THIRD DIVISION.
.
MARIA BUENA OBRA,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
147745
April 9, 2003
-versus-
SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM(JOLLAR INDUSTRIAL
SALES AND SERVICES, INC.),
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO,
J.:
On appeal is the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60704 dated September 27,
2000
sustaining the Decision[2]
of the Employees’ Compensation Commission dated April 13, 2000, as well
as its subsequent Resolution[3]
dated March 6, 2001 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of the case
are as follows:
Juanito Buena Obra,
husband of petitioner, worked as a driver for twenty-four (24) years
and
five (5) months. His first and second employers were logging
companies.
Thereafter, he was employed at Jollar Industrial Sales and Services
Inc.
as a dump truck driver from January 1980 to June 1988. He was
assigned
to the following projects:[4]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1. January 1980 to December
1981 - F.F. Cruz Project, Nabua, Camarines Sur - hauling/delivery of
filling
materials from quarry to job site.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2. January 1982 to December
1983 - F.F. Cruz, 300 MW Coal Fire Thermal Plant, Calaca, Bacungan and
Makban Geothermal Plant, Los Baños, Laguna - hauling/delivery of
filling materials from quarry to job site.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3. January 1984 to December
1985 - Dizon Copper Silver Mines, Pili, San Marcelino, Zambales -
hauling/delivery
filling materials from quarry to job site.cralaw:red
4. January 1986 to June
1988 - Metro Manila Hauling Project.cralaw:red
On 27 June 1988, Juanito
suffered a heart attack while driving a dump truck inside the work
compound,
and died shortly thereafter. In the Report of Death[5]
submitted by his employer to the Social Security System (SSS), Juanito
expired at the Worker's Quarters at 10:30 a.m., of Myocardial
Infarction.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioner Maria M.
Buenaobra immediately filed her claim for death benefits under the SSS
law. She started receiving her pension in November 1988.
Petitioner
was, however, unaware of the other compensation benefits due her under
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, or the Law on Employees’
Compensation.
In September 1998, or more than ten (10) years after the death of her
husband,
that she learned of the benefits under P.D. No. 626 through the
television
program of then broadcaster Ted Failon who informed that one may claim
for Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) benefits if the spouse died
while working for the company. Petitioner prepared the documents
to support her claim for ECC benefits. On 23 April 1999, she
filed
with the SSS her claim for funeral benefits under P.D. No. 626, as
amended,
which was docketed as SSS # 04-0089326-0.[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On 28 July 1999, the
SSS denied the claim of petitioner for funeral benefits ruling that the
cause of death of Juanito was not work-connected, absent a causal
relationship
between the illness and the job. Caridad R. Borja, Assistant
Vice-President
National Capital Region (AVP - NCR) Central of the SSS Member
Assistance
Center in Quezon City wrote:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Please be informed
that funeral claim under the Employees Compensation is hereby
denied.
Per medical evaluation, cause of death of subject member’s (sic) cannot
be considered work connected since there is no causal relationship
between
the illness and the job."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On 8 October 1999, petitioner
wrote to Atty. Teofilo E. Hebron, Executive Director of the ECC,
appealing
the denial of her claim. On 11 November 1999, Atty. Hebron
ordered
Dr. Simeon Z. Gonzales, Assistant Vice-President (AVP) of the Medical
Services
Group of the SSS to review the claim of petitioner.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On 23 November 1999,
the Medical Services Group through Dr. Perla A. Taday, AVP for Medical
Operations, concluded its re-evaluation and affirmed the denial of
petitioner’s
claim. It reiterated that "there is no causal relationship
between
the cause of death/illness and member’s job as dump truck driver."[7]
Pursuant to Section 5, Rule XVIII of the Implementing Rules of PD 626,
the records of the deceased Juanito were elevated to the Commission.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On 13 April 2000, the
Commission rendered a decision, dismissing the appeal.[8]
It ruled that petitioner failed to show by substantial evidence that
her
husband’s cause of death was due to, or the risk of contracting his
ailment
was increased by his occupation and working conditions, as per Section
1(b), Rule III of P.D. No. 626, as amended. In addition, the
Commission
declared that petitioner’s claim has prescribed, citing ECC Resolution
No. 93-08-0068.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioner appealed
to the Court of Appeals. She alleged that her cause of action had
not prescribed because the filing of her claim for SSS benefits shortly
after Juanito’s death suspended the running of the prescriptive period
for filing EC claims, as per Item No. III of ECC Resolution No.
90-03-0022
dated 23 March 1990. The appellate court dismissed the
petition.
It ruled that petitioner's filing of her claim for SSS benefits shortly
after Juanito’s death did not suspend the running of the prescriptive
period
for filing EC claims. It interpreted the aforementioned ECC
Resolutions
to mean that a claimant must indicate the kind of claim filed before
the
running of the prescriptive period for filing EC claims may be
interrupted.
In the case at bar, petitioner indeed filed a claim with SSS. In
fact, she has been receiving her pension since November 1988.
However,
she failed to specify whether the basis of her claim was any
contingency
which may be held compensable under the EC Program.[9]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In addition, the Court
of Appeals cited P.D. No. 626 which states that a contingency may be
held
compensable if listed in Annex "A" of the Rules Implementing Employees'
Compensation as an occupational disease, and satisfying all conditions
set forth therein; or if not listed as an occupational disease, or
listed
but has not satisfied the conditions set forth therein, it must be
proven
by substantial evidence that the risk of contracting the disease which
caused the death of the member, was increased by the member's working
conditions.[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The appellate court
likewise held that the three-year prescriptive period does not apply in
the instant case. Instead, it applied Art. 1142(2) of the Civil
Code
which reads:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Art. 1144. The
following actions must be brought within ten (10) years from the time
the
right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation
created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
(Emphasis
supplied)"
The appellate court
then held that the petitioner's cause of action has prescribed.
Petitioner's
husband died on 27 June 1988. She filed her claim for funeral
benefits
under P.D. No. 626 or the Law on Employees' Compensation only on 23
April
1999, or more than ten (10) years from his death.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Lastly, the appellate
court ruled that even assuming petitioner's cause of action has not
prescribed,
her claim for Employees' Compensation benefits cannot prosper because
of
her failure to prove by substantial evidence that her husband's working
conditions increased the risk of contracting the myocardial infarction
that caused his death.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration dated 27 September 2000 was denied by the appellate
court in a Resolution promulgated on 6 March 2001.cralaw:red
Hence, this petition.
The following issues are raised:[11]
(1) WHETHER, INDEED,
THE CLAIM OF PETITIONER, HAD PRESCRIBED.cralaw:red
(2) WHETHER OR NOT THE
ILLNESS OF PETITIONER’S HUSBAND, MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION, IS WORK-RELATED.cralaw:red
On the first issue,
we rule that the claim of petitioner for funeral benefits under P.D.
No.
626, as amended, has not yet prescribed.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The issue of
prescription
in the case at bar is governed by P.D. No. 626, or the Law on
Employees'
Compensation. Art. 201 of P.D. No. 626 and Sec. 6, Rule VII of
the
1987 Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation both read as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"No claim for compensation
shall be given due course unless said claim is filed with the System
within
three years from the time the cause of action accrued."
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
This is the general
rule. The exceptions are found in Board Resolution 93-08-0068 and
ECC Rules of Procedure for the Filing and Disposition of Employees’
Compensation
Claims. Board Resolution 93-08-0068 issued on 5 August 1993,
states:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"A claim for employee's
compensation must be filed with System (SSS/GSIS) within three (3)
years
from the time the cause of action accrued, provided however, that any
claim
filed within the System for any contingency that may be held
compensable
under the Employee's Compensation Program (ECP) shall be considered as
the EC claim itself. The three-year prescriptive period shall be
reckoned from the onset of disability, or date of death. In case
of presumptive death, the three (3) years limitation shall be counted
from
the date the missing person was officially declared to be presumptively
dead." (Emphasis supplied)
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In addition, Section
4(b), Rule 3 of the ECC Rules of Procedure for the Filing and
Disposition
of Employees’ Compensation Claims, reads:
"RULE 3. FILING OF CLAIM
Section 4. When to file.cralaw:red
(a) Benefit claims shall
be filed with the GSIS or the SSS within three (3) years from the date
of the occurrence of the contingency (sickness, injury, disability or
death).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(b) Claims filed beyond
the 3-year prescriptive period may still be given due course, provided
that:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1.
A claim was filed for Medicare, retirement with disability, burial,
death
claims, or life (disability) insurance, with the GSIS within three (3)
years from the occurrence of the contingency.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2.
In the case of the private sector employees, a claim for Medicare,
sickness,
burial, disability or death was filed within three (3) years from the
occurrence
of the contingency.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3.
In any of the foregoing cases, the employees’ compensation claim shall
be filed with the GSIS or the SSS within a reasonable time as provided
by law. (Emphasis supplied)"chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We agree with the petitioner
that her claim for death benefits under the SSS law should be
considered
as the Employees’ Compensation claim itself. This is but logical
and reasonable because the claim for death benefits which petitioner
filed
with the SSS is of the same nature as her claim before the ECC.
Furthermore,
the SSS is the same agency with which Employees’ Compensation claims
are
filed. As correctly contended by the petitioner, when she filed
her
claim for death benefits with the SSS under the SSS law, she had
already
notified the SSS of her employees’ compensation claim, because the SSS
is the very same agency where claims for payment of
sickness/disability/death
benefits under P.D. No. 626 are filed.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Section 4(b)(2), Rule
3 of the ECC Rules of Procedure for the Filing and Disposition of the
Employees’
Compensation Claims, quoted above, also provides for the conditions
when
EC claims filed beyond the three-year prescriptive period may still be
given due course. Section 4(b)(2) states the condition for
private
sector employees, requiring that a claim for Medicare, sickness,
burial,
disability or death should be filed within three (3) years from the
occurrence
of the contingency. In the instant case, the petitioner was able
to file her claim for death benefits under the SSS law within the
three-year
prescriptive period. In fact, she has been receiving her pension
under the SSS law since November 1988.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is true that under
the proviso, the employees’ compensation claim shall be filed with the
GSIS/SSS within a reasonable time as provided by law. It should
be
noted that neither statute nor jurisprudence has defined the limits of
"reasonable time." Thus, what is reasonable time depends upon the
peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.[12]
In the case at bar, we also find petitioner’s claim to have been filed
within a reasonable time considering the situation and condition of the
petitioner. We have ruled that when the petitioner filed her
claim
for death benefits under the SSS law, her claim for the same benefits
under
the Employees’ Compensation Law should be considered as filed.
The
evidence shows that the System failed to process her compensation
claim.
Under the circumstances, the petitioner cannot be made to suffer for
the
lapse committed by the System. It is the avowed policy of the
State
to construe social legislations liberally in favor of the beneficiaries.[13]
This court has time and again upheld the policy of liberality of the
law
in favor of labor. Presidential Decree No. 626 itself, in its
Art.
166 reads:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"ART. 166. Policy. -
The State shall promote and develop a tax-exempt employees'
compensation
program whereby employees and their dependents, in the event of
work-connected
disability or death, may promptly secure adequate income benefit, and
medical
or related benefits." (Emphasis supplied)
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Furthermore, Art. 4
of P.D. No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines,
which P.D. No. 626 forms a part of, reads as follows:
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"ART. 4.
Construction
in favor of labor. - All doubts in the implementation and
interpretation
of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and
regulations,
shall be resolved in favor of labor."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Particularly, the policy
of liberality in deciding claims for compensability was given emphasis
by this court in the case of Employees’ Compensation Commission vs.
Court
of Appeals,[14]
where it held that:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"the liberality of law
in favor of the working man and woman still prevails and the official
agency
charged by law to implement the constitutional guarantee of social
justice
should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding
claims
for compensability, especially in light of compassionate policy towards
labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances. Elsewise
stated, a humanitarian impulse, dictated by no less than the
Constitution
itself under the social justice policy, calls for a liberal and
sympathetic
approach to legitimate appeals of disabled public servants; or that all
doubts to the right to compensation must be resolved in favor of the
employee
or laborer. Verily the policy is to extend the applicability of
the
law on employees’ compensation to as many employees who can avail of
the
benefits thereunder."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Claims falling under
the Employees’ Compensation Act should be liberally resolved to fulfill
its essence as a social legislation designed to afford relief to the
working
man and woman in our society.[15]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The second issue of
whether or not the illness of petitioner’s husband, myocardial
infarction
which was the cause of his death is work-related, must likewise be
resolved
in favor of the petitioner.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Under the law on employees’
compensation, death is compensable only when it results from a
work-connected
injury or sickness. In the instant case, the cause of
petitioner’s
husband’s death was myocardial infarction and it must be considered
work-connected.
While it is true that myocardial infarction is not among the
occupational
diseases listed under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation,
the Commission, under ECC Resolution No. 432 dated July 20, 1977, laid
down the conditions under which cardio-vascular or heart diseases can
be
considered as work-related and thus compensable, viz:
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(a) If the heart
disease
was known to have been present during employment, there must be proof
that
an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by
reasons of the nature of his/her/her work.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(b) The strain of work
that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and
must
be followed within 24 hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac insult
to
constitute causal relationship.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(c) If a person who
was apparently asymptomatic before being subjected to strain at work
showed
signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his/her
work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a
causal relationship.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Myocardial infarction
is also known as heart attack. It results in permanent heart
damage
or death. A heart attack is called myocardial infarction because
part of the heart muscle (myocardium) may literally die
(infarction).
This occurs when a blood clot blocks one of the coronary arteries (the
blood vessels that bring blood and oxygen to the heart muscle).
When
the heart muscle does not obtain the oxygen-rich blood that it needs,
it
will begin to die. The severity of a heart attack usually depends
on how much of the heart muscle is injured or dies during the heart
attack.
Heart attack accounts for 1 out of every 5 deaths. It is a major
cause of sudden death in adults. Heavy exertion or emotional
stress
can trigger a heart attack.[16]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the case at bar,
the petitioner’s husband’s heart disease falls under the second
condition
of ECC Resolution No. 432 dated July 20, 1977 which states that the
strain
of work that brought about the acute attack must be of sufficient
severity
and must be followed within 24 hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac
insult to constitute causal relationship. Petitioner’s husband
was
driving a dump truck within the company premises where they were
stacking
gravel and sand when he suffered the heart attack. He had to be
taken
down from the truck and brought to the workers’ quarters where he
expired
at 10:30 a.m., just a few minutes after the heart attack, which is much
less than the 24 hours required by ECC Resolution No. 432. This
is
a clear indication that severe strain of work brought about the acute
attack
that caused his death.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Professional drivers,
especially truck drivers like the decedent in the instant case, carry
the
burden of being more exposed and subjected to the stress and strain of
everyday traffic, and the greater physical exertion brought about by
driving
a large and heavy vehicle. In addition, according to the
petitioner,
her husband was under a lot of stress in the workplace. He was a
model worker and his employer highly depended on him. He became
the
object of envy of his co-workers which caused him much emotional
stress.
Add to this the fact that he has been a truck driver for more than
twenty-four
(24) years. Due to the combination of emotional stress and
vigorous
physical exertion, it was easy for him to succumb to the heart
ailment.
We hold that the illness of the decedent which caused his death is
work-connected,
and thus compensable by virtue of ECC Resolution No. 432 dated 20 July
1977.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As a final note, we
find it necessary to reiterate that P.D. No. 626, as amended, is a
social
legislation whose primordial purpose is to provide meaningful
protection
to the working class against the hazards of disability, illness and
other
contingencies resulting in the loss of income. Thus, as the
official
agents charged by law to implement social justice guaranteed by the
Constitution,
the ECC and the SSS should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the
employee
in deciding claims for compensability especially where there is some
basis
in the facts for inferring a work connection with the illness or
injury,
as the case may be. It is only this kind of interpretation that
can
give meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as
embodied
in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code
including
its implementing rules and regulations should be resolved in favor of
labor.[17]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the
petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R.
SP No. 60704 dated 27 September 2000 and its Resolution dated 06 March
2001 are hereby SET ASIDE. The SSS is hereby directed to pay
herein
petitioner the death/funeral benefits due him under the existing law.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Panganiban,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 121-128.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Id. at 110-117.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Id. at 189.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
CA Rollo, p. 26.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Id. at 33.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Id. at 39.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Id. at 46.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Id. at 51.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Rollo, p. 125.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Id., p. 126, citing Employees Compensation Commission vs. CA, 264 SCRA
248.
[11]Id.
at 18.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Far East Realty Investment, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
L-36549,
05 October 1988.
[13]
Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
132648,
04 March 1999.
[14]
G.R. No. 121545, 14 November 1996, 264 SCRA 248, citing Nitura vs.
Employees’
Compensation Commission, 201 SCRA 278, Aris (Phils.), Inc. vs. NLRC,
200
SCRA 246, and Diopenes vs. GSIS, 205 SCRA 331.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Santos vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 221 SCRA 182, 188.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Lee B. Weitzman, M.D., FACC, FCCP, "Heart Attack," (2001)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Nitura vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 201 SCRA 278, 283
(1991);
Santos vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 221 SCRA 182, 188 (1993). |