FIRST DIVISION
PHILIPPINE RABBIT
BUS LINES, INC.,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
147703
April 14, 2004
-versus-
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
D E C I S I
O N
PANGANIBAN,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
When the accused-employee
absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and
executory.
The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a
notice
of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its
subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of
the
accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are
carried in one single decision that has become final and executory. The Case
Before this Court is
a Petition for Review[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 29, 2000[2]
and the March 27, 2001[3]
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59390.
Petitioner’s
appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Fernando,
La Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in the first
Resolution
as follows:
“WHEREFORE, for all
the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the appeal is
ordered
DISMISSED.”[4]
The second Resolution
denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.[5]
The Facts
The facts of the case
are summarized by the CA in this wise:
“On July 27, 1994, accused
[Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and convicted of the
crime
of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical
injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6)
years,
and to pay damages as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
‘a.
to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity
for
his death, plus the sum of P25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his
unearned
income for one year at P2,500.00 a month, P50,000.00 as indemnity for
the
support of Renato Torres, and the further sum of P300,000.00 as moral
damages;
‘b.
to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for
her death, the sum of P237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her unearned
income
for three years at P45,000.00 per annum, and the further sum of
P1,000,000.00
as moral damages and P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees[;]
‘c.
to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for
her
death, the sum of P22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the sum of P20,544.94
as medical expenses and her loss of income for 30 years at P1,000.00
per
month, and the further sum of P100,000.00 for moral damages;
‘d.
to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as hospital expenses,
doctor’s
fees of P170,000.00 for the orthopedic surgeon, P22,500.00 for the
[n]eurologist,
an additional indemnity [of] at least P150,000.00 to cover future
correction
of deformity of her limbs, and moral damages in the amount of
P1,000,000.00;
‘e.
to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical expenses, P2,000.00 as
loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;
‘f.
to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as medical expenses,
P800.00
for loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;
‘g.
to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as medical expenses, P4,600.00
as actual damages and her loss earnings of P1,400.00 as well as moral
damages
in the amount of P10,000.00;
‘h.
to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as hospital expenses,
P14,530.00
as doctor’s fees, P1,000.00 for medicines and P50,000.00 as moral
damages;
‘i.
to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for medical expenses, P87.00
for
medicines, P1,710.00 as actual damages and P5,000.00 as moral damages;
‘j.
to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for hospital bills, P500.00
for
medicine, P2,100.00 as actual damages, P1,200.00 for loss of income and
P5,000.00 as moral damages;
‘k.
to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of the Toyota
Hi-Ace
Van, the amount of P250,000.00 as actual damages for the cost of the
totally
wrecked vehicle; to the owner of the jeepney, the amount of P22,698.38
as actual damages;’chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
“The court further ruled
that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be
liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the
judgment
against accused had become final and executory.cralaw:red
“Admittedly, accused
had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing]
that
Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of
appeal
when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly
hired
and provided by [petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was denied
by the trial court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of
appeal
filed in behalf of accused.cralaw:red
“Simultaneously, on
August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the
judgment
of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due
course
to [petitioner’s] notice of appeal. On December 8, 1998,
[petitioner]
filed its brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor
General received [a] copy of [petitioner’s] brief. On January 8,
1999, the OSG moved to be excused from filing [respondents’] brief on
the
ground that the OSG’s authority to represent People is confined to
criminal
cases on appeal. The motion was however denied per Our resolution
of May 31, 1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private
prosecutor
filed the instant motion to dismiss.”[6]
(citations omitted)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Ruling of the
Court
of Appeals
The CA ruled that the
institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the
civil
action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the
criminal
case against the accused-employee, the employer’s subsidiary civil
liability
as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes
conclusive
and enforceable.cralaw:red
The appellate court
further held that to allow an employer to dispute independently the
civil
liability fixed in the criminal case against the accused-employee would
be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the notice
of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA,
then
the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became
final
and executory. Included in the civil liability of the accused was
the employer’s subsidiary liability.cralaw:red
Hence, this Petition.[7]
The Issues
Petitioner states the
issues of this case as follows:
“A. Whether
or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its
accused-employee,
may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.cralaw:red
“B. Whether
or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 57) and
Yusay
v. Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply to the instant case.”[8]
There is really only
one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item A.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no
merit.cralaw:red
Main Issue: Propriety
of Appeal by the Employerchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Pointing out that it
had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision,
petitioner
contends that the judgment of conviction against the accused-employee
has
not attained finality. The former insists that its appeal stayed
the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped
bail.
In effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of
the accused-employee.cralaw:red
We are not persuaded.cralaw:red
Appeals in Criminal
Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122
of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus:
“Any party may appeal
from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in
double
jeopardy.”
Clearly, both the accused
and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the government may
do so only if the accused would not thereby be placed in double
jeopardy.[9]
Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the
accused
should have been given a more severe penalty.[10]
On the other hand, the offended parties may also appeal the judgment
with
respect to their right to civil liability. If the accused has the
right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended parties should
have the same right to appeal as much of the judgment as is prejudicial
to them.[11]
Appeal by the
Accused Who Jumps Bail
Well-established in
our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may, upon
motion
or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused
jumps
bail. The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000
Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
“The Court of Appeals
may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the
appeal
if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or
flees
to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.”[12]
This rule is based on
the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they
abscond.
Unless they surrender or submit to the court’s jurisdiction, they are
deemed
to have waived their right to seek judicial relief.[13]
Moreover, this doctrine
applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during the appeal, but
also
to one who does so during the trial. Justice Florenz D. Regalado
succinctly explains the principle in this wise:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
“x x x. When, as in
this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment and during the
trial,
but the trial in absentia proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a
judgment against him and his counsel appealed, since he nonetheless
remained
at large his appeal must be dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid
provision
of this Rule [Rule 124, §8 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure]. x
x x”[14]
The accused cannot be
accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the
jurisdiction
of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of
the
judgment against them.[15]
While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are
deemed
to have waived the appeal.[16]
Finality of a
Decision in a Criminal Casechanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As to when a judgment
of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
“A judgment of conviction
may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it
becomes
final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death
penalty
is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or
totally
satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his
right
to appeal, or has applied for probation.”
In the case before us,
the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper
authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal.
Consequently,
the judgment against him has become final and executory.[17]
Liability of an
Employer in a Finding of Guiltchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Article 102 of the Revised
Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, as
follows:
“In default of the persons
criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or
corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments,
in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general
or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their
employees.cralaw:red
“Innkeepers are also
subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft
within
their houses from guests lodging therein, or for payment of the value
thereof,
provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper
himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods
within
the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such
innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the
care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in
case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless
committed by the innkeeper’s employees.”
Moreover, the foregoing
subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103
which
reads:
“The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers,
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties.”
Having laid all these
basic rules and principles, we now address the main issue raised by
petitioner.cralaw:red
Civil Liability
Deemed Instituted in the Criminal Prosecutionchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
At the outset, we must
explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what
civil
actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.cralaw:red
Section 1 of Rule 111
of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
“When a criminal action
is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right
to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal
action.cralaw:red
“x x
x
x x
x
x x x”
Only the civil liability
of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly
instituted
in a criminal action, that is, unless the offended party waives the
civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it
prior to the criminal action.[18]
Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of
the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.[19]
It is clear that the
2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil
actions
and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions.
Thus,
the civil actions referred to in Articles 32,[20]
33,[21]
34[22]
and 2176[23]
of the Civil Code shall remain “separate, distinct and independent” of
any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some
direct
consequences of such revision and omission:
1. The right to
bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be
reserved
in the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.cralaw:red
2. The institution
or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from
the crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action.cralaw:red
3. The only limitation
is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same
act
or omission.[24]
What is deemed instituted
in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the
crime
or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those
liabilities
arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In
fact,
even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil
liability
in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may --
subject
to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal
action,
in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.[25]
This discussion is completely
in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states that “[e]very
person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.”[26]
Petitioner argues that,
as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case and is
conclusively
bound by the outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be
accorded
the right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion -- including the
appeal.cralaw:red
The argument has no
merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the
criminal
case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee.cralaw:red
In its Memorandum, petitioner
cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing with the subsidiary
liability
of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be applied to
it,
because “in all th[o]se cases, the accused’s employer did not interpose
an appeal.”[27]
Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any single case in which the employer
appealed,
precisely because an appeal in such circumstances is not possible.cralaw:red
The cases dealing with
the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly
speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against
their employees.[28]
Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein,
this
fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability.
While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the
latter’s
lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on
their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Waiver of Constitutional
Safeguard Against Double Jeopardy
Petitioner’s appeal
obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved of his criminal
responsibility
and the judgment reviewed as a whole. These intentions are
apparent
from its Appellant’s Brief[29]
filed with the CA and from its Petition[30]
before us, both of which claim that the trial court’s finding of guilt
“is not supported by competent evidence.”[31]
An appeal from the sentence
of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional safeguard
against
double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a review by the
appellate
court. The latter is then called upon to render judgment as law
and
justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant.[32]
This is the risk involved when the accused decides to appeal a sentence
of conviction.[33]
Indeed, appellate courts have the power to reverse, affirm or modify
the
judgment of the lower court and to increase or reduce the penalty it
imposed.[34]
If the present appeal
is given course, the whole case against the accused-employee becomes
open
to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than that which
has already been imposed by the trial court may be meted out to
him.
Petitioner’s appeal would thus violate his right against double
jeopardy,
since the judgment against him could become subject to modification
without
his consent.cralaw:red
We are not in a position
to second-guess the reason why the accused effectively waived his right
to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though, that petitioner
may
not appeal without violating his right against double jeopardy.cralaw:red
Effect of Absconding
on the Appeal Process
Moreover, within the
meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure,
the accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby
made
the judgment of the court below final.[35]
Having been a fugitive from justice for a long period of time, he is
deemed
to have waived his right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now
final
and executory. The Court in People v. Ang Gioc[36]
ruled:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
“There are certain fundamental
rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the
right
of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for
the
benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he
pleases.
He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the
accused
flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he
will
be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered
against him. x x x.”[37]
By fleeing, the herein
accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the court and placed
himself
in a position to speculate on his chances for a reversal. In the
process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to
render
the judgment nugatory at his option.[38]
Such conduct is intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of
the appellate court.[39]
Consequently, the judgment
against an appellant who escapes and who refuses to surrender to the
proper
authorities becomes final and executory.[40]
Thus far, we have clarified
that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal case against the
accused-employee;
that by jumping bail, he has waived his right to appeal; and that the
judgment
in the criminal case against him is now final.cralaw:red
Subsidiary Liability
Upon Finality of Judgment
As a matter of law,
the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Petitioner
argues
that the rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage &
Taxicab,
Inc.,[41]
Alvarez v. CA[42]
and Yusay v. Adil[43]
do not apply to the present case, because it has followed the Court’s
directive
to the employers in these cases to take part in the criminal cases
against
their employees. By participating in the defense of its employee,
herein petitioner tries to shield itself from the undisputed rulings
laid
down in these leading cases.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Such posturing is untenable.
In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability, petitioner lost
track
of the most basic tenet they have laid down -- that an employer’s
liability
in a finding of guilt against its accused-employee is subsidiary.cralaw:red
Under Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the
adjudicated
civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter’s
insolvency.[44]
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability --
Articles
102 and 103 -- are deemed written into the judgments in the cases to
which
they are applicable.[45]
Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need
not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.cralaw:red
In the absence of any
collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party, the
judgment
of conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable.[46]
In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction
surpasses
mere civil liability.[47]
To allow employers to
dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them
to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent
court.[48]
By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal
conviction
of their employees without the latter’s consent would also result in
improperly
amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.cralaw:red
The decision convicting
an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the
employer
not only with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with
regard
to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from
that
of the employee.[49]
Before the employers’
subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be adequate
evidence
establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted
employees;
(2) that the former are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the
crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties;
and (4) that the execution against the latter has not been satisfied
due
to insolvency.[50]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The resolution of these
issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But the
determination
must be based on the evidence that the offended party and the employer
may fully and freely present. Such determination may be done in
the
same criminal action in which the employee’s liability, criminal and
civil,
has been pronounced;[51]
and in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the
employer,
as part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.cralaw:red
Just because the present
petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-employee does not
mean that its liability has transformed its nature; its liability
remains
subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its subsidiary
liability.
The fact remains that since the accused-employee’s conviction has
attained
finality, then the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso facto
attaches.cralaw:red
According to the argument
of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the finality of conviction
could be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the accused for jumping
bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In effect,
petitioner-employer
splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second, for its
accused-employee.cralaw:red
The untenability of
this argument is clearly evident. There is only one criminal case
against the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both
criminal
and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for this single
case to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an
entity
whose liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former.cralaw:red
The subsidiary liability
of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil
liability
of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter
has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the
former’s
subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately
enforceable.
Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary
liability
is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.cralaw:red
No Deprivation
of Due Processchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As to the argument that
petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate that what is
sought
to be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability incident to and
dependent
upon the employee’s criminal negligence. In other words, the
employer
becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the conviction of the
employee
and upon proof of the latter’s insolvency, in the same way that
acquittal
wipes out not only his primary civil liability, but also his employer’s
subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence.[52]
It should be stressed
that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process.[53]
It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may
be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law
authorizing
such exercise.[54]
Hence, the legal requirements must be strictly complied with.[55]
It would be incorrect
to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal as merely harmless
and trivial technicalities that can be discarded.[56]
Indeed, deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated.[57]
In these times when court dockets are clogged with numerous
litigations,
such rules have to be followed by parties with greater fidelity, so as
to facilitate the orderly disposition of those cases.[58]
After a judgment has
become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. If
the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed
period, then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the finality
of the resolution of the case.[59]
In fact, petitioner
admits that by helping the accused-employee, it participated in the
proceedings
before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer was deprived
of due process. It might have lost its right to appeal, but it
was
not denied its day in court.[60]
In fact, it can be said that by jumping bail, the accused-employee, not
the court, deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
All told, what is left
to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the accused. It
should be clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the
subsidiary
liability of petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently
proven
that there exists an employer-employee relationship; that the employer
is engaged in some kind of industry; and that the employee has been
adjudged
guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in
the
discharge of his duties. The proof is clear from the admissions
of
petitioner that “[o]n 26 August 1990, while on its regular trip from
Laoag
to Manila, a passenger bus owned by petitioner, being then operated by
petitioner’s driver, Napoleon Roman, figured in an accident in San
Juan,
La Union x x x.”[61]
Neither does petitioner dispute that there was already a finding of
guilt
against the accused while he was in the discharge of his duties.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the Petition
is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs
against
petitioner.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 9-28.
[2]
Id., pp. 30-34. Penned by Justice Mariano M. Umali and concurred
in by Justices Conrado M. Vasquez Jr. (Division chair) and Edgardo P.
Cruz
(member).
[3]
Id., pp. 36-37.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
CA Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 34.
[5]
Annex “G” of the Petition; rollo, pp. 115-124.
[6]
CA Decision, pp. 2-4; rollo, pp. 31-33.
[7]
The case was deemed submitted for resolution on April 24, 2002, upon
this
Court’s receipt of respondent’s Memorandum signed by Assistant
Solicitors
General Carlos N. Ortega and Roman G. del Rosario and Associate
Solicitor
Elizabeth Victoria L. Medina. Petitioner’s Memorandum, signed by
Atty. Ramon M. Nisce, was received by the Court on April 9, 2002.
[8]
Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 8; rollo, p. 200.
[9]
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II (2001, 9th revised edition),
p. 502.
[10]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
People v. Ursua, 60 Phil. 252, August 1, 1934.
[12]
This is substantially the same as the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
[13]
People v. Del Rosario, 348 SCRA 603, December 19, 2000.
[14]
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, supra, p. 540.
[15]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Ibid., citing People v. Mapalao, 274 Phil. 354, May 14, 1991.
[17]
People v. Enoja, 378 Phil. 623, December 17, 1999.
[18]
Panganiban, Transparency, Unanimity & Diversity (2000 ed.), pp.
211-212.
[19]
Id., p. 212.
[20]
“ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private
individual,
who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“(1) Freedom of religion;
“(2) Freedom of speech;
“(3) Freedom to write for the press
or to maintain a periodical publication;
“(4) Freedom from arbitrary or
illegal
detention;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
“(5) Freedom of suffrage;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
“(6) The right against deprivation
of property without due process of law;
“(7) The right to a just
compensation
when private property is taken for public use;
“(8) The right to the equal
protection
of the laws;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
“(9) The right to be secure in
one’s
person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures;
“(10) The liberty of abode and of
changing
the same;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
“(11) The privacy of communication and
correspondence;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
“(12) The right to become a member of
associations
or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
“(13) The right to take part in a
peaceable
assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;
“(14) The right to be free from
involuntary
servitude in any form;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
“(15) The right of the accused against
excessive
bail;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
“(16) The right of the accused to be
heard
by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation
against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses
face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witness
in his behalf;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
“(17) Freedom from being compelled to be
a witness against one’s self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or
from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such
confession,
except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
“(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or
cruel
and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance
with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional;
and
“(19) Freedom of access to the courts.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
“In
any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the
defendant’s
act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has
a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for
damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed
independently
of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be
proved
by a preponderance of evidence.
“The
indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also
be adjudicated.
“The
responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless
his
act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other
penal
statute.”
[21]
“ART. 33. In cases of defamation,
fraud,
and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.”
[22]
“ART. 34. When a member of a city
or
municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to
any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer
shall
be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be
subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein
recognized
shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance
of
evidence shall suffice to support such action.”chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
“ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)”
[24]
Panganiban, Transparency, Unanimity & Diversity, supra, p. 214.
[25]
Id., pp. 214-215.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code.
[27]
Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 13; rollo, p. 205.
[28]
Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc., 99 Phil. 670, July 31,
1956.
[29]
CA rollo, pp. 66-108.
[30]
Rollo, pp. 9-28.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[31]
Appellant’s Brief, p. 14; CA rollo, p. 84.
[32]
Lontoc v. People, 74 Phil. 513, December 29, 1943.
[33]
People v. Rondero, 320 SCRA 383, December 9, 1999.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
Lontoc v. People, supra; United States v. Abijan, 1 Phil. 83, January
7,
1902. See also §11 of Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
[35]
Francisco, Criminal Procedure (1996, 3rd ed.), p. 520.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[36]
73 Phil. 366, October 31, 1941.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[37]
Id., p. 369, per Abad Santos, J.
[38]
Francisco, Criminal Procedure, supra, p. 520.
[39]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[40]
People v. Enoja, supra.
[41]
Supra at note 28.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[42]
158 SCRA 57, February 23, 1988.
[43]
164 SCRA 494, August 18, 1988.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[44]
Lagazon v. Reyes, 166 SCRA 386, October 18, 1988.
[45]
Alvarez v. CA, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[46]
Martinez v. Barredo, 81 Phil. 1, May 13, 1948.
[47]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[48]
Yusay v. Adil, supra; Pajarito v. Señeris, 87 SCRA 275, December
14, 1978.
[49]
Lagazon v. Reyes, supra; Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,
supra.
[50]
Ozoa v. Vda de Madula, 156 SCRA 779, December 22, 1987.
[51]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[52]
Alvarez v. CA, supra; Martinez v. Barredo, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[53]
Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso, 384 SCRA 466, July 11, 2002.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[54]
Oro v. Judge Diaz, 361 SCRA 108, July 11, 2001; Mercury Drug Corp. v.
CA,
390 Phil. 902, July 13, 2000; Ortiz v. CA, 299 SCRA 708, December 4,
1998.
[55]
Pedrosa v. Hill, 257 SCRA 373, June 14, 1996; Del Rosario v. CA, 241
SCRA
553, February 22, 1995.
[56]
Casim v. Flordeliza, 374 SCRA 386, January 23, 2002.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[57]
People v. Marong, 119 SCRA 430, December 27, 1982.
[58]
Del Rosario v. CA, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[59]
Videogram Regulatory Board v. CA, 265 SCRA 50, November 28, 1996.
[60]
Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[61]
Petition for Review, p. 2; rollo, p. 10; Memorandum for Petitioner, p.
2; rollo, p. 194. |