SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
146846
August 31, 2004
-versus-
RAFAEL F. HOLAZO,
REPRESENTED
HEREIN BY HIS
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT,
RAFAEL ALEXANDER
V. HOLAZO,
Respondent.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This is a Petition for
Review on
Certiorari for the
reversal of the decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57457, affirming the decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, in LRC Case No.
Q-6935(94) granting the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 117130 in the name of Rafael F. Holazo. The Antecedents
Rafael F. Holazo, herein
respondent, executed a Special Power of Attorney[3]
authorizing his son, Rafael Alexander V. Holazo, to file a petition for
the reconstitution of the original and owner’s duplicate copies of TCT
No. 117130 covering a parcel of land located at No. 101 Harvard Street,
Cubao, Quezon City, with an area of 320 square meters, more or less.cralaw:red
On August 30, 1994,
the respondent, represented by his son and attorney-in-fact, Rafael
Alexander,
filed a petition for reconstitution of the original and owner’s
duplicate
copies of TCT No. 117130 with the RTC of Quezon City, alleging therein
that he was the owner of the parcel of land covered by such
title.
He also alleged that the Register of Deeds of Quezon City was razed by
fire on June 11, 1988 and that the original copy of TCT No. 117130 was
among the records that were burned. The respondent also claimed
that
the owner’s duplicate copy of the said certificate of title was kept in
the house at No. 101 Harvard Street, Quezon City, and got wet after
heavy
rains fell in Metro Manila sometime in 1990; the title then became
brittle
and eventually crumbled to pieces which he later on disposed of.
He also alleged that the said certificate of title had never been
pledged,
mortgaged, transferred or otherwise delivered to any person or entity
for
any purpose whatsoever. Attached to the petition were the
following
documents: (a) a Certification[4]
from the Register of Deeds of Quezon City that such office was razed by
fire on June 11, 1988 and that among those burned was the original copy
of TCT No. 117130; (b) an Affidavit of Loss[5]
executed by the respondent on August 4, 1994 and filed with the
Register
of Deeds on the said date declaring that he had custody of the owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT No. 117130 before it was destroyed on account of
the heavy downpour; (c) copies of tax declarations[6]
covering the lot in question; (d) copies of receipts[7]
of payment of real property tax covering the lot in question; and
(e) a Certification[8]
from the Office of the City Assessor indicating the boundaries of the
said
lot.chanrobles virtual law library
On October 5, 1994,
the trial court issued an Order[9]
directing Rafael Alexander to amend the petition to conform with
paragraph
5 of LRC Circular No. 35, Series of 1983, in relation to Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 26, and, likewise, directed that copies of the amended
petition be served on the Register of Deeds, the Office of the
Solicitor
General (OSG), the Office of the City Prosecutor, the Land Registration
Authority, the Land Management Bureau and the owners of the adjoining
lots.cralaw:red
The respondent complied
with the order and filed an amended petition on January 9, 1997
appending
thereto (a) a Resurvey Plan[10]
of Lot 23, Block 18, PCS 817 prepared by a duly licensed geodetic
engineer
in lieu of the lost title; and (b) two duplicate copies of the
technical
descriptions of the property.[11]
In the meantime, the
Land Registration Authority submitted to the trial court a Report[12]
recommending that the amended petition be approved.[13]
The trial court authorized
the respondent to adduce his evidence ex parte when no opposition was
filed
to the petition. The respondent did not testify. Rafael
Alexander
testified in his stead and narrated that after his father purchased the
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 117130, a house was constructed
thereon
in 1964 where he and his parents thereafter resided. His parents
then went to Hubert, Sorsogon sometime in 1985, and it was he who
continued
to reside in the house. According to Rafael Alexander, the
respondent’s
brothers and sisters were aware of the filing of the petition and did
not
object thereto. The following documents were marked and offered
in
evidence: (a) the January 22, 1996[14]
and January 29, 1996[15]
issues of the Official Gazette wherein the order of the trial court
setting
the hearing of the petition was published; (b) the Certificate of
Publication[16]
issued by the National Printing Office; (c) the Special Power of
Attorney[17]
executed by the respondent designating Rafael Alexander to file the
petition;
(d) the Certification[18]
from the Register of Deeds of Quezon City; (e) the Affidavit of Loss[19]
executed by the respondent; (f) copies of receipts[20]
of payment of real property tax for 1996; (g) Revision by the assessor
of Tax Declarations for 1988 and 1990[21]
under the respondent’s name covering the lot in question; (h) the Report[22]
submitted by the Land Registration Authority; (i) the Technical
Description
of the Property[23]
together with the Resurvey Plan;[24]
(j) the Letter of the Land Registration Authority accompanying its
report;[25]
(k) the Certificate of Posting issued by the Process Server of the
court;
and (l) a Certification[26]
from the Office of the City Assessor indicating the boundaries of the
lot.chanrobles virtual law library
On April 7, 1997, the
court a quo rendered a decision granting the petition and ordering the
Register of Deeds to reconstitute the original copy of TCT No. 117130
in
the name of the respondent. The dispositive portion reads as
follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
the amended petition in this case is hereby GRANTED. The Register
of Deeds is hereby ordered to reconstitute the original copy of
Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 117130 in the name of Rafael F. Holazo on the
basis of the technical description and the resurvey plan of the
property
concerned thereby, to wit:
A parcel of
land (Lot) as shown on plan, Rs-00-000483, being a resurvey of Lot 23,
Blk. 18, Pcs-817, L.R.C. Rec. No. 917, situated in Brgy. E. Rodriguez,
(Dist. of Cubao), Quezon City, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon.chanrobles virtual law library
Bounded on the
NW.,
along line 1-2 by Lot 22, Blk. 18, Pcs-817 (Amador Sarroca); on the
NE.,
along line 2-3 by Harvard St., on the SE., along line 3-4 by Lot 24,
Blk.
18, Pcs-817, Manuel Nobleza & Ma. Regina Santos; and on the SW.,
along
line 4-1 by Lot 13, Blk. 18, Pcs-817 (Sps. Teodora T. Escolin &
Yolanda
Escolin).
Beginning at a
point
marked ‘1’ on plan, being S. 85 deg. 11’W., 4,440.32 m. from BLLM-1
Marikina,
thence;
N. 64 deg. 58’E.,
32.00
m. to pt. 2;chanrobles virtual law library
S. 25 deg. 02’E.,
10.00
m. to pt. 3;chanrobles virtual law library
S. 64 deg. 58’W.,
32.00
m. to pt. 4;chanrobles virtual law library
N. 25 deg. 02’W.,
10.00
m. to pt. of
beginning,
containing
an area of THREE HUNDRED TWENTY SQ. METERS (320), more or less.
All
points referred to are indicated on the plan, and are marked on the
ground
by GIS; marked on the corner of hallow (sic) block wall; bearings,
true;
date of original survey, Apr. 8-15, 1920 and that of the resurvey,
Sept.
27, 1994, Approved: 12 Dec. 1994.chanrobles virtual law library
and thereafter, to
issue
to Rafael F. Holazo, petitioner herein, the corresponding owner’s copy
of the certificate of title, so reconstituted, after the payment of any
required fee/s relative thereto.chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.[27]
On May 8, 1997, the OSG
appeared as oppositor on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines and
filed a notice of appeal of the above decision.[28]
In the Court of Appeals, the OSG alleged that the respondent had failed
to present evidence sufficient to warrant the reconstitution of the
original
and the owner’s duplicate copies of TCT No. 117130.chanrobles virtual law library
On January 23, 2001,
the CA rendered its Decision affirming that of the trial court.
It
declared that all the basic requirements of the law on reconstitution
were
complied with, and as such, it was the duty of the trial court to order
the reconstitution of the original and owner’s duplicate copies of the
title in question.cralaw:red
Hence, this petition.cralaw:red
The petitioner Republic
of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
reiterated
the following lone assignment of error it raised in the CA:
WHETHER OR
NOT THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
UPON WHICH THE PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION OF TCT NO. 117130 MAY BE
BASED.[29]
The petitioner contends
that the respondent failed to adduce sufficient and competent evidence
to justify the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed original and
owner’s
duplicate copies of TCT No. 117130. It asserts that the
respondent
who claimed ownership over the property covered by the said title
failed
to testify. It avers that while the respondent’s son and
attorney-in-fact
testified, he failed to adduce any documentary and testimonial evidence
to prove how the respondent acquired the property through any of the
modes
of conveyance recognized by law.
The petitioner further
asserts that the technical description of the property, the tax
declaration
copy of the property and the resurvey plan are not the “other
documents”
envisaged in Section 3(f), in relation to Section 3(a) to (g) of Rep.
Act
No. 26, as amended. The petitioner cites the ruling of this Court
in Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court[30]
that the documents referred to in Section 3(f) of Rep. Act No. 26, as
amended,
refer to documents similar to those enumerated in Section 3(a) to (g)
of
the law. The OSG contends that the absence of documentary
evidence
referred to in Section 3(f) cannot be corrected by the testimonial
evidence
of the respondent’s son that the respondent himself had been in
possession
of the property since 1964.chanrobles virtual law library
In his comment to the
petition, the respondent avers that the petitioner’s failure to file
its
opposition to the petition in the trial court and to adduce its
evidence
in support of such opposition thereby estops the latter from assailing
the sufficiency of evidence presented before the court a quo.cralaw:red
On the other hand, in
affirming the decision of the trial court and traversing the arguments
of the OSG, the CA held as follows:
During the
hearing, the government offered no contradictory evidence, rather, they
allowed petitioner to present evidence ex parte, who then proceeded to
present the sole testimony of Rafael Alexander V. Holazo.
Thereafter,
the case was submitted for decision.
The Solicitor
General’s
main argument is that the petitioner failed to present sufficient proof
to warrant the petition for reconstitution. We find
otherwise.
The evidence presented which are the tax declarations and realty tax
payments
while not conclusive proof of ownership, however, are at least proof
that
the holder had a claim of title over the property, also at best indicia
of possession, and become strong evidence of ownership when acquired by
prescription and accompanied by proof of actual possession of the
property
or supported by other effective proof. The property that is the
subject
matter of the case at hand had been in petitioner’s possession since
1964,
and this fact was never disputed. Besides the absence of any oral
or written opposition on the part of the government and its agencies
through
the Register of Deeds, Land Registration Authority, Office of the
Solicitor
General and the Office of the City Prosecutor, shows that the
government
has no contrary evidence with which to contest and frustrate the
petition.
Hence, its failure to present evidence to the contrary proves that no
interest
of the government was prejudiced by the judgment. As held in the
case of Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court:chanrobles virtual law library
“(i)f the
court
after hearing finds that the evidence presented is sufficient and
proper
to warrant the reconstitution of the lost (destroyed) certificate of
title
and that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property, and
said
certificate was in force at the time it was lost (destroyed), the duty
of the court is to issue the order of reconstitution. This duty
is
mandatory. The law does not give the court discretion to deny the
reconstitution if all the basic requirements have been complied with.”[31] The Ruling
of
the Court
The petition is given
due course and is hereby granted.chanrobles virtual law library
A judicial reconstitution
proceedings is one in rem.[32]
It denotes a restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have
been
lost or destroyed in its original form or condition. The purpose
of the reconstitution of title or any document is to have the same
reproduced,
after observing the procedure prescribed by law, in the same form they
were when the loss or destruction occurred.[33]chanrobles virtual law library
The petition for reconstitution
is mandated to prove not only the loss or destruction of the title
sought
to be reconstituted but also that at the time the said title was lost
or
destroyed, he was the registered owner thereof. The fact that no
opposition is filed by a private party or by the Republic of the
Philippines
will not relieve the petitioner of his burden. The Republic of he
Philippines is not estopped from assailing the decision granting the
petition
if, on the basis of the law and the evidence on record, such petition
has
no merit.cralaw:red
Courts should proceed
with caution in proceedings for reconstitution of titles of land under
Rep. Act No. 26. In Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[34]
citing its ruling in Alabang Development Corporation v. Judge
Valenzuela,[35]
this Court warned that:
The
tampering
of genuine certificates of title and the issuance of fake ones are a
widespread
malaise that has seriously threatened the very stability of the Torrens
system. Worse, the courts have been, at times, unwitting
accomplices
in these acts of corruption. In Alabang, supra, we sounded this
admonition:chanrobles virtual law library
“x
x x We can take judicial notice of innumerable
litigations and controversies that have been spawned by the reckless
and
hasty grant of such reconstitution of alleged lost or destroyed titles
as well as of the numerous purchasers who have been victimized only to
find that the “lands” purchased by them were covered by forged or fake
titles or their areas simply “expanded” through “table surveys” with
the
cooperation of unscrupulous officials.”
an admonition we find
fitting
and proper to reiterate here.[36]
Section 3 of Rep. Act
No. 26, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, provides that transfer
certificates
of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder
enumerated,
as may be available, in the following order:
(a)
The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b)
The
co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate of the certificate of
title;chanrobles virtual law library
(c) A
certified
copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of
deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d)
The
deed of transfer or other document, on file in the registry of deeds,
containing
the description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof,
showing
that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost
or
destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued;
(e) A
document,
on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the
description
of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered,
or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had
been registered; and
(f)
Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient
and
proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of
title.
When Rep. Act No. 26,
Section
2(f), or 3(f) for that matter, speaks of “any other document,” it must
refer to similar documents previously enumerated therein or documents
ejusdem
generis as the documents earlier referred to.[37]
The documents alluded to in Section 3(f) must be resorted to in the
absence
of those preceding in order. If the petitioner for reconstitution
fails to show that he had, in fact, sought to secure such prior
documents
(except with respect to the owner’s duplicate copy of the title which
it
claims had been, likewise, destroyed) and failed to find them, the
presentation
of the succeeding documents as substitutionary evidence is proscribed.
In this case, the respondent
proved that TCT No. 117130 was destroyed by fire when the Quezon City
Hall,
including the Office of the Register of Deeds, was totally burned on
June
11, 1988 as certified by the Register of Deeds.[38]
However, the respondent failed to adduce competent evidence that at the
time of the loss of TCT No. 117130, he, alone, was the lawful owner of
the property. It bears stressing that the respondent failed to
testify;
his lone witness was his son, Rafael Alexander, whose testimony does
not
inspire belief.cralaw:red
First. The original
copy of TCT No. 117130 kept in the Office of the Register of Deeds was
destroyed by fire on June 11, 1988. According to Rafael
Alexander,
the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 117130 in his custody got wet
when
a heavy downpour fell in Metro Manila in 1990 and eventually crumbled
to
pieces. However, the respondent failed to explain why it took him
until August 4, 1994 to execute an affidavit of loss of the owner’s
duplicate
copy of the title and file the same in the Office of the Register of
Deeds
of Quezon City. He, likewise, failed to explain why he filed his
petition in the trial court only on August 30, 1994.cralaw:red
Second. Rafael
Alexander even failed to testify where exactly the owner’s duplicate
copy
of TCT No. 117130 was kept in their house, and the circumstances
surrounding
the incident (the “heavy downpour”) which led to the damage and
destruction
of such title.cralaw:red
Third. Rafael
Alexander testified that the respondent purchased the property but
failed
to adduce a copy of the deed of sale or any document evidencing such
sale.
It bears stressing that under Section 3(f) of Rep. Act No. 26, in case
of the loss or destruction of the owner’s duplicate copy of the title
and
the property covered therein has not been mortgaged or leased, the
petitioner
is bound to adduce in evidence a certified copy of the certificate of
title
previously issued by the Register of Deeds or by a legal custodian
thereof.
In this case, the respondent failed to testify that no such title was
issued
by the Register of Deeds prior to the fire which razed its
office.
In the absence of such certified copy, the respondent was mandated to
adduce
in evidence a copy of the deed of transfer or other document on file in
the Register of Deeds containing the description of the property, or an
authenticated copy thereof showing that its original copy had been
registered
and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of
title
was issued. The respondent failed to do so. He even failed
to show that he had any authenticated copy of the said deed of transfer
showing that the original thereof had been registered in the Register
of
Deeds.cralaw:red
Fourth. The respondent’s
reliance on Tax Declaration No. B-040-00998[39]
and Tax Declaration No. C-040-01-71[40]
under his name is misplaced, because the same are mere revisions signed
by the city assessor and not signed by the respondent himself.
The
respondent did not adduce in evidence the tax declaration signed and
submitted
by him to the Office of the City Assessor before the fire in 1988 and
subsisting
as of 1990. Although the real property tax bill/receipt[41]
issued to the respondent in 1996 was adduced in evidence, realty tax
payment
receipts for 1988 and 1990 were not presented in the court a quo.
Besides, tax declarations or realty tax payments are not conclusive
evidence
of ownership but are mere indicia of possession in the concept of
owners.[42]
Fifth. Rafael
Alexander testified that his parents acquired the property in 1964 and
that his mother was still alive.[43]
However, the respondent, in his petition for reconstitution, averred
that
he was the sole owner of the property, which Rafael Alexander confirmed
when he testified. Erroneously relying on such testimony, the
trial
court ordered the Register of Deeds to reconstitute TCT No. 117130 only
in the name of the respondent.cralaw:red
In sum, then, the respondent
failed to adduce sufficient and competent evidence to warrant a
reconstitution
of TCT No. 117130 in his name.cralaw:red
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The petition for
reconstitution
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, is
DISMISSED.
No costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez,
J.,
(Acting Chairman), Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., (Chairman),
on official leave.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona, with Associate
Justices
Eugenio S. Labitoria and Eloy R. Bello, Jr., concurring.
[2]
Penned by Presiding Judge Reynaldo B. Daway.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
Exhibit “F.”
[4]
Exhibit “G.”
[5]
Exhibit “H.”chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
Exhibits “J” and “K.”
[7]
Exhibit “I.”chanrobles virtual law library
[8]
Records, p. 222.
[9]
Id. at 13.chanrobles virtual law library
[10]
Exhibit “L-2.”
[11]
Exhibit “L-1.”
[12]
Exhibit “L.”
[13]
Records, p. 58.
[14]
Exhibit “C.”chanrobles virtual law library
[15]
Exhibit “D.”
[16]
Exhibit “E.”
[17]
Exhibit “F.”
[18]
Exhibit “G.”
[19]
Exhibit “H.”
[20]
Exhibit “I.”
[21]
Exhibits “J” and “K.”
[22]
Exhibit “L.”
[23]
Exhibit “L-1.”
[24]
Exhibit “L-2.”
[25]
Exhibit “M.”
[26]
Records, p. 222.
[27]
Id. at 288-289.
[28]
Id. at 291.chanrobles virtual law library
[29]
Rollo, p. 12.chanrobles virtual law library
[30]
157 SCRA 62 (1988).
[31]
Rollo, p. 27.chanrobles virtual law library
[32]
Heirs of the late Pedro Pinote v. Judge Dulay, 187 SCRA 12 (1990).
[33]
Ibid.; Lee v. Republic of the Philippines, 366 SCRA 524 (2001); Alipoon
v. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 118 (1999).
[34]
Supra.chanrobles virtual law library
[35]
116 SCRA 261 (1982).chanrobles virtual law library
[36]
Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, p. 70.
[37]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[38]
Exhibit “G.”
[39]
Exhibit “J.”
[40]
Exhibit “K.”
[41]
Exhibit “I.”
[42]
Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago, 404 SCRA 193 (2003); Gapacan v.
Omipet, 387 SCRA 383 (2002); Camara v. Malabao, 407 SCRA 593 (2003);
Heirs
of Ermac v. Heirs of Ermac, 403 SCRA 291 (2003).chanrobles virtual law library
[43]
The provisions of the New Civil Code, applicable at the time, provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art.
160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband
or to the wife.
Art.
148. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1)
That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;chanrobles virtual law library
(2)
That which each acquires, during the marriage by lucrative title;
(3)
That which is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with other
property belonging to only one of the spouses;
(4)
That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or the husband.
Art.
153. The following are conjugal partnership property:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
(1)
That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense
of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or
for only one of the spouses. |