SECOND DIVISION
ROSALIE ODERON
VDA.
DE CARDONA,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
147216
April 15, 2004
-versus-
MARCELINO AMANSEC,
Respondent.
R E S O L U
T I O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This is a petition for
review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Resolution[1]
of the Court of Appeals, dismissing the petition for review in CA-G.R.
SP No. 60684 and its resolution denying the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration
of its first resolution. The Antecedents
On July 16, 1999, petitioner
Rosalie Oderon Vda. de Cardona, filed a Complaint for Ejectment against
Marcelino Amansec with the Municipal Trial Court of Alaminos,
Pangasinan,
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 1878. The petitioner, the plaintiff
therein,
alleged, inter alia, that her son, Ronald Cardona was the owner of a
residential
lot with an area of 1,654 square meters, located in Barangay Cabalera,
Alaminos, Pangasinan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No.
12797 and declared for taxation purposes in his name under Tax
Declaration
No. 227 of the Municipal Assessor of Alaminos. Ronald Cardona
died
intestate on February 18, 1997 and was survived by the petitioner, as
his
sole heir. According to the petitioner, respondent Marcelino Amansec
entered
the property without authority therefor and started erecting
residential
houses. The petitioner, thereafter, sent a formal demand letter[2]
dated May 3, 1999, for the respondent to vacate the property which the
latter received on May 5, 1999.[3]
However, the respondent failed and refused to vacate the property.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In his answer to the
complaint, the respondent averred that he was the tenant of Isabel
Raroque
on the latter’s three (3) parcels of land covered by TCT No. 10163 and
by Original Certificates of Title (OCT) Nos. 1559 and 1379. The lots
had
a land area of 1,654 square meters, 41,176 square meters and 3,799
square
meters, respectively. The said parcels of land were classified as
riceland,
as per the Certification[4]
dated August 13, 1999, issued by Jose A. Camero, Municipal Agrarian
Reform
Office (MARO) and the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), District of
Alaminos, Pangasinan.
Sometime in 1978, he
constructed a house on the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 10163 with
the permission of Isabel Raroque. Emancipation Patents were thereafter
issued to him in 1992 covering the parcels of land covered by OCT Nos.
1559 and 1379. He later discovered that sometime in 1989, Isabel
Raroque had sold the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 10163 without
his
knowledge. According to the respondent, considering the existence of a
tenancy relationship between him and Isabel Raroque, the petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest,
the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
To prove that the
property
was agricultural and not residential, the respondent adduced in
evidence
the Deed of Absolute Sale over the property executed by Isabel Raroque
on February 27, 1989, and Tax Declaration No. 6385 for 1990 under her
name.
He also adduced in evidence the MARO Certification dated August 13,
1999,
that the property was classified as riceland and tenanted by the
defendant
who had been granted Emancipation Patent No. 181144 over Lot 2057-B,
Cad-325-D
with an area of 11,176 square meters and Emancipation Patent No. 151895
over Lot No. 57-D of the same cadastre. The respondent alleged,
thus:
10. That as early as
1978 up to the present my possession over the landholding of Isabel
Raroque,
particularly the subject property was never disturbed until the filing
of Civil Case No. 1878 in the guise that Isabel Raroque had transferred
to plaintiff’s son via Deed of Absolute Sale the said (sic) property is
disregard (sic) of my rights as agricultural lessee under R.A. 3844, as
amended by R.A. 6389, otherwise known as Agricultural Land Reform Code,
and for other purposes;[5]
Meanwhile, on January
20, 2000, the respondent filed a petition with the DARAB, Region I,
Lingayen,
Pangasinan, against Rosalie de Cardona, praying for the (a)
nullification
of the Deed of Sale dated February 27, 1989 executed between Isabel
Raroque,
as seller, and Ronald Cardona, as buyer, with respect to Lot No. 2055
covered
by TCT No. 10163, and (b) issuance of an emancipation patent in
his
favor over the said Lot No. 2055.cralaw:red
On March 30, 2000, the
MTC rendered a Decision[6]
in Civil Case No. 1878, dismissing the complaint for ejectment filed by
the petitioner, on the ground of the existence of a tenancy
relationship
between the respondent and Isabel Raroque. The plaintiff appealed
the decision to the regional trial court, docketed as Civil Case No.
A-2668.cralaw:red
In a parallel development,
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Roberto Caoayan, rendered a
Decision
dated August 7, 2000[7]
granting the petition of the respondent. The Deed of Absolute
Sale
executed by Isabel Raroque in favor of Ronald Cardona was declared void
ab initio and the DAR Provincial Office was ordered to fast track the
granting
of the emancipation patent in respondent’s favor over the land in
question.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Aggrieved by the decision,
the petitioner decided to appeal the decision. However, instead
of
perfecting her appeal to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) in Quezon City, she filed on September 6, 2000 a motion
for
extension of time to file a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals.
She averred therein that she received a copy of the decision of the
PARAD
on August 7, 2000 and, thus, had until August 30, 2000 to file the
petition.
She, likewise, prayed that she be given an extension of fifteen days or
until September 15, 2000 within which to file her petition.
According
to the computation of the petitioners, the last day of the 15-day
extension
would fall on September 15, 2000. Thus, the petitioner filed the
petition for review on the said date.cralaw:red
On September 25, 2000,
the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution[8]
granting the petitioner’s motion for extension of 15 days. It,
however,
clarified that the last day of the additional 15-day extension would
fall
on September 15, 2000 as counted by the petitioner. The said
resolution
was received by the petitioner on October 3, 2000.cralaw:red
On October 5, 2000,
the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution[9]
dismissing the petition for having been filed out of time, as the same
was filed one day late. The petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration
from the said resolution, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated
November 13, 2000.[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On November 27, 2000,
the regional trial court rendered a Decision[11]
in Civil Case No. 2668 reversing and setting aside the decision of the
MTC. The RTC ruled that the defendant failed to prove the
existence
of any tenancy relationship between him and Isabel Raroque, the only
basis
used by the MTC being
the
defendant’s claim that such
relationship
existed.cralaw:red
The defendant (respondent)
filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied on June 25,
2001. He did not file a petition for review of the decision of
the
CA. The petitioner forthwith filed on August 28, 2001 a motion
for
the issuance of a writ of execution with the Municipal Trial Court of
Alaminos,
Pangasinan.cralaw:red
On April 17, 2001, the
petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court
for
the nullification of the resolutions of the CA dismissing her petition.cralaw:red
In the meantime, the
Municipal Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, held in abeyance the
resolution
of the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution filed by the
petitioner
(plaintiff therein) pending the resolution of the present petition.[12]
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is denied
due course and is dismissed.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We agree with the petitioner
that she was guilty of excusable negligence when she overlooked that
the
month of August consists not of thirty (30) days, but of thirty-one
(31)
days.[13]
In Samala vs. Court of Appeals,[14]
we held that a one-day delay does not justify the outright dismissal of
an appeal.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Nonetheless, we resolve
to deny due course to and dismiss the instant petition for review on
certiorari
on the ground that the proper remedy from a decision of the PARAD was
an
appeal to the DARAB and not a petition for review in the Court of
Appeals
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Rule XIII, Sections 1, 2 and
3 of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure provides, thus:
SECTION 1. Appeal to
the Board. a) An appeal may be taken from an order, resolution or
decision
of the Adjudicator to the Board by either of the parties or both,
orally
or in writing, within a period of fifteen (15) days from the receipt of
the order, resolution or decision appealed from, and serving a copy
thereof
on the adverse party, if the appeal is in writing.cralaw:red
b) An oral appeal shall be reduced into writing by the Adjudicator to
be
signed by the appellant, and a copy thereof shall be served upon the
adverse
party within ten (10) days from the taking of the oral appeal.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SECTION 2. Grounds.
The aggrieved party may appeal to the Board from a final order,
resolution
or decision of the Adjudicator on any of the following grounds:
a) That errors in the findings of facts or conclusions of laws were
committed
which, if not corrected, would cause grave and irreparable damage or
injury
to the appellant;
b) That there is a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Adjudicator;
orchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
c) That the order, resolution or decision is obtained through fraud or
coercion.cralaw:red
SECTION 3. Where to
File. The notice of appeal shall be filed with the Adjudicator
concerned
in three (3) legibly written copies.cralaw:red
SECTION 4. Caption.
In all cases appealed to the Board, the party appealing shall be called
the “appellant” and the adverse party the “appellee,” and the case
shall
be assigned a docket number.cralaw:red
SECTION 5. Requisites
and Perfection of the Appeal. a) The Notice of Appeal shall be filed
within
the reglementary period as provided for in Section 1 of this Rule. It
shall
state the date when the appellant received the order or judgment
appealed
from and the proof of service of the notice to the adverse party; andchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
b) An appeal fee of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) shall be paid by the
appellant
within the reglementary period to the DAR Cashier where the Office of
the
Adjudicator is situated. A pauper litigant shall, however, be
exempt
from the payment of the appeal fee.cralaw:red
Non-compliance with
the above-mentioned requisites shall be a ground for the dismissal of
the
appeal.cralaw:red
Under the said rules,
the petitioner should have appealed the decision of the PARAD to the
DARAB
orally or in writing, and perfected the said appeal within the
requisite
period and in the manner provided therefor. The petitioner failed to do
so.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The well-entrenched
rule is that appeal is merely a statutory right and must be availed of
within the period and in the manner provided for by law; otherwise,
upon
the lapse of the period to appeal from a decision or final order and no
appeal has been perfected by the aggrieved party, such final order or
decision
ipso facto becomes final and executory. The appellate court does
not acquire appellate jurisdiction over a belated appeal from the said
order or decision.[15]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED due course and is hereby DISMISSED.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, J., (Chairman),
Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.cralaw:red
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner with Associate Justices
(now
Presiding Justice) Cancio C. Garcia and Andres B. Reyes, Jr. concurring.
[2]
Records, p. 9.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Id. at 53.
[5]
Id. at 58.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Penned by Judge Benjamin N. Abella.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 15-18.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Id. at 33-34.
[9]
Id. at 35-36.
[10]
Id. at 37-38.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Penned by Judge Lilia C. Español.
[12]
Records, p. 181.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Mata vs. Flores, 25 SCRA 876 (1968).
[14]
363 SCRA 535 (2001).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Philippine Commercial International Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA
560 (1994). |