THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
G.R.
No.
147315
January 13, 2003
-versus-
TOMAS
VISPERAS
JR.
ALIAS "BOY SAKSAK";JACINTO CRUZ ALIAS
"BOY LAGARE" (acquitted);AND AVELINO CABLAYAN
ALIAS "WILLY" (acquitted),
Accused, |
TOMAS VISPERAS
JR.
ALIAS "BOY SAKSAK,"
Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN,
J.:cralaw:red
Once again, we rule
that the credible and positive testimony of a single eyewitness is
sufficient
to sustain a conviction. Where the guilt of the accused is firmly
established by the lone eyewitness’ unwavering and unequivocal
testimony
that positively identifies him as the assailant, the defense of denial
and alibi must inevitably collapse. Without any proven qualifying
circumstance, however, the killing constitutes homicide only, not
murder.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Case
Tomas Visperas Jr. appeals
the December 15, 2000 Decision[1]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City (Branch 42) in
Criminal
Case No. 99-03076-D, finding him guilty of murder as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"WHEREFORE, premises
considered, accused AVELINO CABLAYAN alias ‘Willy’ and JACINTO CRUZ
alias
‘Boy Lagare’ are hereby acquitted of the offense charged. Accused
TOMAS VISPERAS, JR. alias ‘Boy Saksak’, on the other hand, is hereby
found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, which is MURDER
as defined by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by RA
No. 7659, otherwise known as the Heinous Crime Law, and there being no
aggravating and mitigating circumstance to be considered, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. In
addition,
he is to indemnify the death of Tito de Guzman in the amount
P50,000.00,
and to pay the heirs of the said victim P130,000.00 as actual and
compensatory
damages, P20,000.00 as temperate damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and costs."[2]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the Information dated
September 2, 1999, appellant, together with Jacinto Cruz and Avelino
Cablayan,
was charged in these words: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"That on or about June
23, 1999 at around 10:45 o’clock in the evening at Barangay
Embarcadero,
[M]unicipality of Mangaldan, [P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused,
armed with an unlicensed gun, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident
premeditation and taking advantage of nighttime, conspiring,
confederating
and mutually helping each other, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully
and feloniously attack and shot TITO DE GUZMAN y PIDLAOAN causing his
death
shortly thereafter due to ‘CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST SECONDARY TO
MASSIVE
BRAIN INJURY DUE TO GUNSHOT WOUND’, as per Certificate of Death issued
by Dra. Ophelia Rivera, Rural Health Officer I, RHU, Mangaldan,
Pangasinan,
to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased TITO DE
GUZMAN y PIDLAOAN and other consequential damages relative thereto."[3]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Upon his arraignment
on September 27, 1999,[4]
appellant, assisted by his counsel de oficio,[5]
pleaded not guilty. After trial in due course, the court a quo
rendered
the assailed Decision. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief, the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecution’s version of
the
facts as follows: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On June 23, 1999, around
10:45 o’clock in the evening, Elmadona de Guzman was in the kitchen of
their house in Barangay Embarcadero, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, waiting for
her husband to enter their abode. As she was thirsty, she went to
a table in the kitchen on which a pitcher of glass water was. She
was drinking water when she heard gunbursts. Shocked, she was
temporarily
immobilized, but after a few seconds, she moved towards the eastern
window
of the kitchen and peeped outside to where the sound of the gunbursts
came
from. With the outside illumined by the light from her mother’s
house
which was near their house, she saw accused Jacinto Cruz alias ‘Boy
Lagare’
holding a long gun, with its nozzle still smoking, pointed at the
bloodied
and falling body of her husband. Appellant Tomas Visperas ran
towards
the falling body of her husband and shot him at close range, on the
forehead.
Accused Avelino Cablayan alias ‘Willy’ then ‘touched’ the victim’s
body,
apparently to see if he was dead and said ‘let’s go’.cralaw:red
Jojit Cruz, her cousin,
who was then heading towards his house, also heard gunbursts and ran
towards
the victim’s house. When he got there, he saw the victim sprawled
and bloodied on the ground of their backyard. He shouted calling
for Elmadona to come down as her husband was shot dead. Crouching
in the kitchen window, shocked, she went down and saw her husband’s
lifeless
body lying on the ground. Together with Jojit Cruz, Ullyses
Fernandez
(her brother-in-law), Boyet Frialde, and Boyet Fernandez, she brought
her
husband to the Dagupan Centrum Hospital where he was pronounced dead on
arrival. They then brought the dead body to Funeraria Aguila
where
Dr. Ophelia Rivera conducted the autopsy. Thereafter, they
brought
him to the house of his parents in Bolingit, San Carlos City for the
wake
and burial. The following morning, on June 24, 1999, Elmadona
reported
the shooting of her husband to police officer Bingo de Asis, in the
Mangaldan
Police Station. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Around past 10:50 in
the evening of June 23, 1999, Ferdinand ‘Bingo’ Zamora de Asis,
received
an information through radio that there was a shooting incident in the
place of the victim Tito de Guzman in Barangay Embarcadero, Mangaldan,
Pangasinan. His team composed of SPO2 Malanum, SPO1 Socao, SPO1
Aqui,
Jr., SPO1 Garcia, and himself proceeded to the crime scene. When
they got there, there were many people gathered around the area that
they
had to secure it to preserve the physical evidence. They found
out
from the crowd that the victim [had already been] brought to the
hospital.
Within the area where the body was found, they found an empty shell of
a .30 caliber bullet. One (1) meter away from where the empty
bullet
was, they found blood stains. About seven (7) meters away from
the
blood stains was a concrete fence, and on its side facing the blood
stain
was a shallow hole apparently caused by a bullet. Near the blood
stains, they found an empty pot, ‘caldero,’ and in it were pieces of
meat,
bits of flesh torn from the victim’s body when he was shot. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Dr. Ophelia T. Rivera
conducted the autopsy of the victim.cralaw:red
x x
x
x x
x
x x x
"She emphasized that
the head wound caused the instantaneous death of the victim due to
‘cardiorespiratory
arrest secondary to massive brain injury.’"[6]
(Citations omitted)
Version of the Defensechanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
For his part, appellant
states his version of the antecedents in the following manner: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
At about 10:45 o’clock
in the evening of June 23, 1999, at Barangay Embarcadero, Municipality
of Mangaldan, Province of Pangasinan, Tito de Guzman was shot while
walking
along the pathway in an open parcel of land leading to his home.
According to the Post-mortem Report, x x x, he sustained through and
through
wounds just about or below his armpit and on his forehead which caused
his death due to ‘cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to massive brain
injury’. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The prosecution presented
as its first witness the widow, Elmadona de Guzman, as an
‘eyewitness’.
x x x.cralaw:red
x x
x
x x
x
x x x
The prosecution next
presented Dr. Ophelia Rivera, Municipal Health Officer. In her
direct
examination, she was merely made to identify her Post-Mortem Report x x
x.cralaw:red
x x
x
x x
x
x x x
The third and last witness
for the prosecution is PO2 Ferdinand Zamora de Asis, Police
Investigator,
Mangaldan Police Station. The only significant testimony of PO2
de
Asis are his findings that: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(1) one (1) empty shell
bearing ‘caliber .30’ at the base thereof, which he assumed belonged to
a .30 caliber carbine
(2) blood stains about
one (1) meter away from, and west of, the empty shell.cralaw:red
(3) A shallow hole caused
by a bullet on the concrete fence of Mrs. Columbres, about seven (7)
meters
from, and east of, the blood stain.cralaw:red
All the accused, namely:
TOMAS VISPERAS, Jr., JACINTO CRUZ AND AVELINO CABLAYAN interposed their
separate and individual defense of alibi.cralaw:red
On the basis of the
alibi of Jacinto Cruz x x x and the alibi of Avelino Cablayan, both
accused
were acquitted of the charge against the three (3) accused of
‘conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, did then and there
attack
and shot TITO DE GUZMAN Y PIDLAOAN causing his death shortly thereafter
due to cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to massive brain injury due
to gunshot wound’.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"On the other hand,
accused-appellant Tomas Visperas, Jr. was convicted of the crime
charged."[7]
(Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial
Court chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The RTC found Prosecution
Witness Elmadona de Guzman’s positive identification of appellant as
one
of the gunmen to be sufficient and convincing. It likewise upheld
the investigation conducted by PO2 Ferdinand de Asis, which had
affirmed
the participation of appellant in the killing. Further, the trial
court ruled that the defense of alibi lacked credibility, because it
was
not impossible for appellant to have been at the crime scene on that
fateful
night. It also found it odd that he did not even attend the wake
and the burial of the victim who, he claimed, was his compadre and
friend.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Hence, this appeal.[8]
Issues
In his Brief, appellant
raises for our consideration the RTC’s alleged errors:
I
The trial court erred
in convicting the accused appellant Tomas Visperas, Jr. on the basis of
the testimony of the widow, Elmadona de Guzman.
II
The trial court erred
[in] relying on the hearsay testimony of police officer De Asis x x x
[regarding]
an allege[d] statement of unidentified persons who were not called to
the
witness stand. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
III
The trial court erred
in theorizing that a bullet fired from a ‘30-caliber’ x x x handgun,
after
plowing through the ground, ricocheted and hit the forehead of the
victim
while ‘falling down’. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
IV
The trial court erred
in theorizing that the place where the empty 30-caliber cartridge was
found
is also the place where the gunman stood, hence the absence of
tat[t]ooing
on the forehead of the victim. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
V
"The trial court erred
in not acquitting the accused-appellant Tomas Visperas, Jr."[9]
In the main, the Court
is called upon to determine whether the testimony of Elmadona de Guzman
was credible and sufficient to convict appellant of murder. We
will
likewise ascertain whether the physical evidence lends credence to her
account, and whether the trial court erred in accepting hearsay
evidence.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is partly
meritorious. Appellant is guilty of homicide, not murder. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Main Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution
Evidence
This Court is convinced
that through the staunch, positive and credible testimony of Elmadona,
the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of appellant. Despite
the grueling cross-examination, she testified repeatedly and
unwaveringly
that he had indeed shot her husband at close range. Specifically,
she narrated that after her husband had faced a hail of bullets from a
rifle, appellant approached him and shot him on the forehead.[10]
Her testimony was corroborated by the Post-mortem Report of Dr. Ophelia
T. Rivera, the medico legal officer who had conducted the
autopsy.
According to the Report, the victim sustained three gunshot wounds, of
which the head wound was the fatal one. The Report reads as
follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Findings:
x x
x
x x
x
x x x
3. Point of entry: Gunshot
wound, 1.2 cm x 1.2 cm, stellate in shape, edges inverted, frontal
area,
left Point of Exit: Gunshot wound, 5 cm x 1.5 cm, irregular in shape,
edges
everted, occipital area, Right, with brain eviscerating from the wound.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Depressed fracture of
the skull, frontal area, left Comminuted fracture of the skull.cralaw:red
CAUSE OF DEATH;
CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST
SECONDARY TO MASSIVE BRAIN INJURY DUE TO GUNSHOT WOUND."[11]
Well-settled is the
rule that the testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible and
positive,
is sufficient to support a conviction, even in a charge of murder.[12]
The trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not
be
disturbed by this Court on appeal, absent any arbitrariness or
oversight
of facts or circumstances of weight and substance.[13]
After thoroughly reviewing the records of the case, we find no cogent
reason
to reverse the findings of the trial court, which believed in
Elmadona’s
testimony.cralaw:red
Appellant also asks
how, on the basis of her testimony, the RTC could convict him but
acquit
his co-accused. Appellant berates the court a quo for giving
credence
to the testimony in order to convict him, while at the same time
discounting
it to acquit his co-accused. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is a well-entrenched
rule that the accused are convicted on the strength of the evidence
presented
against them. Their conviction may or may not be dependent on
evidence
proffered against their co-accused. In the present case, the
conviction
of appellant did not rest upon exactly the same evidence used to acquit
his two co-accused; thus, the latter’s acquittal should not necessarily
benefit him. We will discuss the damning evidence against him
later.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Denial and Alibi
Against Elmadona de
Guzman’s straightforward, convincing and credible eyewitness account,
appellant
interposes the defense of denial and alibi. He disowns
participation
in the crime, claiming to have been with his uncle during its
occurrence
and to have headed straight home to his wife thereafter. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
To merit credibility,
denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability.[14]
Unable to show such evidence, herein appellant fails to overcome
Elmadona’s
testimony, which positively identified him as one of the perpetrators
of
the crime. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As for his alibi, he
should have proven that it was physically impossible for him to have
been
at the scene of the crime when it was committed.[15]
By physical impossibility we refer to the distance and the facility of
access between the situs criminis[16]
and the place where he says he was when the crime was committed.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant argues that
he was drinking gin with his uncle in Barangay Apaya when the killing
occurred.
However, the former himself testified that Barangay Apaya was only 14
kilometers
away from Barangay Embarcadero, where the victim’s house was located.[17]
As correctly observed by the trial court, he could have readily reached
Embarcadero on his uncle’s motorcycle.[18]
Further, for the Court
to give credence to the alibi of appellant, he must provide clear and
credible
evidence that he was in another place at the time the crime was
perpetrated.[19]
However, no witnesses -- other than his wife, Lyra Visperas; and his
uncle,
Jose Bronuela Jr. -- were presented to support his alibi. Jose
testified
that he had been at home drinking with appellant between 6:30 p.m. and
10:30 p.m.,[20]
while Lyra testified that appellant had come home around 11:00 p.m. on
June 23, 1999.[21]
Alibi is the weakest
of all defenses, as it is easy to contrive and difficult to
disprove.
Thus, it is viewed with caution especially when, as in the instant
case,
it is corroborated only by relatives of appellant.[22]
Truly unconvincing is his alibi, which is supported only by his and his
relatives’ testimonies, not by more credible witnesses.[23]
Collateral Issues
Inconsistent Testimony
Appellant maintains
that several inconsistencies in the testimony of Elmadona diminishes
her
credibility. She testified to having been immobilized by fear
when
she first heard the gunfire. He contends that she could not have
peeped through the window and witnessed the succeeding events, as she
later
said in court, if she had indeed been paralyzed by fear.[24]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Such seeming inconsistency,
which at first glance may raise doubts on the truthfulness of her
statements,
was satisfactorily explained. A review of her testimony shows
that
while she froze in fear, she was still able to look out through the
window[25]
without being seen from the outside. Appellant’s assertion that
she
could not have done so is purely argumentative and speculative.
It
collapses in the face of her repeated and consistent testimony, first
during
direct and later during cross-examination, that she actually witnessed
the shooting.[26]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Motive
Appellant insinuates
that Elmadona was ill-motivated in accusing him of killing her
husband.
Appellant’s allegation, however, is unsubstantiated. As the widow
of the victim, she was the most aggrieved party. Her motive -- to
put his killers behind bars -- cannot be considered improper.[27]
We have held that it is unnatural for an aggrieved relative who
earnestly
seeks justice to falsely accuse someone other than the actual culprit.[28]
Thus, since no improper motive on her part has been shown, the sound
conclusion
is that no such motive existed. Her testimony is worthy of full
faith
and credence.[29]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Hearsay
Appellant contends that
the RTC improperly accepted hearsay evidence when it convicted
him.
This evidence pertains to the interviews PO2 de Asis elicited from
persons
near the crime scene who declared appellant as one of the gunmen.[30]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We agree. The
interviews are hearsay and thus lack probative value, because the
persons
interviewed by PO2 de Asis were never presented in court.[31]
It is of no moment that no timely objection was raised during the trial
in the face of such evidence.[32]
A conviction can never be rooted thereon, because it is not grounded on
the personal knowledge of the witness, but on the knowledge of some
other
person who was not cross-examined on the witness stand.[33]
Thus, the court a quo erred when it used the interviews conducted by
PO2
de Asis. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Nonetheless, we emphasize
that appellant’s guilt was proven by Elmadona’s testimony, which was in
turn buttressed by the physical evidence.cralaw:red
Physical Evidence
At this point, it is
worthwhile to discuss the lower court’s assessment of the physical
evidence.
First, the RTC theorized that because the bloodstains of the victim
were
one meter away from the recovered shell, he had been at the same
distance
away from one of the gunmen. Second, no tattooing appeared on the
head wound of the victim, because he was about a meter away from the
assailant;
not less than three feet, which is the distance at which tattooing
appears.[34]
Third, the slug recovered from his head was deformed, because it had
merely
ricocheted after hitting the ground.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant avers that
the above theory is erroneous. First, he says that tattooing should
still
have surrounded the head wound, because the assailant -- firing his gun
a meter away --- would have extended his arm. Thus, the distance
between the gun and the victim would have been less than three
feet.
Second, no deformed bullet or slug, which had purportedly hit the head
of the victim, was ever introduced in evidence. He The victim was
hit on the head with a .30 caliber bullet that ricocheted, not from the
ground as the trial court theorized, but from the wall seven meters
behind
him. Appellant claims that these circumstances all lead to a
single
conclusion: he could not have shot the victim at close range with a
handgun,
because it was a .30 caliber rifle from which came the bullet that
killed
and fully went through the latter’s head and then through the wall
behind.cralaw:red
We clarify. First,
we sustain the contention of appellant that no deformed bullet or slug
was presented in evidence. Neither was there any extracted from
the
head or body of the victim, the ground, or the wall behind him.
The
trial court may have been confused with the testimony of the expert
witness,
Dr. Bu Castro, who had testified that a deformed high velocity object
could
have caused the head injury.[35]
Established from the evidence were merely "soil disturbance" and a hole
in the wall behind the victim, both allegedly caused by bullets.
However, we cannot sustain the theory of the defense that a .30 caliber
bullet hit him on the head, because no bullet was ever recovered either
from his body or from the crime scene. Thus, the kind of bullet
that
hit him cannot possibly be established. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Second, it is true that
the policemen recovered from the ground -- one meter away from the
victim’s
bloodstains -- not a bullet but a .30 caliber empty shell or bullet
casing,[36]
which was the only one recovered from the crime scene.[37]
As testified to by SPO2 de Asis, the shell had been fired from a .30
caliber
carbine and not from a pistol.[38]
Later on, however, he clarified that the shell had been found about
four
meters away from the bloodstains of the victim.[39]
This fact indicates that the carbine may have been fired about four
meters,
not one meter, away from the latter. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Third, at a distance
of four meters, tattooing would not characterize a victim’s
wounds.
Accordingly, the absence of tattooing from the head wound did not
contradict
the testimony of Elmadona. After all, the distance between the
victim
and appellant when the latter fired his gun was not specified by her.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The theories of appellant
and the court a quo may not be clear as to some of the circumstances
surrounding
the killing. We are certain, however, that the victim had been
shot
on the head, and that appellant was positively identified as the
culprit
who had fired the fatal shot at close range. These facts remain
steadfast
and are not by any means diminished by the differing theories
discussed.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Qualifying Circumstance
We note that the trial
court’s assailed Decision failed to pronounce which circumstance, among
those alleged in the Information, qualified the killing to
murder.
More important, the prosecution failed to prove any such circumstance.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is well-settled that
a qualifying circumstance must be proven with equal certainty and
clearness
as the crime itself.[40]
There being no proven qualifying circumstance, appellant should have
been
convicted of homicide only, not murder. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The penalty for homicide
under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
temporal.
Because no aggravating or mitigating circumstances were proven, the
appropriate
penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period.[41]
Appellant is likewise entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence
Law.cralaw:red
Civil Liabilities
Hereby sustained are
the amounts of P50,000 for proven moral damages, and P50,000 for
indemnity
ex delicto awarded by the RTC. However, the award of P130,000 as
actual and compensatory damages is hereby deleted in line with the rule
that only actual damages supported by evidence on record shall be
allowed.[42]
Elmadona presented, not funeral and burial expense receipts, but merely
order slips[43]
and a Deed of Absolute Sale[44]
for a burial plot. This Deed, however, did not indicate as the
buyer
Elmadona or any of the victim’s heirs, but a certain Dionisio de Guzman
whose relationship to the heirs remains unknown. We likewise
delete
the award for temperate damages for lack of basis. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Finally, the heirs of
the victim are entitled to P1,800,000 by way of loss of earning
capacity.[45]
As testified to by Elmadona, his average monthly net income at the time
of his death was P10,000.[46]
His annual net income -- computed at the rate of P10,000 per month
multiplied
by 12 months -- was P120,000. From this amount will be deducted
his
necessary and incidental expenses estimated at 50 percent thereof,
leaving
a balance of P60,000. As he was 35 years old at the time of his
death,[47]
his life expectancy of 30 more years is derived using this formula: 2/3
x (80 – [age of victim at the time of death]). Multiplying the
balance
of P60,000 by his life expectancy of 30 years, we arrive at P1,800,000
as his loss of earning capacity. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the appealed
Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant is CONVICTED of homicide
and
SENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty of eight years of prision mayor
medium,
as minimum; to fourteen years and eight months of reclusion temporal
medium,
as maximum. The award for civil damages is hereby MODIFIED to
P50,000
for moral damages, P50,000 for indemnity ex delicto, and P1,800,000 for
loss of earning capacity. No costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Puno, J.,
(Chairman),
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Written by Judge Luis M. Fontanilla.
[2]
RTC Decision, p. 24; rollo, p. 52.
[3]
Rollo, p. 4; records, p. 2; signed by 3rd Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor
Gonzalo P. Marata.
[4]
Certificate of Arraignment, records, p. 68; Order, records, p. 69.
[5]
Atty. Antonio M. Belen.
[6]
Appellee’s Brief, pp. 5-11; rollo, pp. 152-158; signed by Assistant
Solicitor
General Carlos N. Ortega and Associate Solicitor Ma. Almira M. Tomampos.
[7]
Appellant’s Brief, pp. 4-17; rollo, pp. 70-83; signed by Atty.
Numeriano
Tanopo Jr. of Tanopo & Serafica.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
This case was deemed submitted for decision on March 6, 2002 upon
receipt
by this Court of appellee’s Brief. Appellant’s Brief was received
by this Court on November 14, 2001. The filing of a reply brief
was
deemed waived, as none had been filed within the reglementary period.
[9]
Appellant’s Brief, pp. 1-2; rollo, pp. 67-68; original in upper case.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
TSN, November 5, 1999, p. 3.
[11]
Exhibit 'A', Folder of Exhibits for the Prosecution, p. 1.
[12]
People v. Hinaut, GR No. 143764, February 15, 2002; People v. Coscos,
GR
No. 132321, January 21, 2002.
[13]
People v. Puedan, GR No. 139576, September 2, 2002; People v. Magnabe
Jr.,
GR No. 143071, August 6, 2002; People v. Obordo, GR No. 139528, May 9,
2002; People v. Bertulfo, GR No. 143790, May 7, 2002.
[14]
People v. Coscos, supra.
[15]
People v. Navales, 266 SCRA 569, January 23, 1997; People v. Alib, 322
SCRA 93, January 18, 2000; People v. Juan, 322 SCRA 598, January 20,
2000;
People v. Rendoque, 322 SCRA 622, January 20, 2000.
[16]
People v. Navales, supra.
[17]
TSN, October 12, 2000, p. 2.
[18]
RTC Decision, p. 21; rollo, p. 49.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
People v. Navales, supra; People v. Alib, supra; People v. Juan, supra;
People v. Rendoque, supra.
[20]
TSN, August 29, 2000, pp. 4-5.
[21]
TSN, September 29, 2000, pp. 7-8.
[22]
People v. Vallejo, GR No. 144656, May 9, 2002.
[23]
Ibid.
[24]
Appellant’s Brief, pp. 24-25; rollo, pp. 90-91.
[25]
TSN, November 11, 1999, p. 42.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
TSN, November 5, 1999, pp. 4-6; TSN, November 11, 1999, pp. 39-42,
47-51;
TSN, November 25, 1999, pp. 20-21; TSN, December 2, 1999, pp. 6-9, pp.
23-25.
[27]
People v. Navales, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
People v. Rendoque, supra.
[29]
People v. Lachica, GR No. 143677, May 9, 2002.
[30]
TSN, January 10, 2000, pp. 48-49.
[31]
People v. Canlas, GR No. 141633, December 14, 2001.
[32]
People v. Parungao, 265 SCRA 140, 147, November 28, 1996; citing People
v. Valero, 112 SCRA 661, March 19, 1982.
[33]
People v. Licayan, GR No. 144422, February 28, 2002.
[34]
As testified to by Dr. Bu Catro, medico legal and forensic expert; TSN,
August 15, 2000, pp. 12-13.
[35]
TSN, August 15, 2000, p. 11.
[36]
TSN, December 16, 1999, pp. 7-8.
[37]
TSN, January 10, 2000, p. 3.
[38]
TSN, December 16, 1999, p. 17.
[39]
TSN, January 10, 2000, p. 3.
[40]
People v. Alvarado, GR No. 145730, March 19, 2002.
[41]
As provided for under paragraph 1 of Article 64 of the Revised Penal
Code.
[42]
People v. Manlansing, GR Nos. 131736-37, March 11, 2002; People v.
Magnabe
Jr., supra; People v. Ricafranca, 323 SCRA 652, January 28, 2000.
[43]
Exhibits 'B' to 'B-16', Folder of Exhibits for the Prosecution, pp.
2-17.
[44]
Exhibit 'C', Folder of Exhibits for the Prosecution, p. 18.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[45]
As provided for by Article 2206 (1) of the Civil Code. Following
People v. Laut (351 SCRA 93, February 1, 2001), the formula in
computing
for loss of earning capacity is as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
annual
income
= (monthly
income)
x (12 months) or (weekly income) x (48 weeks)
balance
= (annual
income)
- (necessary and incidental expenses computed at 50% of annual income)
life
expectancy
= (2/3) x
(80
- [age of victim at the time of death])
loss of earning capacity
=
(net annual income) x (life expectancy)
[46]
TSN, November 5, 1999, p. 16.
[47]
Certificate of Death, Folder of Exhibits for the Prosecution, p. 19;
TSN,
November 5, 1999, p. 14. |