FIRST DIVISION
THELMA A.
JADER-MANALO,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
147978
January 23, 2002
-versus-
NORMA FERNANDEZ
C.
CAMAISA
AND EDILBERTO
CAMAISA,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN,
J.:
The issue raised in
this case is whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a
conjugal
property without the wife's written consent.
The present controversy
had its beginning when petitioner Thelma A. Jader-Manalo allegedly came
across an advertisement placed by respondents, the Spouses Norma
Fernandez
C. Camaisa and Edilberto Camaisa, in the Classified Ads Section of the
newspaper BULLETIN TODAY in its April, 1992 issue, for the sale of
their
ten-door apartment in Makati, as well as that in Taytay, Rizal.cralaw:red
As narrated by petitioner
in her complaint filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila,
she was interested in buying the two properties so she negotiated for
the
purchase through a real estate broker, Mr. Proceso Ereno, authorized by
respondent spouses.[1]
Petitioner made a visual inspection of the said lots with the real
estate
broker and was shown the tax declarations, real property tax payment
receipts,
location plans, and vicinity maps relating to the properties.[2]
Thereafter, petitioner met with the vendors who turned out to be
respondent
spouses. She made a definite offer to buy the properties to respondent
Edilberto Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity of his wife,
respondent
Norma Camaisa in the presence of the real estate broker.[3]
After some bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the
purchase
price of P1,500,000.00 for the Taytay property and P2,100,000.00 for
the
Makati property[4]
to be paid on installment basis with downpayments of P100,000.00 and
P200,000.00,
respectively, on April 15, 1992. The balance thereof was to be paid as
follows[5]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Taytay Property Makati
Propertychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
6th month P200,000.00
P300,000.00chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
12th month 700,000.00
1,600,000.00
18th month 500,000.00
This agreement was handwritten
by petitioner and signed by Edilberto.[6]
When petitioner pointed out the conjugal nature of the properties,
Edilberto
assured her of his wife's conformity and consent to the sale.[7]
The formal typewritten Contracts to Sell were thereafter prepared by
petitioner.
The following day, petitioner, the real estate broker and Edilberto met
in the latter's office for the formal signing of the typewritten
Contracts
to Sell.[8]
After Edilberto signed the contracts, petitioner delivered to him two
checks,
namely, UCPB Check No. 62807 dated April 15, 1992 for P200,000.00 and
UCPB
Check No. 62808 also dated April 15, 1992 for P100,000.00 in the
presence
of the real estate broker and an employee in Edilberto's office.[9]
The contracts were given to Edilberto for the formal affixing of his
wife's
signature.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The following day, petitioner
received a call from respondent Norma, requesting a meeting to clarify
some provisions of the contracts.[10]
To accommodate her queries, petitioner, accompanied by her lawyer, met
with Edilberto and Norma and the real estate broker at Cafe Rizal in
Makati.[11]
During the meeting, handwritten notations were made on the contracts to
sell, so they arranged to incorporate the notations and to meet again
for
the formal signing of the contracts.[12]
When petitioner met
again with respondent spouses and the real estate broker at Edilberto's
office for the formal affixing of Norma's signature, she was surprised
when respondent spouses informed her that they were backing out of the
agreement because they needed "spot cash" for the full amount of the
consideration.[13]
Petitioner reminded respondent spouses that the contracts to sell had
already
been duly perfected and Norma's refusal to sign the same would unduly
prejudice
petitioner. Still, Norma refused to sign the contracts prompting
petitioner
to file a complaint for specific performance and damages against
respondent
spouses before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136 on April
29, 1992, to compel respondent Norma Camaisa to sign the contracts to
sell.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A Motion to Dismiss[14]
was filed by respondents which was denied by the trial court in its
Resolution
of July 21, 1992.[15]
Respondents then filed
their Answer with Compulsory Counter-claim, alleging that it was an
agreement
between herein petitioner and respondent Edilberto Camaisa that the
sale
of the subject properties was still subject to the approval and
conformity
of his wife Norma Camaisa.[16]
Thereafter, when Norma refused to give her consent to the sale, her
refusal
was duly communicated by Edilberto to petitioner.[17]
The checks issued by petitioner were returned to her by Edilberto and
she
accepted the same without any objection.[18]
Respondent further claimed that the acceptance of the checks returned
to
petitioner signified her assent to the cancellation of the sale of the
subject properties.[19]
Respondent Norma denied that she ever participated in the negotiations
for the sale of the subject properties and that she gave her consent
and
conformity to the same.[20]
On October 20, 1992,
respondent Norma F. Camaisa filed a Motion for Summary Judgment[21]
asserting that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact on the
basis of the pleadings and admission of the parties considering that
the
wife's written consent was not obtained in the contract to sell, the
subject
conjugal properties belonging to respondents; hence, the contract was
null
and void.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On April 14, 1993, the
trial court rendered a summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the
ground that under Art. 124 of the Family Code, the court cannot
intervene
to authorize the transaction in the absence of the consent of the wife
since said wife who refused to give consent had not been shown to be
incapacitated.
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, considering
these premises, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Dismissing the complaint
and ordering the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens by reason of
its filing on TCT Nos. (464860) S-8724 and (464861) S-8725 of the
Registry
of Deeds at Makati and on TCT Nos. 295976 and 295971 of the Registry of
Rizal.cralaw:red
2. Ordering plaintiff
Thelma A. Jader to pay defendant spouses Norma and Edilberto Camaisa,
FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) as Moral Damages and FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00)
as Attorney's Fees.cralaw:red
Costs against plaintiff.[22]
Petitioner, thus, elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals. On November 29, 2000, the Court of
Appeals
affirmed the dismissal by the trial court but deleted the award of
P50,000.00
as damages and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court of Appeals
explained that the properties subject of the contracts were conjugal
properties
and as such, the consent of both spouses is necessary to give effect to
the sale. Since private respondent Norma Camaisa refused to sign the
contracts,
the sale was never perfected. In fact, the downpayment was returned by
respondent spouses and was accepted by petitioner. The Court of Appeals
also stressed that the authority of the court to allow sale or
encumbrance
of a conjugal property without the consent of the other spouse is
applicable
only in cases where the said spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable
to participate in the administration of the conjugal property.cralaw:red
Hence, the present recourse
assigning the following errors:
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY ERRED IN RENDERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
DISMISSING
THE COMPLAINT ENTIRELY AND ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF NOTICE OF LIS
PENDENS
ON THE TITLES OF THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE SALE OF
REAL
PROPERTIES BY RESPONDENTS TO PETITIONER HAVE ALREADY BEEN PERFECTED,
FOR
AFTER THE LATTER PAID P300,000.00 DOWNPAYMENT, RESPONDENT MRS. CAMAISA
NEVER OBJECTED TO STIPULATIONS WITH RESPECT TO PRICE, OBJECT AND TERMS
OF PAYMENT IN THE CONTRACT TO SELL ALREADY SIGNED BY THE PETITIONER,
RESPONDENT
MR. CAMAISA AND WITNESSES MARKED AS ANNEX "G" IN THE COMPLAINT EXCEPT,
FOR MINOR PROVISIONS ALREADY IMPLIED BY LAW, LIKE EJECTMENT OF TENANTS,
SUBDIVISION OF TITLE AND RESCISSION IN CASE OF NONPAYMENT, WHICH
PETITIONER
READILY AGREED AND ACCEDED TO THEIR INCLUSION;
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT CONTRACT
OF
SALE IS CONSENSUAL AND IT IS PERFECTED BY THE MERE CONSENT OF THE
PARTIES
AND THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS ARE ARTICLES 1157, 1356, 1357, 1358,
1403,
1405 AND 1475 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND GOVERNED BY THE
STATUTE OF FRAUD.[23]
The Court does not find
error in the decisions of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.cralaw:red
Petitioner alleges that
the trial court erred when it entered a summary judgment in favor of
respondent
spouses there being a genuine issue of fact. Petitioner maintains that
the issue of whether the contracts to sell between petitioner and
respondent
spouses was perfected is a question of fact necessitating a trial on
the
merits.cralaw:red
The Court does not agree.
A summary judgment is one granted by the court upon motion by a party
for
an expeditious settlement of a case, there appearing from the
pleadings,
depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no important
questions
or issues of fact involved, and that therefore the moving party is
entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.[24]
A perusal of the pleadings submitted by both parties show that there is
no genuine controversy as to the facts involved therein.cralaw:red
Both parties admit that
there were negotiations for the sale of four parcels of land between
petitioner
and respondent spouses; that petitioner and respondent Edilberto
Camaisa
came to an agreement as to the price and the terms of payment, and a
downpayment
was paid by petitioner to the latter; and that respondent Norma refused
to sign the contracts to sell. The issue thus posed for resolution in
the
trial court was whether or not the contracts to sell between petitioner
and respondent spouses were already perfected such that the latter
could
no longer back out of the agreement.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The law requires that
the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator
in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife,
otherwise,
the disposition is void. Thus, Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration
and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper
remedy,
which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract
implementing such decision.cralaw:red
In the event that one
spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition
or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written
consent
of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the
disposition
or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed
as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the
third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance
by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn
by either or both offerors. (Underscoring ours)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The properties subject
of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts
to
sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur.cralaw:red
Respondent Norma Camaisa
admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting
that respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale
of the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent to the
sale is required by law for its validity. Significantly, petitioner
herself
admits that Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent
Norma
may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal
properties. However, being merely aware of a transaction is not consent.[25]
Finally, petitioner
argues that since respondent Norma unjustly refuses to affix her
signatures
to the contracts to sell, court authorization under Article 124 of the
Family Code is warranted.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The argument is bereft
of merit. Petitioner is correct insofar as she alleges that if the
written
consent of the other spouse cannot be obtained or is being withheld,
the
matter may be brought to court which will give such authority if the
same
is warranted by the circumstances. However, it should be stressed that
court authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases where
the
spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated.[26]
In this case, petitioner failed to allege and prove that respondent
Norma
was incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts. In the absence
of such showing of the wife's incapacity, court authorization cannot be
sought.cralaw:red
Under the foregoing
facts, the motion for summary judgment was proper considering that
there
was no genuine issue as to any material fact. The only issue to be
resolved
by the trial court was whether the contract to sell involving conjugal
properties was valid without the written consent of the wife.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the petition
is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November
29, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 43421 AFFIRMED.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman),
Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ.,
concur.cralaw:red
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Paragraph IV of Complaint; Rollo, p. 61.
[2]
Paragraph V of Complaint; id.
[3]
Paragraph VI of Complaint; id.
[4]
Paragraph VII of Complaint; id., at 62.
[5]
Id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
The handwritten agreement was attached as Annex "E" to the Complaint;
Rollo,
pp.80-83.
[7]
Supra, Note 4.
[8]
Paragraph IX of Complaint; Rollo, p. 63.
[9]
Photocopies of these checks were attached as Annex "H' to the
Complaint;
Rollo, .pp. 90-92.
[10]
Paragraph XI of Complaint; Rollo, pp. 63-64.
[11]
Paragraph XII of Complaint; id.
[12]
Paragraph XIII of Complaint; id.
[13]
Paragraph XIX; id., pp. 64-65.
[14]
Rollo, pp. 107-110.
[15]
Id., at 143.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Paragraph XI of Answer with Cumpolsary Counterclaim, id., p. 95.
[17]
Paragraph XIII, id.
[18]
id.
[19]
id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Answer with Compulsary Counterclaim; id. at
93-94.
[21]
Rollo, p. 186.
[22]
Annex "Q," p. 3; Rollo, pp. 224-225.
[23]
Rollo, p. 23.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
271 SCRA 36 (1997).
[25]
Tinitigan vs. Tinitigan, 100 SCRA 619 (1980).
[26]
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,
Arturo
Tolentino, Vol. I, p. 461 citing the case of Nicolas vs. Court of
Appeals,
154 SCRA 635 [1987] which held that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
".
the very conspicuous absence of the wife's conforme to such disposition
of the ganancial property, there being no showing that Lourdes Manuel,
whom respondent Madlangsakay married in 1927, is legally incapacitated
- renders the alleged sale void ab initio because it is in
contravention
of the mandatory requirement in Article 166 of the Civil Code. This
doctrine
is too well-settled in our jurisprudence to require further
elucidation."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
See
also p. 392 of Tolentino's Commentaries relating to an identical
provision,
Art. 96 of the Civil Code, on community property. Tolentino writes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"
As a result of this joint ownership, neither spouse may alienate or
encumber
any common property without the written consent of the other, or, if
the
other spouse is incapacitated, the authorization of the court." |