal
of the administrative case against Bernante, the action must also fail.
Appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
actions should be brought to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.[21]
The only provision affected by the Fabian ruling is the designation of
the Court of Appeals as the proper forum and of Rule 43 as the proper
mode
of appeal. All other matters in Section 27 of RA 6770, including the
finality
or non-finality of decisions of the Ombudsman, remain valid.[22]
In any event, jurisprudence
now holds that where the findings of the Ombudsman on the existence of
probable cause in criminal cases is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may
file
a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court under Rule 65.[23]
Since Enemecio filed a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals,
instead of the Supreme Court, she availed of a wrong remedy in the
wrong
forum. Hence, the instant petition should be dismissed outright.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Even if we consider
the substance of the case, we find no grave abuse of discretion in the
Ombudsman’s determination of whether there exists a prima facie case
against
Bernante.cralaw:red
Enemecio assails the
dismissal of the criminal charges against Bernante for two reasons: (1)
that she was able to prove before the Ombudsman the charge for
malversation
against Bernante; and (2) that Bernante himself admitted that he signed
and filed the subject leave applications.cralaw:red
Enemecio asserts that
she was able to present before the Ombudsman the payroll of the
CSCST-CFT
employees covering the period from 16 May 1996 to 31 May 1996 signed by
Bernante. Enemecio asserts that this document proved that Bernante
"actually
received and was paid the amount of P3,185.08 as a result of his
falsified
letter-requests and leave applications." According to Enemecio, these
constituted
acts of malversation.cralaw:red
Enemecio’s contentions
do not deserve serious consideration.cralaw:red
Under Article 171, paragraph
4 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of falsification of public
documents
through an untruthful narration of facts are: (a) the offender makes in
a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the
offender
has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c)
the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and (d) the
perversion
of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent to
injure a third person.[24]
As the Ombudsman correctly
pointed out, Enemecio failed to point to any law imposing upon Bernante
the legal obligation to disclose where he was going to spend his leave
of absence. "Legal obligation" means that there is a law requiring the
disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated.[25]
Bernante may not be convicted of the crime of falsification of public
document
by making false statements in a narration of facts absent any legal
obligation
to disclose where he would spend his vacation leave and forced leave.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In PCGG v. Desierto,[26]
the Court ruled that the Ombudsman has the discretion to determine
whether
a criminal case, given the facts and circumstances, should be filed or
not. The Ombudsman may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it
insufficient
in form or substance. On the other hand, he may continue with the
inquiry
if he finds otherwise. If, in the Ombudsman’s view, the complaint is
sufficient
in form and substance, he may proceed with the investigation. In fact,
the Ombudsman has the power to dismiss a complaint outright without
going
through a preliminary investigation.[27]
Our evaluation of the
records leads us to the conclusion that the Ombudsman has carefully
studied
the merits of the criminal complaint. Where the Ombudsman has
thoroughly
examined the merits of the complaint, it would not be right to subject
the private respondent to an unnecessary and prolonged anguish.[28]
WHEREFORE, the petition
is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Penned by Justice Marina L. Buzon, with Associate Justices Ramon A.
Barcelona
and Edgardo P. Cruz concurring.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 60-61.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Ibid., p. 11.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Ibid., pp. 64, 12-15.
[6]
Ibid., p. 64.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Rollo, pp. 65-66.
[8]
CA Rollo, p. 26.
[9]
Ibid., pp. 25-26.
[10]
Ibid., p. 27.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
356 Phil. 787 (1998).
[12]
Rollo, pp. 57-58.
[13]
CA Rollo, pp. 55-56.
[14]
Ibid., pp. 73-74.
[15]
Rollo, p. 19.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[17]
CA Rollo, pp. 5-20, 25-28.
[18]
Rollo, p. 11.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
Ibid., pp. 11, 20-21, 64-66, 77-78.
[20]
Pamaran, Trial Practice in Philippine Court (3rd Ed., 1986).
[21]
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
Barata v. Abalos, Jr., 411 Phil. 204 (2001); Lapid v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 142261, 29 June 2000, 334 SCRA 738.
[23]
Baylon v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 142738, 14 December 2001,
372
SCRA 437; Nava v. Commission on Audit, 419 Phil. 544 (2001); Tirol, Jr.
v. Del Rosario, 376 Phil. 115 (1999).
[24]
Relucio v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 147182, 21 November 2002;
Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 364 Phil. 890 (1999).
[25]
REYES, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, BOOK TWO 210 (15th Ed., Rev. 2001).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
G.R. No. 140358, 8 December 2000, 347 SCRA 561. See also Presidential
Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, 418 Phil. 715
(2001);
Yu v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128466, 31 May 2001, 358 SCRA 353.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,
415 Phil. 135 (2001); Mamburao, Inc. v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R.
Nos.
139141-42, 15 November 2000, 344 SCRA 805; Knecht v. Desierto, 353
Phil.
494 (1998).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
PCGG v. Desierto, G.R. No. 140232, 19 January 2001, 349 SCRA 767. |