Republic of the
Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
SHOPPES MANILA,
INC.,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
147125
January 14, 2004
-versus-
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
THE HON. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
LABOR ARBITER
ERMITA
ABRASALDO - CUYUCA AND
LORIE TORNO,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Before us is a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Shoppes Manila,
Inc. for the nullification of the May 31, 2000 Decision[1]
and February 2, 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 54109. The Antecedents
The petitioner is a
domestic corporation engaged in garments manufacturing using the brand
name "KAMISETA." On May 6, 1994, the petitioner employed private
respondent
Lorie Torno as trimmer with a salary of P80/day. In September 1995, the
respondent’s salary was increased to P110/day. A year later, it was
increased
to P165/day. In April 1997, her salary was further increased to
P185/day.
The private respondent and a co-employee, Maricar Buan, were tasked to
handle the inventory of finished products.cralaw:red
Sometime thereafter,
the petitioner started to receive information from the head of its
production
department that, according to other employees, Buan and the private
respondent
had been stealing "KAMISETA" items from the factory. The petitioner had
the witnesses interviewed. Susan Paligamba and Loly dela Cruz,
co-employees
of Buan and the private respondent, executed unverified statements
implicating
the latter. In her statement, Paligamba declared that the private
respondent
encouraged her to steal a belt, while Dela Cruz stated that she saw
"KAMISETA"
items in the private respondent’s house. When informed of the foregoing
statements, the latter agreed to have her house inspected and searched
for the alleged stolen items. On July 30, 1997, the private
respondent’s
supervisor, Ms. Myrasol O. Silva, conducted the inspection and
submitted
a report to the effect that she found the following items in the
private
respondent’s house:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1. Several yardages
of fabrics – the one used for Kamiseta T-Shirt (waist cutting).cralaw:red
2. She also showed me
2 pcs. of T-Shirts made out of wrong cut materials for Kamiseta
T-Shirts.
These are cut T-Shirt panels with fabric damage.cralaw:red
3. Used Kamiseta wall
papers.cralaw:red
4. New wall papers that
were intended to be used for Nautical Shop.[2]
On the basis of the
said report, the petitioner issued a disciplinary action form
suspending
the private respondent indefinitely without pay.[3]
On August 25, 1997, a notice of dismissal was addressed to the private
respondent specifying the charge against her, the factual basis thereof
and the imposable penalties for the said charge if proven. The charge
and
notice read:
1) On July 31, 1997,
an investigation was conducted involving you for being under suspicion
of theft.cralaw:red
2) On the same day,
two witnesses gave testimonies. One admitted to visiting your home and
finding numerous KAMISETA clothing. The other said you encouraged her
to
steal a KAMISETA belt from the stocks.cralaw:red
3) On the same day,
you were made aware of the allegations made against you and you were
given
a chance to explain yourself. You were also asked by representatives of
the Company if you were willing to have your home inspected. You agreed
and accompanied the said representatives to your residence.cralaw:red
4) During the said inspection,
the representatives found the following items:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
a. KAMISETA fabrics
(approx. 1¼ yds)
b. 2 pcs. shirts made
out of KAMISETA excess cuttings
c. NAUTICAL SHOP wall
paper
5) On July 31, 1997,
you were given a disciplinary action by the company and placed under
indefinite
suspension without pay for stealing. You signed the said form thereby
accepting
the charges as true.cralaw:red
6) You have violated
Article 12 under Category 4 of our Company rules and regulations. You
have
received a copy of this handbook on March 17, 1997 (Booklet No. 63) and
on the same day you signed your acceptance and compliance to the rules
therein.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
ARTICLE 12 UNDER CATEGORY
4 states: Ang pagnanakaw sa kompanya o pagnanakaw sa iba. Kasama nito
ang:
pagkuha ng anumang pag-aari mula sa kapwa empleyado ng walang
pahintulot.
Ang paglabas/paggamit ng pera ng kompanya ng walang pahintulot.cralaw:red
The above violation
is punishable by termination.cralaw:red
7) You are hereby called
to the Head Office on August 26, 1997 to give you an opportunity to
explain
yourself further.cralaw:red
8) Non-attendance would
mean you have no cause to explain yourself further and the Company
shall
proceed with the evaluation of your case.[4]
The private respondent
failed to appear during the scheduled hearing. Consequently, the
petitioner
decided to dismiss the private respondent from her employment. When
notified
of the petitioner’s decision, the private respondent filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of
backwages,
non-payment of service incentive leave pay and 13th-month pay against
the
petitioner before the National Capital Regional Arbitration Branch of
the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC-NCR Case
No.
00-09-06160-97. The case was initially raffled to Labor Arbiter Emerson
C. Tumanong (LA Tumanong for brevity). Despite mandatory conferences,
the
parties did not reach an amicable settlement. In due course, they
submitted
their respective position papers and replies. The petitioner filed a
motion
for the labor arbiter to conduct a formal investigation on its claim
that
a full blown hearing during which the witnesses can be cross-examined
by
the opposing counsel was necessary to ascertain the truth.[5]
Acting on the motion, LA Tumanong granted the same and set the case for
hearing. However, the hearing failed to materialize because of the
absences
of either the private respondent or her counsel. In the meantime, LA
Tumanong
was replaced by Labor Arbiter Ermita Abrasaldo-Cuyuca (LA Cuyuca for
brevity)
who issued an order declaring that the case was submitted for decision.
The petitioner filed a manifestation and motion informing LA Cuyuca
that
a formal hearing had been set by LA Tumanong and requested that the
case
be set for hearing anew. However, no action was taken by LA Cuyuca on
the
said motion.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On August 31, 1998,
LA Cuyuca rendered a decision holding that the respondent was illegally
dismissed and directed the petitioner to pay P62,530 as backwages and
P19,240
as separation pay to the private respondent. The decretal portion of
the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, Shoppes Manila, Inc., is declared to have illegally
dismissed
Lorie Torno and the former is ordered to pay the latter the amount of
P62,530.00
representing backwages and P19,240.00 as separation pay.[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
LA Cuyuca declared that
the private respondent was denied of her right to due process before
she
was dismissed from her employment and that the petitioner failed to
show
that it notified the private respondent of the charges against her. The
petitioner also failed to show that the private respondent received the
notice of dismissal. Hence, the dismissal of the private respondent was
illegal. However, according to the labor arbiter, reinstatement could
no
longer be effected, as the relationship between the private respondent
and the petitioner had been strained and ruptured. The private
respondent’s
claims for non-payment of service incentive leave and 13th-month pay
were
denied for her failure to specify the period covered therein. Her claim
of underpayment of wages (wage differential) was, likewise, denied, as
it was not included in the original complaint.cralaw:red
Aggrieved, the petitioner
appealed the decision to the NLRC, alleging that it was deprived of its
right to a formal hearing before the labor arbiter rendered her
decision.
It argued that while the conduct of hearing is not mandatory in labor
cases,
the Labor Arbiter was mandated to do so in this case because LA
Tumanong
had already declared that a formal hearing was necessary. Hence, the
petitioner
had acquired a vested right thereto. LA Cuyuca’s failure to conduct a
hearing
deprived the petitioner of its vested right; consequently, her decision
was null and void.cralaw:red
On March 17, 1999, the
NLRC issued a resolution dismissing the appeal and affirming the
decision
of the labor arbiter. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the appeal is hereby dismissed for lack of merit and the
decision
affirmed en (sic) toto.[7]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The NLRC reasoned that
a formal hearing of the case on its merits is not mandatory in labor
cases
but is dependent on the discretion of the labor arbiter who has the
sole
power to determine whether or not there is a need for a hearing. Thus,
in finding that there was no longer a need to conduct a hearing before
rendering judgment of the case on its merits, LA Cuyuca cannot be said
to have committed an error.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The NLRC also ruled
that no error could be imputed to LA Cuyuca when she found that the
petitioner
did not comply with the two-notice requirement upon the petitioner’s
failure
to show that (a) she was notified of the charges against her, and (b)
the
notice of dismissal was sent to her.cralaw:red
The petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in a
Resolution
dated May 18, 1999.cralaw:red
Dissatisfied, the petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
before
the Court of Appeals. The petitioner alleged therein that LA Cuyuca
committed
a grave abuse of discretion when she rendered a decision without even
conducting
a formal hearing to enable the petitioner to cross-examine the private
respondent and her witnesses. It reiterated the contention that it had
acquired a vested right to a formal hearing when LA Tumanong granted
its
motion therefor.cralaw:red
The CA rendered judgment
affirming the decision of the NLRC and the finding of both the NLRC and
LA Cuyuca that the private respondent was deprived of due process and
was
thus illegally dismissed. The CA ruled that as laid down in Section 4,
Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, a formal hearing is
not
required in proceedings before the labor arbiter; hence, a failure on
the
part of LA Cuyuca to conduct a formal hearing prior to the rendition of
judgment did not give rise to a grave abuse of discretion on her part.
Moreover, the petitioner was able to appeal the decision of the labor
arbiter
to the NLRC; it cannot thus contend that it was deprived of its right
to
defend itself.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The CA emphasized that
in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
CA
cannot evaluate the findings of fact of the labor arbiter and the NLRC.
Its inquiry is limited to the determination of whether or not the
public
respondent had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion. In this case, the labor arbiter declared that the
petitioner failed to show that the private respondent’s dismissal was
for
a just cause.cralaw:red
The petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration was denied in a CA Resolution dated February 2,
2001.[8]
The petitioner forthwith
filed the instant petition, assigning the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ABSENCE OF A FORMAL HEARING DID
NOT
AMOUNT TO A DENIAL OF PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ILLEGALITY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S
DISMISSAL
DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF JUST CAUSES IN SUPPORT THEREOF.[9]
The petition is barren
of merit.cralaw:red
The petitioner contends
that when LA Tumanong agreed to conduct a formal hearing of the case
and,
indeed, set the case for hearing, the petitioner thenceforth acquired a
vested right. This decision could no longer be set aside by LA
Tumanong’s
successor; otherwise, the petitioner would be deprived of its right to
due process. The petitioner likewise pointed out that the violation of
the notice requirement did not render the private respondent’s
dismissal
as illegal, especially considering that the termination of the
employment
was based on a just and valid cause.cralaw:red
We agree with the CA
that the petitioner did not have a vested right to a formal hearing
simply
and merely because LA Tumanong granted its motion and set the case for
hearing. Pursuant to Section 5, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of
the NLRC,[10]
the labor arbiter has the authority to determine whether or not there
is
a necessity to conduct formal hearings in cases brought before him for
adjudication. The holding of a formal hearing or trial is discretionary
with the labor arbiter and is something that the parties cannot demand
as a matter of right. It is entirely within his authority to decide a
labor
case before him, based on the position papers and supporting documents
of the parties, without a trial or formal hearing.[11]
The requirements of due process are satisfied when the parties are
given
the opportunity to submit position papers wherein they are supposed to
attach all the documents that would prove their claim in case it be
decided
that no hearing should be conducted or was necessary.[12]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The order of LA Tumanong
granting the petitioner’s motion for a hearing of the case was not
conclusive
and binding on LA Cuyuca who had the discretion either to hear the case
before deciding it, or to forego with the hearing if, in her view,
there
was no longer a need therefor as the case could be resolved on its
merits
based on the records.cralaw:red
Similarly, we affirm
the finding of the CA that the private respondent was illegally
dismissed.
In order to effect a valid dismissal, the law requires that (a) there
be
just and valid cause as provided under Article 282 of the Labor Code;[13]
and (b) the employee be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to
defend
himself.[14]
As stated by the CA,
the petitioner had failed to show that it had complied with the
two-notice
requirement: (a) a written notice containing a statement of the cause
for
the termination to afford the employee ample opportunity to be heard
and
defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so
desires;
(b) if the employer decides to terminate the services of the employee,
the employer must notify him in writing of the decision to dismiss him,
stating clearly the reason therefor.[15]
We must stress that
only errors of law are generally reviewed by this Court in petitions
for
review on certiorari of the CA decisions.[16]
Questions of fact are not entertained.[17]
The Court is not a trier of facts, and in labor cases; this doctrine
applies
with greater force. Factual questions are for labor tribunals to
resolve.[18]
The findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, like the NLRC, are
accorded
with respect, even finality, if supported by substantial evidence.
Particularly,
when passed upon and upheld by the CA, they are binding and conclusive
upon the Court and will not normally be disturbed.[19]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
May 31, 2000 and Resolution dated February 2, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 54109 are AFFIRMED.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, J., (Chairman), Quisumbing,
and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez,
J.,
no part.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion with Associate
Justices
Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez (now Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court)
and Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos concurring.
[2]
Annex "C," Rollo, p. 42.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Rollo, p. 52.
[4]
Annex "F," Rollo, p. 45.
[5]
Annex "I," Rollo, pp. 48-49.
[6]
Id. at 59.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Id. at 69.
[8]
Id. at 41.
[9]
Id. at 15.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Section 4. Determination of Necessity of Hearing. – Immediately after
the
submission by the parties of their position papers/memorandum, the
Labor
Arbiter shall motu propio determine whether there is need for a formal
trial or hearing. At this stage, he may, at his discretion and for the
purpose of making such determination, ask clarificatory questions to
further
elicit facts or information, including but not limited to the subpoena
of relevant documentary evidence, if any, from any party or witness.
[11]
Columbus Philippines Bus Corporation v. NLRC, 364 SCRA 606 (2001).
[12]
Mark Roche International v. NLRC, 313 SCRA 356 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Article 282. Termination by employer. – An employer may terminate an
employee
for any of the following causes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a)
Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
lawful
order of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b)
Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(c)
Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by
his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d)
Commission of a crime or offense against the person of his employer or
any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representative;
and
(e)
Other causes analogous to the foregoing.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Teodorico Rosario v. Victory Ricemill, G.R. No. 147572, February 19,
2003.
[15]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Producers Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115324, February 19, 2003.
[17]
Alfaro v. Court of Appeals, 363 SCRA 799 (2001).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
Hacienda Fatima v. National Federation of Sugarcane Workers-Food, etc.,
G.R. No. 149440, January 28, 2003.
[19]
San Miguel Corporation v. MAERC Integrated Services, Inc., G.R. No.
144672,
July 10, 2003. |