SECOND DIVISION
FAR EAST BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
148582
January 16, 2002
-versus-
ESTRELLA O.
QUERIMIT,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA,
J.: .
This is a Petition
for Review on
Certiorariseeking
Review of the Decision, dated March 6,
2001, and Resolution, dated June 19, 2001, of the Court of Appeals[1]
in CA-G.R. CV No. 67147, entitled "Estrella O. Querimit v. Far East
Bank
and Trust Company," which affirmed with modification the decision of
the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Manila,[2]
ordering petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Co. (FEBTC) to allow
respondent
Estrella O. Querimit to withdraw her time deposit with the FEBTC.
The facts are as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondent Estrella
O. Querimit worked as internal auditor of the Philippine Savings Bank
(PSB)
for 19 years, from 1963 to 1992.[3]
On November 24, 1986, she opened a dollar savings account in
petitioner's
Harrison Plaza branch,[4]
for which she was issued four (4) Certificates of Deposit (Nos. 79028,
79029, 79030, and 79031), each certificate representing the amount of
$15,000.00,
or a total amount of $60,000.00. The certificates were to mature in 60
days, on January 23, 1987, and were payable to bearer at 4.5% interest
per annum. The certificates bore the word "accrued," which meant that
if
they were not presented for encashment or pre-terminated prior to
maturity,
the money deposited with accrued interest would be "rolled over" by the
bank and annual interest would accumulate automatically.[5]
The petitioner bank's manager assured respondent that her deposit would
be renewed and earn interest upon maturity even without the surrender
of
the certificates if these were not indorsed and withdrawn.[6]
Respondent kept her dollars in the bank so that they would earn
interest
and so that she could use the fund after she retired.[7]
In 1989, respondent
accompanied her husband Dominador Querimit to the United States for
medical
treatment. She used her savings in the Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI)
to pay for the trip and for her husband's medical expenses.[8]
In January 1993, her husband died and Estrella returned to the
Philippines.
She went to petitioner FEBTC to withdraw her deposit but, to her
dismay,
she was told that her husband had withdrawn the money in deposit.[9]
Through counsel, respondent sent a demand letter to petitioner FEBTC.
In
another letter, respondent reiterated her request for updating and
payment
of the certificates of deposit, including interest earned.[10]
As petitioner FEBTC refused respondent's demands, the latter filed a
complaint,
joining in the action Edgardo F. Blanco, Branch Manager of FEBTC
Harrison
Plaza Branch, and Octavio Espiritu, FEBTC President.[11]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioner FEBTC alleged
that it had given respondent's late husband Dominador an
"accommodation"
to allow him to withdraw Estrella's deposit.[12]
Petitioner presented certified true copies of documents showing that
payment
had been made, to wit:
1. Four FEBTC Harrison
Plaza Branch Dollar Demand Drafts Nos. 886694903, 886694904, 886694905
and 886694906 for US$15,110.96 each, allegedly issued by petitioner to
respondent's husband Dominador after payment on the certificates of
deposit;[13]
2. A letter of Alicia
de Bustos, branch cashier of FEBTC at Harrison Plaza, dated January 23,
1987, which was sent to Citibank, N.A., Citibank Center, Paseo de
Roxas,
Makati, Metro Manila, informing the latter that FEBTC had issued the
four
drafts and requesting Citibank New York to debit from petitioner's
account
$60,443.84, the aggregate value of the four drafts;[14]
3. "Citicorp Remittance
Service: Daily Summary and Payment Report" dated January 23, 1987;[15]
4. Debit Ticket dated
January 23, 1987, showing the debit of US$60,443.84 or its equivalent
at
the time of P1,240,912.04 from the FEBTC Harrison Plaza Branch;[16]
and
5. An Interbranch Transaction
Ticket Register or Credit Ticket dated January 23, 1987 showing that
US$60,443.84
or P1,240,912.04 was credited to petitioner's International Operation
Division
(IOD).[17]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On May 6, 2000, the
trial court rendered judgment for respondent. The dispositive portion
of
the decision stated:
WHEREFORE, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff [Estrella O. Querimit] and
against
defendants [FEBTC et al.]:
1. ORDERING defendants
to allow plaintiff to withdraw her U.S.$ Time Deposit of $60,000.00
plus
accrued interests;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2. ORDERING defendants
to pay moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3. ORDERING defendants
to pay exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00;
4. ORDERING defendants
to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P100,000.00 plus P10,000.00 per
appearance of counsel; and
5. ORDERING defendants
to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[18]chan
robles virtual law library
On May 15, 2000, petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on March 6, 2001, affirmed
through
its Fourteenth Division the decision of the trial court, with the
modification
that FEBTC was declared solely liable for the amounts adjudged in the
decision
of the trial court. The appeals court stated that petitioner FEBTC
failed
to prove that the certificates of deposit had been paid out of its
funds,
since "the evidence by the [respondent] stands unrebutted that the
subject
certificates of deposit until now remain unindorsed, undelivered and
unwithdrawn
by [her]."[19]
But the Court of Appeals held that the individual defendants, Edgardo
F.
Blanco, FEBTC-Harrison Plaza Branch Manager, and Octavio Espiritu,
FEBTC
President, could not be held solidarily liable with the FEBTC because
the
latter has a personality separate from its officers and stockholders.[20]
Hence this appeal.cralaw:red
As stated by the Court
of Appeals, the main issue in this case is whether the subject
certificates
of deposit have already been paid by petitioner.[21]
Petitioner contends that-
I. Petitioner is not
liable to respondent for the value of the four (4) Certificates of
Deposit,
including the interest thereon as well as moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's and appearance fees.cralaw:red
II. The aggregate value
- both principal and interest earned at maturity - of the four (4)
certificates
of deposit was already paid to or withdrawn at maturity by the late
Dominador
Querimit who was the respondent's deceased husband.cralaw:red
III. Respondent is guilty
of laches since the four (4) certificates of deposit were all issued on
24 November 1986 but she attempted to withdraw their aggregate value on
29 July 1996 only on or after the lapse of more than nine (9) years and
eight (8) months.cralaw:red
IV. Respondent is not
liable to petitioner for attorney's fees.[22]
After reviewing the
records, we find the petition to be without merit.cralaw:red
First. Petitioner bank
failed to prove that it had already paid Estrella Querimit, the bearer
and lawful holder of the subject certificates of deposit. The finding
of
the trial court on this point, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is
that petitioner did not pay either respondent Estrella or her husband
the
amounts evidenced by the subject certificates of deposit. This Court is
not a trier of facts and generally does not weigh anew the evidence
already
passed upon by the Court of Appeals.[23]
The finding of respondent court which shows that the subject
certificates
of deposit are still in the possession of Estrella Querimit and have
not
been indorsed or delivered to petitioner FEBTC is substantiated by the
record and should therefore stand.[24]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A certificate of deposit
is defined as a written acknowledgment by a bank or banker of the
receipt
of a sum of money on deposit which the bank or banker promises to pay
to
the depositor, to the order of the depositor, or to some other person
or
his order, whereby the relation of debtor and creditor between the bank
and the depositor is created. The principles governing other types of
bank
deposits are applicable to certificates of deposit,[25]
as are the rules governing promissory notes when they contain an
unconditional
promise to pay a sum certain of money absolutely.[26]
The principle that payment, in order to discharge a debt, must be made
to someone authorized to receive it is applicable to the payment of
certificates
of deposit. Thus, a bank will be protected in making payment to the
holder
of a certificate indorsed by the payee, unless it has notice of the
invalidity
of the indorsement or the holder's want of title.[27]
A bank acts at its peril when it pays deposits evidenced by a
certificate
of deposit, without its production and surrender after proper
indorsement.[28]
As a rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even
where
the plaintiff must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the
burden
rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff
to
prove payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal
certainty
that the obligation has been discharged by payment.[29]
In this case, the certificates
of deposit were clearly marked payable to "bearer," which means, to
"[t]he
person in possession of an instrument, document of title or security
payable
to bearer or indorsed in blank."[30]
Petitioner should not have paid respondent's husband or any third party
without requiring the surrender of the certificates of deposit.cralaw:red
Petitioner claims that
it did not demand the surrender of the subject certificates of deposit
since respondent's husband, Dominador Querimit, was one of the bank's
senior
managers. But even long after respondent's husband had allegedly been
paid
respondent's deposit and before his retirement from service, the FEBTC
never required him to deliver the certificates of deposit in question.[31]
Moreover, the accommodation given to respondent's husband was made in
violation
of the bank's policies and procedures.[32]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioner FEBTC thus
failed to exercise that degree of diligence required by the nature of
its
business.[33]
Because the business of banks is impressed with public interest, the
degree
of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of
the
family or of an ordinary business firm. The fiduciary nature of their
relationship
with their depositors requires them to treat the accounts of their
clients
with the highest degree of care.[34]
A bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with
meticulous care whether such accounts consist only of a few hundred
pesos
or of millions of pesos. Responsibility arising from negligence in the
performance of every kind of obligation is demandable.[35]
Petitioner failed to prove payment of the subject certificates of
deposit
issued to the respondent and, therefore, remains liable for the value
of
the dollar deposits indicated thereon with accrued interest.cralaw:red
Second. The equitable
principle of laches is not sufficient to defeat the rights of
respondent
over the subject certificates of deposit.cralaw:red
Laches is the failure
or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time, to do that which, by
exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined
to assert it.[36]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
There is no absolute
rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is
to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The
question
of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and, being
an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
considerations.
It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice.
Courts will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of
limitations
or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice
would
result.[37]
In this case, it would
be unjust to allow the doctrine of laches to defeat the right of
respondent
to recover her savings which she deposited with the petitioner. She did
not withdraw her deposit even after the maturity date of the
certificates
of deposit precisely because she wanted to set it aside for her
retirement.
She relied on the bank's assurance, as reflected on the face of the
instruments
themselves, that interest would "accrue" or accumulate annually even
after
their
maturity.[38]
Third. Respondent is
entitled to moral damages because of the mental anguish and humiliation
she suffered as a result of the wrongful refusal of the FEBTC to pay
her
even after she had delivered the certificates of deposit.[39]
In addition, petitioner FEBTC should pay respondent exemplary damages,
which the trial court imposed by way of example or correction for the
public
good.[40]
Finally, respondent is entitled to attorney's fees since petitioner's
act
or omission compelled her to incur expenses to protect her interest,
making
such award just and equitable.[41]
However, we find the award of attorney's fees to be excessive and
accordingly
reduce it to P20,000.00.[42]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED and the Decision in
CA-G.R.
CV No. 67147 AFFIRMED, with the modification that the award of
attorney's
fees is reduced to P20,000.00.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Bellosillo, J., (Chairman),
Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Per Associate Justice Martin S. Villanueva, Jr. and concurred in by
Associate
Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Perlita J. Tria Tirona.
[2]
Per Judge Leocadio H. Ramos, Jr.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
TSN (Estrella Querimit), pp. 4-5, Oct. 3, 1997.
[4]
Id., pp. 5-6; TSN (Estrella Querimit), pp. 6-17, Nov. 4, 1998.
[5]
TSN (Estrella Querimit), pp. 6-11, Oct. 3, 1997; TSN (Estrella
Querimit),
p. 11, Nov. 4, 1998; Exhs. A, B, C, D (Certificates of Deposit).
[6]
TSN (Estrella Querimit), p. 17, Oct. 3, 1997.
[7]
TSN (Estrella Querimit), p. 18, Oct. 3, 1997; TSN (Estrella Querimit),
p. 15, Nov. 4, 1997.
[8]
TSN (Estrella Querimit), pp. 18-20, Nov. 4, 1997.
[9]
TSN (Estrella Querimit), p. 11, Oct. 3, 1997; TSN (Estrella Querimit),
pp. 9-22, Nov. 4, 1998.
[10]
TSN (Estrella Querimit), pp. 11-16, Oct. 3, 1997; Records, pp. 8-9
(Letters
of Demand dated July 29, 1996 and Aug. 2, 1996).
[11]
Records, pp. 1-5.
[12]
Petition, p. 15; Rollo, p. 17; TSN (Tomas Silva), pp. 14-20, Dec. 4,
1997.
[13]
Exhs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, and 13.
[14]
Exh. 6.
[15]
Exh. 5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Exh. 7; TSN (Raoul Reniedo), pp. 38-40, April 30, 1998.
[17]
Exhs. 8, 9; id., pp. 40-50.
[18]
Records, pp. 305-311.
[19]
CA Decision, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 43-44.
[20]
Id., p. 6; id., p. 45.
[21]
Id., p. 4; id., p. 43.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
Petition, pp. 11-12; id., pp. 13-14.
[23]
Prudential Bank and Trust Company v. Reyes, G.R. No. 141093, Feb. 20,
2001;
Langkaan Realty Development, Inc. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R.
No. 139437, Dec. 8, 2000; PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association,
Inc.
v. NLRC, 260 SCRA 758 (1996).
[24]
Wong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117857, Feb. 2, 2001.
[25]
10 Am Jur 2d §455.
[26]
10 Am Jur §457.
[27]
10 Am Jur 2d §461.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
Clark v. Young, 21 So.2d 331 (1944); Cohn-Goodman Co. v. People's
Saving
Bank of Grand Haven, 168 N.W. 1042 (1918).
[29]
Sevillana v. I.T. (International) Corp., G.R. No. 99047, April 16,
2001;
Villar v. NLRC, 331 SCRA 686 (2000); Audion Electric Co., Incvs.
NLRC,
308 SCRA 340 (1999); Ropali Trading Corporation v. NLRC, 296 SCRA 309
(1998);
Pacific Maritime Services Inc. v. Ranay, 275 SCRA 717 (1997).
[30]
Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed., 1979), p. 140.
[31]
TSN (Alicia de Bustos), pp. 11-15, July 23, 1999.
[32]
TSN (Tomas de Silva), pp. 33-34, Dec. 4, 1997.
[33]
Civil Code, Art. 1173.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
Canlas v. Court of Appeals, 326 SCRA 415 (2000); Ibaan Rural Bank v.
Court
of Appeals, 321 SCRA 88 (1999); Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of
Appeals, 269 SCRA 695 (1997); Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v.
Court
of Appeals, 237 SCRA 761 (1994); Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
Court
of Appeals, 216 SCRA 51 (1992).
[35]
Prudential Bank v. Court of Appeals, 328 SCRA 264 (2000); Philippine
National
Bank v. Court of Appeals, 315 SCRA 309 (1999); Metropolitan Bank and
Trust
Company v. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 761 (1994); Araneta v. Bank of
America,
40 SCRA 144 (1971).
[36]
Felizardo v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 137509, Aug. 15, 2001; Gabionza v.
Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 140311, March 30, 2001; Avisado v. Rumbana, G.R.
No.
137306, March 12, 2001; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 366
(1999);
PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. v. NLRC, 260 SCRA 758
(1996).
[37]
Rosales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137566, Feb. 28, 2001; Cometa v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141855, Feb. 6, 2001; De Vera v. Court of
Appeals,
305 SCRA 624 (1999).
[38]
TSN (Estrella Querimit), pp. 6-11, Oct. 3, 1997; TSN (Estrella
Querimit),
p. 11, Nov. 4, 1998; Exhs. A, B, C, D (Certificates of Deposit).
[39]
Civil Code, Arts. 2217, 2219.
[40]
Art. 2229.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[41]
Civil Code, Art. 2208.
[42]
Catungal v. Hao, G.R. No. 134972, March 22, 2001; Batingal v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 128636, Feb. 1, 2001. |