SECOND DIVISION
ALEXANDER P.
RUGAS,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
147789
January 14, 2004
-versus-
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
D E C I S I
O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as amended, of
the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 23419 (CR) affirming with
modification
the decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Branch 81, in Criminal Case No.
2095. The Antecedents
On December 11, 1997,
the petitioner Alexander P. Rugas was charged with Frustrated Homicide
in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the
16th day of September 1997, at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, in
barangay
Taclobo, municipality of San Fernando, province of Romblon,
Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously
attack, assault and stab with a deadly weapon one GERBERTO RAFOL,
inflicting
upon the latter critical injuries in different parts of his body, which
ordinarily would cause the death of said Gerberto D. Rafol, thus
performing
all the acts of execution which should have produced the felony of
homicide,
as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of
causes
independent of the will of the accused and that is by the timely and
able
medical assistance rendered to the victim which prevented his death.cralaw:red
Contrary to law.[3]
The petitioner was duly
arraigned, assisted by counsel and entered a plea of not guilty.
The Case for the
Prosecution
As synthesized by the
trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals, the prosecution was
able
to establish the following:
At around 9:00 o’clock
in the evening of September 16, 1997, Herberto (or Gerberto) Rafol was
conversing with Perla Perez in the street fronting the house of Anda
Romano
in barangay Taclobo, San Fernando, Romblon, when the accused Alexander
P. Rugas, suddenly stabbed him at his left thigh. He faced him to know
who stabbed him but the accused stabbed him on his stomach. He ran and
shouted for help. Somebody helped him in boarding him to a tricycle and
he was brought to the hospital at Cajidiocan where Dr. Fermin M.
Fatalla
operated on him and issued the medico-legal certificate, dated
September
25, 1977 (Exh. F) and he drew a sketch (Exh. G). Dr. Fatalla found a
stab
wound on the right upper quadrant of the abdomen, 3 cms. in length and
about 4 to 5 cms. in depth penetrating the abdominal cavity as well as
the right lobe of the liver. This was a fatal wound, involving as it
did
the liver, one of the vital organs of the body. The patient could die
of
severe hemorrhage if no surgical operation was done. And he immediately
operated the patient upon arrival at the hospital. The second stab
wound
was 7.5 cms. in length located at the lower left quadrant or at the
uppermost
part of the left lateral thigh. This was not a fatal wound. Both could
have been caused by any sharp pointed or bladed instrument like a
knife.
The first stab wound could have been inflicted with the assailant in
front
of the victim or at the right side of the victim or somewhere obliquely
to the right of the patient, using his right or left hand. The second
stab
wound could have been inflicted with the assailant in front or could be
on the left side of the victim, obliquely to the side of the victim,
which
he could inflict if he comes from the rear or from the back of the
victim
using his right hand.cralaw:red
According to private
complainant, he first saw the accused coming about twenty-five (25)
meters
from him. He directly came to him and he did not know that he was
holding
a knife. He just came all of a sudden and he did not know he would stab
him. Before this incident, they did not quarrel and had no
misunderstanding.cralaw:red
He spent a total of
P25,390.00 as a result of these injuries he sustained. (Exhs. B, B-1
and
B-2; Exhs. C, C-1 to C-41; and Exhs. E-1 to E-10).[4]
The petitioner invoked
self-defense. He testified that at about 9:00 a.m. on September 16,
1997,
he was in the house of his aunt at Barangay Taclobo, San Fernando,
Romblon.
His aunt had asked him to take care of her children. While he was in
the
kitchen slicing lemon, he heard someone shouting outside the house:
"Get
out those who are brave!" He then pocketed the knife he was using and
went
out of the house to find out what the commotion was all about.cralaw:red
Outside, the petitioner
saw Crispulo Romano, Joval Rones and Herberto Rafol. Rafol was armed
with
a bolo. He went out of the gate and asked Rafol, "Why are you like
that?"
Peeved, Rafol handed his bolo over to Rones and approached the
petitioner,
kicking him on the left arm. The two then had a fistfight. When the
petitioner
saw Rones raise his bolo, he pulled out the knife from his pocket to
defend
himself. Rafol also pulled out a knife of his own. The petitioner then
stabbed Rafol on the front portion of his body, and the latter’s knife
fell to the ground.cralaw:red
The petitioner picked
up his knife and stabbed Rafol anew. He then faced Rones, who ran away.
The petitioner did not notice where Romano had gone. He then fled from
the scene of the crime and proceeded to the house of his aunt.cralaw:red
The petitioner’s testimony
was corroborated in part by Jovy Vicente. He testified that at about
9:00
p.m. on September 16, 1997, he was wheeling his bicycle on his way
home.
He passed by Rafol who was then conversing with Perla Perez. He saw
Rafol
holding an empty bottle of gin and Romano holding a bolo. The two were
already inebriated. He saw the petitioner emerge from the gate of his
aunt’s
house and walk past him on his right side.cralaw:red
The petitioner’s aunt,
Perla Perez, testified that she saw Rafol holding a bolo. When she saw
the petitioner and Rafol throwing stones at each other, she was so
petrified
that she frantically fled from the scene, her legs trembling. However,
she contradicted herself when she also testified that she saw Rafol
hand
over his bolo to Rones, and Rafol and the petitioner boxing each other.
Afraid, she fled from the scene. She did not witness the stabbing of
Rafol
by the petitioner.cralaw:red
The trial court, thereafter,
rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of the crime charged and
sentencing
him to an indeterminate penalty, appreciating against him the generic
aggravating
circumstance of treachery. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court
finds the accused ALEXANDER P. RUGAS, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Frustrated Homicide under the Information, dated December
11, 1997, and hereby sentences him to a prison term of not less than 6
years and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and 1
day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to
pay
Herberto Rafol the sum of P25,390.00 as and for actual expenses,
without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.cralaw:red
The period of preventive
imprisonment the accused had undergone shall be credited in his favor
to
its full extent in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code,
as amended.[5]
The trial court declared
that the petitioner failed to prove that he acted in self-defense when
he stabbed the victim twice on the left side of the body and on the
uppermost
portion of the left thigh. The petitioner likewise failed to surrender
to the police authorities and give a statement stating that he stabbed
the victim in self-defense, and account for the knife he used in
stabbing
the victim. The court also declared that the petitioner’s testimony and
those of his witnesses contradicted each other.cralaw:red
On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with modifications,
with the following ratiocinations:
The defense proved that
there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he
allegedly
kicked the accused. This is just the mere claim of the accused which is
not corroborated by Mrs. Perez who testified that there was a fistfight
between the two. Perla Perez declared that the two had a fistfight
because
of the shout, the brave come out (tsn, Dec. 2, 1998, p. 7). Aside from
this, when asked by the court if the accused was injured when he was
kicked
at the eyebrow, the accused said no. Simply, this Court does not
believe
that the victim kicked the accused at the eyebrow. The accused was
apparently
inconsistent, as the trial court observed in its ratiocination, is
exemplified
to wit: "True, he claimed that Rafol kicked him in his left arm before
the alleged fistfight between him and Rafol (Alexander P. Rugas, Jr.,
on
direct examination, tsn, May 14, 1999, p. 6), yet he would point later
to his eyebrow as sustaining no injury as a result of the kick by Rafol
(supra, on cross-examination, p. 10) likewise, when asked in what part
of the body he stabbed Herberto Rafol of the first time, he answered in
front, with the accused waving his hand up and down (supra, p. 13),
when
actually it was almost directly on the left side of the body of Rafol
at
the uppermost part of the left lateral thigh and certainly not in front
as demonstrated by the accused (please refer also to sketch G).cralaw:red
As questions were profounded
(sic) on both the prosecution’s and defense’s witnesses, it can be
traced
that they knew each other. If this is the case, it can be said
therefore,
that complainant knew that the one whom he claimed to be he was talking
with at the time was the aunt of the accused. Yet, the victim has no
apprehension
in his claim that he was called by Mrs. Perla Perez. As this court went
over the testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses, it finds their
testimony
to be more consistent and credible. Capole, another prosecution’s
witness,
testified that he saw the accused with a knife running towards the
victim.
The defense obviously tried to destroy the testimony of the said
witness
but this Court believes that it failed.cralaw:red
While on the other hand,
the defense witness Perla Perez’ answers were evasive and not
responsive
to the questions profounded (sic) when cross-examination was undertaken
on her. In her direct examination, she testified that she had a
companion
Violeta Eling (tsn, Dec. 2, 1998, p. 3), they were near the street
where
the store was also near (supra, p. 4). But when Alex went out to ask
"Why
are you like that?" allegedly to the victim, Perez declared that she
was
then alone. And Yolanda was far (tsn, Dec. 2, 1998, p. 29). This court
also notes Perez’ testimony at first that the victim broke a bottle of
gin but who later admitted that she did not see it but only overheard
it
from a certain Yolanda. But according to her, Yolanda was far from her.
This court doubts the credibility of this witness. Besides, she
admitted
she had not witnessed anything except that she heard the shouting and
thereafter
left then.cralaw:red
Certainly, this court
is not impressed with the theory of the accused that the victim, Rafol,
was holding a bolo at the time but handed it later allegedly to one
Joval
Rones. That at the course of the fistfight, complainant drew a knife
while
Joval Rones was raising his hand holding the bolo. These two aggressors
were armed if we are to believe the defense but despite of that,
accused
with a mere knife and who was not ready for a fight if he is to be
believed
because he was slicing a lemon at the kitchen then faced his aggressors
without fear. Again, if we would take hook line and sinker the
defense’s
theory, there are three companions of the victim so that, there were
four
in all. Yet, it is surprising and contrary to human nature and
experience
that accused never suffered even a slight injury. The physical facts in
the instant case reveals that accused did not act in self-defense.cralaw:red
In the present case,
the defense claimed that the victim shouted while in the street "Get
out
those who are brave." So that accused got out and asked "why are you
like
that?" Then a fistfight ensued. We opine that accused herein
voluntarily
and practically face a fight. The rule is when one agrees to engage in
a fight, he cannot plead self-defense because there is no unlawful
aggression
to speak of.cralaw:red
Also, we find application
by analogy of an old ruling of the Supreme Court, which held as follows:
"The court a quo rejected
the claim of self-defense interposed by the appellant. We find that
such
plea cannot be availed of because no unlawful aggression, so to speak,
was committed by the deceased, Rodolfo Saldo, and Hernando Caunte
against
the appellant. Appellant’s version of the incident was to the effect
that
he had come to the aid of Villafria at the latter’s call when Villafria
boxed Mariano Dioso and engaged the group of Dioso, Saldo and Caunte in
a fight. In other words, he voluntarily joined the fight, when he did
not
have to. He voluntarily exposed himself to the consequences of a fight
with his opponents. Granting arguendo that the first attack came from
Dioso
or Saldo or Caunte, yet same cannot be considered an unlawful or
unexpected
aggression. The first attack which came from either is but an incident
of the fight. (People vs. Kruse, C.A., 64 O.G. 12632): (Reyes, Revised
Penal Code on Crim. Law, 12th Ed., 1981, p. 168) (underscoring supplied)
Granting arguendo that
the victim and his companion have had shouted, "get out those who are
brave,"
the accused’s name was never mentioned or called out. The victim was
then
in the street but the accused went out from the house and asked the
victim
why they were like that which only shows that he exposed himself to the
consequences of a fight as explained by the Supreme Court in the
aforequoted
ruling.[6]
In this case, the petitioner
asserts that contrary to the findings of the trial court and the Court
of Appeals, he proved that he acted in complete self-defense when he
stabbed
Rafol. Rones raised a hand that held a bolo and Rafol was armed with a
knife. They had a confederate in the person of Romano. He was alone
against
three adversaries, two of whom were armed with lethal weapons, so he
stabbed
Rafol to defend himself. Rafol kicked him on the eyebrow and as a
consequence,
he suffered disgrace and humiliation. The petitioner contends that
Rafol’s
act of kicking him without justifiable cause can be considered as an
unlawful
aggression, citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Sabio.[7]
The petition has no
merit.cralaw:red
First. The determination
of the unlawful aggressor’s identity, as between the appellant or the
victim,
is a factual issue.[8]
In this case, the trial court ruled that the appellant, not the victim,
was the unlawful aggressor, and that the appellant’s evidence to prove
his defense was incredible, thus:
The accused interposed,
in effect, self-defense. There is no showing, however, that he
voluntarily
surrendered to the authorities even on the barangay level. Neither did
he inform any such authorities that he acted in self-defense. No police
statements whatever were executed by him or by any witness in his
behalf.
The knife he used was unaccounted for. While the victim, Herberto
Rafol,
almost died due to one of his stab wounds the accused admittedly
inflicted
upon him, assailant Alexander P. Rugas, Jr. was unable to exhibit even
the slightest scratch on himself. True, he claimed that Rafol kicked
him
on his left arm before the alleged fistfight between him and Rafol
(Alexander
P. Rugas, Jr., on direct examination, tsn, May 14, 1999, p. 6), yet he
would point later to his eyebrow as sustaining no injury as a result of
the kick by Rafol (supra on cross examination, p. 10); likewise, when
asked
in what part of the body he stabbed Herberto Rafol for the first time,
he answered in front, with the accused waving his hand up and down
(supra,
p. 13), when actually it was almost directly on the left side of the
body
of Rafol at the uppermost part of the left lateral thigh and certainly
not in front as demonstrated by the accused (please refer also to the
sketch,
Exh. G).cralaw:red
These badges of guilt
or circumstances coupled with the failure of the accused to prove
self-defense
which he invoked, in effect, by clear and convincing evidenced are
fatal
to his defense. As the burden of proof is shifted on him, he must
consequently
rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of that of
the prosecution. (People vs. Edgar Umadhay Travasas, et al., G.R. No.
119544,
August 3, 1998, Kapunan, J.; Case Digests of Supreme Court Decisions,
August
3, 1998, Vol. 40, No. 2, p. 275). His version failed to convince as
against
that of the prosecution. His conviction must follow.[9]
Case law has it that
the findings of the trial court and its assessment and probative weight
of the testimonies of witnesses are accorded by the Court high respect,
if not conclusive effect, especially when affirmed by the CA, and in
the
absence of any justifiable reason to deviate from the said findings.
This
is in view of the trial court’s unique advantage of being able to
monitor
and observe at close range the deportment and conduct of witnesses as
they
testify. We have reviewed the records and found no such justification
to
modify the trial court’s findings.cralaw:red
Second. Like alibi,
self-defense is inherently a weak defense which can be easily
fabricated.[10]
When the accused interposes self-defense, he hereby admits having
caused
the injuries of the victim. The burden of proof then shifts on him to
prove,
with clear and convincing evidence, the confluence of the essential
requisites
for such a defense, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed and to prevent
or
repel it; (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. The accused must rely on the strength of his own
evidence
and not on the prosecution’s, for even if the latter is weak, it cannot
be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing.[11]
In People v. Alfaro,[12]
and People v. Camacho,[13]
we held that the failure of the accused to account for the presentation
of the bladed weapon allegedly used by the victim is fatal to his plea
of self-defense. In this case, the appellant failed to account for the
knife supposedly held by the victim and the bolo which the victim
allegedly
handed over to Rones. He also failed to account for the knife he used
in
stabbing the victim and to surrender himself and the said knife to the
police authorities and to admit having stabbed the victim in
self-defense.[14]
Such failure rejects appellant’s claim of self-defense.[15]
Third. The petitioner’s
reliance on our ruling in People v. Sabio,[16]
citing the ruling of the Supreme Court of Spain on January 20, 1904, is
misplaced. In that case, the Court ruled that a slap on the face is an
unlawful aggression since the face represents a person and his dignity.
Slapping the face of a person is a serious personal attack; it is a
physical
assault, coupled with a willful disgrace, nay, a defiance, of an
individual’s
personality; and it may, therefore, be frequently regarded as placing
in
real danger a person’s dignity, rights and safety. In this case, there
is no evidence that the victim slapped the petitioner. The petitioner
merely
claimed that he was hit on his eyebrow which the trial court and the
Court
of Appeals found to be baseless. This reliance on People v. Sabio to
sustain
the claim that the petitioner intended to defend his honor, is
inconsistent
with his testimony that he stabbed the victim to defend himself from an
imminent physical assault when the latter pulled out a knife. This is
also
inconsistent with the fact that the victim was stabbed three times.cralaw:red
The trial court and
the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that treachery attended the
commission
of the crime and that it was merely a generic aggravating and not a
qualifying
circumstance. As found by the trial court, the attack on the victim was
so sudden and unexpected that the victim had no time to prepare and
defend
himself.[17]
However, such modifying circumstance was not alleged in the Information
as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.[18]
Thus, treachery cannot be considered by the Court even as a generic
aggravating
circumstance. Although the crime took place before the said Rule took
effect,
it should nevertheless be applied retroactively as it is favorable to
the
appellant.[19]
Under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal
in its full range. The penalty for frustrated homicide is one degree
lower
than reclusion temporal, or prision mayor, which has a range of from 6
years and one day to 12 years. From the penalty of prision mayor shall
be taken the maximum of the indeterminate penalty, taking into account
the modifying circumstances attendant in the commission of the crime,
if
any. There being no modifying circumstances in the instant case, the
maximum
of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium period of
prision
mayor, which has a range of from eight years and one day to ten years.
The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full
range
of the penalty not lower than prision mayor, which is prision
correccional,
with a range of from six months and one day to six years.cralaw:red
The trial court failed
to award moral and exemplary damages to the victim. The decision of the
trial court shall, thus, be modified. The appellant is ordered to pay
P25,000.00
as moral damages[20]
to the victim Herberto D. Rafol, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages,[21]
conformably to current jurisprudence.cralaw:red
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Branch 81, is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION.
Petitioner Alexander P. Rugas is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of
frustrated homicide defined and penalized under Article 247 in relation
to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstance
in the commission of the crime, is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate
penalty of from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
ten
(10) years of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum. The
petitioner
is hereby directed to pay to the victim Herberto D. Rafol P25,000.00,
as
moral damages, and P25,000.00, as exemplary damages. Costs against the
petitioner.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, J., (Chairman), Quisumbing,
Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., with Associate Justices
Eugenio S. Labitoria and Perlita J. Tria Tirona concurring.
[2]
Penned by Judge Placido C. Marquez.
[3]
Rollo, p. 36.
[4]
Rollo, p. 37.
[5]
Rollo, p. 32.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 38-41.
[7]
G.R. No. 23734, April 27, 1967.
[8]
People v. Genebazzo, 361 SCRA 572 (2001).
[9]
Rollo, p. 31
[10]
People v. Moay, 296 SCRA 292 (1998).
[11]
People v. Camacho, 359 SCRA 200 (2002).
[12]
119 SCRA 204 (1982).
[13]
Supra.
[14]
Rollo, p. 129.
[15]
People v. Piamonte, 303 SCRA 577 (1999).
[16]
19 SCRA 901 (1967).
[17]
People v. Perez, 351 SCRA 549 (2001).
[18]
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense.—The complaint or information shall
state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the
acts
or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and
aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference
shall
be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
[19]
People v. Iluis, G.R. No. 135844-45, November 24, 2003.
[20]
Article 2219, paragraph 1, New Civil Code.
[21]
People v. Catubig, 363 SCRA 621 (2001). |