EN BANC
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BYTHE SECRETARY OF
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAND NATURAL
RESOURCES,
THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVEDIRECTOR, (DENR
REGION XI) AND MARION V. ABUNDO, SR.,CONSERVATION OFFICER
(DENR REGION XI),
Petitioners, |
G.R.
No.
150327
June 18, 2003 -versus-
MARILYN A.
PERALTA,
ROSIE A. LAVALAN, GRACE A. REYES,ALBERTO B. ALONDAY,
MERCY B. ALONDAY, RICHELIEU B. ALONDAY,AZUCENA B. ALONDAY
AND JANETA A. BALURAN,AND THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY,
Respondents.
|
D
E C I S I
O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:
This is a Petition for
Review on
Certiorari of the
decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53440 which upheld the
orders,
dated February 5, 1999 and May 6, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, Branch 13.[2] The Antecedents
On September 26, 1994,
Marilyn A. Peralta, Rosie A. Lavalan, Grace A. Reyes, Alberto B.
Alonday,
Mercy B. Alonday, Rochelieu B. Alonday, Azucena B. Alonday,
Benedicto
B. Alonday, and Janeta A. Baluran filed a complaint for recovery of
possession
and ownership of real property with the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City,
Branch 13, against the defendants Republic of the Philippines, the
Regional
Executive Director of Region XI of the Department of Environment and
Natural
Resources (DENR) and the Conservation Officer in said region. The
plaintiffs alleged therein, inter alia, that they are the heirs of
Benedicto
B. Alonday who applied for and was granted Homestead Patent No. V-11244
by the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DENR) over
Lot 3561 with an area of 237,898 square meters; the said lot was a
portion
of Lot 2988 of the Guiang Cadastre located in Guiang, Davao City and
that
on the basis of said patent, Benedicto Alonday was issued Original
Certificate
of Title No. P-275 over the said property by the Register of Deeds;
they
purchased the said property from their father Benedicto and were issued
on April 25, 1988 Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-134231 in their
names;
the property was allegedly alienable and disposable property within
Project
1-B, certified on January 13, 1931 as per LC Map No. 1412 approved by
the
Director of Bureau of Forestry, as confirmed by the letter of the
petitioner
Regional Director, dated February 15, 1994; they had been in possession
of the said property as owner thereof since November 1965 and that some
time in 1969, officers of the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) sought
his permission to use a portion of said property with an area of five
hectares;
the BFD caused the construction of a big concrete building on said
portion
of the property; on June 28, 1971, Benedicto’s lawyer wrote a letter to
the BFD demanding that it vacate the said portion of his property on
which
the building was constructed but said letter was ignored; on February
24,
1979, Forest Conservation Officer Marion Abundio, Sr. asked permission
from Benedicto to allow the BFD to install on a portion of the subject
property consisting of twenty-five square meters a small generator to
provide
electricity to the existing building and compound of the Philippine
Eagles
Acclimatization and Breeding Center; Benedicto did not give his assent
to these requests of the aforenamed government officials despite which
they still caused the construction of the building and installation of
the generator unit; the plaintiffs demanded that the defendants vacate
the property on July 14, 1994 but the latter refused. The
plaintiffs
prayed that after due proceedings judgment be rendered in their favor
and
that the defendants be ordered to vacate the subject property and pay
the
plaintiffs damages and litigation expenses.chanrobles virtual law library
The plaintiffs appended
as annexes to their petition copies of the aforesaid title and letters
of the BFD officials. In their answer to the complaint, the
defendants,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed the
special
and affirmative defenses that: (a) the complaint did not state a cause
of action against them; (b) the building constructed by the defendants
was within the perimeter of the Mt. Apo National Park, a forest reserve
under Proclamation No. 59, as amended, of the President of the
Philippines,
and not on the plaintiffs’ property; (c) the installation of a
generator
unit did not push through; (d) Project 1-B, under which the subject
property
was declassified as alienable and disposable property per Land
Classification
Map No. 1412, should not prevail over Proclamation No. 59, as amended;
(e) the suit was against the State which cannot be sued without its
consent;
(f) the plaintiffs failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before
filing their complaint.[3]
The defendants prayed that the complaint be dismissed.cralaw:red
The parties filed their
respective pre-trial briefs. After the requisite pre-trial
conference,
the RTC issued an Order, dated August 29, 1995, constituting a panel of
commissioners composed of Engineer Roderick R. Calapardo, as Team
Leader,
and Gregorio Cenabre and Engineer Rogelio Zantua, as members, to
conduct
a relocation survey and determine if the respondents’ property is part
of the Mt. Apo National Park. After the survey, the panel
submitted
its report to the trial court, dated November 7, 1995, stating that:
"the
land in case is 92,216 square meters within the certified Alienable and
Disposable (A & D) Lands while the remaining portion of 145,682
square
meters is within the Mt. Apo National Park Reservation."[4]chanrobles virtual law library
In their comment on
the report, the plaintiffs claimed that the survey team altered the
boundary
line of their property in the course of the survey and that the team
did
not take into account Project 1-B per Land Classification Map No. 1412
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Forestry. The
defendants,
on the other hand, insisted that the survey team did not alter the
boundary
line of the property and that it took into account Project 1-B and Land
Classification Map No. 1412 in conducting the survey and preparing its
report. On motion of the plaintiffs and with the conformity of
the
defendants, through Assistant Solicitor General Aurora P. Cortez, the
RTC
issued an order on March 7, 1997 declaring that there were no factual
issues
involved in the case and that it would decide the case on the basis of
the pleadings and memoranda of the parties as well as the
commissioners’
report.cralaw:red
On May 6, 1997, the
RTC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants
finding and declaring that the property occupied by the defendants was
part of the plaintiffs’ property. The RTC ordered the defendants
to vacate the property, restore possession thereof to the plaintiffs
and
remove all the improvements thereon made by them. The decretal
portion
of the decision reads:
In view of
all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered sustaining the validity
and legality of the plaintiff’s right of ownership and possession over
that parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-134231
of the Registry of Davao City. Defendants are hereby ordered to vacate
the portion of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-134231
of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City alluded to by the plaintiffs and
to restore peaceful possession of the same to them. Defendants
are
further ordered to remove all the improvements they have introduced
thereon.[5]
The RTC declared that
the
report of the panel did not take into account Property 1-B for LC Map
1412;
hence, the said report had no probative weight. According to the
RTC, the torrens title of the property prevails over the relocation
survey
of the panel of commissioners and that the Director of Forestry
declassified
the respondents’ property pursuant to Section 1827 of the 1987 Revised
Administrative Code.chanrobles virtual law library
On May 30, 1997, five
days before the expiration of the period to file an appeal, the
defendants
filed, through registered mail, a motion for the reconsideration of the
RTC decision. On June 11, 1997, the RTC issued ex parte an order
expunging the said motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was
a mere scrap of paper for failure of the defendants to incorporate any
notice of hearing as required by Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules
of Court. Unaware of the June 11, 1997 Order of the RTC, the
defendants
filed on July 14, 1997 a Manifestation with Notice of Hearing on Motion
for Reconsideration dated July 7, 1997 appending thereto a notice of
hearing
of their May 30, 1997 Motion for Reconsideration.cralaw:red
In the meantime, on
July 18, 1997, the defendants received a copy of the June 11, 1997
Order
of the trial court expunging their motion for reconsideration. On
July 22, 1997, the defendants filed their notice of appeal from the
decision
of the court. The plaintiffs, for their part, filed a motion to
dismiss
the appeal of the defendants on the ground that their May 30, 1997
Motion
for Reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper; hence, the motion did
not
toll the running of the reglementary period for appeal. Thus, the
defendants allegedly failed to perfect their appeal from the decision
of
the court within the reglementary period. On August 11, 1997, the
RTC received the defendants’ notice of appeal.cralaw:red
Meanwhile, the presiding
judge of Branch 13 retired, and for a time, the said RTC branch
remained
vacant. On January 28, 1999, the RTC, through the newly-appointed
judge, issued an order giving due course to the defendants’ appeal
declaring
that they still had a period of five days from July 18, 1997 when they
received a copy of the order expunging their notice of appeal or until
July 23, 1997 within which to perfect their appeal from the June 11,
1997
Order. Since the defendants filed their notice of appeal on July
22, 1997, they had perfected their appeal within the reglementary
period.
The RTC further declared that although the defendants’ May 30, 1997
Motion
for Reconsideration was defective, the Rules of Court should be
liberally
construed. The RTC forthwith directed the branch clerk of court
to
forward the records of the case to the Court of Appeals.cralaw:red
On February 5, 1999,
however, the RTC issued an ex parte order dismissing the defendants’
appeal
on its finding that in light of jurisprudence brought to its attention,
they failed to perfect their appeal within the reglementary
period.
When the defendants received the February 5, 1999 Order of the RTC,
they
filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, set for hearing on February
19, 1999. On February 8, 1999, the RTC issued an order declaring
that the hearing set on February 19, 1999 was mooted by its Order dated
February 5, 1999 which dismissed the defendants’ appeal. The
plaintiffs
filed on February 10, 1999 a motion for execution, claiming that the
RTC
decision had become final and executory. On February 18, 1999,
the
RTC issued an order granting the plaintiffs’ motion and ordered the
issuance
of a writ of execution. The defendants filed a Motion for
Reconsideration
dated February 26, 1999 of the February 5, 1999 Order of the RTC
dismissing
their appeal and their opposition to the issuance of a writ of
execution.
The defendants were unaware that in the interim, the RTC had already
granted
the plaintiffs’ motion for a writ of execution on February 18,
1999.
The plaintiffs opposed the defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration dated
February 26, 1999.cralaw:red
On May 6, 1999, the
RTC issued an order denying the defendants’ motion for reconsideration
and at the same time denying the plaintiffs’ motion for execution on
the
ground that public policy prohibited the issuance of a writ of
execution
against the government. The RTC recalled the writ of execution it
earlier issued.cralaw:red
Thereafter, the defendants,
now the petitioners, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended, for the
nullification
of the February 5, 1999 and May 6, 1999 Orders of the RTC alleging that
the:chanrobles virtual law library
I
RESPONDENT COURT
COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
IN
ISSUING ITS ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 5, 1999 AND ORDER DATED MAY 6, 1999.
II
RESPONDENT COURT
COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
IN
SUSTAINING THE VALIDITY AND LEGALITY OF OWNERSHIP OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS
OVER A PARCEL OF LAND COVERED BY TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO.
134231.[6]
On April 27, 2001, the
CA rendered its decision denying due course and dismissing the petition
for certiorari. The appellate court held that petitioners’ May
30,
1997 Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC decision did not comply with
Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, as amended; hence, a mere
scrap
of paper which did not toll the running of the reglementary period for
appeal. Thus, the RTC decision had already become final and
executory.
According to the appellate court, the RTC did not commit any grave
abuse
of discretion in dismissing the petitioners’ appeal therein. As
such,
they were not entitled to a writ of certiorari. The CA further
held
that the petitioners, through the negligence of the OSG, failed to
perfect
their appeal. The CA opined that to nullify the title of
respondents
over the subject property, the petitioners should have instituted a
petition
for reversion, and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997
Rules of Court, as amended.cralaw:red
The petitioners filed
the instant petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and
set
aside the decision of the CA. The petitioners allege that the
appellate
court committed reversible error in finding and declaring that they
failed
to perfect their appeal from the decision of the trial court within the
reglementary period. The CA likewise allegedly erred when it held
that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of its discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed the petitioners’
appeal
via its February 5, 1999 Order. The petitioners contend that by
dismissing
their petition, the CA thereby sustained the validity of the
respondents’
title despite strong evidence that the said property is part of the
public
forest and, therefore, inalienable. The petitioners further argue
that even if their notice of appeal was belatedly filed, the rule on
perfection
of appeals should be suspended and that their appeal should be given
due
course on grounds of equity and substantial justice. They submit
that if their appeal is not reinstated, the Republic of the Philippines
will be deprived of a part of the Mt. Apo National Park consisting of
no
less than 145,682 square meters. The petitioners cite the ruling
of this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals.[7]chanrobles virtual law library
The petition is meritorious.cralaw:red
The Court agrees with
the CA that the OSG was negligent when it filed on May 30, 1997 the
defective
motion for reconsideration. Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of
Court
provides that a motion for reconsideration or a motion for a new trial
shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefor, a
written
notice of which shall be served by the movant on the adverse
party.
Such written notice is that prescribed in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court. Under Section 4, paragraph 2 of said rule, a
notice of hearing on a motion shall be served by the movant to all the
parties concerned at least three days before the date of hearing.
Section 5 of the same rule requires that the notice of hearing shall be
directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and place of
the hearing of the motion. The requirements, far from being
merely
technical and procedural as claimed by the petitioners, are vital
elements
of procedural due process.[8]
Since the Rules of Court
do not fix any period within which the said party may file his reply or
opposition, the trial court would have no way of determining whether
the
adverse party agrees or objects to the motion and, if he objects, to
hear
him on his objection. Hence, the need for the movant to set the
time
and place of hearing of its motion.[9]
The requirements entombed in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules
of
Court are mandatory and non-compliance therewith is fatal and renders
the
motion pro forma; a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court
has
no right to receive and which the court has no authority to act upon.[10]
In cases of motions for a new trial or for the reconsideration of a
judgment,
the running of the period for appeal is not tolled by the mere filing
or
pendency of said motion.[11]
In this case, the petitioners,
through the OSG, received on May 20, 1997 the decision of the RTC;
hence,
they had until June 4, 1997 within which to file their motion for
reconsideration
or for a new trial or to perfect their appeal from said adverse
decision.
Although the petitioners filed the motion for reconsideration dated May
30, 1997 within the reglementary period, said motion failed to comply
with
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15. The records show that there is no
proof
that the respondents were actually served with a copy of said motion,
as
required by Section 10, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. The OSG
did
not bother to file an amended motion for reconsideration containing the
requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.chanrobles virtual law library
The OSG offered no valid
justification for its failure to comply with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15
of the Rules of Court except the self-serving claim of Solicitor
Evaristo
M. Padilla that his omission was sheer inadvertence, caused by heavy
pressure
of work in preparing numerous pleadings and in the almost daily
attendance
in court for naturalization cases and those for nullity of marriage,
among
others. Other than the barefaced allegations of Solicitor
Padilla,
he offered no specific details as to what pleadings he prepared and the
hearings he attended which prevented him from complying with Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, if Solicitor
Padilla
was able to prepare within the reglementary period the May 30, 1997
Motion
for Reconsideration, he offered no valid justification for his failure
to incorporate in said motion or append thereto a simple one-paragraph
notice of hearing which could have been accomplished in a few
minutes.
What is so nettlesome is that the May 30, 1997 Motion for
Reconsideration
of petitioners was signed not only by Solicitor Padilla but also by
Assistant
Solicitor General Aurora P. Cortes. Even if Solicitor Padilla,
through
his negligence, failed to incorporate in said motion for
reconsideration
the requisite notice of hearing, the Assistant Solicitor General should
have noticed the omission before she affixed her signature thereon and
sought the immediate rectification thereof by Solicitor Padilla before
said motion was filed. She did not. She offered no valid
explanation
for her faux pas either. The general rule is that the clients are
bound by the mistakes and negligence of their counsel.[12]chanrobles virtual law library
In a case of recent
vintage, the Court took to task the OSG for its lackadaisical attitude
and complacency in the handling of its cases for the government and
reminded
the OSG that:
x
x x just like other members of the Bar, the
canons
under the Code of Professional Responsibility apply with equal force on
lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
tasks.
These ethical duties are rendered even more exacting as to them
because,
as government counsel, they have the added duty to abide by the policy
of the State to promote a high standard of ethics in public
service.
Furthermore, it is incumbent upon the OSG, as part of the government
bureaucracy,
to perform and discharge its duties with the highest degree of
professionalism,
intelligence and skill and to extend prompt, courteous and adequate
service
to the public.[13]
Trite to state, this
Court
is impelled to do so anew in this case. The CA cannot be faulted
for ruling that having lost their right of appeal through the
negligence
of the OSG the petitioners are not entitled to a writ of certiorari
under
Rule 65 of 1987 Rules of Civil Procedure.[14]
However, prescinding
from all the foregoing, this Court grants not only petitioners’ plea
that
it suspend its own rule on the perfection of appeals but also directs
the
reopening of the trial of the case for the parties to adduce their
respective
evidence. The Court excepts this case from the said rule in the
interest
of justice, to avert a grave miscarriage of justice to the State
through
the negligence of the OSG. The State has the right to adduce its
evidence, testimonial and documentary. Courts should proceed with
caution so as not to deprive a party of this right but, instead, afford
every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition
of its cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.[15]
The trial court no less declared in its January 28, 1999 Order that
although
the petitioners’ May 30, 1997 Motion for Reconsideration was defective,
the Rules of Court should be liberally construed only to make a volte
face
and issue ex parte an order dismissing the appeal of the petitioners
and
canceling the hearing on the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
set
on February 19, 1999.chanrobles virtual law library
What is involved in
this case is a portion of land consisting of no less than 145,682
square
meters or less than fifteen hectares which they claim is part of the
Mt.
Apo National Park as shown by the relocation survey of the panel of
commissioners.
The case is one of public interest. If the aforesaid property is,
indeed, part of the forest reserve as claimed by the petitioners but
their
right to adduce their evidence is foreclosed by the dismissal of the
present
petition, the said property would be forever lost to the prejudice of
the
State. In Republic v. Imperial,[16]
this Court held that:
The need, therefore,
to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of petitioner’s
reversion efforts are foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient
cause
for relaxing procedural rules and granting the third and fourth motions
for extension to file appellant’s brief. Petitioner’s appeal presents
an
exceptional circumstance impressed with public interest and must then
be
given due course.[17]
The trial court rendered
judgment in favor of the respondents as it ordered the petitioners to
vacate
that portion of the subject property occupied by them and to return
possession
thereof to the respondents, without requiring the parties to adduce
evidence
on the factual issues of (a) whether or not the property covered by the
title of the respondents is part of the Mt. Apo National Park (a forest
reserve); (b) whether or not the building constructed by the
petitioners
is inside the forest reserve; and (c) whether or not the petitioners
installed
a generator unit in the respondents’ property.cralaw:red
It bears stressing that
the trial court formed a panel of commissioners to conduct a relocation
survey of the subject property. The panel of commissioners found
that 145,682 square meters which is a portion of the Mt. Apo National
Park
had been included in the respondents’ title to the subject
property.
The trial court ignored this and did not even bother to receive the
parties’
respective evidence on the said report. The panel of
commissioners
was not even called to testify on its findings. The appellate
court
will be able to review on appeal the decision of the trial court and
ascertain
whether there has been a travesty of justice to the gross prejudice of
the State.chanrobles virtual law library
The respondents will
not suffer substantial prejudice if the trial is reopened. The
records
show that the trial court denied respondents’ motion for a writ of
execution
although the trial court had dismissed the appeal of the
petitioners.
The respondents did not even assail the order of the trial court.cralaw:red
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53440
is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court
of Davao City, Branch 13, dated February 5, 1999 and May 5, 1999 in
Civil
Case No. 23,168-94 are SET ASIDE. The said Regional Trial Court
is
DIRECTED to reopen the trial to enable the parties to adduce their
respective
evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General is hereby directed
to represent the petitioners during the trial. No costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo,
Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, with Associate
Justices
Eubulo G. Verzola and Marina L. Buzon, concurring.
[2]
Penned by Judge Isaac G. Rabillo, Jr.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
Id. at 94-97.chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
Rollo, p. 44.
[5]
Rollo, p. 110.
[6]
Id. at 66.chanrobles virtual law library
[7]
292 SCRA 243 (1998).chanrobles virtual law library
[8]
Ibasan v. Republic of the Philippines, 97 SCRA 100 (1980).chanrobles virtual law library
[9]
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. v. Bath Construction &
Company,
14 SCRA 435 (1965).
[10]
Pallada v. RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, Br. 1, 304 SCRA 440 (1999).chanrobles virtual law library
[11]
Bank of the Philippine Islands of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 1, v. Far East
Molasses Corporation, 198 SCRA 689 (1991).
[12]
Adaza v. Barinaga, 104 SCRA 684 (1981).chanrobles virtual law library
[13]
Far East Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 30 (1998).
[14]
National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals, 318 SCRA 255
(1999).
[15]
Sapad v. Court of Appeals, 348 SCRA 304 (2000).
[16]
303 SCRA 127 (1999).
[17]
Ibid. |