FIRST DIVISION
SPOUSES GREGORIO
GO AND JUANA TAN GO,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
151942
November 27, 2003
-versus-
JOHNSON Y. TONG;
COURT OF APPEALS;AND
HONORABLE JUDGE
JUAN NABONG
OF THE
REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 32, MANILA,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN,
J.:
As a rule, docket
fees should be paid upon the filing of the initiatory pleadings.
However,
for cogent reasons to be determined by the trial judge, staggered
payment
thereof within a reasonable period may be allowed. Unless grave abuse
of
discretion is demonstrated, the discretion of the trial judge in
granting
staggered payment shall not be disturbed.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Case
Petitioner assails the
September 18, 2001 Decision[1]
and the January 21, 2002 Resolution[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 58942. The decretal
portion
of the Decision reads as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"WHEREFORE,
the petition is hereby DENIED."[3]
The assailed Resolution
denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. The Facts
The facts of the case
are summarized by the CA in this wise:
"Petitioner
Juana Tan Go (petitioner Juana) purchased a cashier's check dated
September
13, 1996 from the Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) Lavezares,
Binondo
Branch in the amount of P500,000.00, payable to Johnson Y. Tong
(private
respondent).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"On petitioner
Juana's
instruction, the cashier's check bore the words 'Final
Payment/Quitclaim'
after the name of payee private respondent allegedly to insure that
private
respondent would honor his commitment that he would no longer ask for
further
payments for his interest in the 'informal business partnership' which
he and she had earlier dissolved.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"After the check
was
delivered to private respondent, he deposited it with the words 'Final
Payment/Quitclaim' already erased, hence, it was not honored.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Private
respondent's
counsel subsequently wrote the manager of FEBTC Lavezares Branch
informing
that the words 'Final Payment/Quitclaim' on the check had been
'inadvertently
erased without being initialed by your bank or the purchaser thereof'
and
thus requesting that the check be replaced with another payable to
'Johnson
Tong-Final Settlement/Quitclaim' with the same amount, the bank charges
therefor to be paid by his client-private respondent.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"FEBTC did not
grant
the request of private respondent's counsel, hence, private respondent
filed a complaint against FEBTC and petitioner Juana and her husband
Gregorio
Go at the Manila RTC, for sum of money, damages, and attorney's fees,
subject
of the case at bar.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Answering the
Complaint,
therein defendants-herein petitioners Juana and her husband and FEBTC
alleged
that the erasure of the words 'Final Payment/Quitclaim' was intentional
on private respondent's part, reflective of his intention to collect
more
from petitioner Juana, hence, the non-issuance of a replacement check
was
justified, unless private respondent was sincere in abiding with the
'terms
agreed upon.'
"During the
pendency
of the case, petitioner's son, George Tan Go, filed a criminal
complaint
against private respondent for falsification of the check. The criminal
complaint was dismissed, however, by the Manila Prosecutor's Office.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"On July 17, 1998,
private
respondent requested public respondent for leave to file Supplemental
Complaint.
Acting on the request, public respondent suggested to him 'to file a
Motion
to admit' within fifteen (15) days, copy furnished petitioners who were
given the same number of days from receipt to file their Comment.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"On August 25,
1998,
private respondent filed a 'Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental
Complaint
and to Admit the Attached Supplemental Complaint' which Supplemental
Complaint
alleged that petitioners 'used' their son to file the criminal
complaint
for falsification against him which caused damages, hence, the prayer
for
an increase in the amount of moral and exemplary damages sought to be
recovered
from P2.5 million to P55 million and praying for the award of actual
damages
of P58,075.00. The motion was set for hearing on September 4, 1998.
Copy
of the motion to petitioners was sent by registered mail.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Public
respondent,
by Order of September 4, 1998, noting that petitioners had been
furnished
copy of the 'Motion for Leave' x x
x
but that there had been no comment thereon, granted the motion and
admitted
the Supplemental Complaint.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Petitioners and
FEBTC's
Comment-Opposition were subsequently filed.
"Petitioners and
FEBTC
filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration of the September 4,
1998 Order.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"On November 18,
1998,
petitioners filed a Manifestation of Deposit and deposited to the RTC
Clerk
of Court the amount of P500,000.00 representing the amount of the
check,
'subject to the condition that it shall remain deposited until the
disposition
of the case.'chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Petitioners' and
FEBTC's
separate Motions for Reconsideration of the September 4, 1998 Order
were
later denied by Order of December 4, 1998, hence, petitioners filed
their
Answer dated December 18, 1998 to the Supplemental Complaint with
Counterclaim,
alleging as Special Affirmative defenses the following:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
'5. As
already
intimated, the defendants are not a party to the aforementioned
criminal
complaint, but only their son George who took it upon himself to file
it
in his own right, without their involvement in any way, hence, said
incident
cannot be pleaded as supplement to the original complaint, much less as
a new cause of action without impleading George Go as party defendant.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
'6. Plaintiff
cannot
prosecute his Supplemental Complaint, and the same should be dismissed,
unless the corresponding docket fee and legal fees for the monetary
claims
in the amount of P55,057,075.00 are paid for x x x.'chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"On February 5, 1999,
public
respondent, acting on the verbal manifestation/motion of private
respondent's
counsel, allowed the release of petitioners' P500,000.00 deposit to
private
respondent.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"By order of
November
17, 1999, public respondent, 'in the interest of justice and because of
the huge amount of outlay involved (the Court considers the business
climate
and the peso crunch prevailing),' allowed private respondent to first
deposit
P25,000.00 on or before December 15, 1999 and P20,000.00 every month
thereafter
until the full amount of docket fees is paid, and 'only then shall the
deposits be considered as payment of docket fees.'chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Petitioners filed
a
Motion for Reconsideration of the November 17, 1999 Order which was, by
Order of April 11, 2000, denied.
"Thus arose the
present
petition filed on May 30, 2000 which ascribes to public respondent the
commission of grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Orders of
February
5, 1999 (allowing the release of the P500,000.00 deposit to private
respondent),
November 17, 1999 (allowing the payment, on staggered basis, of the
docket
fees for the Supplemental Complaint) and April 11, 2000 (denying the
Motion
for Reconsideration of the November 17, 1999 Order)."[4]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Ruling of
the
Court of Appeals
In their Petition for
Certiorari before the CA, petitioners alleged that respondent judge
committed
grave abuse of discretion when he issued the Orders dated February 5,
1999,[5]
November 17, 1999[6]
and April 11, 2000.[7]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
According to the CA,
petitioners failed to assail, within the prescribed period, respondent
judge's February 5, 1999 Order allowing the release of the money
deposited
by them. It was only in their May 30, 2000 Petition before the CA that
they questioned the Order. Moreover, the appellate court held that,
anyway,
private respondent was entitled to the deposit, which represented the
amount
indicated on the check that belonged to him.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As to the November 17,
1999 Order allowing private respondent to pay the docket fee on a
staggered
basis and the April 11, 2000 Order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration
thereof, the CA held that "Sun Insurance Office Ltd x
x
x. permits the payment of the prescribed docket fee within a reasonable
period but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or regular
period."[8]
In that case, the court a quo opined that the docket fee payment scheme
imposed by the respondent judge "cannot be said to have been issued
with
grave abuse of discretion."[9]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Hence, this Petition.[10]
The Issues
In their Memorandum,[11]
petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Whether or
not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave and serious errors
which
are tantamount to grave abuse of discretion when it upheld the validity
of the Orders dated February 5, 1999, November 17, 1999 and April 11,
2000
issued by public respondent Hon. Judge Juan Nabong of RTC Branch 32 of
Manila, in Civil Case No. 97-81935.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Whether or not
public
respondent Judge Juan Nabong committed grave abuse of discretion in not
suspending the proceedings pending appeal with the Honorable Court of
Appeals,
and in x x x refusing to inhibit
himself."[12]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court's
Ruling
The Petition has no
merit.cralaw:red
Preliminary Issue:
Mode of Appeal
Private respondent argues
that the instant Petition should have been brought under Rule 45 of the
Revised
Rules of
Court
and not under Rule 65. On the other hand, petitioners maintain that
their
suit questions interlocutory orders issued by the RTC and thus falls
within
the ambit of Rule 65, under which questions of law and facts may be
raised.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We clarify. A petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court may be filed under the following condition:
"When any
tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course
of law x x x."[13]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the other hand, Rule
45 prevails under this circumstance:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"A party
desiring
to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of
the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or
other
courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a
verified
petition for review on certiorari x x x."[14]
Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court specifically states that in all cases, the CA's decisions, final
orders or resolutions — regardless of the nature of the action or
proceedings
involved — may be appealed to this Court through a petition for review,
which is just a continuation of the appellate process involving the
original
case.[15]
On the other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is an
independent
suit based on the specific grounds provided therein. As a general rule,
certiorari cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of
an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45.[16]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Very recently, in Fortune
Guarantee and Insurance Corporation v. CA,[17]
this Court had the occasion to discuss this matter. In that case, the
petitioner
alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent trial
court
judge when the latter issued the assailed Order granting a Motion for
Execution
Pending Appeal. Said the Court in that case:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"It must be
pointed out that petitioner adopted the wrong mode of appeal in
bringing
this case before us. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a
decision
of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45 which is
not similar to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court x x x."[18]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the present case,
petitioners
are appealing a final decision of the CA by resorting to Rule 65, when
their remedy should be based on Rule 45.[19]
When an error of judgment of the CA is brought up to this Court for
review,
the action is properly designated as a petition for review and not a
special
civil action.[20]
Thus, while the instant Petition is one for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court,
the assigned errors are more properly addressed in a petition for
review
under Rule 45.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Accordingly, when parties
adopt an improper remedy, as in this case, their petitions may be
dismissed
outright.[21]
However, in the interest of substantial justice, we deem it wise to
overlook
procedural technicalities in order to rule speedily on this case[22]
and demonstrate that even without the procedural infirmity, the
Petition
should be rejected due to its lack of merits.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
First Issue:
Release of the Money Deposited
Petitioners argue that
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he issued the
February 5, 1999 Order allowing the release of their P500,000 bank
deposit.
According to them, he "demonstrated his capacity for abuse of judicial
authority as the release of the money was made in direct contravention
of their condition thereto which was that the money shall remain
deposited
until the disposition of this case."[23]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We disagree. As correctly
found by the CA, there was a prior understanding between the parties
that
petitioners would deposit P500,000, which private respondent could
withdraw
if he so desired.[24]
Because petitioners claim that they deposited the money as a sign of
good
faith, we see no reason why they should not abide by their earlier
agreement
with private respondent. In fact, in their Manifestation of Deposit,[25]
they even referred to the earlier hearing during which the deposit had
been agreed upon. This Manifestation shows that the deposit was indeed
made pursuant to their earlier agreement.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The CA was likewise
correct in finding that petitioners had failed to assail, within the
prescribed
period, the Order allowing the release of the money.[26]
The Manifestation of Deposit was received and approved by the RTC on
November
18, 1998. On February 5, 1999, private respondent, through his counsel,
made his oral manifestation to withdraw the amount deposited.[27]
It was only on May 30, 2000, upon the filing of their Petition for
Certiorari
with the CA, when petitioners questioned the Order allowing the
withdrawal
of the deposit.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
If petitioners honestly
believed that respondent judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion
when he issued the Order, why did they allow more than one year to
lapse
before assailing it? In fact, they had not even filed a motion for
reconsideration.
Elementary is the rule that before certiorari may be availed of, a
petitioner
must have filed with the lower court a motion for reconsideration of
the
act or order complained of.[28]
This requirement enables the lower court to pass upon and correct its
mistakes
in the first instance, without the intervention of the higher tribunal.[29]
While there are exceptions to this rule,[30]
petitioners have not convinced this Court that they are entitled
thereto.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners claim that
they learned of the existence of the Order only after more than one
year
had passed, and of the withdrawal of the deposit only after their new
counsel
had appeared.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We are not persuaded.
It is undeniable that petitioners actively prosecuted their case during
the period when they were allegedly still ignorant of the existence of
the Order dated February 5, 1999. Whether such ignorance was due to
negligence
or mere oversight will not release them from its effects.cralaw:red
More important, the
CA was correct in holding that, ultimately, private respondent was
entitled
to the deposit, because it represented the amount indicated on the
check
that undeniably belonged to him. In all the pleadings they filed,
petitioners
never denied that the amount of P500,000 properly belonged to him. He
correctly
argued as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"There is
no
question, and it is admitted by petitioners in their Manifestation of
Deposit,
dated November 16, 1998 x x x that
the amount of P500,000 deposited by them with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, represented the amount covered by Far East Bank & Trust
Company Cashier's Check No. 041A-0000032561.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"It is likewise
admitted
by the parties that the said FEBTC Cashier's Check No. 041A-0000032561
was paid (payable) to and belong to private respondent."[31]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Second
Issue:
Payment of Docket Fee
Petitioners argue that
respondent judge and the CA erred in allowing private respondent to pay
the docket fee on a staggered basis. According to them, the Order dated
November 17, 1999 was "unprecedented in the annals of the Philippine
judicial
system."[32]
They describe the allegedly anomalous situation in this wise:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Thus, we
have
perhaps x x x in the case at
bar
x x x the only known case in Philippine
judicial
history where a supplemental complaint was admitted without the payment
of the FULL docket fees. And not only that, said fees were made payable
over a mind-boggling, over-expanded period of nearly two (2) years!"[33]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners make
contradictory
assertions when they aver that the circumstances in the present case do
not meet the parameters set by the Court in Sun Insurance Office Ltd.
(SIOL)
v. Asuncion,[34]
then make a complete volte face by arguing that the former is
inapplicable,
because there is no under-assessment of the docket fee in the instant
case.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court clarified
the rule in Sun Insurance thus:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"x x
x. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a
trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the
action.
Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment
of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable
time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period."[35]
(Emphasis
supplied.)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Plainly, while the
payment
of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its
nonpayment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the
dismissal
of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable
prescriptive
or reglementary period;[36]
more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by
the rules prescribing such payment.[37]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
While the cause of action
of private respondent was supposed to prescribe in four (4) years,[38]
he was allowed to pay; and he in fact paid the docket fee in a year's
time.[39]
We do not see how this period can be deemed unreasonable. Moreover, on
his part there is no showing of any pattern or intent to defraud the
government
of the required docket fee. We sustain the CA's findings absolving
respondent
judge of any capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. Ruled the appellate court:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"The Sun
Insurance
Office Ltd. case permits the payment of the prescribed docket fee
'within
a reasonable period but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive
or
regular period.' Since the prescriptive period to file the complaint
subject
of the present petition which is an action upon an injury to the right
of private respondent, is four years and the scheme of payment of the
docket
fees in the amount of P252,503.50 given by public respondent called for
an implementation thereof within one year, as in fact private
respondent
manifested in his Rejoinder that he had fully paid the said amount on
December
12, 2000, then the assailed Orders of November 17, 1999 and April 11,
2000
cannot be said to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion."[40]
(Citations
omitted.)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
To be sure, for
certiorari
to lie against respondent judge, the abuse of discretion committed must
be grave, as when power is exercised arbitrarily or despotically by
reason
of passion or personal hostility; and such exercise must be so patent
and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual
refusal
to perform it or to act in contemplation of law.[41]
These conditions are absolutely wanting in the present case.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Final Issue:
Inhibition and Suspension of Proceedings
Finally, petitioners
ascribe grave abuse of discretion to respondent judge for not
inhibiting
himself from this case and for not suspending the proceedings in the
RTC
pending the resolution of the Petition for Certiorari before the
appellate
court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We need not belabor
these questions, because they were never raised before the CA. It is
well-settled
that parties are not permitted to raise before this Court issues that
were
not taken up below.[42]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the Petition
is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED.
Costs
against petitioners.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Davide, Jr., C.J., Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Annex "A" of the Petition; rollo, pp. 59–67; penned by Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales (Division chair and now a member of this Court), with
the
concurrence of Justices Candido V. Rivera and Juan Q. Enriquez Jr.
(members).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Annex "B" of the Petition; id., pp. 68–70.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
CA Decision, p. 7; id., p. 66.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
CA Decision, pp. 2–5; id., pp. 61–64.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Annex "C" of the Petition; id., p. 71.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Annex "D" of the Petition; id., p. 72.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Annex "E" of the Petition; id., p. 73.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
CA Decision, p. 7; id., p. 66.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
This case was deemed submitted for decision on December 2, 2002, upon
this
Court's receipt of petitioners' Reply to Memorandum, which was signed
by
Atty. Teresita C. Marbibi. Earlier or on October 24, 2002, this Court
received
petitioners' Memorandum signed by the same counsel. On the other hand,
private respondent's Memorandum, signed by Atty. Efren N. de la Cruz
was
filed with this Court on November 5, 2002.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Rollo, pp. 311–341.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 12; rollo, p. 322.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
§1 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
§1 of Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Heirs of Pagobo v. CA, 345 Phil. 1119, October 16, 1997.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
G.R. No. 110701, March 12, 2002.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
Id., p. 5, per De Leon Jr., J.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
The Director of Lands v. CA, 342 Phil. 239, July 28, 1997.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
Cruz v. CA, 369 Phil. 161, July 2, 1999.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
Fortune Guarantee and Insurance Corporation v. CA, supra; Sea Power
Shipping
Enterprises Inc. v. CA, 360 SCRA 173, June 28, 2001.
[22]
Ibid.; Caraan v. CA, 289 SCRA 579, April 24, 1998.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
Petitioners' Memorandum, pp. 13–14; rollo, pp. 323–324.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
See Order dated November 11, 1998; records, p. 211.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
Records, pp. 213–214.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
CA Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 65.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
See Order dated February 5, 1999; records, p. 237.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
Sevillana v. I.T. Corp., 356 SCRA 451, April 16, 2001; Indiana
Aerospace
University v. CHED, 356 SCRA 367, April 4, 2001; Seagull Shipmanagement
and Transport Inc. v. NLRC, 388 Phil. 906, June 8, 2000.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
Abraham v. NLRC, 353 SCRA 739, March 6, 2001; Seagull Shipmanagement
and
Transport Inc. v. NLRC, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[30]
Indiana Aerospace University v. CHED, supra; Marawi Marantao General
Hospital
Inc. v. CA, 349 SCRA 321, January 16, 2001.
[31]
Private respondent's Memorandum, p. 10; rollo, p. 351. Emphasis in the
original.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[32]
Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 18; rollo, p. 328.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[33]
Id., pp. 19 & 329.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
170 SCRA 274, February 13, 1989.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[35]
Id., p. 285, per Gancayco, J.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[36]
Suson v. CA, 278 SCRA 284, August 21, 1997.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[37]
Teofilo Gensoli & Co. v. NLRC, 289 SCRA 407, April 22, 1998.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[38]
Article 1146 of the Civil Code states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(2) Upon a quasi-delict."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[39]
See Manifestation dated January 15, 2001; records, pp. 394–409.
[40]
CA Decision, p. 7; rollo, p. 66.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[41]
Benito v. Comelec, 349 SCRA 705, January 19, 2001; Miranda v. Abaya,
370
Phil. 642, July 28, 1999; Cuison v. CA, 289 SCRA 159, April 15, 1998.
[42]
Rupa Sr. v. CA, 380 Phil. 112, January 25, 2000.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |