FIRST DIVISION
JACINTO SAGUID,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
150611
June 10, 2003
-versus-
HON. COURT
OF
APPEALS,
THE REGIONAL
TRIAL
COURT,
BRANCH 94, BOAC,
MARINDUQUE
AND GINA S. REY,
Respondents.
D E C I S I
O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The regime of limited co-ownership
of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated
to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and
wife,
applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion
to
their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the
extent
of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry.
Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding
shares shall be presumed to be equal.[1]chanrobles virtual law library
Seventeen-year old Gina
S. Rey was married,[2]
but separated de facto from her husband, when she met petitioner
Jacinto
Saguid in Marinduque, sometime in July 1987.[3]
After a brief courtship, the two decided to cohabit as husband and wife
in a house built on a lot owned by Jacinto’s father.[4]
Their cohabitation was not blessed with any children. Jacinto
made
a living as the patron of their fishing vessel "Saguid Brothers."[5]
Gina, on the other hand, worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work
as
an entertainer in Japan from 1992 to 1994 when her relationship with
Jacinto’s
relatives turned sour. Her periodic absence, however, did not ebb
away the conflict with petitioner’s relatives. In 1996, the
couple
decided to separate and end up their 9-year cohabitation.[6]chanrobles virtual law library
On January 9, 1997,
private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of
Personal
Property with Receivership against the petitioner with the Regional
Trial
Court of Boac, Marinduque. She alleged that from her salary of
$1,500.00
a month as entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute P70,000.00
in the completion of their unfinished house. Also, from her own
earnings
as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was able to acquire and
accumulate
appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects, with a total
value
of P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of
these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00,
representing
her contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to
her.cralaw:red
Private respondent testified
that she deposited part of her earnings in her savings account with
First
Allied Development Bank.[7]
Her Pass Book shows that as of May 23, 1995, she had a balance of
P21,046.08.[8]
She further stated that she had a total of P35,465.00[9]
share in the joint account deposit which she and the petitioner
maintained
with the same bank.[10]
Gina declared that said deposits were spent for the purchase of
construction
materials, appliances and other personal properties.[11]chanrobles virtual law library
In his answer[12]
to the complaint, petitioner claimed that the expenses for the
construction
of their house were defrayed solely from his income as a captain of
their
fishing vessel. He averred that private respondent’s meager
income
as fish dealer rendered her unable to contribute in the construction of
said house. Besides, selling fish was a mere pastime to her; as
such,
she was contented with the small quantity of fish allotted to her from
his fishing trips. Petitioner further contended that Gina
did
not work continuously in Japan from 1992 to 1994, but only for a
6-month
duration each year. When their house was repaired and improved
sometime
in 1995-1996, private respondent did not share in the expenses because
her earnings as entertainer were spent on the daily needs and business
of her parents. From his income in the fishing business, he
claimed
to have saved a total of P130,000.00, P75,000.00 of which was placed in
a joint account deposit with private respondent. This savings,
according
to petitioner was spent in purchasing the disputed personal properties.cralaw:red
On May 21, 1997, the
trial court declared the petitioner as in default for failure to file a
pre-trial brief as required by Supreme Court Circular No. 1-89.[13]
On May 26, 1997, petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration[14]
of the May 21, 1997 order, which was denied on June 2, 1997, and
private
respondent was allowed to present evidence ex parte.[15]
Petitioner filed another motion for reconsideration but the same was
also
denied on October 8, 1997.cralaw:red
On July 15, 1998, a
decision[16]
was rendered in favor of private respondent, the dispositive
portion
of which reads:chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE,
in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the
plaintiff Gina S. Rey against defendant Jacinto Saguid:
(a)
Ordering the partition of the house identified as plaintiff’s Exhibit C
and D and directing the defendant to return and/or reimburse to the
plaintiff
the amount of seventy thousand pesos (P70,000,00) which the latter
actually
contributed to its construction and completion;chanrobles virtual law library
(b)
Declaring the plaintiff as the exclusive owner of the personal
properties
listed on Exhibit M;chanrobles virtual law library
(c)
Ordering the defendant, and/or anyone in possession of the aforesaid
personal
properties, to return and/or deliver the same to the plaintiff; and
(d)
Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages in the sum of
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[17]
On appeal, said
decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals; however, the award of P50,000.00
as moral damages was deleted for lack of basis.[18]
The appellate court ruled that the propriety of the order which
declared
the petitioner as in default became moot and academic in view of the
effectivity
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It explained that the new
rules
now require the filing of a pre-trial brief and the defendant’s
non-compliance
therewith entitles the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte.chanrobles virtual law library
Both parties filed motions
for reconsideration which were denied; hence, petitioner filed the
instant
petition based on the following assigned errors:
A.
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING RETROACTIVELY THE
1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE PRESENT CASE AND HOLDING THE FIRST
ASSIGNED ERROR THEREIN MOOT AND ACADEMIC THUS, FAILED TO RULE ON THE
PROPRIETY
OF THE TRIAL COURT’S REFUSAL TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF DEFAULT DUE TO
MISTAKE
AND/OR EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE COMMITTED BY PETITIONER.
B.
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RELYING ON THE FACTUAL
FINDINGS
OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH RECEIVED THE EVIDENCE OF HEREIN RESPONDENT
ONLY
EX PARTE.[19]
The issues for resolution
are: (1) whether or not the trial court erred in allowing private
respondent
to present evidence ex parte; and (2) whether or not the trial court’s
decision is supported by evidence.cralaw:red
Under Section 6, Rule
18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure of the defendant
to
file a pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear
at the pre-trial, i.e., the plaintiff may present his evidence ex parte
and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof.[20]
The remedy of the defendant is to file a motion for reconsideration[21]
showing that his failure to file a pre-trial brief was due to fraud,
accident,
mistake or excusable neglect.[22]
The motion need not really stress the fact that the defendant has a
valid
and meritorious defense because his answer which contains his defenses
is already on record.[23]chanrobles virtual law library
In the case at bar,
petitioner insists that his failure to file a pre-trial brief is
justified
because he was not represented by counsel. This justification is
not, however, sufficient to set aside the order directing private
respondent
to present evidence ex parte, inasmuch as the petitioner chose at his
own
risk not to be represented by counsel. Even without the
assistance
of a lawyer, petitioner was able to file a motion for extension to file
answer,[24]
the required answer stating therein the special and affirmative
defenses,[25]
and several other motions.[26]
If it were true that petitioner did not understand the import of the
April
23, 1997 order directing him to file a pre-trial brief, he could have
inquired
from the court or filed a motion for extension of time to file the
brief.
Instead, he waited until May 26, 1997, or 14 days from his alleged
receipt
of the April 23, 1997 order before he filed a motion asking the court
to
excuse his failure to file a brief. Pre-trial rules are not to be
belittled or dismissed because their non-observance may result in
prejudice
to a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they should be
followed
except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed
to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree
of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[27]
In the instant case,
the fact that petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer is not a
persuasive
reason to relax the application of the rules. There is nothing in
the Constitution which mandates that a party in a non-criminal
proceeding
be represented by counsel and that the absence of such representation
amounts
to a denial of due process. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable,
is not indispensable. The legal profession is not engrafted in the due
process clause such that without the participation of its members the
safeguard
is deemed ignored or violated.[28]
However, the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, specifically, Section 6, Rule 18 thereof, rendered moot and
academic the issue of whether or not the plaintiff may be allowed to
present
evidence ex parte for failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial
brief.
While the rules may indeed be applied retroactively, the same is not
called
for in the case at bar. Even before the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure
took effect on July 1, 1997, the filing of a pre-trial brief was
required
under Circular No. 1-89 which became effective on February 1,
1989.
Pursuant to the said circular, "[f]ailure to file pre-trial briefs may
be given the same effect as the failure to appear at the pre-trial,"
that
is, the party may be declared non-suited or considered as in default.[29]chanrobles virtual law library
Coming now to the substantive
issue, it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to
marry each other because the former was validly married to another man
at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their property
regime
therefore is governed by Article 148[30]
of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships,
relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man
and
woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same
married man. Under this regime, "..only the properties
acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions x x x"[31]
Proof of actual contribution is required.[32]
In the case at bar,
although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1987,
which is before the date of the effectivity of the Family Code on
August
3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was
intended
precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.[33]
Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no
provision
governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery
or
concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition
of
the property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148
governs.[34]
In the cases of Agapay
v. Palang,[35]
and Tumlos v. Fernandez,[36]
which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the
parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship,
respectively,
we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property
is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners
therein
who were parties to the bigamous and adulterous union is without basis
because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they
contributed
money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano
v. Court of Appeals,[37]
we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the
name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient
proof
of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the
acquisition
of the property.chanrobles virtual law library
As in other civil cases,
the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings
or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue.
Contentions
must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the
strength
of the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s
defense.[38]
This applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the
plaintiff
was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The plaintiff is not
automatically
entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant some
measure
of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the
complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court
is
convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief.[39]
Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a
mere
allegation is not evidence.[40]
In the case at bar,
the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the
parties.
Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed
P70,000.00
for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in her
testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What
appears
in the record are receipts[41]
in her name for the purchase of construction materials on November 17,
1995 and December 23, 1995, in the total amount of P11,413.00.chanrobles virtual law library
On the other hand, both
parties claim that the money used to purchase the disputed personal
properties
came partly from their joint account with First Allied Development
Bank.
While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint
account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact
amount
of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148
of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties’
respective
contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal. Here,
the
disputed personal properties were valued at P111,375.00, the existence
and value of which were not questioned by the petitioner. Hence,
their share therein is equivalent to one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each.chanrobles virtual law library
The Court of Appeals
thus erred in affirming the decision of the trial court which granted
the
reliefs prayed for by private respondent. On the basis of the
evidence
established, the extent of private respondent’s co-ownership over the
disputed
house is only up to the amount of P11,413.00, her proven contribution
in
the construction thereof. Anent the personal properties, her
participation
therein should be limited only to the amount of P55,687.50.cralaw:red
As regards the trial
court’s award of P50,000.00 as moral damages, the Court of Appeals
correctly
deleted the same for lack of basis.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, in view of
all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No.
64166 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Private respondent Gina S.
Rey
is declared co-owner of petitioner Jacinto Saguid in the controverted
house
to the extent of P11,413.00 and personal properties to the extent of
P55,687.50.
Petitioner is ordered to reimburse the amount of P67,100.50 to private
respondent, failing which the house shall be sold at public auction to
satisfy private respondent’s claim.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Family Code, Article 148; Agapay v. Palang, 342 Phil. 302, 311-312
(1997),
citing Tolentino, I Civil Code Of The Philippines Commentaries and
Jurisprudence,
500 (1999 edition); Tumlos v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 137650, 12 April
2000,
330 SCRA 718, 733-734, citing Agapay v. Palang, supra; Adriano v. Court
of Appeals, 385 Phil. 474, 484-485 (2000).
[2]
Exhibit "A", Marriage Contract showing that Gina S. Rey was married at
the age of 15 to Eduardo V. Salazar on June 19, 1985.
[3]
Complaint, Records, p. 7.chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
Id., p. 8.chanrobles virtual law library
[5]
Answer, Records, p. 21.
[6]
Complaint, p. 8.chanrobles virtual law library
[7]
TSN, 20 January 1998, pp. 5-7.
[8]
Exhibit "K".chanrobles virtual law library
[9]
TSN, 20 January 1998, pp. 16-18.chanrobles virtual law library
[10]
Exhibit "L", First Allied Development Bank Golden Account Pass Book.
[11]
TSN, 20 January 1998, pp. 5-6 and 9-10.chanrobles virtual law library
[12]
Records, p. 19.chanrobles virtual law library
[13]
Records, p. 41.chanrobles virtual law library
[14]
Records, p. 46.chanrobles virtual law library
[15]
Records, p. 53.chanrobles virtual law library
[16]
Penned by Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano.
[17]
Records, p. 92.chanrobles virtual law library
[18]
CA-G.R. CV No. 64166, penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria
Tirona
and concurred in by Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Eloy R.
Bello, Jr.
[19]
Rollo, p. 20.chanrobles virtual law library
[20]
Rule 18, SEC. 5. Effect of failure to appear.—The failure of the
plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding
section
shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with
prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on
the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to
present
his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis
thereof.chanrobles virtual law library
[21]
Jungco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78051, 8 November 1989, 179 SCRA
213,
217-218, citing Lucero v. Dacayo, 131 Phil. 99 (1968).
[22]
Circle Financial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77315, 22
April
1991, 196 SCRA 166, 170.
[23]
Junco v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 24 at 218.
[24]
Records, p. 16.
[25]
Id., p. 19.
[26]
Records, pp. 44, 46 and 54.chanrobles virtual law library
[27]
Victory Liner, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125034, 30 July 1998,
293 SCRA 378, 384, citing Pedrosa v. Hill, 327 Phil. 153 (1996).
[28]
Nera v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-24957, 3 August 1988, 164 SCRA 1, 6.chanrobles virtual law library
[29]
Section 2, Rule 20 of the old rules.chanrobles virtual law library
[30]
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under [Article
147],
only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them
in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the
absence
of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares
are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply
to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.chanrobles virtual law library
If
one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in
the
co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad
faith
is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited
in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.chanrobles virtual law library
Art.
147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
other
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit
of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be
owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them
through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.chanrobles virtual law library
In
the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts,
work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition
of the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in
the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.chanrobles virtual law library
Neither
party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share
in
the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without
the consent of the other, until after the termination of the
cohabitation.chanrobles virtual law library
When
only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share
of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in
favor
of their common children. In case of default or of waiver by any
or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share
shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In
all
cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.chanrobles virtual law library
The
foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties
are in bad faith.
[31]
Cariño v. Cariño, G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001, 351
SCRA
127, 135.
[32]
Agapay v. Palang, supra, note 1.chanrobles virtual law library
[33]
Tumlos v. Fernandez, supra, note 1, at 733, citing Sempio-Dy, Handbook
on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1997 ed., p. 228; Vitug,
Compendium
on Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 ed., pp. 210-211.chanrobles virtual law library
[34]
Tumlos v. Fernandez, supra, citing the Family Code, Article 256.
[35]
Supra, note 1.chanrobles virtual law library
[36]
Supra, note 1.chanrobles virtual law library
[37]
Supra, note 1.chanrobles virtual law library
[38]
Heirs of Anastacio Fabela v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.142546, 9 August
2001, 362 SCRA 531, citing Javier v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101177,
28 March 1994, 231 SCRA 498; Pornellosa v. Land Tenure Administration,
110 Phil. 986 (1961).chanrobles virtual law library
[39]
Luxuria Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 989, 1001 (1999),
citing
Pascua v. Florendo, 220 Phil. 588 (1985); Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, G.R.
No.
L-40098, 29 August 1975, 66 SCRA 425;
[40]
Id., citing P.T. Cerna Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91622,
6 April 1993, 221 SCRA 19.chanrobles virtual law library
[41]
Exhibits "O", "O-1" and "O-2". |