THIRD DIVISION.
.
GEORGE T.
VILLENA,
CARLOS N. VILLENA,AURORA
M. BONDOC
AND RONNIE C. FERNANDEZ,AND THEIR
RESPECTIVE
SPOUSES,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
148126
November 10, 2003
-versus-
SPOUSES ANTONIO
C.
CHAVEZ AND NOEMI MARCOS-
CHAVEZAND CARLITA C.
CHAVEZ,
Respondents.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN,
J.:
Stare decisis simply
means that a judgment reached in one case should be applied to
successive
ones in which the facts are substantially identical, even though the
parties
may be different. Like cases ought to be decided alike.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Case
Before this Court is
a Petition for Review[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the May 9, 2001 Decision[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 58329. The decretal
portion
of the Decision reads as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"WHEREFORE,
the judgment dated March 29, 2000 of Branch 56 of the RTC of Angeles
City
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment entered in favor
of
the petitioners, ordering the respondents and all persons claiming
rights
under them to vacate from the subject lots and to remove their houses
and/or
any other structures or constructions thereon."[3]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The overturned Decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 56,[4]
affirmed in toto the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Angeles City,
Branch
II.[5]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Facts
The facts of the case
are summarized by the CA in this wise:
"In a
Complaint
for Illegal Detainer with Damages filed on October 15, 1998, the
[respondents]
alleged that they are the owners of four (4) parcels of land designated
as Lot Nos. 164, 165, 166, and 167 of the Cadastral Survey of Angeles
City,
and covered, respectively, by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
83247,
83246, 83248 and 83249, all issued by the Register of Deeds of Angeles
City. These four (4) parcels of land have been consolidated and
subdivided
into several blocks and lots, and are now collectively designated as
Bagong
Silang Phase III-C. By mere permission and tolerance of the
respondents,
the petitioners have occupied and erected their homes on four (4) of
the
said lots, as follows:
George T.
Villena
and wife = Block 5, Lot 14chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Carlos N. Villena
and
wife = Block 5, Lot 13chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Aurora M. Bondoc
and
husband = Block 2, Lot 4chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Ronnie C. Hernandez
and wife = Block 3, Lot 5chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"All the petitioners
are
members of the Bagong Silang Phase III-C Homeowners' Association, Inc.,
with office address at Cutud, Angeles City. The respondents allowed the
petitioners and other members of the said homeowners' association to
continue
occupying the subject lots and ultimately to acquire ownership of the
lots
occupied, in consideration of a certain amount to be paid to the
respondents
as equity.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"The respondents
further
alleged that the other members of the said homeowners' association paid
to the respondents their respective equity for their right to continue
occupying and ultimately acquiring ownership of the occupied lots.
However,
notwithstanding repeated demands made upon the petitioners, they have
refused
and failed without any justifiable ground to pay their respective
equity.
In view of such failure to pay, the petitioners have forfeited their
right
to continue occupying the lots in question. Formal demand letters were
then sent by registered mail to the petitioners, wherein they were
given
a period of thirty (30) days from receipt within which to vacate and
remove
their houses from the subject lots. The period given to the petitioners
lapsed on April 11, 1998, but up to the present time, the petitioners
refused
and failed without any justifiable reason or ground to vacate and
remove
their houses from the said lots.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"The respondents
then
prayed in their Complaint that the petitioners be ordered to vacate and
remove their houses from the lots currently occupied; that each of the
petitioners be ordered to pay the respondents P1,000.00 a month as
reasonable
rental for the use and occupation of the lots starting from April 11,
1998
until they have finally vacated and removed their houses from said
lots;
and that the petitioners jointly and severally pay the respondents
P25,000.00
as actual and compensatory damages, P2,000.00 as appearance fee per
hearing,
exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"In their answer
with
compulsory counter-claim filed on November 3, 1998, the petitioners
countered
that the respondents have no cause of action to institute the present
action,
considering that the properties in question are under the community
mortgage
program implemented by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation.
Moreover, the petitioners claimed that they are lawful tenants of the
premises,
and that they have been paying their equity to their originator, the
Urban
Land and Development Foundation, Inc. However, they were not issued the
corresponding receipts evidencing payment and a copy of their contract.
The petitioners further averred that they were willing to continue
paying
their equity until the same shall have been fully paid, but their
originator,
without justifiable reason, refused to accept the tender of payment
made
by them. The petitioners subsequently agreed with their originator that
the payment of equity should be continued only upon the release of a
Purchase
Commitment Line (PCL).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"In addition, the
petitioners
alleged that they are qualified beneficiaries under Republic Act No.
7279,
otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992;
hence,
they cannot be summarily evicted and their dwelling houses demolished
unless
and until they have been relocated. According to the petitioners, they
are also builders in good faith and should be indemnified for the
improvements
they constructed on the properties in question.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"The petitioners
prayed
in their answer that the complaint be dismissed; that they be declared
lawful tenants and qualified beneficiaries under R.A. 7279; that the
respondents
be ordered to sell the lots in question to them, and to pay attorney's
fees and the costs of suit.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"After the
pre-trial
conference, both parties submitted their position papers. On September
15, 1999, MTC Branch II of Angeles City rendered a decision dismissing
both the respondents' complaint and the petitioners' counter-claim, on
the ground that the filing of an ejectment case based on the alleged
violation
of the parties' agreement which has not yet been rescinded is
premature,
and that it is beyond the competence of the said court to act on the
case,
as rescission or specific performance is beyond the jurisdiction of the
said court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"The respondents
appealed
such adverse judgment to the RTC of Angeles City, which appeal was
raffled
to Branch 56 of the said court. On March 29, 2000, RTC Branch 56 of
Angeles
City rendered a decision affirming in toto the MTC judgment."[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Ruling of
the
Court of Appeals
The CA held that the
right of petitioners to continue occupying the subject properties
hinged
on their continued payment of the agreed amount as equity.[7]
Even after formal letters of demand to vacate the premises had been
sent
to them, however, they still did not make any effort to pay their
equity
to protect their right to continue occupying those lots. Thus the
appellate
court ruled that their failure to pay made their occupancy unlawful, in
consequence of which they became subject to an ejectment suit.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The CA rejected the
contention of petitioners that they were protected by RA 7279.
According
to the appellate court, there was no express declaration by the local
government
unit that the parcels of land owned by respondents were to be used for
socialized housing. Neither was there proof of the allegation that they
had applied therefor under the Community Mortgage Program of the
National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation under Section 31 of RA 7279. Besides,
even granting that petitioners were protected under RA 7279, they were
still liable to pay amortization or face eviction.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Likewise debunked was
the allegation of petitioners that respondents were not the real
parties
in interest. Being the owners of the lots occupied by the former, the
latter
had a material interest in the suit and stood to be benefited or
injured
by any judgment affecting those parcels of land.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Hence, this Petition.[8]
The Issues
Petitioners raise the
following issues for our consideration:
"I
Whether or not the
Honorable
Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in reversing and setting aside the Decisions
of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch II and of the Regional Trial
Court,
Branch 56 both of Angeles City;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"II
Whether or not the
Honorable
Municipal Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case;
"III
Whether or not the
non-inclusion
of the Bagong Silang Homeowners Association Inc., is fatal to
respondents'
cause of action;
"IV
Whether or not
ejectment
is proper in the case at bar;
"V
Whether or not the
absence
of contractual relations between the respondents and the petitioners
bars
the filing of any action by the respondents against the petitioner."[9]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The primordial issue
to be resolved is whether unlawful detainer is the proper action to
resolve
this case. If it is, then the MTC indeed had jurisdiction over the
case,
and the CA was correct in overturning the RTC's ruling that the MTC had
no jurisdiction over the case.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.cralaw:red
Main Issue:
Propriety of Unlawful Detainer
The CA ruled that petitioners'
possession or occupancy of the subject premises was by mere tolerance
of
respondents. Hence, once petitioners failed to pay the agreed amount as
equity, their right to continue occupying the lots was lost.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We disagree. Contradictory
were the statements of the appellate court that, on the one hand, there
was no contract between the parties; and yet, on the other, that
petitioners
failed to pay the agreed equity. The fact that the CA found that there
was failure to pay the equity was an indication of an agreement. To be
sure, petitioners' possession the subject premises was not by mere
tolerance
of respondents.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the Complaint[10]
of respondents, filed before Branch II of the Municipal Trial Court of
Angeles City, they themselves alleged the presence of an agreement
between
the parties as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"10. That
in
consideration of a certain amount to be paid to the respondents by each
of the petitioners as equity for their right to continue occupying and
ultimately acquire ownership of the lots that they occupy, the said
homeowners'
association has made arrangements with the respondents to allow the
petitioners
and other members of the said homeowners' association to continue
occupying
and ultimately acquire ownership of the lots that they occupy."[11]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Further, in the Special
Power of Attorney[12]
annexed to their Complaint, they constituted and appointed Teodorico B.
Sanchez and/or Arturo M. Yadan as their attorneys-in-fact to do, among
others, the following:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"1. To
collect
and receive any amount or amounts as equity for the sale thereof to
them
from the occupants or any other interested buyer or buyers of any
portion
or portions of the following-described parcels of land:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x x
x
x x
x
x x x
of which we are
the
absolute and exclusive owners, and which comprise the parcels of land
being
acquired by the members or beneficiaries of the BAGONG SILANG PHASE
III-C
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, at Brgy. Cutud, Angeles City."[13]
Based on the admissions
of respondents themselves, they entered into an agreement with
petitioners.
Necessarily, the latter's occupancy of the lots in question was not
based
merely on the former's tolerance or permission. Thus, petitioners were
not necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand,
failing
which, a summary action for ejectment would have become proper.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The MTC's findings of
fact on this point are instructive:
"About the
only thing that the parties have met on a common ground is that:
Respondents
have entered into an arrangement/agreement with Bagong Silang
Homeowners'
Association, Inc. that called for the payment of certain amounts as
equity
for petitioners' right to continue occupying the lots with the end in
view
of eventually becoming the owners thereof, that pursuant to such
agreement
petitioners have paid certain amounts as acquisition fees or as equity
but later discontinued making payments in view of the non-issuance of
the
so-called purchase commitment line/loan, and as a consequence,
respondents
are now accusing petitioners for violating the agreement and on the
basis
of such breach of the agreement by petitioners, demands for the latter
to vacate the lots were made by respondents."[14]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
When respondents
alleged
that the Bagong Silang Phase III-C Homeowners' Association made
arrangements
with them to allow petitioners and other members of the association to
continue to occupy and ultimately to acquire ownership of the lots in
question,
respondents explicitly admitted that a contract had indeed been entered
into. The eventual transfer of ownership of real property evidenced
that
obligation. What is clear is that in their Complaint, respondents
alleged
that petitioners had violated the stipulations of their agreement as
follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"11. That
the
other members of the Bagong Silang Phase III-C Homeowners' Association,
Inc., paid to the respondents their respective equity for their right
to
continue occupying and ultimately acquire ownership of the lots that
they
occupy, but notwithstanding repeated demands made on them, up to the
present
time, the petitioners have refused and failed without any justifiable
ground
or reason to pay their respective equity to the respondents, and, in
view
of such refusal and failure, the petitioners have forfeited their right
to continue occupying and ultimately acquire ownership of the lots that
they occupy."[15]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners, on the
other
hand, denied any breach on their part and argued that the principal
issue
was one of interpretation, enforcement and/or rescission of the
contract.
Under these circumstances, proof of violation of the provisions of the
contract is a condition precedent to resolution or rescission.[16]
The contract can be declared rescinded only when its nature has been
clarified
and the eventual violation thereof, if any, has been established. Upon
such rescission, in turn, hinges a pronouncement that the possession of
the realty has become unlawful. Thus, the basic issue is not possession
but interpretation, enforcement and/or rescission of the contract — a
matter
that is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court to hear
and
determine.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
An allegation of a violation
of a contract or agreement in a detainer suit may be proved by the
presentation
of competent evidence, upon which an MTC judge might make a finding to
that effect. But certainly, that court cannot declare and hold that the
contract is rescinded, as such power is vested in the RTC.[17]
The rescission of the
contract is the basis of, and therefore a condition precedent for, the
illegality of a party's possession of a piece of realty.[18]
Without judicial intervention and determination, even a stipulation
entitling
one party to take possession of the land and building in case the other
party violates the contract cannot confer upon the former the right to
take possession thereof, if that move is objected to.[19]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
To be sure, the jurisdiction
of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint.[20]
Thus, in ascertaining whether or not an action is one for unlawful
detainer
falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts, the
averments
of the complaint and the character of the relief sought should be
examined.cralaw:red
Also, as correctly pleaded
by petitioners, a similar case had been decided by the CA in CA-GR SP
No.
58679, in which it ruled that the proper action should have been a
complaint
for rescission or specific performance, not for illegal detainer. In
that
case, the same plaintiffs filed the same charges against a different
but
similarly situated set of defendants.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The appellate court
ruled therein that there was an existing agreement or contract that
determined
the nature of the parties' relationship.[21]
Thus, it held that the proper action should have been for rescission of
contract or specific performance, not unlawful detainer.[22]
When the CA Decision was elevated, this Court denied the appeal for
failure
to show that a reversible error had been committed by the appellate
court.
Thereafter, the Decision became final and executory on April 23, 2002.[23]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Said the appellate court
in the previous case:
"Inasmuch
as
the relationship existing between the parties is not a lessor-lessee
relationship
but one that emanated from the agreement between appellants and the
Urban
Land and Development Foundation, Inc., the so-called originator of the
Bagong Silang Homeowners Association, Inc., the relief being sought
then
by appellants appears to be improper. If ever there was no payment of
equity
as provided for under the said agreement, the same cannot be considered
as non-payment of rentals. Thus, it cannot be a sufficient basis for
filing
an ejectment case against appellees, the proper remedy being an action
for rescission of contract or specific performance."[24]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We stress that when a
court
has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts,
it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in
which
the facts are substantially the same.[25]
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb
not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of
certainty,
a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow
if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be
different.[26]
It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any
powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike.[27]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Having ruled that the
MTC had indeed no jurisdiction to take cognizance of this case in the
first
place, we see no more need to address the other issues raised by
petitioners.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the Petition
is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
OVERTURNED. Consequently, the Decisions of the MTC and the RTC of
Angeles
City are REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona and Carpio Morales, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 20–33.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Id., pp. 36–44. Penned by Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis (Division
chair)
and concurred in by Justices Teodoro P. Regino and Josefina
Guevara-Salonga
(members).
[3]
CA Decision, p. 9; id., p. 44.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
RTC Decision dated March 29, 2000; CA rollo, pp. 96–99.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
MTC Decision dated September 15, 1999; id., pp. 87–93.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
CA Decision, pp. 1–3; rollo, pp. 36–38.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Id. pp. 6 & 41.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
The case was deemed submitted for decision on June 26, 2002, upon this
Court's receipt of the Memorandum for both petitioners and respondents.
Petitioners' Memorandum was signed by Atty. Willie B. Rivera of Rivera,
Perico & David Law Offices; respondents' Memorandum was signed by
Atty.
Avelino L. Liangco.
[9]
Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 6; rollo, p. 96. Original in upper case.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Annex "D" of the CA Petition for Review; CA rollo, pp. 34–42.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Complaint dated October 15, 1998, p. 4; id., p. 37.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Annex "A" of the Complaint; id., pp. 43–44.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Id., pp. 1–2 & 43–43-A.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
MTC Decision, p. 5; CA rollo, p. 91.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Complaint dated October 15, 1998, pp. 4–5; CA rollo, pp. 37–38.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Zulueta v. Hon. Mariano, 197 Phil. 195, January 30, 1982; Nera v.
Vacante,
113 Phil. 491, November 29, 1961.
[17]
Lavibo v. CA, 337 Phil. 591, April 10, 1997; Spouses De Leon v. CA, 350
Phil. 535, March 6, 1998.
[18]
Zulueta v. Mariano, supra; Nera v. Vacante, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
Spouses Tirona v. Hon. Alejo, 419 Phil. 285, October 10, 2001; Oronce
v.
CA, 358 Phil. 616, October 19, 1998; Lavibo v. CA, supra.
[21]
CA Decision in CA-GR SP No. 58679 dated January 25, 2002, p. 8; rollo,
p. 116. It must be noted that the respondents therein belong to the
same
association as herein respondents.
[22]
Id., pp. 9 & 117.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
See Entry of Judgment for GR No. 151905.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
CA Decision in CA-GR SP No. 58679 dated January 25, 2002, p. 9; rollo,
p. 117; penned by Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and concurred in by
Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Eloy R. Bello Jr.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
Tala Realty Services Corp. v. Banco Filipino, 412 Phil. 50, June 25,
2001;
De la Cruz v. CA, 364 Phil. 786, March 25, 1999.
[26]
Tala Realty Services Corp. v. Banco Filipino, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
Ayala Corporation v. Rosa-Diana Realty and Development Corporation, 346
SCRA 663, December 1, 2000. |