FIRST DIVISION
JESSIE DELA CRUZ,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
148190
August 16, 2004
-versus-
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS,
Respondents.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
.
In its September 10, 1998,
decision[1]
in Criminal Case No. Br. 19-1134, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cauayan,
Isabela, Branch 19, adjudged petitioner Jessie dela Cruz and her
co-accused
Oscar Galvizo[2]
guilty of violating Presidential Decree No. 583,[3]
as amended. The judgment sentencing them to imprisonment of eight
(8) years and one (1) day as minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor
as maximum was affirmed on August 7, 2000, by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R.
CR No. 22637. Petitioner now seeks the reversal of the Court of
Appeals’
Decision,[4]
as well as the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
The factual antecedents
of this case, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Claro Ignacio was the
owner of a parcel of irrigated riceland with an area of around three
hectares
situated in Barangay Buyon, San Mateo, Isabela. On June 6, 1976,
Ignacio entered into a leasehold contract over the land with Valentin[5]
Sarmiento. As lessee, Valentin bound himself to pay Claro 45
cavans
of palay every cropping. Valentin’s only son, Julian “Bugtong”
Sarmiento,
assisted him in tilling the land.chanrobles virtual law library
Upon Valentin’s death
in 1981, Julian Sarmiento succeeded to the leasehold. Meanwhile,
Claro migrated to the U.S.A. and his daughter, herein petitioner Jessie
dela Cruz, continued collecting rent from Sarmiento until 1991, when
dela
Cruz refused to accept any more rent.chanrobles virtual law library
On May 28, 1996, one
Norberto de Guzman informed Sarmiento that someone had entered his
land.
Sarmiento went to the farm, saw and heard petitioner and Oscar Galvizo
giving instructions to some laborers who were armed with bolos locally
known as “tabas.” Sarmiento reported the incident to Barangay
Captain
Charlie Bartolome, who with other barangay officials, proceeded to the
farm the next day. Sarmiento was then advised to report the
matter
to higher authorities.cralaw:red
On May 31, 1996, Sarmiento
filed Criminal Case No. 5664 with the Municipal Trial Court of San
Mateo,
Isabela, charging petitioner and a “John Doe” with violation of P.D.
No.
583.cralaw:red
On June 3, 1996, Sarmiento
also filed a Complaint with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication
Board (DARAB) against petitioner to restrain her from disturbing his
possession
of the subject property. The administrative case was docketed as
DARAB Case No. II-571-ISA ‘96.[6]
Petitioner, for her
part, filed with the RTC of Cauayan, Isabela, on June 4, 1996, a case
against
Sarmiento for declaratory relief, recovery of possession, collection of
rentals, irrigation fees, damages, and injunction with prayer for
temporary
restraining order, docketed as Special Civil Case No. Br. 20-66.
At the pre-trial conference in the said civil suit, the parties made
the
following stipulation of facts:chanrobles virtual law library
(a)
That the father of the defendant Vicente Sarmiento was a tenant of the
land in question with an area of 3.5 hectares until his death;
(b)
That after the death of Vicente Sarmiento, the defendant Julian
Sarmiento
cultivated the land in question;chanrobles virtual law library
(c)
That defendant delivered the owner’s share but the plaintiffs refused
to
receive so defendant deposited the money with the bank. Through
counsel,
plaintiffs withdrew the P91,000.00.[7]chanrobles virtual law library
On June 28, 1996, the
criminal
complaint before the MTC was dismissed as it had no jurisdiction.
Sarmiento subsequently filed before the RTC, a new case for violation
of
the same P.D. No. 583, this time including Oscar Galvizo as another
accused.
The indictment in said case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 19-1134,
reads:
That on or
about the 28th day of May 1996, in the municipality of San Mateo,
province
of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused Jessie dela Cruz, representing Claro Ignacio who is
the landlord of tenant/farmer Julian Sarmiento, together with Oscar
Galvi[z]o
and several Does, whose identification are still to be determined,
conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, by means of force,
scheme,
strategy and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and
feloniously eject, exclude, remove and oust and cause the ouster,
exclusion,
removal and ejectment of the said tenant/farmer, Julian Sarmiento from
his landholding over a parcel of land containing an area of 30,000.00
square
meters and belonging to the said Claro Ignacio situated at Brgy. Buyon,
in said municipality, to the damage and prejudice of the said Julian
Sarmiento.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
When arraigned,
petitioner
and Galvizo, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the
charge.
At the trial, Sarmiento’s
testimony on the alleged entry made by petitioner into the subject
property
was corroborated by Modesto Agpaoa, a former barangay kagawad of
Tandul,
Cabatuan, Isabela, and Rey Galindez, son-in-law of Sarmiento.chanrobles virtual law library
In her defense, petitioner
averred that despite repeated demands, from April 1992 to 1996,
Sarmiento
continuously failed to pay his lease rentals for about nine
croppings.
Petitioner’s lawyer sent him a demand letter, but got no reply.
She
went to his home, but he would not face her. Eventually,
Sarmiento
verbally agreed that if he again does not pay the rent due on April
1996,
she would repossess the land. Since Sarmiento made no payments
from
May 1996 to date, she took over the land. She admitted being at
the
farm on May 28, 1996, to supervise her farm helpers and laborers, but
denied
employing force, intimidation and coercion to eject Sarmiento.
According
to her, Sarmiento was even there on June 2 or 3, 1996, watching her
laborers
planting, but nary a protest came from him.cralaw:red
For his part, petitioner’s
co-accused, Galvizo, declared that dela Cruz did inform him that the
land
was contested because Sarmiento had not paid rent. Galvizo said
that
sometime in May 1996 at about 8:30 a.m., he visited dela Cruz at her
residence
in Tandul, Cabatuan, Isabela. On dela Cruz’s invitation, they
went
to the farm, which at that time was being tilled by her farm
helpers.
He left after three hours.cralaw:red
On September 10, 1998,
the RTC adjudged petitioner and Galvizo guilty of unlawfully
dispossessing
Sarmiento of the land. The trial court ruled:
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing considerations and finding both accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the information,
judgment
is hereby rendered sentencing them to suffer an imprisonment of eight
(8)
years and one (1) day as minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor as
maximum, and further ordering them, jointly and severally, to vacate
the
land in question and to deliver the possession thereof to Julian alias
Bugtong Sarmiento.chanrobles virtual law library
Costs against the
accused.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Aggrieved, petitioner
and
Galvizo filed an appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 22637, with the
Court
of Appeals.
On August 7, 2000, the
appellate court upheld the trial court’s judgment in toto.[10]
The motion for reconsideration having been denied in the appellate
court’s
Resolution of May 28, 2001,[11]
petitioner filed the instant appeal based on the following assigned
errors:
I.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
RULING
THAT PETITIONER JESSIE DELA CRUZ IS GUILTY OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 4 OF
p.d. no. 583 as amended by P.D. NO. 815, IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT;
II.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
RULING
THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY UNDER THE PREMISES;
III.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO
THAT
PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED, RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF EIGHT
(8)
YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY AS MINIMUM TO TEN (10) YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR AS
MAXIMUM DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE.[12]
The issues for our resolution
are (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to prove petitioner’s guilt
with
moral certainty; (2) the sufficiency of proof to establish conspiracy
between
petitioner and Galvizo; and (3) the correctness of the penalty.chanrobles virtual law library
On the issue of sufficiency
of evidence, petitioner contends that the appellate court erred in
finding
her guilty of the crime charged considering that the element of
stealth,
threat or intimidation was not proven. Petitioner also maintains
that she is not guilty of unlawfully dispossessing Sarmiento of the
land
because the oral agreement between the two of them authorized her to
recover
possession of the land if Sarmiento continues to fail to pay rent.cralaw:red
For the respondent,
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that Sarmiento as a
tenant-farmer is entitled to security of tenure under Section 7[13]
of Republic Act No. 3844.[14]
According to the OSG, petitioner breached Sarmiento’s legal rights when
she ejected him from the land. The OSG asks this Court to affirm
in toto the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals.[15]
We sustain the conviction.cralaw:red
By express provision
of Rep. Act No. 3844, the law governing leasehold relations, the
leasehold
relation between the original agricultural tenant, Valentin Sarmiento,
and the agricultural lessor, Claro Ignacio, did not cease to exist when
Valentin died. Section 9[16]
of this law substituted into the leasehold relation Julian Sarmiento,
the
only direct descendant capable of personally cultivating the
land.
As tenant, Julian Sarmiento had the right to security of tenure under
Section
7.[17]
This right entitled him to continue working on his landholding until
the
leasehold relation is terminated or until his eviction is authorized by
the DARAB in a judgment that is final and executory. Only in the
instances stated in Section 8[18]
and 28[19]
of the law and Article 1275[20]
of the New Civil Code (merger of the character of the lessor and the
lessee)
can the leasehold relation be terminated, and only through a final and
executory order of the DARAB authorizing dispossession on the grounds
specified
under Section 36[21]
may the lessor eject the tenant.chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner has failed
to prove adequately any ground for which the leasehold relation can be
terminated. That Julian Sarmiento immediately reported to
barangay
officials petitioner’s intrusion into his landholding, charged
petitioner
with violation of P.D. No. 583 only three days after the intrusion, and
commenced a forcible entry case in the DARAB three days after filing
the
charge negates petitioner’s claim of voluntary surrender. Thus,
by
admittedly re-possessing the land on May 28, 1996, without a final and
executory judgment from the DARAB authorizing the dispossession,[22]
during the existence of the leasehold relation, petitioner violated
Julian
Sarmiento’s right to security of tenure. She is liable under
Section
4, P.D. No. 583, which provides:
Sectiion
4.
Subject to the studies on zoning of the Human Settlements Commission
and
unless previously authorized by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, any
landowner,
landholder, agricultural-lessor or anybody acting for and in their
behalf,
who converts his tenanted land primarily devoted to rice and corn into
any non-agricultural use or to the production of any other crop as a
means
to avoid the application of the land reform laws or decrees to his
landholdings
and to dispossess his tenant-farmers of the land tilled by them shall,
upon conviction, suffer the penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging
from P5,000.00 to P10,000.00, or both, at the discretion of the court.chanrobles virtual law library
The same penalty
shall
be imposed on a landowner, landholder, agricultural-lessor, or anybody
acting for and in their behalf, who by any other act, scheme or
strategy
shall eject, exclude, remove or oust and/or cause the ouster,
exclusion,
removal or ejectment of a tenant-farmer from his farmholding in
contravention
of decrees, laws, and other orders on land reform.[23]
The alleged oral
agreement
between petitioner and Sarmiento, even if it were proven, cannot
justify
petitioner’s action. Not only is an agreement limiting the period
of tenancy prejudicial to the tenant’s right to security of tenure, and
therefore expressly prohibited by Section 16[24]
of Rep. Act No. 3844, Section 31[25]
in relation to Section 36 also makes unlawful any act of dispossession
based on those agreements. As we held in Datu v. Hon.
Cabañgon,[26]Section 49 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act,[27]
from which the present provisions of Section 36 of Rep. Act No. 3844
were
taken, does not allow the parties to stipulate at what future time the
tenant will leave or surrender the landholding he cultivates.
That the tenant, Julian Sarmiento, has not been paying rentals for nine
croppings also does not exonerate petitioner, contrary to her
contentions.
Nonpayment of rentals only entitles a lessor to seek a judgment of
eviction
against the tenant. Before dispossession based on nonpayment of
rentals
can be validly made, it is essential that (1) the fact of nonpayment be
first established after hearing, and that (2) the judgment authorizing
dispossession under that ground has become final and executory.[28]
The tenant’s failure to pay rentals does not, of itself, give the
lessor
any right to eject the tenant upon the lessor’s own volition as it is
clear
from Sections 31 and 36, the idea being to give to tenants some
security
of tenure of their landholding so that they may enjoy the same
peacefully
for their benefit and that of their family. The language of the
provisions
of Sections 31 and 36 is definite and unmistakable as to the spirit,
intent
and purpose of the lawmakers that under no circumstance may a tenant or
lessee be deprived or dispossessed of his landholding without a final
and
executory judgment of ejectment rendered after proper hearing where,
understandably,
the tenant or lessee has been given an opportunity to be heard.[29]chanrobles virtual law library
Further, use of violence,
threat, force, or intimidation is not an element of the crime, contrary
to petitioner’s contention. Section 4 of P.D. No. 583, penalizes
any unlawful ouster of a tenant-farmer by any act, scheme or strategy
in
contravention of decrees, laws, and other orders on land reform.
Hence, it is sufficient for conviction if the prosecution establishes,
as it has in this case (1) the existence of a leasehold relationship;
(2)
the fact of dispossession of the tenant by the landowner, landholder,
agricultural-lessor,
or anybody acting in their behalf; and (3) the absence of a final and
executory
judgment authorizing such dispossession.cralaw:red
Petitioner’s argument
that she must be acquitted in view of the DARAB’s finding that
Sarmiento
forfeited his security of tenure by his failure to pay rent is
untenable.
The DARAB issued its decision on September 3, 1998, while the eviction
took place on May 28, 1996. The DARAB decision could not cure the
criminal liability that already attached upon the actual unauthorized
dispossession.
In Valino v. Muñoz,[30]
we declared that even a subsequent or independent finding of the Court
of Agrarian Relations (now the DARAB)[31]
that the ejectment may be authorized under Section 36 cannot cure the
criminal
liability that already attaches upon the actual dispossession without
previous
court authority.chanrobles virtual law library
All told, we find that
the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it sustained
the
RTC and found petitioner and Galvizo liable for violation of P.D. No.
583.cralaw:red
On the issue of conspiracy,
the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Galvizo conspired to
oust
Sarmiento from his landholding. No less than two witnesses
corroborated
Sarmiento’s account. Prosecution witness Rey Galindez testified
that
he saw Galvizo working on the land when he went there to spray the
seedbeds.
Another witness, Modesto Agpaoa, attested that upon receiving
Sarmiento’s
complaint, barangay officials and he went to the premises the following
day, and found petitioner and Galvizo in the sublot along with other
unidentified
men. From these testimonies, we are convinced that Galvizo and
petitioner
had planned the ejectment of Sarmiento. The Court of Appeals did
not err in concluding that petitioner and Galvizo were co-conspirators
against Sarmiento.cralaw:red
Anent the penalty, the
trial court sentenced petitioner and Galvizo to suffer imprisonment of
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as a minimum to ten
(10)
years of prision mayor as maximum. Said penalty was affirmed by
the
Court of Appeals, as it conforms with Section 4 of P.D. No. 583, which
provides for the penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from P5,000
to P10,000, or both, at the discretion of the Court.cralaw:red
The law provides that
an illegal ouster of a tenant-farmer may be penalized by imprisonment
or
a fine or both. Under the facts of this case, we find the penalty
of imprisonment too harsh. Petitioner and Galvizo do not have any
record of prior conviction, we are convinced that in lieu of
imprisonment,
a fine in the amount of P7,000 is appropriate following our
pronouncement
in Vaca v. Court of Appeals,[32]
to wit:chanrobles virtual law library
It would
best
serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the
range of discretion allowed by §1, par. 1, the same philosophy
underlying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of redeeming
valuable
human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal
liberty
and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social
order.
Conformably with
Section
11(a)[33]
of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, petitioner’s co-accused, Oscar
Galvizo,
shall likewise pay a fine of P7,000 in lieu of imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, the petition
is DENIED and the Decision dated August 7, 2000 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 22637, as well as its Resolution dated May 28, 2001,
is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in lieu of imprisonment,
JESSIE DELA CRUZ and OSCAR GALVIZO shall instead PAY a fine of
P7,000.00
each.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.
Davide, C.J., (Chairman),
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Records, pp. 134-141.
[2]
“Calvizo” or “Galviso” in some parts of the records.
[3]
Entitled “Prescribing Penalties for the Unlawful Ejectment, Exclusion,
Removal, or Ouster of Tenant-Farmers from Their Farmholdings.”
[4]
Rollo, pp. 45-59. Penned by Associate Justice Delilah
Vidallon-Magtolis,
with Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr., and Elvi John S. Asuncion
concurring.
[5]
Also referred to as “Vicente” in the Pre-Trial Order, marked as Exh.
“H.”chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
CA Rollo, pp. 50-52. Later re-docketed as DARAB Case No.
II-1459-ISA
’98 per decision dated September 3, 1998.
[7]
Exh. “H,” Pre-Trial Order.chanrobles virtual law library
[8]
CA Rollo, p. 7.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 70-71.
[10]
CA Rollo, p. 201.
[11]
Id. at 302-303.
[12]
Rollo, p. 16.
[13]
Sec. 7. Tenure of Agricultural Leasehold Relation.—The
agricultural
leasehold relation once established shall confer upon the agricultural
lessee the right to continue working on the landholding until such
leasehold
relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be
entitled
to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected
therefrom
unless authorized by the Court for causes herein provided.
[14]
Entitled “An Act to Ordain the Agricultural Land Reform Code and to
Institute
Land Reforms in the Philippines, Including the Abolition of Tenancy and
the Channeling of Capital into Industry, Provide for the Necessary
Implementing
Agencies, Appropriate Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes.”
[15]
Rollo, p. 192.chanrobles virtual law library
[16]
Sec. 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Death or
Incapacity
of the Parties.—In case of death or permanent incapacity of the
agricultural
lessee to work his landholding, the leasehold shall continue between
the
agricultural lessor and the person who can cultivate the landholding
personally,
chosen by the agricultural lessor within one month from such death or
incapacity,
from among the following: (a) the surviving spouse; (b) the eldest
direct
descendant by consanguinity; or (c) the next eldest descendant or
descendants
in the order of their age: Provided, That in case the death or
permanent
incapacity of the agricultural lessee occurs during the agricultural
year,
such choice shall be exercised at the end of that agricultural year:
Provided,
further, That in the event the agricultural lessor fails to exercise
his
choice within the periods herein provided, the priority shall be in
accordance
with the order herein established.
[17]
Supra, note 13.chanrobles virtual law library
[18]
Sec. 8. Extinguishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation.—The
agricultural
leasehold relation established under this Code shall be extinguished by:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1)
Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the
agricultural
lessor;chanrobles virtual law library
(2)
Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee,
written
notice of which shall be served three months in advance; or
(3)
Absence of the persons under Section nine to succeed to the lessee, in
the event of death or permanent incapacity of the lessee.
[19]
SEec 28. Termination of Leasehold by Agricultural Lessee During
Agricultural
Year.—The agricultural lessee may terminate the leasehold during the
agricultural
year for any of the following causes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1)
Cruel, inhuman or offensive treatment of the agricultural lessee or any
member of his immediate farm household by the agricultural lessor or
his
representative with the knowledge and consent of the lessor;chanrobles virtual law library
(2)
Noncompliance on the part of the agricultural lessor with any of the
obligations
imposed upon him by the provisions of this Code or by his contract with
the agricultural lessee;
(3)
Compulsion of the agricultural lessee or any member of his immediate
farm
household by the agricultural lessor to do any work or render any
service
not in any way connected with farm work or even without compulsion if
no
compensation is paid;chanrobles virtual law library
(4)
Commission of a crime by the agricultural lessor or his representative
against the agricultural lessee or any member of his immediate farm
household;
or
(5)
Voluntary surrender due to circumstances more advantageous to him or
his
family.
chan
robles virtual law library chan robles virtual law library
[20]
ART. 1275. The obligation is extinguished from the time the
characters
of creditor and debtor are merged in the same person.
[21]
Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.—Notwithstanding
any
agreement as to the period or future surrender of the land, an
agricultural
lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his
landholding
except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a
judgment
that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
(1)
The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation
of the National Planning Commission to be suited for residential,
commercial,
industrial or some other urban purposes: Provided, That the
agricultural
lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five
times the average of the gross harvests on his landholding during the
last
five preceding calendar years;
(2)
The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the
terms and conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this
Code
unless his failure is caused by fortuitous event or force majeure;chanrobles virtual law library
(3)
The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a
purpose
other than what had been previously agreed upon;
(4)
The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as
determined
under paragraph 3 of Section twenty-nine;chanrobles virtual law library
(5)
The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is
substantially
damaged or destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated through the fault
or negligence of the agricultural lessee;
(6)
The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls
due:
Provided, That if the nonpayment of the rental shall be due to crop
failure
to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous
event,
the nonpayment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the
obligation
to pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby extinguished;
orchanrobles virtual law library
(7)
The lessee employed a sublessee on his landholding in violation of the
terms of paragraph 2 of Section twenty-seven. [As amended by Rep. Act
No.
6389.] Also, Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152085, 8 July
2003, 405 SCRA 440, 446.
[22]
TSN, 4 March 1998, pp. 17-18, 25-28.
[23]
As amended by P.D. No. 815.chanrobles virtual law library
[24]
SEC. 16. Nature and Continuity of Conditions of Leasehold Contract.—In
the absence of any agreement as to the period, the terms and conditions
of a leasehold contract shall continue until modified by the parties:
Provided,
That in no case shall any modification of its terms and conditions
prejudice
the right of the agricultural lessee to the security of his tenure on
the
landholding…. [Emphasis supplied.]
See
Datu v. Cabañgon, No. L-14590, 25 May 1960, 108 Phil. 243, 247.chanrobles virtual law library
[25]
SEC. 31. Prohibitions to the Agricultural Lessor.—It shall be
unlawful
for the agricultural lessor:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1)
To dispossess the agricultural lessee of his landholding except upon
authorization
by the Court under Section thirty-six. Should the agricultural
lessee
be dispossessed of his landholding without authorization from the
Court,
the agricultural lessor shall be liable for damages suffered by the
agricultural
lessee in addition to the fine or imprisonment prescribed in this Code
for unauthorized dispossession;
[26]
No. L-14590, 25 May 1960, 108 Phil. 243, 246-247.chanrobles virtual law library
[27]
Sec. 49. Ejectment of Tenant.—Notwithstanding any agreement or
provision
of law as to the period or future surrender of the land, in all cases
where
land devoted to any agricultural purpose is held under any system of
tenancy,
the tenant shall not be dispossessed of his holdings by the landholder
except for any of the causes hereinafter enumerated and only after the
same has been proved before and the dispossession is authorized by the
court.chanrobles virtual law library
It
shall likewise be unlawful for any third party to dispossess the tenant
of his holding except by order of the Court. Any violation of
this
provision shall be penalized in accordance with section fifty-seven of
this Act and/or under the general provisions of law applicable to the
act
committed. [As amended by Rep. Act No. 2263.]chanrobles virtual law library
[28]
Montemayor, II Labor, Agrarian and Social Legislation 313. Bernardo v.
Court of Appeals, No. L-30821, 14 December 1988, 168 SCRA 439, 446.
[29]
Valino v. Muñoz, No. L-26151, 22 October 1970, 35 SCRA 413,
419-421.
[30]
Id. at 421.chanrobles virtual law library
[31]
Quismundo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95664, 13 September 1991, 201
SCRA
609, 613-614.
[32]
G.R. No. 131714, 16 November 1998, 298 SCRA 656, 664.chanrobles virtual law library
[33]
SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.-chanrobles virtual law library
(a)
An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect
those
who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate
court
is favorable and applicable to the latter. |