FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G.R.
No.
147764
January 16, 2003
-versus-
DANILO CUETO Y
CUETO,
Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
Accused-appellant Danilo
Cueto y Cueto was charged with murder in an information[1]
which reads:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
That on or about July
16, 1997, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill
and
with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault, and use
personal
violence upon one EDUARDO ANDAL y MARTINEZ by then and there shooting
the
latter with a handgun hitting him on the lower portion of his stomach,
thereby inflicting upon the said EDUARDO ANDAL y MARTINEZ a mortal
gunshot
wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Accused-appellant pleaded
"not guilty" when arraigned. Trial on the merits then ensued. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Accused-appellant and
the victim Eduardo Andal were neighbors on Madre Peria Street, San
Andres
Bukid, Manila, their houses being only ten (10) meters apart. A few
days
prior to the incident, a certain Boy Zapanta filed a complaint against
accused-appellant for alleged gun-toting. Eduardo Andal was tasked to
serve
the summons on accused-appellant, which the latter resented.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
At around 10:00 in the
evening of July 16, 1997, an ambulance passed by and accused-appellant
was allegedly heard shouting at the ambulance driver, "Maghintay ka
diyan,
may isasakay ako diyan." At about the same time, Eduardo went out of
his
house to see if the flooded street was passable considering that it
rained
hard that night. Eduardo and his family planned to have a late dinner
with
their house guest, whose car was parked inside their garage. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Upon reaching the corner
of Madre Peria and Marmol Streets, accused-appellant accosted Eduardo
from
behind and angrily uttered, "Putang ina mo, wala kang kwentang tao."
Before
Eduardo could react, accused-appellant shot him on the upper left
thigh.
Eduardo’s son tried to confront accused-appellant but stopped on his
tracks
when the latter pointed his gun at him and said, "Isa ka pa."
Accused-appellant
then casually walked away. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Eduardo died in the
hospital. Dr. Jaime Rodrigo L. Leal, PNP Medico-Legal Officer,
conducted
the autopsy and found that the cause of death was "hemorrhage as a
result
of gunshot wound, trunk."[2]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Accused-appellant went
into hiding for two years. On September 28, 1999, Eduardo’s widow,
Teresita,
accidentally saw accused-appellant in a sing-along club somewhere in
Manila
and immediately caused his arrest. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Accused-appellant interposed
self-defense. He averred that while he was inside his house at 11:00 in
the evening of July 16, 1997, an allegedly drunk Eduardo loudly knocked
at the door and shouted invectives at him. He went out of his house and
confronted the victim. A heated argument ensued and they cursed each
other.
At this point, Eduardo drew a gun from the right side of his waist.
Accused-appellant
grappled for possession of the gun and, in the ensuing struggle, the
gun
accidentally fired hitting the lower portion of Eduardo’s stomach.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Fearful that Eduardo’s
relatives might exact revenge, accused-appellant moved his family to
his
parent’s residence in Singalong, Manila, while he hid in different
houses
of his friends. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The trial court lent
credence to the prosecution’s version of the incident and rendered a
decision,[3]
the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, accused Danilo
Cueto y Cueto is hereby convicted of the crime of murder without any
aggravating
and/or mitigating circumstances, and sentenced to suffer reclusion
perpetua
with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs.
The accused is further ordered to pay the legal heirs of the victim
actual
and moral damages in the respective sums of P10,500.00 and P400,000.00
and compensation for the loss of the life of the victim in the sum of
P50,000.00
with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6% per annum from this date
until fully paid. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Aggrieved, accused-appellant
interposed the instant appeal, raising the following errors: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
I. The trial court erred in totally discarding the claim of legitimate
self-defense interposed by the accused;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
II.
The
trial court overlooked or misappreciated certain documents, facts and
circumstances
which, if considered, would have altered the outcome of the case:
III.
Flight
as an admission of guilt if reasonably explained should not be taken
against
the accused;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
IV.
Prosecution
eyewitnesses were not at the scene of the incident when the complained
act was committed; chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
V.
The
trial court exhibited manifest bias and hostility against the accused
by
acting as the judge, prosecutor and executioner at the same time in a
despotic
and arbitrary manner;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
VI.
Arbitrary
and capricious order of the court compelling the newly appointed
counsels
de oficio to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses on short notice
grossly
violated the right of the accused to due process; and chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
VII.
Prosecution
witnesses incurred serious contradictions and manifestly false
assertions
which pose a grave challenge on their credibility.[4]
Accused-appellant
assails
the trial court for giving credence to the prosecution’s evidence and
disregarding
his claim of self-defense.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Where the accused
owns up to killing the victim in self-defense, the burden of evidence
shifts
to him. He must show by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed
acted
in self-defense. To prove self-defense, the accused must show with
clear
and convincing evidence, that: (1) he is not the unlawful aggressor;
(2)
there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) he
employed
reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression. Self-defense, like
alibi, is a defense which can easily be concocted. It is well-settled
in
this jurisdiction that once an accused had admitted that he inflicted
the
fatal injuries on the deceased, it was incumbent upon him, in order to
avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying circumstance claimed
by him with clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence.[5]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In stressing his plea
of self-defense, accused-appellant reiterates the following points:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1. That
the victim was drunk at the time of the commission of the complained
act
as evidenced by the medico-legal report (Exhibit '1' or 'K'); chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2. That
the downward trajectory of the bullet which hit the upper thigh of the
victim is consistent with the theory of the defense that there was a
scuffle
for the possession of the gun before it accidentally went off;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3. That
the incident happened in front of the house of the accused at an unholy
hour of 11:30 in the evening;
4. That
the victim was the holder of a license to possess a .357 cal. Rossi
revolver
(Exhibit '3');chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
5. That
the victim had a permit to carry the said firearm outside of his
residence
and said permit has not yet expired when the shooting incident occurred
(Exhibit '4'); and
6. That
the accused is not the holder of any license to possess firearm
(Exhibits
'5' and 'I').chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We are not convinced
that Eduardo is the unlawful aggressor just because he was drunk at the
time of the incident. The mere fact that Eduardo was drunk cannot
constitute
proof that he committed unlawful aggression against accused-appellant.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
For one to be considered
the unlawful aggressor, he must be shown to have exhibited external
acts
clearly showing his intent to cause and commit harm to the other. In
the
case at bar, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses belied any
act
of aggression on the part of the victim. It was established that at the
time of the incident, the victim was unarmed and clearly had no idea of
the impending attack on his person. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the same vein, the
trajectory of the bullet which hit the upper thigh of the victim is not
proof that the protagonists initially grappled for possession of the
weapon
before it went off. At any rate, even if indeed the parties initially
engaged
in a scuffle prior to the shooting, standing alone, such fact does not
prove that Eduardo was the unlawful aggressor.cralaw:red
Likewise, accused-appellant’s
contention that he could not have been the aggressor because the
incident
happened in front of his house does not prove that it was Eduardo who
was
the aggressor. On the contrary, the same is also consistent with the
theory
that it was accused-appellant who accosted Eduardo in front of his
house
when the latter passed by. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Neither can it be said
that since Eduardo was licensed to possess and had a permit to carry a
gun, it follows that he was the unlawful aggressor. It must be
considered
that in this case, the ownership of the weapon used in the shooting was
not established as Eduardo’s or even that of accused-appellant. All
that
was established was that a gun was used to kill Eduardo. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The proliferation of
unlicensed firearms has become pervasive and it is of judicial notice
that
most firearms used in the commission of crimes are usually unlicensed.cralaw:red
All in all, accused-appellant
failed to establish the element of unlawful aggression. In
self-defense,
unlawful aggression is an indispensable element. Without unlawful
aggression,
there is no need to discuss the rest of the elements.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Admittedly, there were
contradictions between Teresita Andal’s and Ephraim Andal’s testimonies
in open court and their statements before the police officers.
Nevertheless,
contradictions between a witness’ affidavit and his testimony in open
court
are not unusual because an affidavit, being taken ex parte, is often
incomplete
and inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions and inquiries. An
affidavit
is not a complete reproduction of what the declarant has in mind
because
it is generally prepared by the administering officer and the affiant
simply
signs it after it has been read to him.[6]
In any case, open court declarations take precedence over written
affidavits
in the hierarchy of evidence.[7]
Unlike written statements, there is flexibility on the part of the
questioner
to adapt his questions to elicit the desired answer in order to ferret
out the truth. In addition, the credibility of the testimony as well as
of the one testifying is better assessed by the trial court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As to who between the
prosecution and the defense witnesses are to be believed, the trial
court’s
assessment enjoys a badge of respect for the reason that the trial
court
has the advantage of observing the demeanor of the witnesses as they
testify,
unless found to be clearly arbitrary or unfounded. The rationale for
this
doctrine, as explained in People v. Cayabyab, is that "the trial judge
is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and
prevarication
that will determine the guilt and innocence of the accused. That line
may
not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal records by the
reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that
will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush
of
an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the
tremulous
mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply.
The
record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in
remembered
pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see
all
these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and
reasoned
verdict."[8]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Hence, well-settled
is the rule that the findings of facts and assessment of credibility of
witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because of its
unique
position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of
the witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying, which
opportunity
is denied to the appellate courts. Only the trial judge can observe the
furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or
sneering
tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath - all
of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness’
honesty
and sincerity. The trial court’s findings are accorded finality, unless
there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which
the
lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and
which,
if properly considered, would alter the results of the case.[9]
Accused-appellant implies
that the trial court might have overlooked or misappreciated some
circumstances
which might cast doubt on the credibility of prosecution witnesses. He
claims that the prosecution eyewitnesses were not at the scene of the
incident
at the time of the shooting. Accused-appellant further argues that if
Eduardo’s
reason for going out of the house was to check whether the streets were
passable to motor vehicles, then they could have simply peeped out of
the
window. Finally, accused-appellant submits that if he were to
assassinate
someone in a treacherous manner, he would not shoot the man frontally
and
in front of his house. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Notwithstanding the
foregoing, accused-appellant still has to rely on the strength of his
own
evidence, and not on the weakness of the prosecution for even if it
were
weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused admitted the
killing.[10]
Precisely because he has to rely on the strength of his evidence,
accused-appellant’s
admission that he shot Eduardo would render immaterial his submission
that
the prosecution eyewitnesses were not at the scene of the incident when
it happened. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Nevertheless, even if
the points raised by accused-appellant are considered, they can hardly
affect the credibility of the prosecution eyewitnesses especially since
the trial court assessed the testimonies of Teresita and Ephraim, the
main
eyewitnesses, as "positive, straightforward and plausible - both of
whom
positively identified the accused as the one who gunned down the
victim."[11]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Accused-appellant’s
contention that the trial judge exhibited manifest bias and hostility
against
him is likewise without basis. A reading of the stenographic notes
reveals
that the trial judge was only trying to clarify certain matters
relative
to the testimony of Gio Carlo Cueto, accused-appellant’s son. In so
doing,
the trial judge was also testing Gio Carlo’s credibility. In fact, he
focused
his questions on what Gio Carlo supposedly witnessed and on his
knowledge
of accused-appellant’s whereabouts when he was supposedly in hiding.
Regardless,
the questions asked were not necessarily favorable to the prosecution,
contrary to accused-appellant’s contention, as Gio Carlo was consistent
in his testimony that he witnessed the incident and that
accused-appellant
went into hiding because of perceived danger to his person and his
family.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Likewise, there is nothing
arbitrary or capricious when the trial court ordered counsel de oficio
to cross-examine Teresita and Ephraim immediately after their
respective
direct examinations. A reading of the transcripts of stenographic notes
shows that the questions propounded by counsel de oficio during the
cross-examination
were sufficiently effective, meaning, they were reasonable under the
circumstances.[12]
In the case of Teresita’s cross-examination, the counsel de oficio even
manifested his observation that there was an inconsistency between her
testimony and her sworn statement.[13]
Nonetheless, the cross-examination conducted on Ephraim more than made
up for whatever perceived deficiency there might have been in
Teresita’s
cross-examination.[14]
If accused-appellant, through his counsel of record, felt prejudiced by
the order of the trial judge for counsel de oficio to cross-examine
Teresita
and Ephraim in the absence of the counsel of record, then he could have
asked the trial court to recall Teresita and Ephraim for further
cross-examination.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The trial court held
that accused-appellant’s flight was the most telling indication of his
guilt. Thus, it brushed aside accused-appellant’s claim of self-defense
when it stated, thus: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The accused’s claim
of self-defense is unworthy of serious consideration and credence. If
his
assertion were true it would have been natural for him to voluntarily
surrender
and turn over the victim’s gun to the police instead of fleeing and
hiding
for almost two years since the shooting incident. The flight of the
accused
is significative of his guilt.[15]
In criminal law, flight
means the act of evading the course of justice by voluntarily
withdrawing
oneself to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or continuance
of criminal proceedings. Flight, in jurisprudence, has always been a
strong
indication of guilt, betraying a desire to evade responsibility.[16]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the matter of damages,
we affirm the award of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. As
regards the actual damages, it appears that the trial court only
awarded
P10,500.00 when the prosecution was able to substantiate with receipts
the amount of P40,000.00 representing funeral services and P10,500.00
as
interment fee. The award for actual damages is therefore increased to
P50,500.00.
However, the award of P400,000.00 as moral damages is deemed excessive
and not in accord with prevailing jurisprudence. The amount of
P50,000.00
is deemed reasonable. It must be stressed that the purpose of the award
of moral damages is not to enrich the heirs of the victim but to
compensate
them for the injuries to their feelings.[17]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the decision
dated March 16, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18
in
Criminal Case No. 98-165422 finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable
doubt of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is ORDERED to
pay the heirs of Eduardo Andal the sums of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity,
P50,500.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Davide, Jr.,
C.J.
,
(Chairman), Vitug,
Carpio, and Azcuna,
JJ.
, concur.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
____________________________
Endnotes:cralaw:red
[1]
Rollo, p. 6.
[2]
Exhibit 'K', Records, p. 40.
[3]
Penned by Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 18.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 33-34.
[5]
People v. Belbes, 334 SCRA 161 [2000].
[6]
Sumalpong v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 764 [1997].
[7]
People v. Mangat, 310 SCRA 101 [1999].
[8]
People v. Andarme, G.R. No. 140426, July 30, 2002.
[9]
People v. Andarme, supra.
[10]
People v. Villegas, G.R. No. 138782, September 27, 2002.
[11]
Decision, Records, p. 92.
[12]
People v. Liwanag, G.R. No. 120468, August 15, 2001.
[13]
TSN, April 6, 2000, p. 33.
[14]
TSN, April 13, 2000, pp. 20-25.
[15]
Decision, Rollo, p. 16.
[16]
People v. Andarme, supra.
[17]
People v. Galvez, G.R. No. 130397, January 17, 2002. |