FIRST DIVISION
BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS,AS
SUCCESSOR-IN-
INTEREST
OFBPI INVESTMENT
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
151821
April 14, 2004
-versus-
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ALS MANAGEMENT
AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Factual findings of the
lower courts are entitled to great respect, but may be reviewed if they
do not conform to law and to the evidence on record. In the case
at bar, a meticulous review of the facts compels us to modify the award
granted by the Court of Appeals. The Case
Before us is a petition
for review[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the November
24, 2000 decision[2]
and the January 9, 2002 Resolution[3]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 25781. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:chanrobles virtual law library
“WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto and the
instant
appeal DISMISSED.”[4]
The assailed Resolution
denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case
are narrated by the appellate court as follows:
“On July 29, 1985, [petitioner]
BPI Investment Corporation filed a complaint for a Sum of Money against
ALS Management and Development Corporation, alleging inter alia that on
July 22, 1983, [petitioner] and [respondent] executed at Makati, Metro
Manila a Deed of Sale for one (1) unfurnished condominium unit of the
Twin
Towers Condominium located at Ayala Avenue, corner Apartment Ridge
Street,
Makati, Metro Manila designated as Unit E-4A comprising of 271 squares
[sic] meters more or less, together with parking stalls identified as
G022
and G-63. The Condominium Certificate of Title No. 4800 of the
Registry
of Deeds for Makati, Metro Manila was issued after the execution of the
said Deed of Sale. [Petitioner] advanced the amount of P26,300.45
for the expenses in causing the issuance and registration of the
Condominium
Certificate of Title. Under the penultimate paragraph of the Deed
of Sale, it is stipulated that the VENDEE [respondent] shall pay all
the
expenses for the preparation and registration of this Deed of Sale and
such other documents as may be necessary for the issuance of the
corresponding
Condominium Certificate of Title. After the [petitioner] complied
with its obligations under the said Deed of Sale, [respondent],
notwithstanding
demands made by [petitioner], failed and refused to pay [petitioner]
its
legitimate advances for the expenses mentioned above without any valid,
legal or justifiable reason.cralaw:red
“In its Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim, [respondent] averred among others that it has
just and valid reasons for refusing to pay [petitioner’s] legal
claims.
In clear and direct contravention of Section 25 of Presidential Decree
No. 957 which provides that ‘No fee except those required for the
registration
of the deed of sale in the Registry of Deeds shall be collected for the
issuance of such title’, the [petitioner] has jacked-up or increased
the
amount of its alleged advances for the issuance and registration of the
Condominium Certificate of Title in the name of the [respondent], by
including
therein charges which should not be collected from buyers of
condominium
units. [Petitioner] made and disseminated brochures and other
sales
propaganda in and before May 1980, which made warranties as to the
facilities,
improvements, infrastructures or other forms of development of the
condominium
units (known as ‘The Twin Towers’) it was offering for sale to the
public,
which included the following:
‘The Twin Towers is
destined to reflect condominium living at its very best.’chanrobles virtual law library
‘While the twin tower
design and its unusual height will make the project the only one of its
kind in the Philippines, the human scale and proportion [are] carefully
maintained.’
‘To be sure, modern
conveniences are available as in the installation of an intercom system
and a closed-circuit TV monitor through which residents from their
apartments
can see their guests down at the lobby call station.’
‘Some of the features
of each typical apartment unit are: x x x A bar x x x Three toilets
with
baths x x x.’
‘The penthouse units
are privileged with the provision of an all-around balcony. x x x’
“[Respondent] further
averred that [petitioner] represented to the [respondent] that the
condominium
unit will be delivered completed and ready for occupancy not later than
December 31, 1981. [Respondent] relied solely upon the
descriptions
and warranties contained in the aforementioned brochures and other
sales
propaganda materials when [respondent] agreed to buy Unit E-4A of the
Twin
Tower(s) for the hefty sum of P2,048,900.00 considering that the Twin
Towers
was then yet to be built. In contravention of [petitioner’s]
warranties
and of good engineering practices, the condominium unit purchased by
[respondent]
suffered from the following defects and/or deficiencies:
‘1.
The clearance in the walkway at the balcony is not sufficient for
passage;
‘2.
The anodized aluminum used in the door and windows were damaged;
‘3.
The kitchen counter tops/splashboard suffered from cracks and were
mis-cut
and misaligned;chanrobles virtual law library
‘4.
The partition between living and master’s bedroom was unpainted and it
had no access for maintenance due to aluminum fixed glass cover;
‘5.
The varifold divider, including the bar and counter top cabinet were
not
installed;
‘6.
The toilets had no tiles;
‘7.
No closed circuit TV was installed;
‘8.
Rainwater leaks inside or into the condominium unit.’”[5]
Respondent’s Answer
prayed that “judgment be rendered ordering [petitioner] to correct such
defects/deficiencies in the condominium unit,”[6]
and that the following reliefs be granted:
“1.
The sum of P40,000.00 plus legal interest thereon from the date of
extra-judicial
demand, representing the amount spent by the defendant for the
completion
works it had undertaken on the premises.cralaw:red
“2.
The sum of U.S.$6,678.65 (or its equivalent in the Philippine currency)
representing the unearned rental of the premises which the defendant
did
not realize by reason of the late delivery to him of the condominium
unit;
“3.
Twenty-four percent (24%) interest per annum on the agreed one (1) year
advance rental and one (1) month deposit (totaling U.S.$15,785.00)
corresponding
to the period January 1, 1982 to June 17, 1982, which [petitioner]
would
have earned had he deposited the said amount in a bank;
“4.
The sum of U.S.$1,214.30 per month, commencing from May 1, 1985, which
the [respondent] no longer earns as rental on the premises because the
lessee vacated the same by reason of defects and/or deficiencies;chanrobles virtual law library
“5.
The sum of P50,000.00 plus appearance fees of P300.00 per court
hearing,
as attorney’s fees;
“6.
Litigation expenses and costs of suit.”[7]
On February 6, 1990,
the trial court issued this judgment:
“1.
Ordering the [respondent] to pay [petitioner] the sum of P26,300.45,
with
legal interest from the filing of the complaint up to full payment
thereof,
representing the amount spent for the registration of the title to the
condominium unit in [respondent’s] name;
“2.
Ordering [petitioner] to deliver, replace or correct at [petitioner’s]
exclusive expense/cost or appoint a licensed qualified contractor to do
the same on its behalf, the following defects/deficiencies in the
condominium
unit owned by the [respondent]:
a)
KITCHEN
i)
The sides of the kitchen sink covered with sealants as well as miscut
marble
installed as filler at the right side of the sink;
ii)
Miscut marble installed on both sides of the side wall above the gas
range;chanrobles virtual law library
b)
FOYERS
Water marks at the parquet
flooring, near the main water supply room;
c)
MAIDS ROOM
Ceiling cut off about
one (1) square foot in size and left unfinished
d)
DINING ROOM
i)
Water damaged parquet up to about one (1) meter from the wall
underneath
the open shelves and directly behind the plant box;
ii)
Plant box directly behind the dining room;
iii)
The water damaged parquet flooring near the door of the dining room to
the passage way
e)
MASTER’S BEDROOM
i)
Falling off paint layers at the bathroom wall behind the bathtub/faucet
along the passageway of the master’s bedroom;
ii)
Falling off water-damaged plywood ceiling in the master’s bedroom
bathroom;
iii)
Grinders mark damage at the bathtub;chanrobles virtual law library
f)
BALCONY WALKWAY
i)
PVC pipes installed two (2) inches above floor level causing water to
accumulate;
ii)
Cracks on level of wash out flooring;
iii)
14-inches passageway going to the open terrace not sufficient as
passageway;
iv)
PVC pipe installed on the plant box water drained directly on the
balcony
floor;
g)
BALCONY (OPEN) TERRACE
i)
Two (2) concrete cement measuring about 6 x 4 inches with protruding
live
wires, purportedly lamp posts which were not installed;
h)
BOY'S BEDROOMchanrobles virtual law library
i)
Water mark on the parquet flooring due to water seepage;
ii)
Asphalt plastered at the exterior wall/floor joints to prevent water
seepage;
i)
ANALOC FINISH of the aluminum frames of doors and windows all around
the
condominium were painted with dark gray paint to cover dents and
scratches;
j)
LIVING ROOM
Intercom equipment installed
without the TV monitor;
k)
STORAGE FACILITIES at the ground floor
“3.
Ordering [petitioner] to pay [respondent] the following:
a)
The sum of P40,000.00 representing reimbursement for expenses incurred
for the materials/labor in installing walls/floor titles in 2 bathrooms
and bar counter cabinet.cralaw:red
b)
The sum of P136,608.75, representing unearned income for the five-month
period that the defendant had to suspend a lease contract over the
premises.cralaw:red
c)
The sum of P27,321.75 per month for a period of twenty-one (21) months
(from May 1985 to January 1987), representing unearned income when
defendant’s
lessee had to vacate the premises and condominium unit remained vacant,
all with legal interest from the filing of the counterclaim until the
same
are fully paid.”[8]
Ruling of the
Court
of Appeals
On appeal, after “a
thorough review and examination of the evidence on record,"[9]
the CA found “no basis for disbelieving what the trial court found and
arrived at.”[10]
The appellate court
sustained the trial court’s finding that “while [petitioner] succeeded
in proving its claim against the [respondent] for expenses incurred in
the registration of [the latter’s] title to the condominium unit
purchased,
x x x for its part [respondent] in turn succeeded in establishing an
even
bigger claim under its counterclaim.”[11]chanrobles virtual law library
Hence, this Petition.[12]
The Issues
Petitioner raises the
following issues for our consideration:
“I.
Whether or not the
Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the trial court
had
no jurisdiction over the respondent’s counterclaims.
“II.
Whether or not the
decision of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts
and/or
manifestly mistaken warranting a review by this Honorable Court of the
factual findings therein.
“III.
Whether or not the
award of damages by the Honorable Court of Appeals is conjectural
warranting
a review by this Honorable Court of the factual findings therein.”[13]
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is partly
meritorious.cralaw:red
First Issue:
Jurisdiction
Contending that it was
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) -- not the RTC --
that
had jurisdiction over respondent’s counterclaim, petitioner seeks to
nullify
the award of the trial court.cralaw:red
Promulgated on July
12, 1976, PD No. 957 -- otherwise known as “The Subdivision and
Condominium
Buyers’ Protective Decree” -- provides that the National Housing
Authority
(NHA) shall have “exclusive authority to regulate the real estate trade
and business.”[14]
Promulgated later on April 2, 1978, was PD No. 1344 entitled
“Empowering
the National Housing Authority to Issue Writs of Execution in the
Enforcement
of Its Decisions Under Presidential Decree No. 957.” It expanded
the jurisdiction of the NHA as follows:
“SECTION 1. In the exercise
of its function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition
to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National
Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases of the following nature:chanrobles virtual law library
A. Unsound real
estate business practices;
B. Claims involving
refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium
unit
buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman;
and
C. Cases involving
specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner,
developer,
broker or salesman.” (Italics ours)
On February 7, 1981,
by virtue of Executive Order No. 648, the regulatory functions of the
NHA
were transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
(HSRC).
Section 8 thereof provides:
“SECTION 8. Transfer
of Functions. -The regulatory functions of the National Housing
Authority
pursuant to Presidential Decree Nos. 957, 1216, 1344 and other related
laws are hereby transferred to the Commission (Human Settlements
Regulatory
Commission). x x x. Among these regulatory functions are: 1)
Regulation
of the real estate trade and business; x x x 11) Hear and decide cases
of unsound real estate business practices; claims involving refund
filed
against project owners, developers, dealers, brokers, or salesmen; and
cases of specific performance.”chanrobles virtual law library
Pursuant to Executive
Order No. 90 dated December 17, 1986, the functions of the HSRC were
transferred
to the HLURB.cralaw:red
As mandated by PD No.
957, the jurisdiction of the HLURB is encompassing. Hence, we
said
in Estate Developers and Investors Corporation v. Sarte:[15]
“x x x. While PD 957
was designed to meet the need basically to protect lot buyers from the
fraudulent manipulations of unscrupulous subdivision owners, sellers
and
operators, the ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ vested in the NHA is broad and
general -‘to regulate the real estate trade and business’ in accordance
with the provisions of said law.”
Furthermore, the jurisdiction
of the HLURB over cases enumerated in Section 1 of PD No. 1344 is
exclusive.
Thus, we have ruled that the board has sole jurisdiction in a complaint
of specific performance for the delivery of a certificate of title to a
buyer of a subdivision lot;[16]
for claims of refund regardless of whether the sale is perfected or not;[17]
and for determining whether there is a perfected contract of sale.[18]
In Solid Homes v. Payawal,[19]
we declared that the NHA had the competence to award damages as part of
the exclusive power conferred upon it -- the power to hear and decide
“claims
involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium
unit buyers against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman.”[20]
Clearly then, respondent’s
counterclaim -- being one for specific performance (correction of
defects/deficiencies
in the condominium unit) and damages -- falls under the jurisdiction of
the HLURB as provided by Section 1 of PD No. 1344.cralaw:red
The Applicability
of Estoppel
The general rule is
that any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and
may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court.[21]
Indeed, the question of jurisdiction may be raised at any time,
provided
that such action would not result in the mockery of the tenets of fair
play.[22]
As an exception to the rule, the issue may not be raised if the party
is
barred by estoppel.[23]
In the present case,
petitioner proceeded with the trial, and only after a judgment
unfavorable
to it did it raise the issue of jurisdiction. Thus, it may no
longer
deny the trial court’s jurisdiction, for estoppel bars it from doing
so.
This Court cannot countenance the inconsistent postures petitioner has
adopted by attacking the jurisdiction of the regular court to which it
has voluntarily submitted.[24]chanrobles virtual law library
The Court frowns upon
the undesirable practice of submitting one’s case for decision, and
then
accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction if it is not.[25]
We also find petitioner
guilty of estoppel by laches for failing to raise the question of
jurisdiction
earlier. From the time that respondent filed its counterclaim on
November 8, 1985, the former could have raised such issue, but failed
or
neglected to do so. It was only upon filing its appellant’s brief[26]
with the CA on May 27, 1991, that petitioner raised the issue of
jurisdiction
for the first time.cralaw:red
In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,[27]
we declared that the failure to raise the question of jurisdiction at
an
earlier stage barred the party from questioning it later.
Applying
the rule on estoppel by laches, we explained as follows:
“A party may be estopped
or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons.
Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppe[l] by deed or by record,
and of estoppel by laches.cralaw:red
“Laches, in general
sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled
to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.cralaw:red
“The doctrine of laches
or of ‘stale demands’ is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires,
for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and,
unlike
the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is
principally
a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim
to be enforced or asserted.”[28]
Thus, we struck down
the defense of lack of jurisdiction, since the appellant therein failed
to raise the question at an earlier stage. It did so only after
an
adverse decision had been rendered.cralaw:red
We further declared
that if we were to sanction the said appellant’s conduct, “we would in
effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present
case
since it was commenced x x x and compel the judgment creditors to go up
their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is
not
only patent but revolting.”[29]chanrobles virtual law library
Applicable herein is
our ruling in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals,[30]
in which we said:
“Public policy dictates
that this Court must strongly condemn any double-dealing by parties who
are disposed to trifle with the courts by deliberately taking
inconsistent
positions, in utter disregard of the elementary principles of justice
and
good faith. There is no denying that, in this case, petitioners
never
raised the issue of jurisdiction throughout the entire proceedings in
the
trial court. Instead, they voluntarily and willingly submitted
themselves
to the jurisdiction of said court. It is now too late in the day
for them to repudiate the jurisdiction they were invoking all along.”[31]
Second and Third
Issues: Appreciation of Facts
It is readily apparent
that petitioner is raising issues of fact that have been ruled upon by
the RTC and sustained by the CA. The factual findings of lower
courts
are generally binding upon this Court and will not be disturbed on
appeal,
especially when both sets of findings are the same.[32]
Nevertheless, this rule has certain exceptions,[33]
as when those findings are not supported by the evidence on record.cralaw:red
We have carefully scrutinized
the records of this case and found reason to modify the award to
conform
to law and the evidence. We thus address the arguments of
petitioner
seriatim.cralaw:red
Warranties and
Representations in the Brochure
The brochure that was
disseminated indicated features that would be provided each condominium
unit; and that, under Section 19 of PD No. 957, would form part of the
sales warranties of petitioner.[34]
Respondent relied on the brochure in its decision to purchase a unit.[35]
Since the former failed to deliver certain items stated therein, then
there
was a clear violation of its warranties and representations.cralaw:red
The brochure says that
“[t]he particulars stated x x x as well as the details and visuals
shown
x x x are intended to give a general idea of the project to be
undertaken,
and as such, are not to be relied [upon] as statements or
representations
of fact.”[36]
This general disclaimer should apply only to the general concept of the
project that petitioner aptly characterizes thus:
“’x x x [D]estined to
reflect condominium living at its very best’ and ‘its design x x x will
make the project the only one of its kind in the Philippines.’”[37]
This disclaimer, however,
should not apply to the features and the amenities that the brochure
promised
to provide each condominium unit. Petitioner was thus in breach
when
it failed to deliver a “closed-circuit TV monitor through which
residents
from their apartments can see their guests x x x.”[38]
Storage Facilities
The trial court erred,
though, in requiring petitioner to provide storage facilities on the
ground
floor, as the non-delivery had not been alleged in respondent’s Answer
with Counterclaim.[39]chanrobles virtual law library
It is elementary that
a judgment must conform to and be supported by both the pleadings and
the
evidence, and that it be in accordance with the theory of the action on
which the pleadings were framed and the case was tried.[40]
Indeed, issues in each case are limited to those presented in the
pleadings.[41]
We are aware that issues
not alleged in the pleadings may still be decided upon, if tried with
the
parties’ express or implied consent.[42]
Trial courts are not precluded from granting reliefs not specifically
claimed
in the pleadings -- notwithstanding the absence of their amendment --
upon
the condition that evidence has been presented properly, with full
opportunity
on the part of the opposing parties to support their respective
contentions
and to refute each other’s evidence.[43]
This exception is not present in the case at bar.cralaw:red
Moreover, a cursory
reading of the brochure shows that there is no promise to provide
individual
storage facilities on the ground floor for each condominium unit.
The brochure reads: “Storage facilities in the apartment units and the
ground floor.”[44]
Apparent from the letter of petitioner dated June 18, 1982,[45]
was its compliance with its promise of storage facilities on the ground
floor. In that letter, respondent was also informed that it may
course
a reservation of those facilities through the building superintendent.cralaw:red
Damages for Delay
in Delivery
It is undisputed that
petitioner sent respondent a “Contract to Sell”[46]
declaring that the construction would be finished on or before December
31, 1981.[47]
The former delivered the condominium unit only in June 1982;[48]
thus, the latter claims that there was a delay in the delivery.cralaw:red
Because of this delay,
the trial court ordered petitioner to pay damages of P136,608.75
representing
unearned income for the period that respondent had to suspend a lease
contract.
We find a dearth of evidence to support such award.cralaw:red
To recover actual damages,
the amount of loss must not only be capable of proof, but also be
proven
with a reasonable degree of certainty.[49]
The lone evidence for this award was the self-serving testimony of
respondent’s
witness that a lease contract had indeed been intended to commence in
January
1982, instead of the actual implementation on June 18, 1982.[50]
Without any other evidence, we fail to see how the amount of loss was
proven
with a reasonable degree of certainty.cralaw:red
Condominium Defects
The rule is that a party’s
case must be established through a “preponderance of evidence.”[51]
By such term of evidence is meant simply evidence that is of greater
weight,
or is more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it.[52]
Respondent was able to establish through its witness’ testimony that
the
condominium unit suffered from defects.[53]
This testimony was confirmed by an inspection report[54]
noted and signed by petitioner’s representative, as well as by a
commissioner’s
report[55]
prepared after an ocular inspection by the clerk of court acting as a
commissioner.
Furthermore, this conclusion is supported by the circumstances that
occurred
during the lease period, as evidenced by the complaint and the update
letters[56]
of respondent’s lessee.cralaw:red
Petitioner’s contention
that the claim arising from the alleged defects has already prescribed
must fail for being raised for the first time only on appeal.[57]
Well-settled is the rule that issues not raised below cannot be
resolved
on review in higher courts.[58]
We agree, however, that
the lower courts erred in finding that there was a defect in a portion
of the balcony, which respondent alleges to be a “walkway x x x [that]
is not sufficient for passage.”[59]
Petitioner was able to prove, however, that the specifications thereof
conformed to the building plan.cralaw:red
Respondent contends
that this portion should have been 65 to 80 centimeters wide, so that
it
would be sufficient as a passageway.[60]
The building plan[61]
had not specified the width, however. Architect Leo Ramos of W.V.
Coscolluela & Associates, the architectural firm that prepared the
building plan, testified thus:
“Q
I am directing your attention xxx to a certain portion in this
condominium
unit x x x it appears x x x [that] there is no measurement
indicated
therein, do you know why the measurement of said portion was not
indicated
in the building plan?chanrobles virtual law library
A
Normally, it is variable.chanrobles virtual law library
Q
What do you mean by variable?chanrobles virtual law library
A
It depends on the actual measurement of the building construction.chanrobles virtual law library
Q
Could you please tell the Court, what x x x the purpose of the said
portion
of the condominium unit [is]?
A
It is used for watering the plants and the servicing of some area[s].cralaw:red
Q
How much measurement is made to affix the portion of watering the
plants?
A
Approximately .50 [m].”[62]
Respondent maintains
that this portion should have been .80 meters (or 80 centimeters),
similar
to another area in the building plan that it offered as Exhibit “2-A.”[63]
But an analysis of this plan reveals that the latter area has a
different
width from that of the former.cralaw:red
It is readily apparent
from the foregoing facts that the portion in controversy was not
intended
to be a walkway. Thus, there was no deviation from the building
plan.
Because it has not been shown that this section was insufficient to
serve
the purpose for which it was intended, the lower courts erred in
considering
it as defective.cralaw:red
Reimbursement
of P40,000 for Completion Workchanrobles virtual law library
The lower courts did
not err in ordering petitioner to correct the defects in the
condominium
unit, but in requiring it to reimburse respondent in the amount of
P40,000
for completion work done.cralaw:red
Petitioner argues that
the trial court’s Decision encompassed the areas beyond those alleged
in
respondent’s Answer.[64]
This contention is not convincing, because the allegations in the
latter
were broad enough to cover all the defects in the condominium
unit.
In fact, respondent prayed that “judgment be rendered ordering
[petitioner]
to correct such defects x x x in the condominium unit as may be
prove[d]
during the trial.”[65]
Petitioner further challenges
the award of P40,000 as reimbursement for completion work done by
respondent,
on the ground that this claim was not proven during the trial.
The
latter’s evidence partook of a witness’ testimony[66]
and of a demand letter[67]
sent to petitioner requesting reimbursement for completion work
done.
Petitioner argues that respondent should have presented receipts to
support
the expenses.[68]
We agree with petitioner.
While respondent may have suffered pecuniary losses for completion work
done, it failed to establish with reasonable certainty the actual
amount
spent. The award of actual damages cannot be based on the
allegation
of a witness without any tangible document, such as receipts or other
documentary
proofs to support such claim.[69]
In determining actual damages, courts cannot rely on mere assertions,
speculations,
conjectures or guesswork, but must depend on competent proof and on the
best obtainable evidence of the actual amount of loss.[70]chanrobles virtual law library
Unearned Lease
Income
Respondent entered into
a lease contract with Advanced Micro Device on May 18, 1982, for the
period
June 18, 1982 to June 17, 1983, with option to renew.[71]
The lease -- which was for an agreed monthly rental of P17,000 -- was
renewed
for a period ending May 1, 1985, when Advanced Micro Device vacated the
unit.[72]
On the basis of these facts, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay
damages by way of unrealized income for twenty-one months or from May
1,
1985, until January 1987 -- when respondent decided to move into the
condominium
unit, which was unoccupied by then.cralaw:red
Despite the defects
of the condominium unit, a lessee stayed there for almost three years.[73]
The damages claimed by respondent is based on the rent that it might
have
earned, had Advanced Micro Device chosen to stay and renew the
lease.
Such claim is highly speculative, considering that respondent failed to
adduce evidence that the unit had been offered for lease to others, but
that there were no takers because of the defects therein.
Speculative
damages are too remote to be included in an accurate estimate thereof.[74]
Absent any credible proof of the amount of actual damage sustained, the
Court cannot rely on speculations as to its existence and amount.[75]
We recognize, however,
that respondent suffered damages when its lessee vacated the
condominium
unit on May 1, 1985, because of the defects therein. Respondents
are thus entitled to temperate damages.[76]
Under the circumstances, the amount equivalent to three monthly rentals
of P17,000 -- or a total of P51,000 -- would be reasonable.chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, this Petition
is PARTLY GRANTED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court
of Appeals MODIFIED, as follows:
Hereby DELETED is the
requirement on the part of petitioner to (1) deliver storage facilities
on the ground floor; (2) pay P136,608.75 for unearned income for the
five-month
period that the lease contract was allegedly suspended; (3) correct the
alleged passageway in the balcony; (4) pay P40,000.00 as reimbursement
for completion work done by respondent; (5) pay P27,321.75 per month
for
a period of twenty-one months for the alleged unearned income during
the
period when the condominium unit remained vacant. Petitioner,
however,
is ORDERED to pay P51,000 as temperate damages for the termination of
the
lease contract because of the defects in the condominium unit.
All
other awards are AFFIRMED.cralaw:red
No pronouncement as
to costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 9-50.chanrobles virtual law library
[2]
Id., pp. 51-63. Tenth Division. Penned by Justice Ramon A.
Barcelona
(Division chairman), with the concurrence of Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico
and Bienvenido L. Reyes (members).
[3]
Id., pp. 64-66.chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
CA Decision, p. 12; rollo, p. 62.chanrobles virtual law library
[5]
Id., pp. 5-7 & 55-57.chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
Respondent’s Answer with Counterclaim, p. 5; records, p. 17.
[7]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[8]
RTC Decision, pp. 8-11; rollo, pp. 75-78.
[9]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[10]
Rollo, p. 59.chanrobles virtual law library
[11]
Id., p. 61.
[12]
This case was deemed submitted for resolution on May 12, 2003, upon
this
Court’s receipt of respondent’s Memorandum signed by Atty. George H.
Yarte
Jr. Petitioner’s Memorandum, signed by Atty. Emmanuel Ruben T.
Malto
Jr., was received by this Court on May 9, 2003.
[13]
Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 12-13; rollo, pp. 145-146. Original in
upper
case.chanrobles virtual law library
[14]
Section 3, PD No. 957.chanrobles virtual law library
[15]
GR No. 93646, August 13, 1990. Penned by Justice Emilio A.
Gancayco
and concurred in by Justices Isagani A. Cruz, Carolina
Griño-Aquino,
Leo D. Medialdea and (later Chief Justice) Andres R. Narvasa, as quoted
in Estate Developers and Investors Corp. v. CA, 213 SCRA 353, 358,
September
2, 1992. See also Francel Realty Corporation v. CA, 322 Phil. 138,
January
22, 1996, in which we held that the failure of a real property buyer to
pay the agreed installment, based on the right to stop paying monthly
amortizations
under PD 957, involves a determinative question cognizable by the HLURB
-- the question of what rights and obligations parties have in a sale
of
real estate under PD 957, not PD 1344 (as explained in Roxas v. CA, 391
SCRA 351, 360, October 29, 2002).
[16]
C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Hibionada, 191 SCRA 268, 274, November
9, 1990.chanrobles virtual law library
[17]
Tejada v. Homestead Property Corporation, 178 SCRA 164, 167, September
29, 1989.
[18]
Spouses Raet v. CA, 356 Phil. 979, 989, September 17, 1998.chanrobles virtual law library
[19]
177 SCRA 72, August 29, 1989.chanrobles virtual law library
[20]
Id., p. 78, per Cruz, J.chanrobles virtual law library
[21]
Solid Homes, Inc. v. Payawal, supra, p. 80; Trinidad v. Yatco, 111
Phil.
466, 470, March 21, 1961; Corominas Jr. and Corominas & Co. v.
Labor
Standard Commission, 112 Phil. 551, 562, June 30, 1961; Roxas v. CA,
supra,
p. 358.chanrobles virtual law library
[22]
Roxas v. CA, supra.chanrobles virtual law library
[23]
Solid Homes, Inc. v. Payawal, supra, p. 80; TCL Sales Corp. v. CA, 349
SCRA 35, 44, January 5, 2001; National Steel Corporation v. CA, 362
Phil.
150, 160, February 2, 1999; ABS-CBN Supervisors Employees Union Members
v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, 364 Phil. 133, 141, March 11, 1999.
[24]
Roxas v. CA, supra.chanrobles virtual law library
[25]
Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. v. Cabrigas, 411 Phil. 369,
390,
June 19, 2001.
[26]
Appellant’s Brief filed with the CA by petitioner, p. 30; CA rollo, p.
64.
[27]
131 Phil. 556, April 15, 1968.chanrobles virtual law library
[28]
Id., p. 563, per Dizon, J.chanrobles virtual law library
[29]
Id., p. 565.chanrobles virtual law library
[30]
394 SCRA 472, December 27, 2002.
[31]
Id., p. 477, per Corona, J.chanrobles virtual law library
[32]
Lubos v. Galupo, 373 SCRA 618, 622 January 16, 2002; Gonzales v. CA,
358
Phil. 806, 817, October 30, 1998; Xentrex Automotive, Inc. v. CA, 353
Phil.
258, 263, June 18, 1998.
[33]
See CIR v. Embroidery and Garments Industries (Phil.), Inc., 364 Phil.
541, 546, March 22, 1999.chanrobles virtual law library
[34]
Section 19 of PD No. 957 provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
“Sec.
19. Advertisements. - Advertisements that may be made by the x x
x developer x x x about the condominium x x x must reflect the real
fact
and must be presented in such manner that will not tend to mislead or
deceive
the public.chanrobles virtual law library
The
x x x developer shall be answerable and liable for the facilities,
improvements,
infrastructures or other forms of development represented or promised
in
brochures, advertisements and other sales propaganda disseminated by
the
x x x developer x x x and the same shall form part of the sales
warranties
enforceable against said x x x developer x x x.”
[35]
TSN, May 21, 1996, pp. 19-21.chanrobles virtual law library
[36]
Petitioner’s Exhibit “I-2a”; records, p. 118.
[37]
Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 16; rollo, p. 149; citing Petitioner’s
Exhibit
“I-2.”
.[38]
Respondent’s Exhibit “1”; records, p. 112.chanrobles virtual law library
[39]
Respondent’s Answer with Counterclaim, dated November 8, 1985, p. 5;
records,
p. 17.
[40]
Jose Clavano, Inc. v. Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board, 378 SCRA
172, 184, February 27, 2002.
[41]
Lianga Lumber Company v. Lianga Timber Co., Inc., 76 SCRA 197, 222,
March
31, 1977.
[42]
§5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.chanrobles virtual law library
[43]
Northern Cement Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 158 SCRA 408,
717,
February 29, 1988.
[44]
Respondent’s Exhibit “1-A-1”; records, p. 118.chanrobles virtual law library
[45]
Petitioner’s Exhibit “J”; records, p. 197.chanrobles virtual law library
[46]
Respondent’s Exhibit “3”; records, p. 119.
[47]
Respondent’s Exhibit “3-A”; records, p. 122.
[48]
TSN, May 21, 1986, p. 31.
[49]
Magat Jr. v. CA, 337 SCRA 298, 308, August 4, 2000.
[50]
TSN, February 11, 1987, pp. 17-19, 35-36.
[51]
§1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.chanrobles virtual law library
[52]
Republic v. CA, 204 SCRA 160, 168, November 21, 1991; citing 32 CJS
1051.
[53]
TSN, May 21, 1986, pp. 14-23, 31-36.chanrobles virtual law library
[54]
Respondent’s Exhibit “5”; records, p. 127.
[55]
Records, p. 218.chanrobles virtual law library
[56]
Respondent’s Exhibits “7” and “8”; records, pp. 135-138.chanrobles virtual law library
[57]
Appellant’s Brief filed with the CA by petitioner, p. 29; CA rollo, p.
63.chanrobles virtual law library
[58]
Magellan Capital Management Corporation v. Zosa, 355 SCRA 157, 170,
March
26, 2001.
[59]
Respondent’s Answer with Counterclaim, p. 3; records, p. 15.chanrobles virtual law library
[60]
TSN, May 21, 1986, p. 14; TSN, February 11, 1987, p. 4.
[61]
Respondent’s Exhibit “2”; records, p. 150.chanrobles virtual law library
[62]
TSN, July 11, 1988, pp. 4-5.chanrobles virtual law library
[63]
TSN, August 12, 1987, pp. 3-8.chanrobles virtual law library
[64]
Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 30; rollo, p. 163.chanrobles virtual law library
[65]
Respondent’s Answer with Counterclaim, p. 5; records, p. 17.
[66]
TSN, May 21, 1996, pp. 23-28.chanrobles virtual law library
[67]
Respondent’s Exhibit “4”; records, pp. 125-126.chanrobles virtual law library
[68]
Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 31; rollo, p. 164.chanrobles virtual law library
[69]
David v. CA, 353 Phil. 170, 189, June 17, 1998; Magat Jr. v. CA, supra,
p. 308.
[70]
Barzaga v. CA, 335 Phil. 568, 578, February 12, 1997; Citytrust Banking
Corporation v. Villanueva, 413 Phil. 776, 787, July 19, 2001.
[71]
Respondent’s Exhibit “6”; records, p. 128.chanrobles virtual law library
[72]
TSN, February 11, 1987, p. 35.chanrobles virtual law library
[73]
Id., pp. 23-29, 35-42; Exhibits “7,” “8,” “10”; records, pp. 135-138,
144-146.chanrobles virtual law library
[74]
Sun Life Insurance Co. of Canada v. Rueda Hermanos & Co., 37 Phil.
844, 849, March 21, 1918.
[75]
Manufacturers Building, Inc. v. CA, 354 SCRA 521, 533, March 16, 2001.chanrobles virtual law library
[76]
Under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages are recoverable
when
some pecuniary loss has been suffered, but its amount cannot -- from
the
nature of the case -- be proved with certainty. |