SECOND DIVISION
ATTY. ROMEO B.
IGOT,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
150794
August 17, 2004
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALSAND MANILA ELECTRIC
COMPANY (MERALCO),
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Before us is a Petition
for Mandamus with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
filed by petitioner Atty. Romeo B. Igot to compel the respondent Manila
Electric Company (Meralco) to comply with the Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory
Injunction[1]
issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66251. The Antecedents
On February 24, 1983,
the petitioner and the respondent executed a service contract under
which
the latter would provide electricity to the petitioner’s house at No. 1
Lucky Street, Santolan, Pasig City. The respondent installed an
electric
meter on a Meralco post, along F. Pasco Avenue, Santolan, Pasig City,
about
fifteen (15) meters away from the petitioner’s residence.cralaw:red
On November 13, 1998,
the petitioner compiled all his electric bills and discovered that his
Meralco statement amounted to only P18.20 for the period of September
24,
1998 to October 26, 1998. Suspicious of the unusual figure, the
petitioner
inspected the electric meter which the respondent installed near his
house
and discovered that the Meralco seal was still intact but that the
meter
had stopped rotating. He sent a letter[2]
to the respondent requesting that his electric meter be checked at the
soonest possible time and if found to be defective, demanded that it be
replaced.cralaw:red
The petitioner did not
receive any reply from the respondent. On February 1, 1999, he
was
surprised to receive his Meralco electric bill[3]
showing his estimated electrical consumption for the period of December
23, 1998 to January 25, 1999, as amounting to P12,100.30. He
wrote
the respondent on February 3, 1999, requesting that he be furnished
with
a detailed computation. The petitioner received a letter[4]
from the respondent on February 6, 1999 demanding the payment of the
sum
of P111,182.05, within ten days from receipt thereof, on account of the
alleged findings of defects in the metering installation which was
discovered
during an inspection by its employees. Portions of the letter
read:chanrobles virtual law library
The
inspection
of your metering installation on January 5, 1999, yielded the following
findings of our field personnel:
1. THE
LEAD
COVER SEALS WERE PULLED OUT FROM THE SEALING WIRE.
2. THE DRIVING
GEAR
OF THE 2ND SHAFT WAS FILED CAUSING IT TO DISENGAGE PARTIALLY FROM THE
DRIVEN
GEAR OF THE 3rd SHAFT OF THE REGISTER ASSEMBLY.
Given the above
finding(s)
and in accordance with Republic Act No. 7832 (Anti-Pilferage of
Electricity
and Theft of Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Act of 1994) (sic),
you are billed the amount of P111,182.05.
Worse, on February 11,
1999, the petitioner received a notice of disconnection[5]
from the respondent, which the latter threatened to implement should he
fail to pay the amount of P123,282.35 within the day.
On February 12, 1999,
the petitioner filed a complaint for damages with an application for
the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondent
with
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. The trial court issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO).chanrobles virtual law library
During the hearing on
February 15, 1999, Atty. Angelito Aguila, the counsel of the
respondent,
manifested that it would not disconnect the petitioner’s electric
supply
until the trial court shall have resolved the issue on the preliminary
injunction. The petitioner, in turn, manifested that he was
withdrawing
his plea for the issuance of a TRO.cralaw:red
However, on July 9,
1999, the electric supply to the petitioner’s house was disconnected by
the respondent. As a consequence, the petitioner paid the bill on
the same day, after being assured by the respondent that it would order
the reconnection the following day, which was a Saturday. The
weekend
passed, but the electricity at the petitioner’s residence remained
unrestored,
and his children personally went to the respondent to plead their
cause.
However, the respondent’s employees, namely, Atty. Alfonso Lacap and
Rolando
Dela Paz, disallowed the reconnection unless the petitioner tendered
the
amount of P12,100.30, supposedly as payment for the electric bill
covering
the period of December 24, 1998 to January 25, 1999. As a
consequence,
the petitioner personally tendered PNB Check No. 0000408 in the amount
of P12,100.30 on July 13, 1999, accompanied by a formal request for the
restoration of his electric supply. Notwithstanding the offer of
payment, Rolando Dela Paz made a notation on the petitioner’s letter
stating
that payment of arrears would be accepted, but without the
reconnection.
Still, the respondent restored the petitioner’s electricity in the
afternoon
of July 13, 1999.chanrobles virtual law library
In the Order dated July
15, 1999, the trial court granted the petitioner’s plea for a writ of
preliminary
injunction upon posting and approval of the required bond in the amount
of P124,000.00 to answer for the damages that the respondent may incur
if the writ would later on be found to have been wrongly issued.cralaw:red
The petitioner filed
a supplemental complaint impleading Atty. Alfonso Lacap, Atty. Angelito
Aguila and Rolando Dela Paz, for their alleged refusal to cause the
reconnection
of the electricity to his house. In the Order dated January 4,
2000,
the trial court admitted the supplemental complaint.cralaw:red
For the petitioner’s
repeated failure to appear during the hearings set for the presentation
of his evidence, the trial court dismissed the complaint on January 11,
2001. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner on
January 12, 2001, which the trial court denied on June 29, 2001.cralaw:red
Aggrieved, the petitioner
filed a special civil action for certiorari on August 22, 2001 with the
Court of Appeals for the nullification of the trial court’s order
dismissing
his complaint, alleging that the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. At 11:00
a.m. on August 24, 2001, the respondent disconnected the electric
supply
to the petitioner’s house. The CA issued a resolution at about
3:00
p.m. enjoining the trial court from further proceeding with the case
and,
likewise, ordered the respondent to cease and desist from enforcing its
threatened act to disconnect the petitioner’s electric supply.[6]
The petitioner filed
with the CA a motion for the issuance of an order directing the
respondent
to immediately restore his electricity as ordered by the appellate
court.
The petitioner, likewise, filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to compel the respondent to
restore
the electric supply to his residence. The respondent opposed the
same, alleging that the electricity was disconnected as early as 11:00
a.m. of August 24, 2001, while the CA’s resolution which granted the
TRO
was promulgated at around 3:45 p.m. of the same day. It also
alleged
that the TRO was rendered moot and academic, as the electricity in the
petitioner’s house was already disconnected even prior to the
promulgation
of the CA resolution.chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner filed
an urgent motion for the reconnection of the electric supply to his
house
within twenty-four hours. The CA, thereafter, issued a Resolution[7]
granting the petitioner’s request for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary
mandatory injunction and requiring the respondent to restore the
electricity
in the petitioner’s house within twenty-four hours “from notice of the
approval of the bond.” On September 3, 2001, the petitioner
posted
a surety bond[8]
in the amount of P50,000.00 but the CA did not act thereon. The
CA
rendered the decision[9]
on September 17, 2001, directing the trial court to proceed with the
trial
of the case, and making the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction it
earlier issued permanent.chanrobles virtual law library
The respondent filed
a motion for the reconsideration of the decision, alleging that the
writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the trial court was
ineffective.
It pointed out that the petitioner posted a surety bond instead of
depositing
cash or cashier’s check as required by Section 2 of Republic
Act No. 7832. On September 18, 2001, the petitioner wrote the
respondent requesting for the restoration of electric supply to his
house,
to no avail. On September 24, 2001, the petitioner filed an
urgent
motion for the CA to issue a supplemental order directing the
respondent
to restore the electric supply to his house within twenty-four hours,
considering
that he had posted a surety bond in the amount of P50,000.00. On
September 27, 2001, the CA issued a Resolution granting the
petitioner’s
motion with a warning to the respondent that it may be impelled to take
a more drastic action. In a manifestation, the respondent alleged
that the decision of the CA had not yet become final and executory;
hence,
it could not be compelled to restore the electric supply to the
petitioner’s
residence. The petitioner again wrote the respondent on October
5,
2001, reiterating the need for compliance with the CA resolution.
On October 16, 2001, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion alleging as
follows:
1. FOR
WITHDRAWAL
OF VERY URGENT MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER, etc.,
FILED ON OCTOBER 11, 2001;
2. FOR ISSUANCE OF
AN
ORDER DIRECTING THE PASIG POLICE STATION TO HELP IMPLEMENT THE WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION ISSUED ON AUGUST 31, 2001 AND THE
SUCCEEDING
ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 27, 2001, RESPECTIVELY;
3. FOR REITERATED
MOTION
TO CITE PRIVATE RESPONDENT MERALCO’S OFFICERS AND LAWYERS IN CONTEMPT
OF
COURT.[10]
On November 8, 2001,
the
respondent filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court
for
the reversal of the decision of the CA. The case was docketed as
G.R. No. 149913. The respondent filed a manifestation that it
would
reconnect the electric supply to the house of the petitioner as soon as
the decision of the CA had become final and executory. On
December
5, 2001, this Court issued a Resolution denying the petition.
On December 8, 2001,
the petitioner filed his petition for mandamus with this Court to
compel
the CA to execute the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction it
earlier
issued; alternatively, to grant his omnibus motion filed on October 16,
2001 with the CA to direct the Chief of the Pasig Police Station to
enforce
the writs issued by the appellate court; and to cite the officers and
lawyers
of the respondent in contempt of court for resisting the writs issued
by
the CA.cralaw:red
In its comment on the
petition, the respondent averred that it had already reconnected the
electric
supply to the petitioner’s house at about 8:00 a.m. of February 14,
2001
in view of the Court’s denial of its petition for review in G.R. No.
149913.
It emphasized that the CA never issued a writ for preliminary mandatory
injunction against the respondent; nor was it notified of the approval
by the CA of the petitioner’s injunction bond. The respondent
prayed
for the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit, and for being moot
and academic.chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner filed
a reply alleging that while his petition for mandamus may have been
rendered
moot and academic, its petition to cite the officers and lawyers of the
respondent still has to be resolved by the Court.cralaw:red
The issues for resolution
are the following: (a) whether the petition for mandamus has become
moot
and academic in light of the restoration by the respondent of the
electric
supply to the house of the petitioner pendente lite; and, (b) whether
the
Court has jurisdiction over the omnibus motion of the petitioner filed
with the CA to cite the officers and lawyers of the respondent in
contempt
of the CA.
The Ruling of the
Court
On the first issue,
we agree that with the electric supply to the petitioner’s house having
been restored by the respondent pendente lite, the instant petition for
mandamus has become moot and academic. We note, however, that
contrary
to the allegations of the petitioner in this case, the CA did not issue
any writ of preliminary mandatory injunction before it rendered its
decision
granting his petition for mandamus. In fact, the CA never
approved
the surety bond which was dated September 3, 2001 posted by the
petitioner.
Under its Resolution dated August 31, 2001, the CA ordered the
reconnection
of the electric supply to the petitioner’s house, to take effect within
twenty-four hours from notice of the approval of the petitioner’s bond.chanrobles virtual law library
On the second issue,
the petitioner’s plea for the Court to cite respondent Meralco and its
officers and lawyers for indirect contempt for resisting to comply with
the CA Decision and the Resolutions dated August 31, 2001 and September
27, 2001 has no merit. The petitioner, being a lawyer himself,
ought
to know that the charge must be filed before the court against which
the
indirect contempt was committed.[11]
The pertinent rules on the matter are Sections 4 and 5, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, which read:chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 4. How
proceedings commenced. – Proceedings for indirect contempt may be
initiated
motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by
an
order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause
why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other
cases,
charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition
with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or
papers
involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for
filing
initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If
the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action
pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact
but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately,
unless
the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt
charge
and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 5. Where
charge
to be filed. – Where the charge for indirect contempt has been
committed
against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank,
or against an officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with
such
court. Where such contempt has been committed against a lower
court,
the charge may be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place in
which
the lower court is sitting; but the proceedings may also be instituted
in such lower court subject to appeal to the Regional Trial Court of
such
place in the same manner as provided in section 11 of this Rule.
As we ruled in San Luis
v. Court of Appeals:[12]
“In
whatever
context it may arise, contempt of court involves the doing of an act,
or
the failure to do an act, in such a manner as to create an affront to
the
court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. As a
matter
of practical judicial administration, jurisdiction has been felt to
properly
rest in only one tribunal at a time with respect to a given
controversy.”
Only the court which rendered the order commanding the doing of a
certain
act is vested with the right to determine whether or not the order has
been complied with, or whether a sufficient reason has been given for
noncompliance,
and, therefore, whether a contempt has been committed. It is a
well-established
rule that the power to determine the existence of contempt of court
rests
exclusively with the court contemned. No court is authorized to
punish
a contempt against another.chanrobles virtual law library
“The
rationale
that is usually advanced for the general rule … is that, contempt
proceedings
are sui generis and are triable only by the court against whose
authority
the contempts are charged; the power to punish for contempt exists for
the purpose of enabling a court to compel due decorum and respect in
its
presence and due obedience to its judgments, orders and processes and
in
order that a court may compel obedience to its orders, it must have the
right to inquire whether there has been any disobedience thereof, for
to
submit the question of disobedience to another tribunal would operate
to
deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency.”
Section 4, Rule 71 of
the
Rules of Court provides, in effect, that a charge for indirect contempt
must be filed with the court contemned. Although this provision
is
permissive in nature, in the event of concurrent jurisdiction over
cases
of contempt of court, it would be a good practice to acknowledge the
preferential
right of the court against which the act of contempt was committed to
try
and punish the guilty party.chanrobles virtual law library
The court that granted
the preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order preserving
the
status quo is vested with the power to hear and determine the
sufficiency
and merit of the contempt charge. Only the court which issued the
injunction can impose a sanction for contempt of that injunction, and a
court without subject matter jurisdiction cannot transfer the case to
another
court.[13]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the petition for mandamus is DISMISSED for being MOOT AND
ACADEMIC.
The petitioner’s omnibus motion to cite the officers and lawyers of the
respondent is DENIED. No costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.
Puno., J., (Chairman),
Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, with Associate
Justices
Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and Perlita J. Tria Tirona, concurring.
[2]
Annex “J,” Records, Vol. I, p. 22.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
Annex “K,” Id. at 23.chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
Annex “N,” Id. at 30.
[5]
Annex “O,” Id. at 31.
[6]
CA Rollo, pp. 197-198.
[7]
Id. at 237.chanrobles virtual law library
[8]
Id. at 240.chanrobles virtual law library
[9]
Id. at 303.chanrobles virtual law library
[10]
Rollo, pp. 33-34.chanrobles virtual law library
[11]
See Section 5, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Where
charge to be filed. – Where the charge for indirect contempt has been
committed
against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank,
or against an officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with
such
court.chanrobles virtual law library
[12]
365 SCRA 279 (2001).
[13]
17 Am.Jur.2d Contempt § 60. |