SECOND DIVISION
RURAL BANK OF
MAKATI,
INC., ESTEBAN S. SILVA
AND MAGDALENA V.
LANDICHO,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
150763
July 2, 2004
-versus-
MUNICIPALITY OF
MAKATI
AND ATTY. VICTOR
A. L. VALERO,
Respondents.
D E C I S I
O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:
In its decision[1]
dated July 17, 2001, in CA-G.R. CV No. 58214, the Court of Appeals
affirmed
the decision[2]
dated October 22, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch
134, in Civil Case No. 91-2866 dismissing petitioners’ Complaint for
Recovery
of a Sum of Money and Damages. Petitioners now assail said CA decision
as well as the resolution[3]
dated November 9, 2001, which denied their Motion for Reconsideration.chanrobles virtual law library
The facts are as follows:
Sometime in August 1990,
Atty. Victor A.L. Valero, then the Municipal Attorney of the
Municipality
of Makati, upon request of the Municipal Treasurer, went to the Rural
Bank
of Makati to inquire about the bank’s payments of taxes and fees to the
municipality. He was informed, however, by petitioner Magdalena
V.
Landicho, corporate secretary of the bank, that the bank was exempt
from
paying taxes under Republic Act No. 720, as amended.[4]
On November 19, 1990,
the municipality lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor’s Office,
charging
petitioners Esteban S. Silva, president and general manager of the bank
and Magdalena V. Landicho for violation of Section 21(a), Chapter II,
Article
3 in relation to Sections 105 and 169 of the Metropolitan Tax Code.cralaw:red
On April 5, 1991, an
Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 140208, for violation of
Municipal
Ordinance Nos. 122 and 39 for non-payment of the mayor’s permit fee,
was
filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati against
petitioners.
Another Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 140209, for
non-payment
of annual business tax, in violation of Metro Manila Commission
Ordinance
No. 82-03, Section 21(a), Chapter II, Article 3, was likewise filed
with
the MeTC.cralaw:red
While said cases were
pending with the municipal court, respondent municipality ordered the
closure
of the bank. This prompted petitioners to pay, under protest, the
mayor’s permit fee and the annual fixed tax in the amount of P82,408.66.cralaw:red
On October 18, 1991,
petitioners filed with the RTC of Makati a Complaint for Sum of Money
and
Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 91-2866. Petitioners alleged that
they
were constrained to pay the amount of P82,408.66 because of the closure
order, issued despite the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 140208-09 and
the lack of any notice or assessment of the fees to be paid. They
averred that the collection of the taxes/fees was oppressive,
arbitrary,
unjust and illegal. Additionally, they alleged that respondent
Atty.
Valero had no power to enforce laws and ordinances, thus his action in
enforcing the collection of the permit fees and business taxes was
ultra
vires. Petitioners claimed that the bank lost expected earnings
in
the amount of P19,778. Petitioners then assailed the municipal
ordinances
of Makati as invalid for want of the requisite publication.chanrobles virtual law library
In its Answer, respondent
municipality asserted that petitioners’ payment of P82,408.66 was for a
legal obligation because the payment of the mayor’s permit fee as well
as the municipal business license was required of all business
concerns.
According to respondent, said requirement was in furtherance of the
police
power of the municipality to regulate businesses.cralaw:red
For his part, Atty.
Valero filed an Answer claiming that there was no coercion committed by
the municipality, that payment was a legal obligation of the bank, and
that its claim of exemption had no legal basis. He further
alleged
that petitioners’ action was clearly intended to harass and humiliate
him
and as counterclaim, he asked for moral and other damages.cralaw:red
On October 22, 1996,
the RTC decided Civil Case No. 91-2866 as follows:
WHEREFORE,
in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing
the
complaint.
On the
counterclaim,
the plaintiffs are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay to
defendant
Victor Valero the sum of P200,000.00 as moral damages and the amount of
P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.chanrobles virtual law library
The counterclaim
of
defendant Municipality is dismissed.
Cost against the
plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.[5]
In finding for
respondents,
the RTC ruled that the bank was engaged in business as a rural
bank.
Hence, it should secure the necessary permit and business license, as
well
as pay the corresponding charges and fees. It found that the
municipality
had authority to impose licenses and permit fees on persons engaging in
business, under its police power embodied under the general welfare
clause.
Also, the RTC declared unmeritorious petitioners’ claim for exemption
under
Rep. Act No. 720 since said exemption had been withdrawn by Executive
Order
No. 93[6]
and the Rural Bank Act of 1992.[7]
These statutes no longer exempted rural banks from paying corporate
income
taxes and local taxes, fees and charges. It also found petitioners’
claim
of lack of publication of MMC Ordinance Nos. 82-03 and Municipal
Ordinance
No. 122 to be mere allegations unsupported by clear and convincing
evidence.
In awarding damages
to Atty. Valero, the RTC found that he had been maliciously impleaded
as
defendant. It noted that Atty. Valero, as a municipal legal
officer,
was tasked to enforce municipal ordinances. In short, he was merely an
agent of the local chief executive and should not be faulted for
performing
his assigned task.cralaw:red
Petitioners seasonably
moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by the RTC in its Order
dated January 10, 1997.[8]
Petitioners appealed
to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58214. The appellate
court
sustained the lower court in this wise:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The Court of Appeals
found
the order of closure of the bank valid and justified since the bank was
operating without any permit and without having paid the requisite
permit
fee. Thus, declared the Court of Appeals, “it is not merely a matter of
enforcement and collection of fees, as the appellants would have it,
but
a violation of the municipality’s authority to regulate the businesses
operating within its territory.”[10]chanrobles virtual law library
The appellate court
also brushed aside petitioners’ claim that the general welfare clause
is
limited only to legislative action. It declared that the exercise of
police
power by the municipality was mandated by the general welfare clause,
which
authorizes the local government units to enact ordinances, not only to
carry into effect and discharge such duties as are conferred upon them
by law, but also those for the good of the municipality and its
inhabitants.
This mandate includes the regulation of useful occupations and
enterprises.cralaw:red
Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but the appellate court in its resolution[11]
of November 9, 2001 denied the same.cralaw:red
Hence, this instant
petition alleging that the Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred
in:
(1)
x x xHOLDING THAT THE CLOSURE BY THE APPELLEE, VICTOR
VALERO,
OF THE APPELLANT BANK WAS A LEGITIMATE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER BY THE
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI;chanrobles virtual law library
(2)
x
x xNOT CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT MAKATI ORDINANCE 122 REQUIRING
MAYOR’S
PERMIT FOR OPERATION OF AN ESTABLISHMENT AND MMC ORDINANCE NO. 82-03
WERE
ADMITTED AS NOT PUBLISHED AS REQUIRED IN TAÑADA, ET AL., vs.
TUVERA,
NO. L-63915, DECEMBER 29, 1986 AND THAT NO TAX ASSESSMENT WAS PRESENTED
TO THE BANK;chanrobles virtual law library
(3)
x
x xAWARDING MORAL DAMAGES TO APPELLEE VICTOR VALERO IN THE AMOUNT
OF P200,000.00 AND ATTORNEY’S FEES IN THE SUM OF P50,000.00;chanrobles virtual law library
(4)
x
x xNOT AWARDING TO THE APPELLANT BANK, THE AMOUNT OF P57,854.00
REPRESENTING
THE AMOUNT UNJUSTLY AND ILLEGALLY COLLECTED FROM THE APPELLANT BANK;chanrobles virtual law library
(5)
x
x xNOT AWARDING THE AMOUNT OF P10,413.75 YEARLY REPRESENTING THE
UNREALIZED PROFIT WHICH THE APPELLANT BANK IS BEING DEPRIVED OF IN THE
USE OF THE AFORESAID AMOUNT PLUS LEGAL INTEREST ALLOWED IN JUDGMENT
FROM
THE TIME OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL DEMAND. (DEMAND LETTER, DATED OCTOBER 4,
1991, EXHIBIT “O” FOR THE APPELLANTS);
(6)
x
x xNOT GRANTING TO APPELLANTS ESTEBAN S. SILVA AND MAGDALENA
LANDICHO
MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P15,000.00;
(7)
x
x xNOT AWARDING TO APPELLANTS, P1,000,000.00 EXEMPLARY DAMAGES;
25%
OF THE APPELLANTS CLAIM AS AND FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEE AND COSTS OF SUIT.[12]
Essentially, the
following
are the relevant issues for our resolution:chanrobles virtual law library
1.
Whether
or not petitioner bank is liable to pay the business taxes and mayor’s
permit fees imposed by respondent;
2. Whether
or
not the closure of petitioner bank is valid;
3. Whether
or
not petitioners are entitled to an award of unrealized profit and
damages;
4. Whether
or
not respondent Atty. Victor Valero is entitled to damages.
On the first issue,
petitioner
bank claims that of the P82,408.66 it paid under protest, it is
actually
liable only for the amount of P24,154, representing taxes, fees and
charges
due beginning 1987, or after the issuance of E.O. No. 93. Prior
to
said year, it was exempt from paying any taxes, fees, and charges by
virtue
of Rep. Act No. 720.
We find the bank’s claim
for refund untenable now.cralaw:red
Section 14 of Rep. Act
No. 720, as amended by Republic Act No. 4106,[13]
approved on July 19, 1964, had exempted rural banks with net assets not
exceeding one million pesos (P1,000,000) from the payment of all taxes,
charges and fees. The records show that as of December 29, 1986,
petitioner
bank’s net assets amounted only to P745,432.29[14]
or below the one million ceiling provided for in Section 14 of the old
Rural Banking Act. Hence, under Rep. Act No. 720, petitioner bank could
claim to be exempt from payment of all taxes, charges and fees under
the
aforementioned provision.cralaw:red
However, on December
17, 1986, Executive Order No. 93 was issued by then President Corazon
Aquino,
withdrawing all tax and duty incentives with certain exceptions.
Notably, not included among the exceptions were those granted to rural
banks under Rep. Act No. 720. With the passage of said law, petitioner
could no longer claim any exemption from payment of business taxes and
permit fees.cralaw:red
Now, as to the refund
of P57,854 claimed by petitioners allegedly because of overpayment of
taxes
and fees, we note that petitioners have not adequately substantiated
their
claim. As found by the Court of Appeals:chanrobles virtual law library
As to the computation
of the payable fees, the plaintiffs-appellants claim an overpayment and
pray for a refund. It is not clearly shown from their argument
that
such overpayment exists. And from their initial complaint, they
even
asked for the refund of the whole P82,408.66 paid, which complaint was
instituted in 1991. They claim having paid the fees and charges
due
since 1991, which is irrelevant, since the P82,408.66 was paid for the
period before 1991, and thus no deduction can be made for payments
after
that period. It is not clear where their computation of
P57,854.00
owed them came from, and lacking solid support, their prayer for a
partial
refund must fail. Plaintiffs-appellants have failed to show that
the payment of fees and charges even covered the period before their
exemption
was withdrawn.[15]
Factual findings of
the Court of Appeals, which are supported on record, are binding and
conclusive
upon this Court. As repeatedly held, such findings will not be
disturbed
unless they are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or
unless
the judgment itself is based on misapprehension of facts.[16]
Moreover, in a petition for review, only questions of law are properly
raised. On this score, the refund sought by petitioners could not
be entertained much less granted.cralaw:red
Anent the second issue,
petitioner bank claims that the closure of respondent bank was an
improper
exercise of police power because a municipal corporation has no
inherent
but only delegated police power, which must be exercised not by the
municipal
mayor but by the municipal council through the enactment of ordinances.
It also assailed the Court of Appeals for invoking the General Welfare
Clause embodied in Section 16[17]
of the Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect in 1992,[18]
when the closure of the bank was actually done on July 31, 1991.chanrobles virtual law library
Indeed the Local Government
Code of 1991 was not yet in effect when the municipality ordered
petitioner
bank’s closure on July 31, 1991. However, the general welfare
clause
invoked by the Court of Appeals is not found on the provisions of said
law alone. Even under the old Local Government Code (Batas
Pambansa
Blg. 337)[19] which was then in effect, a general welfare clause was
provided
for in Section 7 thereof. Municipal corporations are agencies of
the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government
and
as such are endowed with police powers in order to effectively
accomplish
and carry out the declared objects of their creation.[20]
The authority of a local government unit to exercise police power under
a general welfare clause is not a recent development. This was already
provided for as early as the Administrative Code of 1917.[21]
Since then it has been reenacted and implemented by new statutes on the
matter. Thus, the closure of the bank was a valid exercise of
police
power pursuant to the general welfare clause contained in and restated
by B.P. Blg. 337, which was then the law governing local government
units.
No reversible error arises in this instance insofar as the validity of
respondent municipality’s exercise of police power for the general
welfare
is concerned.chanrobles virtual law library
The general welfare
clause has two branches. The first, known as the general
legislative
power, authorizes the municipal council to enact ordinances and make
regulations
not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge
the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by
law.
The second, known as the police power proper, authorizes the
municipality
to enact ordinances as may be necessary and proper for the health and
safety,
prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the
municipality and its inhabitants, and for the protection of their
property.[22]chanrobles virtual law library
In the present case,
the ordinances imposing licenses and requiring permits for any business
establishment, for purposes of regulation enacted by the municipal
council
of Makati, fall within the purview of the first branch of the general
welfare
clause. Moreover, the ordinance of the municipality imposing the
annual business tax is part of the power of taxation vested upon local
governments as provided for under Section 8 of B.P. Blg. 337,[23]
to wit:
Sec.
8.
Authority to Create Sources of Revenue.- (1) Each local government unit
shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy
taxes,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.chanrobles virtual law library
x x x
Implementation of these
ordinances is vested in the municipal mayor, who is the chief executive
of the municipality as provided for under the Local Government Code, to
wit:
Sec.
141.
Powers and Duties.-
(1) The
mayor
shall be the chief executive of the municipal government and shall
exercise
such powers, duties and functions as provided in this Code and other
laws.
(2) He shall:
x x x
(k) Grant
licenses and
permits in accordance with existing laws or municipal ordinances and
revoke
them for violation of the conditions upon which they have been granted;
x x x
(o) Enforce
laws, municipal
ordinances and resolutions and issue necessary orders for their
faithful
and proper enforcement and execution;chanrobles virtual law library
(p) Ensure that
all
taxes and other revenues of the municipality are collected, and that
municipal
funds are spent in accordance with law, ordinances and regulations;
x x x
(t) Cause to be
instituted
judicial proceedings in connection with the violation of ordinances,
for
the collection of taxes, fees and charges, and for the recovery of
property
and funds of the municipality, and otherwise to protect the interest of
the municipality;[24]
(Emphasis supplied.)chanrobles virtual law library
x
x
x
Consequently, the
municipal
mayor, as chief executive, was clothed with authority to create a
Special
Task Force headed by respondent Atty. Victor A.L. Valero to enforce and
implement said ordinances and resolutions and to file appropriate
charges
and prosecute violators.[25]
Respondent Valero could hardly be faulted for performing his official
duties
under the cited circumstances.
Petitioners contend
that MMC Ordinance No. 82-03 and Municipal Ordinance No. 122 are void
for
lack of publication. This again raises a factual issue, which
this
Court may not look into. As repeatedly held, this Court is not a
trier of facts.[26]
Besides, both the Court of Appeals and the trial court found lack of
sufficient
evidence on this point to support petitioners’ claim, thus:
And finally the matter
of the lack of publication is once again alleged by the
plaintiffs-appellants,
claiming that the matter was skirted by the trial court. This
argument
must fail, in the light of the trial court’s squarely finding lack of
evidence
to support the allegation of the plaintiffs-appellants. We quote
from the trial court’s decision:
The contention that
MMC Ordinance No. 82-03 and Municipal Ordinance No. 122 of Makati are
void
as they were not publishced (sic) is untenable. The mere
allegation
of the plaintiff is not sufficient to declare said ordinances
void.
The plaintiffs failed to adduce clear, convincing and competent
evidence
to prove said Ordinances void. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, an
ordinance is presumed to be valid unless declared otherwise by a Court
in an appropriate proceeding where the validity of the ordinance is
directly
put in issue.[27]
On the issue of the
closure of the bank, we find that the bank was not engaged in any
illegal
or immoral activities to warrant its outright closure. The
appropriate
remedies to enforce payment of delinquent taxes or fees are provided
for
in Section 62 of the Local Tax Code, to wit:
Sec.
62.
Civil Remedies.- The civil remedies available to enforce payment of
delinquent
taxes shall be by distraint of personal property, and by legal
action.
Either of these remedies or both simultaneously may be pursued at the
discretion
of the proper authority.chanrobles virtual law library
The payment of
other
revenues accruing to local governments shall be enforced by legal
action.[28]
Said Section 62 did not
provide for closure. Moreover, the order of closure violated
petitioner’s
right to due process, considering that the records show that the bank
exercised
good faith and presented what it thought was a valid and legal
justification
for not paying the required taxes and fees. The violation of a
municipal
ordinance does not empower a municipal mayor to avail of extrajudicial
remedies.[29]
It should have observed due process before ordering the bank’s closure.
Finally, on the issue
of damages, we agree with both the trial and the appellate courts that
the bank is not entitled to any damages. The award of moral
damages
cannot be granted to a corporation, it being an artificial person that
exists only in legal contemplation and cannot, therefore, experience
physical
suffering and mental anguish, which can be experienced only by one
having
a nervous system.[30]
There is also no sufficient basis for the award of exemplary
damages.
There being no moral damages, exemplary damages could not be awarded
also.
As to attorney’s fees, aside from lack of adequate support and proof on
the matter, these fees are not recoverable as a matter of right but
depend
on the sound discretion of the courts.[31]
Under the circumstances
of this case, the award of damages to Atty. Valero is also
baseless.
We cannot ascribe any illegal motive or malice to the bank for
impleading
Atty. Valero as an officer of respondent municipality. The bank
filed
the case against respondent municipality in the honest belief that it
is
exempt from paying taxes and fees. Since Atty. Valero was the
official
charged with the implementation of the ordinances of respondent
municipality,
he was rightly impleaded as a necessary party in the case.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the assailed
Decision dated July 17, 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
58214 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, so that (1) the order denying any
claim for refunds and fees allegedly overpaid by the bank, as well as
the
denial of any award for damages and unrealized profits, is hereby
SUSTAINED;
(2) the order decreeing the closure of petitioner bank is SET ASIDE;
and
(3) the award of moral damages and attorney’s fees to Atty. Victor A.L.
Valero is DELETED. No pronouncement as to costs.chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Puno, J., (Chairman), Callejo,
Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez,
J.,
on leave.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 34-43. Penned by Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco,
Jr., with Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes, and Juan Q. Enriquez,
Jr. concurring.
[2]
CA Rollo, pp. 51-A-57.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
Rollo, p. 60.chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
Republic Act No. 720. Entitled “An Act Providing For The
Creation,
Organization And Operation Of Rural Banks, And For Other Purposes.”
Sec.
14. of said law reads: “All rural banks created and organized under the
provisions of this Act with net assets not exceeding one million pesos,
excluding the counterpart capital subscribed and paid in by the
Government
under Sections seven and eight of this Act, shall be exempt from the
payment
of all taxes, charges and fees of whatever nature and description:
Provided,
however, That when the net assets of a rural bank exceed one million
pesos,
the taxes, charges and fees shall be levied in the proportion that such
excess bears to the said net assets: Provided, finally, That when the
net
assets of a rural bank exceed three million pesos, it shall pay taxes,
fees and charges like any other bank.”
[5]
Records, p. 377.chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
E.O. No. 93. Entitled “Withdrawing All Tax and Duty Incentives,
Subject
to Certain Exceptions, Expanding the Powers of the Fiscal Incentives
Review
Board, and For Other Purposes.” Section 1 of said Executive Order
states
in part: “The provisions of any general or special law to the
contrary
notwithstanding, all tax and duty incentives granted to government and
private entities are hereby withdrawn—”
[7]
Republic Act No. 7353. an act providing for the creation, organization
and operation of rural banks, and for other purposes.
[8]
Records, p. 398.chanrobles virtual law library
[9]
Rollo, p. 42.chanrobles virtual law library
[10]
Id. at 39.chanrobles virtual law library
[11]
Id. at 60.
[12]
Id. at 9-10.chanrobles virtual law library
[13]
An Act to Further Amend Section Fourteen of Republic Act Numbered Seven
Hundred Twenty, As Amended, Otherwise known as Rural Banks’ Act.
[14]
Records, p. 251; Statement of Condition, p. 2.
[15]
Rollo, p. 41.chanrobles virtual law library
[16]
Austria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133323, 9 March 2000, 327 SCRA
668,
674.
[17]
SEC. 16. General Welfare. – Every local government unit shall exercise
the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as
well
as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective
governance and those which are essential to the promotion of the
general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation
and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of
the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development
of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities,
improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and
order,
and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.chanrobles virtual law library
[18]
SEC. 536. Effectivity Clause – This Code shall take effect on January
first,
nineteen hundred and ninety-two, unless otherwise provided herein,
after
its complete publication in at least one (1) newspaper of general
circulation.chanrobles virtual law library
[19]
B.P. Blg. 337, Sec. 7. Governmental Powers in General. – Every
local
government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for
governance
such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve
morals,
and maintain peace and order in the local government unit, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein.chanrobles virtual law library
[20]
Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, G.R. No. 40243, 11 March 1992, 207 SCRA
157, 160.chanrobles virtual law library
[21]
SEC. 2238. General power of council to enact ordinances and make
regulations.
– The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such
regulations,
not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge
the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem
necessary
and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of the
property therein.
[22]
See Ruperto G. Martin, Public Corporations 165 (1971 Ed.)chanrobles virtual law library
[23]
Now Section 18 of the Local Government Code of 1991.chanrobles virtual law library
[24]
Section 141, B.P. Blg. 337, Local Government Code.chanrobles virtual law library
[25]
Records, pp. 321-323.chanrobles virtual law library
[26]
Tan v. Mendez, Jr., G.R. No. 138669, 6 June 2002, 383 SCRA 202, 211.
[27]
Rollo, pp. 41-42.chanrobles virtual law library
[28]
Section 62, P.D. No. 231, as amended, also known as the “Local Tax
Code.”
[29]
Estate of Gregoria Francisco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95279, 25
July
1991, 199 SCRA 595, 600.
[30]
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128690,
21 January 1999, 301 SCRA 572, 602-603.
[31]
Article 2233, Civil Code of the Philippines. |