Republic
of the Philippines
SUPREME
COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION .
.
DIAMOND MOTORS
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
151981
December 1, 2003
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS,
NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSIONAND AGRIPINO
C.
CADAO,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
This is a Petition for
Review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63143,[1]
which affirmed the Decision and Resolution[2]
of the National Labor Relations Commission dated October 27, 2000 and
December
28, 2001, respectively.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Diamond Motors
Corporation hired respondent Agripino C. Cadao on May 17, 1989 and
subsequently
appointed him Special Accounts Manager in 1993 with a fixed monthly
salary
excluding commission for every car sold. His tasks included the
promotion
and sale of Mitsubishi vehicles to precisely listed corporate clients
on
fleet basis. Units purchased by fleet sale are usually lower by an
average
amount of P5,000.00 than those bought on retail. The transactions are
usually
done through letters of intent or purchase orders submitted by the
client.[3]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
TAPE, Inc. is one of
petitioner's clients on a fleet sale basis. On July 1, 1994, its
purchasing
officer and Executive Secretary to the President, Esper Reate, sent a
letter
of intent to respondent confirming an order for one unit of a 1994
Mitsubishi
Lancer EL at P363,000.00, to be registered in the name of Ruth Racela.
On July 28, 1994, two other letters of the same tenor were sent to the
respondent confirming the orders for two Mitsubishi Lancer GLI 1300 to
be registered in the names of Josefina Antonio and Federico de Joya,
respectively.[4]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
TAPE, Inc. subsequently
sent Purchase Order No. 001508 to petitioner for the three units
amounting
to P1,213,000.00. Petitioner investigated the said transaction through
its Finance and Insurance Operations Manager, Ms. Santa T. Vargas. The
latter found out that, with the exception of Ruth Racela, the two other
customers were not employees of TAPE, Inc. or its sister corporation,
M-Zet.
Therefore, the production companies manifested that they will not pay
for
the purchase orders.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The report further
noted that P.O. No. 001508 was 84 sheets ahead from the purchase order
then in use, P.O. No. 001424; and that Esper Reate was not the
authorized
signatory for the purchases considering that only Mr. Antonio Tuviera
as
the President of TAPE, Inc., or, in his absence, Ms. Leslie Dionisio,
AVP
for Administration, can sign for them.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On September 3, 1994,
respondent received a memorandum dated August 31, 1994 from petitioner,
asking him to explain the misrepresentation he committed in favor of
the
three customers. In addition, he was accused by petitioner of
dishonesty
and deceit in the conduct of said sale.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondent, on the same
day, submitted his written explanation in answer to the allegations. On
September 8, 1994, petitioner terminated the services of respondent.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On February 2, 1995,
private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer
for the payment of earned salary, commission and other accrued benefits
against the petitioner before the National Labor Relations Commission.
On April 2, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Aggrieved, private
respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission which
reversed
the decision of the Labor Arbiter and declared his dismissal illegal.
Respondent
was awarded separation pay plus backwages. Petitioner filed a motion
for
reconsideration but the same was denied.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioner filed a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals,[5]
contending that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter. Petitioner maintained that respondent's dismissal was
for
a valid cause pursuant to Article 282 of the Labor Code and
jurisprudence;
and that because of his misrepresentation and deception it suffered
losses
in the total sum of P115,000.00 corresponding to the differences
between
the regular and fleet prices of the units sold.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Appellate Court
dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the NLRC. Hence,
this
petition for review raising the following errors:
I.
THAT THE HONORABLE
COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT, PETITIONER FAILED TO SUBSTANTIATE ITS
CLAIM OF DISHONESTY AND LOSS OF CONFIDENCE AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT
AGRIPINO
CADAO;
II.
THAT SAID DECISION
OF
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
WERE PREMISED IN THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE BUT SUCH FINDINGS ARE
CONTRADICTED
BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD; AND THAT THE SAME HAVE BEEN MADE WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION;
III.
THAT THE PUBLIC
RESPONDENT
FAILED TO OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE OF STARE DECISIS ;
IV.
WHAT KIND OF
EVIDENCE
IS REQUIRED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF AN EMPLOYEE IN LABOR CASES? IS IT
MERE
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE OR PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT?[6]
We find merit in the
petition.cralaw:red
A disharmony between
the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor
Relations
Commission opens the door to a review thereof by this Court.[7]
Factual findings of administrative agencies are not infallible and will
be set aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness. Moreover, when
the
findings of the National Labor Relations Commission contradict those of
the labor arbiter, this Court, in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction,
may look into the records of the case and reexamine the questioned
findings.[8]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the case at bar,
we find that private respondent was not illegally dismissed. In his
decision,
the Labor Arbiter ruled that based on the evidence adduced by the
parties,
respondent knowingly violated company rules and regulations. There was
also a clear taint of deceit on his part when he passed off what was
otherwise
a retail sale as a fleet sale.[9]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Indeed, respondent cannot
deny that at the time he was negotiating what he claimed to be a fleet
sale to TAPE, Inc., he already knew that the would-be end users are not
employees of TAPE, Inc. This is shown by Check Voucher No. 004297 dated
August 15, 1994 issued by M-ZET in favor of Ruth Racela, two days ahead
of the Purchase Order issued by TAPE, Inc. on August 17, 1994,[10]
which means that before TAPE, Inc. prepared and issued the purchase
order,
respondent already knew that Ruth Racela was an M-ZET employee,
otherwise
the latter would not have prepared and issued the corresponding check
if
there was no assurance of a fleet sale by him to the company.[11]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We reiterate the rule
under Article 282(c) of the Labor Code, which states that an employer
can
terminate the employment of the employee concerned for "fraud or
willful
breach by an employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or
duly
authorized representative." The loss of trust and confidence must be
based
on the willful breach of the trust reposed in the employee by his
employer.
Ordinary breach will not suffice. A breach of trust is willful if it is
done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable
excuse,
as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly
or inadvertently.[12]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Moreover, we have laid
down the guidelines for the application of the doctrine of loss of
confidence
in the case of Concorde Hotel v. Court of Appeals,[13]
i.e., (a) the loss of confidence should not be simulated; (b) it should
not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or
unjustified;
(c) it should not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming
evidence
to the contrary; and (d) it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to
justify earlier action taken in bad faith.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondent claims that
at the time of the purchase, there was a promotional program by
petitioner
on its units so that the promotional price of the same were as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
UNIT
Regular Price Promotional Price
Mitsubishi EL 1300
P396,000.00
P363,000.00
Mitsubishi Gli 1300
465,000.00 425,000.00
Mitsubishi GLXi
521,000.00
486,000.00[14]
He maintains that
it was the promotional price that he quoted to the buyers and which the
latter paid to petitioner without any further discount as in fleet
sales;
hence, no disadvantage was caused to petitioner since the promotional
price
is open to any client.[15]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We are not persuaded.cralaw:red
The fact that petitioner
failed to show it suffered losses in revenue as a consequence of
private
respondent's questioned act is immaterial. The fact that respondent
attempted
to deprive petitioner of its lawful revenue is tantamount to fraud
against
the company, which warrants dismissal from the service.[16]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Finally, we hold that
the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that there was nothing in the
letters
of intent, purchase orders and checks submitted which would lead
petitioner
to doubt or suspect that said documents were accomplished through
fraud.
In the first place, the same were signed by TAPE Inc.'s Purchasing
Officer
and Executive Secretary to the President Ms. Esper Reate, who is not an
authorized signatory. It is only Mr. Antonio Tuviera, TAPE Inc.
President,
or in his absence, Ms. Leslie Dionisio, its Assistant Vice President
for
Administration, who can duly sign.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Secondly, respondent
was not able to explain the use of a purchase order not belonging to
the
series currently in use at the time the transaction took place.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In fine, we find that
the foregoing constitute substantial evidence to support the conclusion
that respondent's dismissal was just and legal. Substantial evidence is
that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as
adequate to justify a conclusion.[17]
The evidence relied upon by the Court of Appeals in affirming the
NLRC's
decision failed to establish the fact that respondent was illegally
dismissed.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, the instant petition for review is GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated October 18, 2001 and the Resolution dated
January 25, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63143 which affirmed the decision
and
resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated October 27,
2000 and December 28, 2001, respectively are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The
decision dated April 2, 1998 of Labor Arbiter Jose G. De Vera in
NLRC-NCR
Case No. 00-02-01363-95, dismissing respondent's complaint for illegal
dismissal for lack of merit, is REINSTATED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Panganiban, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
CA Rollo, p. 168; penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos,
concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Bernardo P.
Abesamis.
[2]
Records, pp. 15–20; penned by Commissioner Victoriano R. Calaycay,
concurred
in by Commissioners Raul T. Aquino and Angelita A. Gacutan.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 28–29.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Id., pp. 29–30.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63143.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 10–11.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Asuncion v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 129329, 31
July
2001, 362 SCRA 56.
[8]
Aklan Electric Cooperative, Incorporated v. National Labor Relations
Commission,
G.R. No. 121439, 25 January 2000, 323 SCRA 258.
[9]
CA Rollo, p. 30.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Id., pp. 29–31.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Gonzalez v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 131653, 26
March
2001, 355 SCRA 195.
[13]
G.R. No. 144089, 9 August 2001, 362 SCRA 583.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
CA Rollo, p. 43.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Id.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. 126805, 16 March 2000, 328 SCRA 273.
[17]
Aklan Electric Cooperative, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |