FIRST DIVISION
SPOUSES MANUELAND ROSEMARIE WEE,
Petitioners,
G.
R.
No. 147394
August 11, 2004
-versus-
ROSARIO D. GALVEZ,
Respondent.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For review is the decision[1]
dated December 4, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55415,
which denied special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus
filed by petitioners Manuel and Rosemarie Wee. In said petition,
the Wees sought to (1) annul and set aside the Order dated July 29,
1999
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 80, denying
their
prayer to dismiss Civil Case No. Q-99-37372, as well as the Order of
September
20, 1999 denying their motion for reconsideration; (2) order the trial
court to desist from further proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-99-37372;
and (3) order the trial court to dismiss the said action. Also assailed
by the Wees is the resolution[2]
of the Court of Appeals, promulgated March 7, 2001, denying their
motion
for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts
in this case are not complicated.cralaw:red
Petitioner Rosemarie
Wee and respondent Rosario D. Galvez are sisters.[3]
Rosemarie lives with her husband, petitioner Manuel Wee, in Balanga,
Bataan,
while Rosario resides in New York, U.S.A. The present controversy
stemmed
from an investment agreement between the two sisters, which had gone
sour
along the way.cralaw:red
On April 20, 1999, Rosario,
represented by Grace Galvez as her attorney-in-fact, filed a complaint
before the RTC of Quezon City to collect a sum of money from Manuel and
Rosemarie Wee. The amount for collection was US$20,000 at the
exchange
rate of P38.30 per dollar. The complaint, which was docketed as Civil
Case
No. Q-99-37372, alleged that Rosario and Rosemarie entered into an
agreement
whereby Rosario would send Rosemarie US$20,000, half of said amount to
be deposited in a savings account while the balance could be invested
in
the money market. The interest to be earned therefrom would be given to
Rosario’s son, Manolito Galvez, as his allowance.chanrobles virtual law library
Rosario claimed that
pursuant to their agreement, she sent to Rosemarie on various dates in
1993 and 1994, five (5) Chemical Bank checks, namely:
CHECK
No.
DATE
AMOUNT
CB No.
97
05-24-93
US$1,550.00chanrobles virtual law library
CB No.
101
06-11-93
10,000.00chanrobles virtual law library
CB No.
104
11-12-93
5,500.00chanrobles virtual law library
CB No.
105
02-01-94
2,000.00chanrobles virtual law library
CB No.
123
03-03-94
1,000.00chanrobles virtual law library
TOTAL
US$20,050.00[4]
Rosario further alleged
that all of the aforementioned checks were deposited and encashed by
Rosemarie,
except for the first check, Chemical Bank Check No. 97, which was
issued
to one Zenedes Mariano, who gave the cash equivalent of US$2,000 to
Rosemarie.chanrobles virtual law library
In accordance with her
agreement with Rosario, Rosemarie gave Manolito his monthly allowance
ranging
from P2,000 to P4,000 a month from 1993 to January 1999. However,
sometime
in 1995, Rosario asked for the return of the US$20,000 and for an
accounting.
Rosemarie promised to comply with the demand but failed to do so.cralaw:red
In January 1999, Rosario,
through her attorney-in-fact, Grace Galvez, sent Rosemarie a written
demand
for her US$20,000 and an accounting. Again, Rosemarie ignored the
demand,
thus causing Rosario to file suit.cralaw:red
On May 18, 1999, the
Wees moved to dismiss Civil Case No. Q-99-37372 on the following
grounds:
(1) the lack of allegation in the complaint that earnest efforts toward
a compromise had been made in accordance with Article 151[5]
of the Family Code; (2) failure to state a valid cause of action, the
action
being premature in the absence of previous earnest efforts toward a
compromise;
and (3) the certification against forum shopping was defective, having
been executed by an attorney-in-fact and not the plaintiff, as required
by Rule 7, Section 5[6]
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Conformably with Rule
10, Sections 1[7]
and 3[8]
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rosario amended her complaint
with
the addition of the following paragraph:
9-A. Earnest efforts
towards (sic) have been made but the same have failed. As a
matter
of fact, plaintiff thru her daughter as Attorney-In-Fact caused the
sending
of a Demand Letter dated January 4, 1999 and the last paragraph of
which
reads as follows:
Trusting this will merit
your utmost preferential attention and consideration in as much as you
and our client are sisters and in order that [earnest] efforts toward a
compromise could be obtained.[9]
The Wees opposed Rosario’s
motion to have the Amended Complaint admitted. They contended that said
motion was a mere scrap of paper for being in violation of the
three-day
notice requirement of Rule 15, Section 4[10]
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and for having the notice of
hearing
addressed to the Clerk of Court and not to the adverse party as
required
by Section 5[11]
of the same Rule.chanrobles virtual law library
On July 29, 1999, the
trial court came out with an Order denying the Wees’ motion to dismiss
for being “moot and academic,” thus:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the amended complaint is hereby admitted.
Defendant-spouses
are hereby directed to file their Answer within the reglementary period
provided by the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The Wees duly moved for
reconsideration, but the motion was denied on September 20, 1999, for
lack
of merit.
On October 18, 1999,
the Wee couple brought the matter to the Court of Appeals via a special
civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, docketed as
CA-G.R.
SP No. 55415. The petition assailed the trial court for having acted
with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
for
issuing the interlocutory orders of July 29, 1999 and September 20,
1999,
instead of dismissing Civil Case No. Q-99-37372 outright.chanrobles virtual law library
On December 4, 2000,
the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 55415 in this wise:
WHEREFORE,
the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[13]
The Court of Appeals
held
that the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-99-37372, as amended,
sufficiently
stated a cause of action. It likewise held that the questioned
certification
against forum shopping appended thereto was not so defective as to
warrant
the dismissal of the complaint.
On January 9, 2001,
the petitioners herein moved for reconsideration of the appellate
court’s
decision, but this was denied on March 7, 2001.cralaw:red
Hence, the instant petition,
raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR
NOT
THE INSTANT PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 OF THE
REVISED
RULES OF COURT IS THE PROPER REMEDY FOR PETITIONERS UPON THE DENIAL OF
THEIR PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS;
2. WHETHER OR NOT
THE
CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING EXECUTED BY THE PLAINTIFF’S
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
IS DEFECTIVE; AND
3. WHETHER OR NOT
THE
AMENDED COMPLAINT BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SUFFICIENTLY STATES A
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS.[14]
We shall now resolve
these
issues seriatim.
On the first issue,
the petitioners argue that the present appeal by certiorari filed with
this Court assailing the dismissal of their special civil action for
certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus by the appellate court is meritorious.
After all, according to petitioners, a petition for review under Rule
45,
Section 1,[15]
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure could be brought before us,
regardless
of whether the assailed decision of the appellate court involves an
appeal
on the merits from the trial court’s judgment or the dismissal of a
special
civil action questioning an interlocutory order of the trial court.
What
is important under Rule 45, Section 1, is that the assailed decision of
the appellate court is final and that the petition before this Court
should
raise only questions of law.chanrobles virtual law library
Respondent, in turn,
point out that the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of herein
petitioners’
special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in
CA-G.R.
SP No. 55415 is not the final judgment or order, which could be the
subject
of an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. This is because, according to
respondent, certiorari as a mode of appeal involves the review of a
judgment,
final order, or award on the merits. Respondent contends that the
appellate court’s ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 55415 did not dispose of the
case on the merits, as the orders of the trial court subject of CA-G.R.
SP No. 55415 were all interlocutory. In other words, the ruling of the
appellate court did not put an end to Civil Case No. Q-99-37372, which
is still pending before the trial court. Hence, a petition for review
on
certiorari will not lie to assail the judgment of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 55415, according to respondent.chanrobles virtual law library
We find no basis for
respondent’s contention that the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R.
SP No. 55415, dismissing the petitioners’ special civil action for
certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus is interlocutory in nature. The CA’s decision
on said petition is final for it disposes of the original action for
certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus directed against the interlocutory orders of
the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-99-37372. In other words, having
dismissed
the said action, there is nothing more left to be done in CA-G.R. SP
No.
55415 as far as the appellate court is concerned.cralaw:red
Nor can we sustain respondent’s
argument that the appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 55415 is
not on the merits. In special civil actions for certiorari, such as
CA-G.R.
SP No. 55415, the only issue before the appellate court is whether the
lower court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Stated
differently, in a certiorari petition the appellate court is not tasked
to adjudicate the merits of the respondent’s claims before the trial
court.
Resolving such claims on the merits remains the proper province of the
trial court in Civil Case No. Q-99-37372. The appellate court
properly
ruled in CA-G.R. SP No. 55415 that the trial court committed no grave
abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction so as to
warrant
the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus that
petitioners
sought. In so limiting itself to and addressing squarely only the issue
of grave abuse of discretion or lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
Court
of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 55415, precisely decided the matter on
the
merits. In other words, it found that the special civil action of
petitioners
before it had no merit.chanrobles virtual law library
Now, as to whether the
Court of Appeals decided the matter in CA-G.R. SP No. 55415 in a manner
contrary to law or established jurisprudence remains precisely for us
to
determine in this review on certiorari. Considering the factual and
procedural
circumstances of this case, the present petition is petitioners’ proper
remedy to challenge the appellate court’s judgment in CA-G.R. SP No.
55415
now.cralaw:red
Anent the second issue,
the petitioners aver that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding
that the certification against forum shopping in Civil Case No.
Q-99-37372
was valid, notwithstanding that it was not the plaintiff below, Rosario
D. Galvez, who executed and signed the same, but her attorney-in-fact,
Grace Galvez. Petitioners insist that there was nothing in the special
power of attorney executed by Rosario D. Galvez in favor of Grace
Galvez,
which expressly conferred upon the latter the authority to execute and
sign, on behalf of the former, the certificate of non-forum shopping.
Petitioners
point out that under Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure,
it is the “plaintiff” or “principal party” who must sign the
certification.
They rely on our ruling in BA Savings Bank v. Sia,[16]
that where the parties in an action are natural persons, the party
himself
is required to sign the certification, and where a representative is
allowed
in case of artificial persons, he must be specifically authorized to
execute
and sign the certification. The petitioners stress that Rosario D.
Galvez
failed to show any justifiable reason why her attorney-in-fact should
be
the one to sign the certification against forum shopping, instead of
herself
as the party, as required by Santos v. Court of Appeals.[17]
Respondent counters
that petitioners’ contention has no basis. The Special Power of
Attorney
executed by her in favor of Grace Galvez, if subjected to careful
scrutiny
would clearly show that the authority given to the latter is not only
broad
but also all encompassing, according to respondent. By virtue of
said document, Grace Galvez is given the power and authority to
institute
both civil and criminal actions against any person, natural or
juridical,
who may be obliged or answerable to the respondent. Corollary with this
power is the authority to sign all papers, documents, and pleadings
necessary
for the accomplishment of the said purpose. Respondent likewise
stresses
that since Grace Galvez is the one authorized to file any action in the
Philippines on behalf of her principal, she is in the best position to
know whether there are other cases involving the same parties and the
same
subject matter instituted with or pending before any other court or
tribunal
in this jurisdiction. Moreover, as an attorney-in-fact, Grace Galvez is
deemed to be a party, pursuant to Rule 3, Section 3[18]
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Hence, petitioners’ argument that
Grace Galvez is not specifically authorized to execute and sign the
certification
of non-forum shopping deserves scant consideration.cralaw:red
We find for the respondent.
Noteworthy, respondent in the instant case is already a resident of the
United States, and not of the Philippines. Hence, it was proper
for
her to appoint her daughter, Grace Galvez, to act as her
attorney-in-fact
in the Philippines. The Special Power of Attorney granted by the
respondent
to her attorney-in-fact, Grace Galvez, categorically and clearly
authorizes
the latter to do the following:chanrobles virtual law library
1. To ask,
demand and claim any sum of money that is duly [due] from any person
natural,
juridical and/or corporation in the Philippines;
2. To file
criminal
and/or civil complaints before the courts of justice in the Philippines
to enforce my rights and interests;chanrobles virtual law library
3. To attend
hearings
and/or Preliminary Conferences, to make stipulations, adjust claims, to
settle and/or enter into Compromise Agreements, to litigate and to
terminate
such proceedings; and
chan
robles virtual law libraryy
4. To sign all
papers,
documents and pleadings necessary for the accomplishment of the above
purposes.[19]
From the foregoing, it
is indisputable that Grace Galvez, as attorney-in-fact of the
respondent,
was duly authorized and empowered not just to initiate complaints,
whether
criminal or civil, to enforce and protect the respondent’s rights,
claims,
and interests in this jurisdiction, but is specifically authorized to
sign
all “papers, documents, and pleadings” necessarily connected with the
filing
of a complaint. Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 04-94,[20]
which extended the requirement of a certification on non-forum shopping
to all initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and quasi-judicial
agencies,[21]
as well as Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure, the
aforementioned papers and documents, which Grace Galvez was authorized
and empowered to sign, must necessarily include the certification on
non-forum
shopping. To conclude otherwise would render nugatory the Special Power
of Attorney and also render respondent’s constitution of an
attorney-in-fact
inutile.chanrobles virtual law library
Forum shopping “occurs
when a party attempts to have his action tried in a particular court or
jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most favorable judgment
or verdict.”[22]
In our jurisdiction, it has taken the form of filing multiple petitions
or complaints involving the same issues before two or more tribunals or
agencies in the hope that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition.[23]
There is also forum shopping when, because of an adverse decision in
one
forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or
certiorari)
in another.[24]
The rationale against forum shopping is that a party should not be
allowed
to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different fora. Filing multiple
petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court processes,[25]
which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon
orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily
burdened
dockets of the courts.[26]
Thus, the rule proscribing forum shopping seeks to promote candor and
transparency
among lawyers and their clients in the pursuit of their cases before
the
courts to promote the orderly administration of justice, prevent undue
inconvenience upon the other party, and save the precious time of the
courts.
It also aims to prevent the embarrassing situation of two or more
courts
or agencies rendering conflicting resolutions or decisions upon the
same
issue.[27]
It is in this light that we must look at the propriety and correctness
of the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping signed by Grace Galvez on the
respondent’s behalf. We have examined said Certificate[28]
and find that under the circumstances, it does not negate but instead
serves
the purpose of the rule against forum shopping, namely to promote and
facilitate
the orderly administration of justice.chanrobles virtual law library
Rule 7, Section 5 of
the Rules of Court, requires that the certification should be signed by
the “petitioner or principal party” himself. The rationale behind this
is “because only the petitioner himself has actual knowledge of whether
or not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in different
courts
or agencies.”[29]
However, the rationale does not apply where, as in this case, it is the
attorney-in-fact who instituted the action. The Special Power of
Attorney in this instance was constituted precisely to authorize Grace
Galvez to file and prosecute suits on behalf of respondent, who was no
longer resident of the Philippines but of New York, U.S.A. As
respondent
points out, it is Grace Galvez, as attorney-in-fact for her, who has
actual
and personal knowledge whether she initiated similar actions or
proceedings
before various courts on the same issue on respondent’s behalf. Said
circumstance
constitutes reasonable cause to allow the attorney-in-fact, and not the
respondent, as plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-99-37372 to personally
sign
the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping. Under the circumstances of this
case, we hold that there has been proper compliance with the rule
proscribing
forum shopping. As we previously held concerning Administrative
Circular
No. 04-94:
The fact that the Circular
requires that it be strictly complied with merely underscores its
mandatory
nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or its requirements
altogether
disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial compliance
with
its provisions under justifiable circumstances.[30]
Administrative Circular
No. 04-94 is now incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
Rule 7, Section 5. It is basic that the Rules “shall be liberally
construed
in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.”[31]
Otherwise put, the rule requiring a certification of forum shopping to
accompany every initiatory pleading, “should not be interpreted with
such
absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate
objective
or the goal of all rules of procedure – which is to achieve substantial
justice as expeditiously as possible.”[32]
On the third issue,
petitioners submit that the amended complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-99-37372
violates Rule 8, Section 1[33]
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as there is no plain and direct
statement
of the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies for her claim.
Specifically,
petitioners contend that the allegation in paragraph 9-A[34]
of the amended complaint that “Earnest efforts towards have been made
but
the same have failed” is clearly insufficient. The sentence is
incomplete,
thus requires the reader of the pleading to engage in deductions or
inferences
in order to get a complete sense of the cause of action, according to
petitioners.cralaw:red
Respondent rebuts petitioners’
contention by stating that the amended complaint as well as the annexes
attached to the pleadings should be taken in their entirety in
determining
whether a cause of action was validly stated in the complaint. Thus
taken
together, in their entirety, the amended complaint and the attachments
to the original complaint, clearly show that a sufficient cause of
action
as it is shown and stated that earnest efforts towards a compromise
have
been made, according to respondent.chanrobles virtual law library
Under Article 151 of
the Family Code, a suit between members of the same family shall not be
entertained, unless it is alleged in the complaint or petition that the
disputants have made earnest efforts to resolve their differences
through
compromise, but these efforts have not succeeded. The attempt to
compromise
as well as its failure or inability to succeed is a condition precedent
to the filing of a suit between members of the same family.[35]
Rule 8, Section 3[36]
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that conditions precedent
may be generally averred in the pleadings. Applying the foregoing to
the
instant case, we have to ask: Is there a sufficient general
averment
of the condition precedent required by the Family Code in the Amended
Complaint
in Civil Case No. Q-99-37372?
We find in the affirmative.
Our examination of paragraph 9-A of the Amended Complaint shows that
respondent
has complied with this requirement of a general averment. It is true
that
the lead sentence of paragraph 9-A, which reads “Earnest efforts
towards
have been made but the same have failed” may be incomplete or even
grammatically
incorrect as there might be a missing word or phrase, but to our mind,
a lacking word like “compromise” could be supplied by the rest of the
paragraph.
A paragraph is “a distinct section or subdivision of a written or
printed
composition that consists of from one to many sentences, forms a
rhetorical
unit (as by dealing with a particular point of the subject or by
comprising
the words of a distinct speaker).”[37]
As a “short composition consisting of a group of sentences dealing with
a single topic,”[38]
a paragraph must necessarily be construed in its entirety in order to
properly
derive the message sought to be conveyed. In the instant case,
paragraph
9-A of the Amended Complaint deals with the topic of efforts made by
the
respondent to reach a compromise between the parties. Hence, it
is
in this light that the defective lead sentence must be understood or
construed.
Contrary to what petitioners claim, there is no need for guesswork or
complicated
deductions in order to derive the point sought to be made by respondent
in paragraph 9-A of the Amended Complaint, that earnest efforts to
compromise
the differences between the disputants were made but to no avail. The
petitioners’
stance that the defective sentence in paragraph 9-A of the Amended
Complaint
fails to state a cause of action, thus, has no leg to stand on. Having
examined the Amended Complaint in its entirety as well as the documents
attached thereto, following the rule that documents attached to a
pleading
are considered both as evidence and as part of the pleading,[39]
we find that the respondent has properly set out her cause of action in
Civil Case No. Q-99-37372.chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated December 4,
2000
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55415, as well as its
Resolution
dated March 7, 2001, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioners.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, C.J., (Chairman),
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
CA Rollo, pp. 111-117. Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner,
with
Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia, and Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
concurring.
[2]
Id. at 147-148.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
Id. at 47.
[4]
Id. at 35-36.
[5]
ART. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper
unless
it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts
toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If
it
is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be
dismissed.chanrobles virtual law library
This
rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of
compromise
under the Civil Code.chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or
principal
party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory
pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto
and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced
any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such
other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending
action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof;
and
(c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or
claim
has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5)
days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory
pleading has been filed.
Failure
to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause
for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided,
upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification
or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute
indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative
and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly
constitute
willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for
summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well
as a cause for administrative sanctions.chanrobles virtual law library
[7]
Sec. 1. Amendments in general. – Pleadings may be amended by adding or
striking out an allegation or the name of any party, or by correcting a
mistake in the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation
or
description in any other respect, so that the actual merits of the
controversy
may speedily be determined, without regard to technicalities, and in
the
most expeditious and inexpensive manner.
[8]
Sec. 3. Amendments by leave of court. – Except as provided in the next
preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave
of
court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that
the
motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the
matters
provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and
after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.chanrobles virtual law library
[9]
CA Rollo, pp. 50-51.chanrobles virtual law library
[10]
Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. - Except for motions which the court may act
upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written
motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every
written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing
thereof
shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other
party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the
court
for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
[11]
Sec. 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed
to
all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the
hearing
which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the
motion.chanrobles virtual law library
[12]
CA Rollo, p. 63.
[13]
Rollo, p. 138.
[14]
Id. at 230.
[15]
Sec. 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to
appeal
by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court
of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
questions
of law which must be distinctly set forth.
[16]
G.R. No. 131214, 27 July 2000, 336 SCRA 484, 489.
[17]
G.R. No. 141947, 5 July 2001, 360 SCRA 521, 526.chanrobles virtual law library
[18]
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. – Where the action is allowed to be
prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a
fiduciary
capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case
and
shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may
be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or
administrator,
or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own
name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued
without joining the principal except when the contract involves things
belonging to the principal.
[19]
Records, p. 11.chanrobles virtual law library
[20]
The Circular is entitled “Additional Requisites for Civil Complaints,
Petitions
and Other Initiatory Pleadings Filed In All Courts and Agencies, Other
Than the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, To Prevent Forum
Shopping
or Multiple Filing of Such Pleadings.”chanrobles virtual law library
[21]
Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Flores, A.C. No. 4058, 12 March
1998,
287 SCRA 449, 456.
[22]
Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979) 590.chanrobles virtual law library
[23]
Melo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123686, 16 November 1999, 318
SCRA 94, 100 citing Executive Secretary v. Gordon, G.R. No.
134171,
18 November 1998, 298 SCRA 736, 740; Domingo, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections,
G.R. No. 136587, 30 August 1999, 313 SCRA 311, 317.chanrobles virtual law library
[24]
Fortich v. Corona, G.R. No. 131457, 24 April 1998, 289 SCRA 624, 647
citing
First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
115849,
24 January 1996, 252 SCRA 259, 283; Villanueva v. Adre, G.R. No. 0863,
27 April 1989, 172 SCRA 876, 882; Crisostomo v. Securities and
Exchange
Commission, G.R. Nos. 89095 & 89555, 6 November 1989, 179 SCRA 146,
155.
[25]
Zebra Security Agency v. NLRC, G.R. No. 115951, 26 March 1997, 337
Phil.
200, 209.chanrobles virtual law library
[26]
Nacuray v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 114924-27, 18 March 1997, 336 Phil. 749, 756.chanrobles virtual law library
[27]
Solid Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108451, 11 April 1997,
337 Phil. 605, 616.
[28]
Records, pp. 8-9.chanrobles virtual law library
[29]
Digital Microwave Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128550, 16
March 2000, 328 SCRA 286, 290.
[30]
Loyola v. CA, G.R. No. 117186, 29 June 1995, 315 Phil. 529, 538.
[31]
Rule 1, Section 6.chanrobles virtual law library
[32]
Dar v. Alonzo-Legasto, G.R. No. 143016, 30 August 2000, 339 SCRA 306,
309
citing Gabionza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112547, 18 July 1994, 234
SCRA 192, 198.
[33]
SEC. 1. In general. – Every pleading shall contain in a methodical and
logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate
facts
on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the
case
may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts.
If
a defense relied on is based on law, the pertinent provisions thereof
and
their applicability to him shall be clearly and concisely stated.
[34]
Records, pp. 38-39. Paragraph 9-A in its entirety reads as follows:
“Earnest
efforts towards (sic) have been made but the same have failed. As a
matter
of fact, plaintiff thru her daughter as Attorney-In-Fact caused
the
sending of a Demand Letter dated January 4, 1999 and the last paragraph
of which reads as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
“Trusting
this will merit your utmost preferential attention and consideration in
as much as you and our client are sisters and in order that eranest
(sic)
efforts toward a compromise could be obtained.”
[35]
O’Laco v. Co Cho Chit, G.R. No. 58010, 31 March 1993, 220 SCRA 656, 661
citing Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, No. L-23102, 24 April 1967, 19 SCRA
756, 759; Guerrero v. RTC of Ilocos Norte, Br. XVI, G.R. No. 109068, 10
January 1994, 229 SCRA 274, 277.
[36]
SEC. 3. Conditions precedent. – In any pleading a general averment of
the
performance or occurrence of all conditions precedent shall be
sufficient.
[37]
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary.chanrobles virtual law library
[38]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[39]
Asia Banking Corporation v. Walter E. Olsen & Co., No. 24488, 28
December
1925, 48 Phil. 529, 532. |