FIRST DIVISION
EXECUTIVE LABOR
ARBITER
RICARDO N. OLAIREZ,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
148030
March 10, 2003
-versus-
SANDIGANBAYAN
(SECOND
DIVISION),THE OFFICE
OF THE
OMBUDSMAN AND ALICIA ABAD TENORIA,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Before the Court is a petition
for certiorari assailing the resolution, dated 30 April 2001, of the
Sandiganbayan
(Second Division) which has denied the motion for
reinvestigation/reconsideration
filed by herein petitioner Executive Labor Arbiter Ricardo N. Olairez.
It would be useful to
trace the origin of the case. Alicia Abad Tenoria instituted an
action
for illegal dismissal before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC)
against Combate Clinic, St. Peter Thelmo Drug, Mercury Drug Aparri
Branch,
Dr. Valeriano Combate and Mrs. Hedy Combate, hereinafter collectively
referred
to as Mercury Drug, et al. The case, docketed NLRC Case No. RAB
II
CN-11-00300-92, was initially assigned to Executive Labor Arbiter
Adrian
Pagalilawan. When Pagalilawan was appointed to the position of a
Regional Trial Court judge, the case was assigned to Executive Labor
Arbiter
Olairez. In a decision, dated 10 August 1994, Olairez dismissed
Tenoria's
complaint for lack of merit. Tenoria appealed to the NLRC which,
in a decision promulgated on 25 May 1995, vacated the order of
dismissal
and entered another judgment; its dispositive portion read:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the appealed decision of August 10, 1994 is hereby VACATED
and SET ASIDE and another judgment entered as follows:
"1.
Declaring the dismissal of the complainant to be illegal and
consequently,
the respondents are directed to reinstate the complainant to her former
position without loss of seniority right and with full backwages;
"2.
The money claims of the complainant are remanded to Labor Arbiter of
origin
for further appropriate proceedings with the instruction that the same
should be acted upon with dispatch; and
"3.
Dismissing the claims for moral and exemplary damages for lack of
merit."[1]
Tenoria moved for the
execution of the judgment. At the pre-execution hearing, it was
manifested
that a motion for reconsideration had been filed and still then pending
with the NLRC and that, likewise, Mercury Drug, et al., were elevating
the case to the Supreme Court. Further proceedings on the motion
for execution were thereupon suspended.cralaw:red
In a resolution, dated
05 February 1996, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, docketed
G.R.
No. 123326, of Mercury Drug, et al., for the failure of petitioners to
submit a certified true copy of the NLRC decision and on the further
ground
that the NLRC was yet to resolve the then pending motion for
reconsideration.
After the NLRC ultimately denied the motion for reconsideration,
another
case, docketed G.R. No. 124967, was filed before the Supreme
Court.
The new petition was denied by the Court in its resolution of 03 July
1996.
A motion for its reconsideration was denied with finality in another
resolution
of 30 September 1996. In due time, a pre-execution conference was
conducted; in an order, dated 15 May 1997, Executive Labor Arbiter
Olairez
ruled:
"WHEREFORE, premises
considered, respondents are ordered to reinstate complainant
immediately
upon presentation of a medical certificate that she is physically fit
to
assume her former position and as regards her backwages there is
nothing
to execute because her earnings elsewhere which should be deducted from
her backwages are computed to be much more than her supposed full
backwages."[2]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Feeling aggrieved, Tenoria
filed a petition for preliminary mandatory injunction before the NLRC
assailing
the order. In a decision, promulgated on 24 February 1999, the
NLRC
granted the petition; it said:
"There is no doubt,
however, that in our 25 May 1995 decision, petitioner's entitlement to
backwages, as well as, reinstatement is conditioned upon no uncertain
terms,
other than the punitive sanction provided by law to redress the wrong
done
against her as a legal consequence of her unauthorized dismissal from
employment.cralaw:red
"Indubitably, the imposition
of conditions sine qua non in the execution of our 25 May 1995
decision,
by all barometrical standards, is absolutely an amendment thereto plain
and simple. x x x.cralaw:red
"WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is hereby GRANTED. Let the Writ of Execution in NLRC
CASE
NO. RAB-II-11-00300-92 issue in accordance with the disposition in our
25 May 1995 decision. For strict compliance by respondent
Executive
Labor Arbiter Ricardo N. Olairez."[3]
Another pre-execution
hearing was conducted; in an order, dated 07 March 2000, Executive
Labor
Arbiter Olairez held:
"WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the respondents are hereby ordered to pay complainant the
computed
amount of P310,000.00 representing her full backwages and separation
pay.
If no voluntary payment is made within a reasonable period, let a writ
of execution issue for the enforcement and collection of the amount of
P310,000.00 award for the complainant."[4]
Meanwhile, on 06 March
2000, Tenorio filed a case for violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
docketed
OMB-1-00-0436, against Executive Labor Arbiter Olairez, Dr. Valeriano
Combate
in his capacity as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, and Hedy Combate in her capacity as member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Calamaniugan, Cagayan. In a resolution, dated 29
November
2000, Graft Investigator I Joy N. Casihan-Dumlao, with the concurrence
of Director Ernesto M. Nocos, recommended the dismissal of the case
against
the Combates and the filing, however, of an information against
Executive
Labor Arbiter Olairez for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019.
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Jesus F. Guerrero recommended the approval
of
the resolution. On 15 December 2000, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto
approved
the resolution. On 27 December 2000, an Information was filed
before
the Sandiganbayan and there docketed Criminal Case No. 26418; it read:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"That on or about May
1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court,
the above-named accused, a public officer, being an Executive Labor
Arbiter
of the Regional Arbitration Branch II of the National Labor Relations
Commission
(NLRC), committing the crime herein charged in relation to and taking
advantage
of his official functions, and through evident bad faith, manifest
partiality
and/or gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully
and criminally fail to issue a Writ of Execution, anent a RAB II CN.
11-00300-92
entitled `ALICIA ABAD TENORIA and COMBATE CLINIC, ET AL.' despite the
finality
of the 25 May 1995 Decision of the NLRC and after respondent was again
ordered to issue said Writ by the NLRC in its Decision dated February
24,
1999, thus, causing undue injury to ALICIA ABAD TENORIA."[5]
Executive Labor Arbiter
Olairez moved for the reconsideration of the 29th November 2000
resolution
but it was denied in an order, dated 16 March 2001, which was approved
on 30 March 2001 by Ombudsman Desierto. Executive Labor Arbiter
Olairez
then filed a motion for reinvestigation or reconsideration before the
Sandiganbayan.
In a resolution, dated 30 April 2001 and promulgated on 03 May 2001,
the
motion was denied for lack of merit.cralaw:red
On 11 July 2001, the
Court granted petitioner's motion to consolidate the case with G.R. No.
142889 (Executive Labor Arbiter Ricardo N. Olairez vs. Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto, et al). In a resolution, dated 24 September 2001, the
Court
decided to grant a temporary restraining order enjoining the
Sandiganbayan
(Second Division) from further hearing Criminal Case No. 26418 upon
petitioner's
filing of a five thousand-peso bond. Upon petitioner's
compliance,
a temporary restraining order was issued on 01 October 2001. On
even
date, the Court resolved to deconsolidate the case from G.R. No. 142889
in view of the promulgation, on 21 September 2001, of a decision
thereon.cralaw:red
In the instant petition,
Labor Arbiter Olairez claims that Article 254 of the Labor Code is a
proscription
against the filing of criminal cases against labor arbiters in matters
involving or growing out of labor disputes. This contention has
no
legal basis. The provision of the law invoked merely states that
no "temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case
involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court
or other entity, except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264
of
this Code." Clearly, the complaint filed by Tenoria against Olairez
before
the Office of the Ombudsman is not in the nature of an injunction
contemplated
under Article 254 of the Labor Code. The ruling in Deltaventures
Resources, Inc., vs. Cabato,[6]
cited by petitioner, refers to an instance where a Regional Trial
Court,
being a co-equal body, may not enjoin the execution of a decision of
the
NLRC. The case of Judge Dolalas vs. Office of the Ombudsman,[7]
upon the other hand, deals with an administrative case against a judge
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman in disregard of the
Constitutional-mandate
that the Supreme Court shall have exclusive administrative supervision
over all courts and the personnel thereof.[8]
Neither can Tenoria's complaint filed before the Ombudsman be
considered
as an act of forum shopping. The complaint with the Ombudsman is
confined to an alleged act of malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance
committed
by Olairez, which is well within its authority under the Ombudsman Act,[9]
and it would not necessarily affect in any material way the outcome of
the labor action pending before him.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The other issues raised
in the petition touch on the question of whether or not there appears
to
be a probable cause against respondent Olairez. Almost
invariably,
the Court has respected the assessment of the Ombudsman on the
determination
of the existence or absence of probable cause.[10]
It is basically within his sound judgment to evaluate whether, given
the
facts and circumstances before him, a criminal case should or should
not
be filed.[11]
Thus, it has been consistently held that it is not for this Court to
review
the Ombudsman's paramount discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a
complaint
filed before his office.[12]
In Ocampo, IV vs. Ombudsman,[13]
the Court has ratiocinated:
"The rule is based not
only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted
by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon
practicality
as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be
grievously
hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to
complaints
filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be
extremely
swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion
on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they
decide
to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant."[14]
There is, however, one
important exception to the above rule, and it would be when grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman in either prosecuting or
dismissing
a case before it is evident. In this event, the act of the
Ombudsman
can justifiably be assailed.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Information charged
Executive Labor Arbiter Olairez for having failed "to issue a Writ of
Execution,
anent a RAB II CN. 11-00300-92 x x x despite the finality of the 25 May
1995 Decision of the NLRC and after respondent was again ordered to
issue
said writ by the NLRC in its decision dated February 24, 1999 x x x"[15]
Culled from the records, no writ of execution was issued after the
promulgation
of the 25 May 1995 decision, despite the motion by Tenoria, because of
a pending motion for reconsideration before the NLRC and, later,
because
of the elevation of the case before this Court. On 30 September
1996,
this Court denied with finality the motion for reconsideration filed by
Mercury Drug, et al. On 15 May 1997, acting on a motion for
reconsideration,
Executive Labor Arbiter Olairez issued an order directing Mercury Drug,
et al., to reinstate complainant upon presentation of a medical
certificate
to show Tenoria's fitness to assume her former position. Relative
to the matter of back salaries, the order decreed that there was
nothing
to execute because her earnings elsewhere, deductible from her back
salaries,
were computed to be much more than what would have been her full back
salaries.
The order became the subject of a petition for preliminary mandatory
injunction
filed by Tenoria before the NLRC which, in its decision of 24 February
1999, ordered Executive Labor Arbiter Olairez to issue a writ of
execution
in accordance with the disposition of the 25th May 1995 decision.
Accordingly, another pre-execution hearing was called. It might
be
noted that the pre-execution hearing was necessary because, in its 25th
May 1995 decision, the NLRC remanded the money claims of the
complainant
to the Executive Labor Arbiter for appropriate proceedings.
Finally,
on 07 March 2000, a day after Tenoria's complaint before the Ombudsman
and prior to the receipt by Olairez of an order directing him to file
his
counter-affidavit,[16]
as well as long before the filing of the assailed Information before
the
Sandiganbayan, Olairez had already issued an order directing Mercury
Drug,
et al., to pay Tenoria the amount of P310,000.00 representing her full
back salaries and separation pay. Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019,
under which petitioner was charged, would require that the public
officer
should have caused undue injury to any party, or should have given any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions,
"through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence."
There might have been an undue delay in the execution of the NLRC
decision
but there was no showing that he acted with manifest partiality, in bad
faith, with malicious intent, or with gross inexcusable
negligence;
if at all, it was poor judgment on the part of respondent.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is neither right
nor just to unnecessarily put to anxiety and anguish a person by an
indictment
for a crime that, on its face, cannot stand. No useful purpose
but
only harm and undue concern can be achieved from an unwarranted
criminal
prosecution.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the petition
is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The Resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman
in OMB-1-00-0436, approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto on 15
December
2000, is SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan (Second Division) is
directed
to DISMISS the Information against petitioner Executive Labor Arbiter
Ricardo
N. Olairez in Criminal Case No. 26418. No costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Carpio and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J.,
on leave.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 339-340.
[2]
Rollo, p. 355.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Rollo, p. 358.
[4]
Rollo, p. 137.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 69-70.
[6]
G.R. No. 118216, 09 March 2002, 237 SCRA 521.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
G.R. No. 118808, 24 December 1996, 265 SCR4A 819.
[8]
Section 6, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
See Concerned Officials of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System
(MWSS) vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 109113, 25 January 1995, 240 SCRA 502.
[10]
Raro vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108431, 14 July 2000, 335 SCRA 581.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Presidential Commission on Good Government vs. Desierto, G.R. No.
140358,
08 December 2000, 347 SCRA 561.
[12]
Blanco vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 136757-58, 27 November 2000, 346
SCRA
108.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
G.R. Nos. 103446-47, 30 August 1993, 225 SCRA 725.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Page 730.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Rollo, pp. 70-71.
[16]
The order was received by petitioner on 05 April 2000; Rollo, p. 149. |