FIRST DIVISION
HEIRS OF
SIMPLICIO
SANTIAGO,REPRESENTED
BY
ANGELITA
S. CASTRO,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
151440
June 17, 2003
-versus-
HEIRS OF MARIANO
E. SANTIAGO,
Respondents.
D E C I S I
O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A free patent issued over
a private land is null and void and produces no legal effects
whatsoever.
Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum.[1]
Free patent applications under the Public Land Act[2]
apply only to disposable lands of the public domain, and not to private
lands which became such by virtue of a duly registered possessory
information
or by open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, of the
present
or previous occupants.[3]
This petition seeks
to reverse and set aside the December 3, 1999 decision[4]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 42761, which reversed and set
aside the December 3, 1999 Decision[5]
of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 27 in Civil
Case
No. 7401-M.cralaw:red
The instant controversy
involves a 574 square meter parcel of land known as Lot No. 2344,
Cad-349,[6]
located in Poblacion, Angat, Bulacan, which was formerly owned by the
spouses
Vicente Santiago and Magdalena Sanchez. The spouses had five
children,
among whom were Pablo and Marta. Pablo is the father of Simplicio
Santiago and Guillermo Santiago; while Marta is the mother of Jose
Santiago.[7]chanrobles virtual law library
On April 3, 1984, petitioners,
the heirs of Simplicio Santiago, initiated a complaint[8]
for accion publiciana with damages against Mariano Santiago, son of
Jose
Santiago.[9]
They alleged that Lot 2344 was acquired by Simplicio by purchase from
his
father, Pablo, and brother, Guillermo.[10]
When Simplicio retired from government service in 1968, he constructed
a house on the said lot.[11]
Before his demise on May 6, 1983, he applied for a free patent,[12]
which was granted. Thus, on September 26, 1980, Original
Certificate
of Title No. P-10878 covering Lot 2344 was issued in his name.[13]
Sometime in 1983, Mariano Santiago, through stealth and evident bad
faith,
constructed a house on a portion of Lot 2344 and refused to vacate the
premises despite written and oral demands.[14]
At the trial, twenty-three-year
old Nestor Santiago, one of the children of Simplicio Santiago,
admitted
that since he attained the age of reason, the house of Mariano Santiago
was already existing in Lot No. 2344-C. His father allegedly
advised
Mariano to remove the house but the latter refused to do so.[15]
In his answer,[16]
Mariano Santiago contended that Lot 2344 was subdivided into three
portions,
i.e., Lot 2344-A, with an area of 168 square meters; Lot 2344-B, with
an
area of 349 square meters; and Lot 2344-C, with an area of 57 square
meters.[17]
Petitioners owned only Lot 2344-B, and Lots 2344-A and 2344-C,
containing
an area of 225 square meters, was fraudulently included in the free
patent
and certificate of title issued to Simplicio Santiago. Mariano
testified
that he and his sister, Belen S. Marcelo, purchased Lot 2344-A from
Simplicio
Santiago for the price of P5,000.00, as evidenced by a deed of sale
dated
September 15, 1972.[18]
Immediately after the sale, they constructed a house on the lot.[19]
Without their knowledge, however, Simplicio secured a free patent and
an
original certificate of title over the entire Lot 2344. On the
other
hand, he and his sister inherited Lot 2344-C from their grandmother,
Marta
Santiago, who in turn inherited the lot from her parents, Vicente and
Magdalena.
During her lifetime, Marta had been living in the house built on the
said
lot.[20]
When Mariano was born in 1926, the house was still made of nipa, but it
was subsequently improved in 1931 and 1952 into a house of strong
materials.[21]chanrobles virtual law library
Mariano’s testimony
was corroborated by seventy-year old Socorro Ocampo,[22]
first cousin of Simplicio and Mariano’s father, Jose, and by
fifty-two-year
old Flordeliza Austria,[23]
a long-time neighbor of the parties. Both witnesses testified
that
since they were still children, the house of Marta where she and
Mariano’s
family resided was already existing on Lot 2344-C.cralaw:red
On August 6, 1991, the
trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. It found
that Mariano’s claim over the controverted lot lacks basis and held
that
his defense constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of a
Torrens
title which was barred by prescription for having been raised more than
one year after the entry of the decree of registration. The
dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant:
1.
Declaring the plaintiffs, children and heirs of the late Simplicio
Santiago,
the owners of the property covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
P-10878 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, which is registered in the
name of Simplicio Santiago;chanrobles virtual law library
2.
Ordering the defendant Mariano Santiago to remove and vacate the 57
square
meter portion of the property covered by said title (O.C.T. No.
P-10878)
on which his house is established and surrender the possession thereof
to the plaintiffs;
3.
Dismissing/denying all claims and counterclaims for damages by the
parties.
No pronouncement
as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.[24]
Meanwhile, Mariano died
on July 5, 1993 and was substituted by his heirs.[25]
Respondents appealed
to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the trial court
on December 3, 1999. It sustained respondents’ claim over Lots
2344-A
and 2344-C and ruled that the Free Patent and the Original Certificate
of Title issued in favor of Simplicio Santiago are void, because Lot
2344
is a private land which cannot be the subject of a Free Patent.
The
decretal portion thereof states:chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the decision dated August 6, 1991 is hereby
REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and in its stead another judgment is rendered in favor of
the appellant and against the appellees as follows:
a.
declaring the Free Patent Title under O.C.T. No. P-10878 (Exh. "A")
null
and void;chanrobles virtual law library
b.
declaring the appellants the absolute owner of the 225 square meters of
Lot 2344, designated as Lot 2344-A and 2344-C (Exhs. "2-A" & "2-B",
respectively;chanrobles virtual law library
c.
declaring the appellees the absolute owners of 349 square meters of Lot
2344, designated as Lot No. 2344-B (Exh. "2-C");
d.
ordering the appellees to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[26]
Hence, the instant
petition.
The main issues are:
(1) whether or not the free patent and the certificate of title issued
to Simplicio Santiago are valid; and (2) whether or not respondents’
claim
over Lots 2344-C and 2344-A is supported by the evidence.cralaw:red
The settled rule is
that a free patent issued over a private land is null and void, and
produces
no legal effects whatsoever. Private ownership of land
-
as when there is a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly
registered
possessory information or a clear showing of open, continuous,
exclusive,
and notorious possession, by present or previous occupants
-
is not affected by the issuance of a free patent over the same land,
because
the Public Land law applies only to lands of the public domain.
The
Director of Lands has no authority to grant free patent to lands that
have
ceased to be public in character and have passed to private
ownership.
Consequently, a certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead
patent
partakes of the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding
only if the land covered by it is really a part of the disposable land
of the public domain.[27]chanrobles virtual law library
In the instant case,
it was established that Lot 2344 is a private property of the Santiago
clan since time immemorial, and that they have declared the same for
taxation.[28]
Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not
conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of
possession
in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying
taxes
for a property that is not in his actual or constructive
possession.
They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title
over
the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property
for
taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to
obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against
the
State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to
contribute
needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one’s
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.[29]
Considering the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
land
by respondents and their predecessors in interests, they are deemed to
have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a government grant
without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land
was
thus segregated from the public domain and the director of lands had no
authority to issue a patent. Hence, the free patent covering Lot
2344, a private land, and the certificate of title issued pursuant
thereto,
are void.[30]
Similarly in Magistrado
v. Esplana,[31]
the applicant for a free patent declared that the lots subject of the
application
formed part of the public domain for the sole purpose of obtaining
title
thereto as cheaply as possible. We annulled the titles granted to
the applicant after finding that the lots were privately owned and
continuously
possessed by the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest since time
immemorial. Likewise, in Robles v. Court of Appeals,[32]
the free patent issued to the applicant was declared void because the
lot
involved was shown to be private land which petitioner inherited from
his
grandparents.cralaw:red
Respondents’ claim of
ownership over Lot 2344-C and Lot 2344-A is fully substantiated.
Their open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of Lot
2344-C
in the concept of owners for more than seventy years supports their
contention
that the lot was inherited by Mariano from her grandmother Marta, who
in
turn inherited the lot from her parents. This fact was also
corroborated
by respondents’ witnesses who declared that the house where Marta and
Mariano’s
family resided was already existing in the disputed portion of Lot 2344
even when they were still children. It is worthy to note that
although
Lot 2344-C was within the property declared for taxation by the late
Simplicio
Santiago, he did not disturb the possession of Marta and Mariano.
Moreover, while the heirs of Simplicio tried to make it appear that
Mariano
built his house only in 1983, Nestor Santiago admitted on
cross-examination
that Mariano Santiago’s house was already existing in the disputed lot
since he attained the age of reason. The fact that Mariano did
not
declare Lot 2344-C for taxation does not militate against his
title.
As he explained, he was advised by the Municipal Assessor that his 57
square
meter lot was tax exempt and that it was too small to be declared for
taxation,
hence, he just gave his share in the taxes to his uncle, Simplicio, in
whose name the entire Lot 2344 was declared for taxation.[33]chanrobles virtual law library
The Court of Appeals
correctly ruled that Lot 2344-C was sold by Simplicio Santiago to
Mariano
Santiago and Belen Sanchez. The document of sale evidencing the
transaction
is duly notarized and, as such, is considered a public document and
enjoys
the presumption of validity as to its authenticity and due
execution.
This legal presumption was not overcome by petitioners.[34]
Other than their allegation that the deed of sale was a forgery,[35]
no other evidence was presented to substantiate their claim.
Hence,
the presumption of validity of the deed of sale, ceding Lot 2344-C to
Mariano
Santiago and Belen Marcelo, prevails.cralaw:red
Furthermore, respondents’
assertion of ownership is buttressed by their possession of Lot
2344-C.
Immediately after the sale in 1972, Mariano Santiago and Belen Sanchez
built a house on the said lot. The lack of opposition on the part
of petitioners, indicates that they recognized the validity of the sale
and it was only later that they thought of repudiating the authenticity
thereof.cralaw:red
Clearly, therefore,
respondents are the lawful owners of Lot 2344-C and Lot 2344-A, which
they
co-own with Belen Marcelo. Free Patent No. 0130448 and OCT No.
P-10878
are void not only because of the fraudulent inclusion therein of
respondents’
lots, but also because Lot 2344 is a private lot, over which the Bureau
of Lands had no jurisdiction.cralaw:red
Petitioners contend
that respondents’ action to annul OCT No. P-10878 is barred by
prescription
and that, even assuming that it was filed within one year from the
entry
of the decree of registration, it constitutes a collateral attack on a
Torrens title. Further, they averred that respondents have no
personality
to sue for the annulment of OCT No. P-10878.chanrobles virtual law library
The contentions are
without merit.cralaw:red
A certificate of title
issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to a homestead
patent
covering a disposable public land within the contemplation of the
Public
Land Law or Commonwealth Act No. 141 is as indefeasible as a
certificate
of title issued under a judicial registration proceeding. Under
the
Land Registration Act, title to the property covered by a Torrens
certificate
becomes indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the entry of
the decree of registration. Such decree of registration is
incontrovertible
and becomes binding on all persons whether or not they were notified
of,
or participated in, the in rem registration process. There is no
specific provision in the Public Land Law or the Land Registration Act
(Act 496), now Presidential Decree 1529, fixing a similar one-year
period
within which a public land patent can be considered open to review on
the
ground of actual fraud (such as that provided for in Section 38 of the
Land Registration Act, and now Section 32 of Presidential Decree 1529),
and clothing a public land patent certificate of title with
indefeasibility.
Nevertheless, this Court has repeatedly applied Section 32 of
Presidential
Decree 1529 to a patent issued by the Director of Lands, approved by
the
Secretary of Natural Resources, under the signature of the President of
the Philippines. The date of the issuance of the patent
corresponds
to the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary cases. Just
as the decree finally awards the land applied for registration to the
party
entitled to it, the patent issued by the Director of Lands
equally and finally grants and conveys the land applied for
to the applicant.[36]
The one-year prescriptive
period, however, does not apply when the person seeking annulment of
title
or reconveyance is in possession of the lot. This is because the
action partakes of a suit to quiet title which is imprescriptible.[37]
In David v. Malay,[38]
we held that a person in actual possession of a piece of land under
claim
of ownership may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, and his
undisturbed
possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a
third party and its effect on his title.cralaw:red
In the case at bar,
inasmuch as respondents are in possession of the disputed portions of
Lot
2344, their action to annul Original Certificate of Title No. P-10878,
being in the nature of an action to quiet title, is therefore not
barred
by prescription.cralaw:red
Section 48 of P.D. 1529,
the Property Registration Decree, provides that a certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack and can not be altered,
modified,
or canceled except in a direct proceeding. An action is an attack
on a title when the object of the action is to nullify the title, and
thus
challenge the judgment or proceeding pursuant to which the title was
decreed.
The attack is direct when the object of an action is to annul or set
aside
such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the
attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a
different
relief, an attack on the judgment or proceeding is nevertheless made as
an incident thereof.[39]chanrobles virtual law library
In this case, while
the original complaint filed by the petitioners was for recovery of
possession,
or accion publiciana, and the nullity of the title was raised merely as
respondents’ defense, we can rule on the validity of the free patent
and
OCT No. P-10878 because of the counterclaim filed by respondents.
A counterclaim can be considered a direct attack on the title. In
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court Appeals,[40]
we ruled on the validity of a certificate of title despite the fact
that
the nullity thereof was raised only as a counterclaim. It was
held
that a counterclaim is considered a complaint, only this time, it is
the
original defendant who becomes the plaintiff. It stands on the
same
footing and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were an
independent
action. Moreover, since all the facts necessary in the
determination
of the title’s validity are now before the Court, it would be in the
best
interest of justice to settle this issue which has already dragged on
for
19 years.[41]
There is no merit in
petitioners’ contention that only the State may bring an action for
reconveyance
of the lots in dispute. To reiterate, Lot 2344 is a private
property
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the Santiago
family. The nullification of its free patent and title would not
therefore result in its reversion to the public domain. Hence,
the
State, represented by the Solicitor General, is not the real party in
interest.
Parenthetically, in Robles v. Court of Appeals,[42]
a case involving the personality to sue for the reconveyance of a
private
land, we ruled that inasmuch as there was no reversion of the disputed
property to the public domain, the State is not the proper party to
bring
a suit for reconveyance.chanrobles virtual law library
It should be clarified,
however, that notwithstanding the Court’s declaration that Lot No. 2344
is a private property and not a part of the public domain, the parties’
title to the said lot is imperfect and is still subject to the rules on
confirmation of title under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act.
Nevertheless, this imperfect title is enough to defeat the free patent
and certificate of title issued over the said lot. Hence, the
ruling
of the Court of Appeals declaring the respondents as the absolute
owners
of Lot Nos. 2344-A and C; and declaring petitioners as absolute owners
of Lot No. 2344-B, should be modified.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
42761
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Patent No. 0130448 and Original
Certificate
of Title No. P-10878, both in the name of Simplicio Santiago are
declared
null and void. Respondent Heirs of Mariano Santiago are declared
owners and holders of imperfect title over Lot No. 2344-A and Lot No.
2344-C;
while petitioner Heirs of Simplicio Santiago are declared owners and
holders
of imperfect title over Lot No. 2344-B. Costs against petitioners.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Heirs of Macario Nagaño v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 724, 732
(1997), citing Vital v. Anore, 90 Phil. 855, 858 (1952); Agne v.
Director
of Lands, G.R. No. L-40399, 6 February 1990, 181 SCRA 793; Mendoza v.
Navarette,
G.R. No. 82531, 30 September 1992, 214 SCRA 337.
[2]
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
Magistrado v. Esplana, G.R. No. 54191, 8 May 1990, 185 SCRA 104, 109,
citing
Concha v. Magtira, 124 Phil. 961 (1966).
[4]
Penned by Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria and concurred in by
Associate
Justices Ramon A. Barcelona and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole.
[5]
Penned by Judge Ibarra R. Vigilia.chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
Exhibit "F", Tax Declaration No. 5930, for 1967, Records, p. 120;
Exhibit
"6-1", Certification dated April 14, 1975 of the Office of the
Treasurer
of the Municipality of Angat, Bulacan.
[7]
TSN, 7 December 1984, pp. 6-9, 25- 27, 31-32; 11 January 1985, p. 18.
[8]
Records, p. 1.chanrobles virtual law library
[9]
Previously, Mariano Santiago filed on July 21, 1983 a similar case for
recovery of possession with damages against the petitioners but the
case
was dismissed without prejudice for failure to comply with the Barangay
Conciliation requirement under P.D. No. 1508.
[10]
TSN, 23 January 1985, pp. 82-83; Exhibit "C", Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng
Lupa.
[11]
TSN, 17 October 1984, pp. 22-23; 2 October 1984, pp. 37-38.
[12]
Exhibit "1", Records, p. 103.chanrobles virtual law library
[13]
Exhibit "A", Original Certificate of Title.
[14]
Complaint, Records, pp. 1-2.chanrobles virtual law library
[15]
TSN, 31 October 1984, pp. 6-9.
[16]
Records, p. 55.chanrobles virtual law library
[17]
Exhibit "2", Subdivision Plan of Lot No. 2344, Records, p. 89.
[18]
Exhibit "3", Records, p. 104.
[19]
TSN, 7 December 1984, pp. 35-41.
[20]
TSN, 7 December 1984, pp. 25-26 and 32.
[21]
TSN, 7 December 1984, pp. 29-31.chanrobles virtual law library
[22]
TSN, 11 January 1985, pp. 22-29.chanrobles virtual law library
[23]
TSN, 14 December 1984, pp. 84-89.chanrobles virtual law library
[24]
Rollo, p. 46. In its Order dated December 5, 1991, the trial
court
denied due course to respondents’ notice of appeal and granted
petitioners’
motion for execution (Records, p. 648). Respondents filed a
petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 27241) which
on
November 26, 1992, issued an Order quashing the writ of execution and
directing
the trial court to give due course to respondents’ notice of appeal
(Records,
p. 779).chanrobles virtual law library
[25]
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated January 18, 1994 (CA Rollo, p.
11).
[26]
Rollo, p. 32.chanrobles virtual law library
[27]
Magistrado v. Esplana, supra, note 3.
[28]
Exhibits "D" - "G", Declaration of Real Property, Records, pp.
118-
122.
[29]
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 367 Phil. 597, 604 (1999),
citing
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 239 (1996).
[30]
Robles v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 635, 655 (2000); citing Herico v.
Dar, G.R. No. L-23265, 28 January 1980, 95 SCRA 437; Mesina v. Vda. de
Sonza, et al., 108 Phil. 251, (1960); Azarcon v. Vallarta, G.R. No.
L-43679,
28 October 1980, 100 SCRA 450; Mendoza v. Navarette, G.R. No. 82531, 30
September 1992, 214 SCRA 337; Heirs of Marciano Nagaño v. Court
of Appeals, supra, note 1.
[31]
Supra, note 3.chanrobles virtual law library
[32]
Supra, note 31.
[33]
TSN, 14 December 1984, pp. 26-31.chanrobles virtual law library
[34]
Agasen v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 391, 399 (2000), citing Sanchez
v.
Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 155 (1997); Cacho v. Court of Appeals, 336
Phil. 154 (1997).
[35]
Reply to Answer with Counterclaim, Records, p. 73.chanrobles virtual law library
[36]
David v. Malay, G.R. No. 132644, 19 November 1999, 318 SCRA 711,
718-719,
citing Trinidad v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 65922, 3
December
1991. 204 SCRA 524; Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. 68291, 6 March 1991, 194 SCRA 743; Sumail v. Judge of CFI of
Cotobato,
et al., 96 Phil. 946 (1955).
[37]
Mendoza v. Navarette, G.R. No. 82531, 30 September 1992, 214 SCRA 337,
353, citing Caragay-Layno v. Court of Appeals, 218 Phil. 685 (1984).
[38]
Supra, citing Faja v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45045, 28 February
1977,
75 SCRA 441.chanrobles virtual law library
[39]
Mallilin, Jr. v. Castillo, G.R. No. 136803, 16 June 2000, 333 SCRA 628,
citing Co v. Court of Appeals, 274 Phil. 108 (1991).
[40]
G.R. No. 129471, 28 April 2000, 331 SCRA 267, 287, citing A Francisco
Realty
and Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 833 (1998).
[41]
Id., citing Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-62089, 9 March
1988,
158 SCRA 508.
[42]
Supra, note 31.
chan
robles virtual law library |