EN BANC
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
152154
July 15, 2003
-versus-
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN
(SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION),FERDINAND
E. MARCOS
(REPRESENTED BY HIS ESTATE/HEIRS:IMELDA
R. MARCOS,
MARIA IMELDA [IMEE] MARCOS-MANOTOC,FERDINAND
R. MARCOS,
JR. AND IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA)AND
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ
MARCOS,
Respondents. |
D E C I S I O N
CORONA,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This is a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court seeking to (1) set aside
the Resolution dated January 31, 2002 issued by the Special First
Division
of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141 entitled "Republic of the
Philippines
vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et. al.," and (2) reinstate its earlier
decision
dated September 19, 2000 which forfeited in favor of petitioner
Republic
of the Philippines (Republic) the amount held in escrow in the
Philippine
National Bank (PNB) in the aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of
January 31, 2002. BACKGROUND OF THE
CASE
On December 17, 1991,
Petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government
(PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
a Petition for Forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Civil
Case
No. 0141 entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos,
represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos," pursuant to R.A.
1379[1]
in relation to Executive Orders Nos. 1,[2]
2,[3]
14[4]
and 14-A.[5]
In said case, Petitioner
sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (now
estimated
to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in
escrow
in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held
by the following five account groups, using various foreign foundations
in certain Swiss banks:
(1)
Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts;chanrobles virtual law library
(2)
Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-Spinus- Avertina Foundation
accounts;chanrobles virtual law library
(3)
Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts;chanrobles virtual law library
(4)
Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts; andchanrobles virtual law library
(5)
Maler Foundation accounts.chanrobles virtual law library
In addition, the
Petition
sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury
notes
which exceeded the Marcos couple’s salaries, other lawful income as
well
as income from legitimately acquired property. The treasury
notes
are frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines,
now
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by
the
PCGG.chanrobles virtual law library
On October 18, 1993,
respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta
and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. filed their answer.cralaw:red
Before the case was
set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements[6]
dated December 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then
PCGG
Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of
the Marcos family. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children filed
a motion dated December 7, 1995 for the approval of said agreements and
for the enforcement thereof.cralaw:red
The General Agreement/Supplemental
Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and
distribute
all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the
conditions
contained therein. The aforementioned General Agreement specified
in one of its premises or "whereas clauses" the fact that petitioner
"obtained
a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990,
that the Three Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million)
belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided
certain
conditionalities are met x x x." The said decision of the Swiss
Federal
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Zurich District Attorney Peter
Consandey,
granting petitioner’s request for legal assistance.[7]
Consandey declared the various deposits in the name of the enumerated
foundations
to be of illegal provenance and ordered that they be frozen to await
the
final verdict in favor of the parties entitled to restitution.cralaw:red
Hearings were conducted
by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the General/Supplemental
Agreements. Respondent Ferdinand, Jr. was presented as witness for the
purpose of establishing the partial implementation of said agreements.chanrobles virtual law library
On October 18, 1996,
petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the
pleadings.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition thereto which was later
adopted
by respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.cralaw:red
In its resolution dated
November 20, 1997, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for
summary
judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the motion
to approve the compromise agreement "(took) precedence over the motion
for summary judgment."
Respondent Mrs. Marcos
filed a manifestation on May 26, 1998 claiming she was not a party to
the
motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement and that she owned 90%
of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate.cralaw:red
Meanwhile, on August
10, 1995, petitioner filed with the District Attorney in Zurich,
Switzerland,
an additional request for the immediate transfer of the deposits to an
escrow account in the PNB. The request was granted. On
appeal
by the Marcoses, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in a decision dated
December
10, 1997, upheld the ruling of the District Attorney of Zurich granting
the request for the transfer of the funds. In 1998, the funds
were
remitted to the Philippines in escrow. Subsequently, respondent Marcos
children moved that the funds be placed in custodia legis because the
deposit
in escrow in the PNB was allegedly in danger of dissipation by
petitioner.
The Sandiganbayan, in its resolution dated September 8, 1998, granted
the
motion.cralaw:red
After the pre-trial
and the issuance of the pre-trial order and supplemental pre-trial
order
dated October 28, 1999 and January 21, 2000, respectively, the case was
set for trial. After several resettings, petitioner, on March 10, 2000,
filed another motion for summary judgment pertaining to the forfeiture
of the US$356 million, based on the following grounds:
I.
THE ESSENTIAL FACTS
WHICH WARRANT THE FORFEITURE OF THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE PETITION UNDER
R.A. NO. 1379 ARE ADMITTED BY RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PLEADINGS AND OTHER
SUBMISSIONS MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDING.
II.
RESPONDENTS’
ADMISSION
MADE DURING THE PRE-TRIAL THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE ANY INTEREST OR
OWNERSHIP
OVER THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE ACTION FOR FORFEITURE TENDERS NO GENUINE
ISSUE OR CONTROVERSY AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT IN THE PRESENT ACTION,
THUS
WARRANTING THE RENDITION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.[8]
Petitioner contended
that, after the pre-trial conference, certain facts were established,
warranting
a summary judgment on the funds sought to be forfeited.cralaw:red
Respondent Mrs. Marcos
filed her opposition to the petitioner’s motion for summary judgment,
which
opposition was later adopted by her co-respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs.
Araneta
and Ferdinand, Jr.chanrobles virtual law library
On March 24, 2000, a
hearing on the motion for summary judgment was conducted.cralaw:red
In a decision[9]
dated September 19, 2000, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner’s motion
for summary judgment:
CONCLUSION
There is no issue
of
fact which calls for the presentation of evidence.
The Motion for
Summary
Judgment is hereby granted.
The Swiss deposits
which
were transmitted to and now held in escrow at the PNB are deemed
unlawfully
acquired as ill-gotten wealth.
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE,
judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of the Republic of the Philippines and
against
the respondents, declaring the Swiss deposits which were transferred to
and now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the
total
aggregate value equivalent to US$627,608,544.95 as of August 31, 2000
together
with the increments thereof forfeited in favor of the State.[10]
Respondent Mrs.
Marcos
filed a motion for reconsideration dated September 26, 2000. Likewise,
Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. filed their own motion for
reconsideration
dated October 5, 2000. Mrs. Araneta filed a manifestation dated October
4, 2000 adopting the motion for reconsideration of Mrs. Marcos, Mrs.
Manotoc
and Ferdinand, Jr.
Subsequently,
petitioner
filed its opposition thereto.
In a resolution[11]
dated January 31, 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed its September 19,
2000
decision, thus denying petitioner’s motion for summary judgment:
CONCLUSION
In sum, the
evidence
offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money
in
the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof
exists
in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds in
escrow
from the Swiss Banks.
The basis for the
forfeiture
in favor of the government cannot be deemed to have been established
and
our judgment thereon, perforce, must also have been without basis.chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the
decision
of this Court dated September 19, 2000 is reconsidered and set aside,
and
this case is now being set for further proceedings.[12]chanrobles virtual law library
Hence, the instant
petition.
In filing the same, petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan, in
reversing
its September 19, 2000 decision, committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that - I.
PETITIONER WAS ABLE
TO PROVE ITS CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OF SECTIONS 2 AND 3
OF R.A. NO. 1379:
A.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CATEGORICALLY ADMITTED NOT ONLY THE PERSONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES
OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND IMELDA R. MARCOS AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS BUT
ALSO
THE EXTENT OF THEIR SALARIES AS SUCH PUBLIC OFFICIALS, WHO UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION,
WERE PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN THE MANAGEMENT OF FOUNDATIONS.
B.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ALSO ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF THE SWISS DEPOSITS
AND
THEIR OWNERSHIP THEREOF:
1.
ADMISSIONS
IN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ ANSWER;
2.
ADMISSION
IN THE GENERAL / SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENTS THEY SIGNED AND SOUGHT TO
IMPLEMENT;
3.
ADMISSION
IN A MANIFESTATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT IMELDA R. MARCOS AND IN THE
MOTION
TO PLACE THE RES IN CUSTODIA LEGIS; AND
4.
ADMISSION
IN THE UNDERTAKING TO PAY THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS.
C.
PETITIONER HAS PROVED THE EXTENT OF THE LEGITIMATE INCOME OF FERDINAND
E. MARCOS AND IMELDA R. MARCOS AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS.
D.
PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF UNLAWFULLY
ACQUIRED
WEALTH.
II.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS
PROPER SINCE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT RAISED ANY GENUINE ISSUE OF
FACT
CONSIDERING THAT:
A.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ DEFENSE THAT SWISS DEPOSITS WERE LAWFULLY ACQUIRED
DOES NOT ONLY FAIL TO TENDER AN ISSUE BUT IS CLEARLY A SHAM; AND
B.
IN SUBSEQUENTLY
DISCLAIMING OWNERSHIP OF THE SWISS DEPOSITS, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
ABANDONED
THEIR SHAM DEFENSE OF LEGITIMATE ACQUISITION, AND THIS FURTHER
JUSTIFIED
THE RENDITION OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT. III.
THE FOREIGN
FOUNDATIONS
NEED NOT BE IMPLEADED.
IV.
THE HONORABLE
PRESIDING
JUSTICE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING HIMSELF ON THE
GROUND THAT ORIGINAL COPIES OF THE AUTHENTICATED SWISS DECISIONS AND
THEIR
"AUTHENTICATED TRANSLATIONS" HAVE NOT BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE COURT, WHEN
EARLIER THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS QUOTED EXTENSIVELY A PORTION OF THE
TRANSLATION
OF ONE OF THESE SWISS DECISIONS IN HIS "PONENCIA" DATED JULY 29, 1999
WHEN
IT DENIED THE MOTION TO RELEASE ONE HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION US DOLLARS
($150,000,000.00)
TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS.
V.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
ARE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED THEIR OBJECTION TO THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE
SWISS
FEDERAL SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.[13]
Petitioner, in the main,
asserts that nowhere in the respondents’ motions for reconsideration
and
supplemental motion for reconsideration were the authenticity, accuracy
and admissibility of the Swiss decisions ever challenged. Otherwise
stated,
it was incorrect for the Sandiganbayan to use the issue of lack of
authenticated
translations of the decisions of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court as the
basis for reversing itself because respondents themselves never raised
this issue in their motions for reconsideration and supplemental motion
for reconsideration. Furthermore, this particular issue relating to the
translation of the Swiss court decisions could not be resurrected
anymore
because said decisions had been previously utilized by the
Sandiganbayan
itself in resolving a "decisive issue" before it.cralaw:red
Petitioner faults the
Sandiganbayan for questioning the non-production of the authenticated
translations
of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court decisions as this was a marginal and
technical matter that did not diminish by any measure the
conclusiveness
and strength of what had been proven and admitted before the
Sandiganbayan,
that is, that the funds deposited by the Marcoses constituted
ill-gotten
wealth and thus belonged to the Filipino people.cralaw:red
In compliance with the
order of this Court, Mrs. Marcos filed her comment to the petition on
May
22, 2002. After several motions for extension which were all granted,
the
comment of Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. and the separate comment of
Mrs. Araneta were filed on May 27, 2002.cralaw:red
Mrs. Marcos asserts
that the petition should be denied on the following grounds:
A.
PETITIONER HAS A
PLAIN,
SPEEDY, AND ADEQUATE REMEDY AT THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
B.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN
DID
NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN SETTING THE CASE FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.[14]
Mrs. Marcos contends
that petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law in view of the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated
January
31, 2000 directing petitioner to submit the authenticated translations
of the Swiss decisions. Instead of availing of said remedy, petitioner
now elevates the matter to this Court. According to Mrs. Marcos, a
petition
for certiorari which does not comply with the requirements of the rules
may be dismissed. Since petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy,
that is, to proceed to trial and submit authenticated translations of
the
Swiss decisions, its petition before this Court must be dismissed.
Corollarily,
the Sandiganbayan’s ruling to set the case for further proceedings
cannot
and should not be considered a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment.chanrobles virtual law library
Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc
and Ferdinand, Jr., in their comment, prayed for the dismissal of the
petition
on the grounds that:
(A)
BY THE TIME
PETITIONER
FILED ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 10 MARCH 2000, IT WAS ALREADY
BARRED FROM DOING SO.
(1)
The Motion for Summary Judgment was based on private respondents’
Answer
and other documents that had long been in the records of the case.
Thus,
by the time the Motion was filed on 10 March 2000, estoppel by laches
had
already set in against petitioner.
(2)
By its positive acts and express admissions prior to filing the Motion
for Summary Judgment on 10 March 1990, petitioner had legally bound
itself
to go to trial on the basis of existing issues. Thus, it clearly waived
whatever right it had to move for summary judgment. (B)
EVEN ASSUMING THAT
PETITIONER
WAS NOT LEGALLY BARRED FROM FILING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE
SANDIGANBAYAN IS CORRECT IN RULING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT YET
ESTABLISHED
A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR THE FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS.
(1)
Republic Act No. 1379, the applicable law, is a penal statute. As such,
its provisions, particularly the essential elements stated in section 3
thereof, are mandatory in nature. These should be strictly construed
against
petitioner and liberally in favor of private respondents.
(2)
Petitioner has failed to establish the third and fourth essential
elements
in Section 3 of R.A. 1379 with respect to the identification,
ownership,
and approximate amount of the property which the Marcos couple
allegedly
"acquired during their incumbency".
(a)
Petitioner has failed to prove that the Marcos couple "acquired" or own
the Swiss funds.
(b)
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the fact of acquisition
has
been proven, petitioner has categorically admitted that it has no
evidence
showing how much of the Swiss funds was acquired "during the
incumbency"
of the Marcos couple from 31 December 1965 to 25 February 1986.
(3)
In contravention of the essential element stated in Section 3 (e) of
R.A.
1379, petitioner has failed to establish the other proper earnings and
income from legitimately acquired property of the Marcos couple over
and
above their government salaries.
(4)
Since petitioner failed to prove the three essential elements provided
in paragraphs (c)[15]
(d),[16]
and (e)[17]
of Section 3, R.A. 1379, the inescapable conclusion is that the prima
facie
presumption of unlawful acquisition of the Swiss funds has not yet
attached.
There can, therefore, be no premature forfeiture of the funds.
(C)
IT WAS ONLY BY
ARBITRARILY
ISOLATING AND THEN TAKING CERTAIN STATEMENTS MADE BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS
OUT OF CONTEXT THAT PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO TREAT THESE AS "JUDICIAL
ADMISSIONS"
SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE AND THEREAFTER A CONCLUSIVE CASE
TO JUSTIFY THE FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS.
(1)
Under Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the General and
Supplemental
Agreements, as well as the other written and testimonial statements
submitted
in relation thereto, are expressly barred from being admissible in
evidence
against private respondents.
(2)
Had petitioner bothered to weigh the alleged admissions together with
the
other statements on record, there would be a demonstrable showing that
no such "judicial admissions" were made by private respondents.chanrobles virtual law library (D)
SINCE PETITIONER HAS
NOT (YET) PROVEN ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE
CASE FOR FORFEITURE, AND PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT MADE ANY JUDICIAL
ADMISSION THAT WOULD HAVE FREED IT FROM ITS BURDEN OF PROOF, THE
SANDIGANBAYAN
DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT. CERTIORARI, THEREFORE, DOES NOT LIE, ESPECIALLY AS THIS COURT
IS NOT A TRIER OF FACTS.[18]
For her part, Mrs. Araneta,
in her comment to the petition, claims that obviously petitioner is
unable
to comply with a very plain requirement of respondent Sandiganbayan.
The
instant petition is allegedly an attempt to elevate to this Court
matters,
issues and incidents which should be properly threshed out at the
Sandiganbayan.
To respondent Mrs. Araneta, all other matters, save that pertaining to
the authentication of the translated Swiss Court decisions, are
irrelevant
and impertinent as far as this Court is concerned. Respondent
Mrs.
Araneta manifests that she is as eager as respondent Sandiganbayan or
any
interested person to have the Swiss Court decisions officially
translated
in our known language. She says the authenticated official English
version
of the Swiss Court decisions should be presented. This should stop all
speculations on what indeed is contained therein. Thus, respondent Mrs.
Araneta prays that the petition be denied for lack of merit and for
raising
matters which, in elaborated fashion, are impertinent and improper
before
this Court.cralaw:red
PROPRIETY OF PETITIONER’S
ACTION FOR CERTIORARI
But before this Court
discusses the more relevant issues, the question regarding the
propriety
of petitioner Republic's action for certiorari under Rule 65[19]
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Sandiganbayan
Resolution
dated January 21, 2002 should be threshed out.cralaw:red
At the outset, we would
like to stress that we are treating this case as an exception to the
general
rule governing petitions for certiorari. Normally, decisions of the
Sandiganbayan
are brought before this Court under Rule 45, not Rule 65.[20]
But where the case is undeniably ingrained with immense
public
interest, public policy and deep historical repercussions, certiorari
is
allowed notwithstanding the existence and availability of the remedy of
appeal.[21]chanrobles virtual law library
One of the foremost
concerns of the Aquino Government in February 1986
was
the recovery of the unexplained or ill-gotten wealth reputedly amassed
by former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, their relatives,
friends
and business associates. Thus, the very first Executive Order (EO)
issued
by then President Corazon Aquino upon her assumption to office after
the
ouster of the Marcoses was EO No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986.
It created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and
charged
it with the task of assisting the President in the "recovery of all
ill-gotten
wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located
in
the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of
all
business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them during
his
administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue
advantage
of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship." The urgency of this undertaking was
tersely described by this Court in Republic vs. Lobregat:[22]
surely x x x an enterprise
"of great pith and moment"; it was attended by "great expectations"; it
was initiated not only out of considerations of simple justice but also
out of sheer necessity - the national coffers were empty, or nearly so.cralaw:red
In all the alleged ill-gotten
wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside
technicalities
and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious
resolution.
This Court prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at the
Sandiganbayan.
But substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all parties
concerned,
not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly
and
firmly pursued. Almost two decades have passed since the government
initiated
its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive
resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there
is
proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or
illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these
funds and other assets be finally determined and resolved with
dispatch,
free from all the delaying technicalities and annoying procedural
sidetracks.[23]
We thus take cognizance
of this case and settle with finality all the issues therein.
ISSUES BEFORE
THIS
COURT
The crucial issues which
this Court must resolve are: (1) whether or not respondents raised any
genuine issue of fact which would either justify or negate summary
judgment;
and (2) whether or not petitioner Republic was able to prove its case
for
forfeiture in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379.
(1) THE PROPRIETY
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
We hold that respondent
Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their pleadings.
Thus, on motion of petitioner Republic, summary judgment should take
place
as a matter of right.chanrobles virtual law library
In the early case of
Auman vs. Estenzo,[24]
summary judgment was described as a judgment which a court may render
before
trial but after both parties have pleaded. It is ordered by the
court
upon application by one party, supported by affidavits, depositions or
other documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may in turn
file
an opposition supported also by affidavits, depositions or other
documents.
This is after the court summarily hears both parties with their
respective
proofs and finds that there is no genuine issue between them. Summary
judgment
is sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997
Rules
of Civil Procedure:
SECTION 1. Summary judgment
for claimant.- A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim,
or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after
the
pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting
affidavits,
depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all
or any part thereof.[25]
Summary judgment is
proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact
in
the action.[26]
The theory of summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its
face
appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is demonstrated by
affidavits,
depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine but sham or
fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and
rendering
summary judgment for petitioner Republic.cralaw:red
The Solicitor General
made a very thorough presentation of its case for forfeiture:
x
x x
4. Respondent
Ferdinand E. Marcos (now deceased and represented by his Estate/Heirs)
was a public officer for several decades continuously and without
interruption
as Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President of the Republic
of the Philippines from December 31, 1965 up to his ouster by direct
action
of the people of EDSA on February 22-25, 1986.chanrobles virtual law library
5. Respondent
Imelda Romualdez Marcos (Imelda, for short) the former First Lady who
ruled
with FM during the 14-year martial law regime, occupied the position of
Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976 up to the peaceful
revolution
in February 22-25, 1986. She likewise served once as a member of the
Interim
Batasang Pambansa during the early years of martial law from 1978 to
1984
and as Metro Manila Governor in concurrent capacity as Minister of
Human
Settlements. x x x
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
11. At the outset,
however, it must be pointed out that based on the Official Report of
the
Minister of Budget, the total salaries of former President Marcos as
President
form 1966 to 1976 was P60,000 a year and from 1977 to 1985, P100,000 a
year; while that of the former First Lady, Imelda R. Marcos, as
Minister
of Human Settlements from June 1976 to February 22-25, 1986 was P75,000
a year xxx.
ANALYSIS OF
RESPONDENTS
LEGITIMATE INCOME
x
x x
12. Based on available
documents, the ITRs of the Marcoses for the years 1965-1975 were filed
under Tax Identification No. 1365-055-1. For the years 1976 until 1984,
the returns were filed under Tax Identification No. M 6221-J 1117-A-9.chanrobles virtual law library
13. The data contained
in the ITRs and Balance Sheet filed by the "Marcoses are summarized and
attached to the reports in the following schedules:
Schedule A:
Schedule of Income (Annex
"T" hereof);
Schedule B:
Schedule of Income Tax
Paid (Annex "T-1" hereof);
Schedule C:
Schedule of Net Disposable
Income (Annex "T-2" hereof);
Schedule D:
Schedule of Networth
Analysis (Annex "T-3" hereof).cralaw:red
14. As summarized
in Schedule A (Annex "T" hereof), the Marcoses reported P16,408,442.00
or US$2,414,484.91 in total income over a period of 20 years from 1965
to 1984. The sources of income are as follows:chanrobles virtual law library
Official
Salaries
- P
2,627,581.00
- 16.01%
Legal
Practice
-
11,109,836.00
- 67.71%
Farm
Income
-
149,700.00
- 91%
Others
-
2,521,325.00
-
15.37%
Total
- P16,408,442.00
-
100.00%
15. FM’s official
salary pertains to his compensation as Senate President in 1965 in the
amount of P15,935.00 and P1,420,000.00 as President of the Philippines
during the period 1966 until 1984. On the other hand, Imelda reported
salaries
and allowances only for the years 1979 to 1984 in the amount of
P1,191,646.00.
The records indicate that the reported income came from her salary from
the Ministry of Human Settlements and allowances from Food Terminal,
Inc.,
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, National Food Authority
Council,
Light Rail Transit Authority and Home Development Mutual Fund.cralaw:red
16. Of the P11,109,836.00
in reported income from legal practice, the amount of P10,649,836.00 or
96% represents "receivables from prior years" during the period 1967 up
to 1984.cralaw:red
17. In the guise
of reporting income using the cash method under Section 38 of the
National
Internal Revenue Code, FM made it appear that he had an extremely
profitable
legal practice before he became a President (FM being barred by law
from
practicing his law profession during his entire presidency) and that,
incredibly,
he was still receiving payments almost 20 years after. The only problem
is that in his Balance Sheet attached to his 1965 ITR immediately
preceeding
his ascendancy to the presidency, he did not show any Receivables from
client at all, much less the P10.65-M that he decided to later
recognize
as income. There are no documents showing any withholding tax
certificates.
Likewise, there is nothing on record that will show any known Marcos
client
as he has no known law office. As previously stated, his networth
was a mere P120,000.00 in December, 1965. The joint income tax returns
of FM and Imelda cannot, therefore, conceal the skeletons of their
kleptocracy.chanrobles virtual law library
18. FM reported
a total of P2,521,325.00 as Other Income for the years 1972 up to 1976
which he referred to in his return as "Miscellaneous Items" and
"Various
Corporations." There is no indication of any payor of the
dividends
or earnings.cralaw:red
19. Spouses Ferdinand
and Imelda did not declare any income from any deposits and placements
which are subject to a 5% withholding tax. The Bureau of Internal
Revenue
attested that after a diligent search of pertinent records on file with
the Records Division, they did not find any records involving the tax
transactions
of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda in Revenue Region No. 1, Baguio City,
Revenue
Region No.4A, Manila, Revenue Region No. 4B1, Quezon City and Revenue
No.
8, Tacloban, Leyte. Likewise, the Office of the Revenue Collector
of Batac. Further, BIR attested that no records were found on any
filing
of capital gains tax return involving spouses FM and Imelda covering
the
years 1960 to 1965.cralaw:red
20. In Schedule
B, the taxable reported income over the twenty-year period was
P14,463,595.00
which represents 88% of the gross income. The Marcoses paid
income
taxes totaling P8,233,296.00 or US$1,220,667.59. The business
expenses
in the amount of P861,748.00 represent expenses incurred for
subscription,
postage, stationeries and contributions while the other deductions in
the
amount of P567,097.00 represents interest charges, medicare fees, taxes
and licenses. The total deductions in the amount of P1,994,845.00
represents
12% of the total gross income.cralaw:red
21. In Schedule
C, the net cumulative disposable income amounts to P6,756,301.00 or
US$980,709.77.
This is the amount that represents that portion of the Marcoses income
that is free for consumption, savings and investments. The amount
is arrived at by adding back to the net income after tax the personal
and
additional exemptions for the years 1965-1984, as well as the
tax-exempt
salary of the President for the years 1966 until 1972.cralaw:red
22. Finally, the
networth analysis in Schedule D, represents the total accumulated
networth
of spouses, Ferdinand and Imelda. Respondent’s Balance Sheet
attached
to their 1965 ITR, covering the year immediately preceding their
ascendancy
to the presidency, indicates an ending networth of P120,000.00 which FM
declared as Library and Miscellaneous assets. In computing for
the
networth, the income approach was utilized. Under this approach,
the beginning capital is increased or decreased, as the case may be,
depending
upon the income earned or loss incurred. Computations establish
the
total networth of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda, for the years 1965
until
1984 in the total amount of US$957,487.75, assuming the income from
legal
practice is real and valid x x x.
G. THE
SECRET
MARCOS DEPOSITS IN SWISS BANKS
23. The following
presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in detail how
both
respondents clandestinely stashed away the country’s wealth to
Switzerland
and hid the same under layers upon layers of foundations and other
corporate
entities to prevent its detection. Through their
dummies/nominees,
fronts or agents who formed those foundations or corporate entities,
they
opened and maintained numerous bank accounts. But due to the
difficulty
if not the impossibility of detecting and documenting all those secret
accounts as well as the enormity of the deposits therein hidden, the
following
presentation is confined to five identified accounts groups, with
balances
amounting to about $356-M with a reservation for the filing of a
supplemental
or separate forfeiture complaint should the need arise.
H. THE
AZIO-VERSO-VIBUR
FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
24. On June 11,
1971, Ferdinand Marcos issued a written order to Dr. Theo Bertheau,
legal
counsel of Schweizeresche Kreditanstalt or SKA, also known as Swiss
Credit
Bank, for him to establish the AZIO Foundation. On the same date,
Marcos executed a power of attorney in favor of Roberto S. Benedicto
empowering
him to transact business in behalf of the said foundation.
Pursuant
to the said Marcos mandate, AZIO Foundation was formed on June 21, 1971
in Vaduz. Walter Fessler and Ernst Scheller, also of SKA Legal
Service,
and Dr. Helmuth Merling from Schaan were designated as members of the
Board
of Trustees of the said foundation. Ferdinand Marcos was named
first
beneficiary and the Marcos Foundation, Inc. was second
beneficiary.
On November 12, 1971, FM again issued another written order naming
Austrahil
PTY Ltd. In Sydney, Australia, as the foundation’s first and sole
beneficiary.
This was recorded on December 14, 1971.cralaw:red
25. In an undated
instrument, Marcos changed the first and sole beneficiary to CHARIS
FOUNDATION.
This change was recorded on December 4, 1972.cralaw:red
26. On August
29, 1978, the AZIO FOUNDATION was renamed to VERSO FOUNDATION.
The
Board of Trustees remained the same. On March 11, 1981, Marcos
issued
a written directive to liquidated VERSO FOUNDATION and to transfer all
its assets to account of FIDES TRUST COMPANY at Bank Hofman in Zurich
under
the account "Reference OSER." The Board of Trustees decided to dissolve
the foundation on June 25, 1981.cralaw:red
27. In an apparent
maneuver to bury further the secret deposits beneath the thick layers
of
corporate entities, FM effected the establishment of VIBUR FOUNDATION
on
May 13, 1981 in Vaduz. Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a
wholly-owned
subsidiary of Fides Trust, were designated as members of the Board of
Trustees.
The account was officially opened with SKA on September 10, 1981.
The beneficial owner was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust
Company
acted as fiduciary. However, comparison of the listing of the
securities
in the safe deposit register of the VERSO FOUNDATION as of
February
27, 1981 with that of VIBUR FOUNDATION as of December 31,
1981
readily reveals that exactly the same securities were listed.cralaw:red
28. Under the
foregoing circumstances, it is certain that the VIBUR FOUNDATION is the
beneficial successor of VERSO FOUNDATION.cralaw:red
29. On March 18,
1986, the Marcos-designated Board of Trustees decided to liquidate
VIBUR
FOUNDATION. A notice of such liquidation was sent to the Office
of
the Public Register on March 21, 1986. However, the bank accounts
and respective balances of the said VIBUR FOUNDATION remained with SKA.
Apparently, the liquidation was an attempt by the Marcoses to transfer
the foundation’s funds to another account or bank but this was
prevented
by the timely freeze order issued by the Swiss authorities. One of the
latest documents obtained by the PCGG from the Swiss authorities
is a declaration signed by Dr. Ivo Beck (the trustee) stating that the
beneficial owner of VIBUR FOUNDATION is Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Another
document signed by G. Raber of SKA shows that VIBUR FOUNDATION is
owned by the "Marcos Familie"
30. As of December
31, 1989, the balance of the bank accounts of VIBUR FOUNDATION with
SKA,
Zurich, under the General Account No. 469857 totaled
$3,597,544.00 chanrobles virtual law library
I.
XANDY-WINTROP:
CHARIS-SCOLARI-VALAMO-SPINUS-AVERTINA FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
31. This is the
most intricate and complicated account group. As the Flow Chart
hereof
shows, two (2) groups under the foundation organized by Marcos
dummies/nominees
for FM’s benefit, eventually joined together and became one (1) account
group under the AVERTINA FOUNDATION for the benefit of both FM and
Imelda.
This is the biggest group from where the $50-M investment fund of the
Marcoses
was drawn when they bought the Central Bank’s dollar-denominated
treasury
notes with high-yielding interests.cralaw:red
32. On March 20,
1968, after his second year in the presidency, Marcos opened bank
accounts
with SKA using an alias or pseudonym WILLIAM SAUNDERS, apparently to
hide
his true identity. The next day, March 21, 1968, his First Lady,
Mrs. Imelda Marcos also opened her own bank accounts with the same bank
using an American-sounding alias, JANE RYAN. Found among the
voluminous
documents in Malacañang shortly after they fled to Hawaii in
haste
that fateful night of February 25, 1986, were accomplished forms for
"Declaration/Specimen
Signatures" submitted by the Marcos couple. Under the caption
"signature(s)"
Ferdinand and Imelda signed their real names as well as their
respective
aliases underneath. These accounts were actively operated and
maintained
by the Marcoses for about two (2) years until their closure sometime in
February, 1970 and the balances transferred to XANDY FOUNDATION.cralaw:red
33. The XANDY
FOUNDATION was established on March 3, 1970 in Vaduz. C.W. Fessler, C.
Souviron and E. Scheller were named as members of the Board of Trustees.cralaw:red
34. FM and Imelda
issued the written mandate to establish the foundation to Markus Geel
of
SKA on March 3, 1970. In the handwritten Regulations signed by
the
Marcos couple as well as in the type-written Regulations signed by
Markus
Geel both dated February 13, 1970, the Marcos spouses were named the
first
beneficiaries, the surviving spouse as the second beneficiary and the
Marcos
children - Imee, Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong) and Irene
- as equal third beneficiaries.cralaw:red
35. The XANDY
FOUNDATION was renamed WINTROP FOUNDATION on August 29,
1978.
The Board of Trustees remained the same at the outset. However,
on
March 27, 1980, Souviron was replaced by Dr. Peter Ritter. On
March
10. 1981, Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos issued a written order to the
Board
of Wintrop to liquidate the foundation and transfer all its assets to
Bank
Hofmann in Zurich in favor of FIDES TRUST COMPANY. Later, WINTROP
FOUNDATION
was dissolved.cralaw:red
36. The AVERTINA
FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Atty. Ivo Beck
and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of FIDES TRUST
CO.,
as members of the Board of Trustees. Two (2) account categories,
namely: CAR and NES, were opened on September 10, 1981. The
beneficial
owner of AVERTINA was not made known to the bank since the FIDES TRUST
CO. acted as fiduciary. However, the securities listed in the
safe
deposit register of WINTROP FOUNDATION Category R as of December 31,
1980
were the same as those listed in the register of AVERTINA FOUNDATION
Category
CAR as of December 31, 1981. Likewise, the securities listed in the
safe
deposit register of WINTROP FOUNDATION Category S as of December
31, 1980 were the same as those listed in the register of Avertina
Category
NES as of December 31, 1981.Under the circumstances, it is certain that
the beneficial successor of WINTROP FOUNDATION is AVERTINA
FOUNDATION.
The balance of Category CAR as of December 31, 1989 amounted to
US$231,366,894.00
while that of Category NES as of 12-31-83 was US$8,647,190.00.
Latest
documents received from Swiss authorities included a declaration signed
by IVO Beck stating that the beneficial owners of AVERTINA FOUNDATION
are
FM and Imelda. Another document signed by G. Raber of SKA
indicates
that Avertina Foundation is owned by the "Marcos Families."
37. The other
groups of foundations that eventually joined AVERTINA were also
established
by FM through his dummies, which started with the CHARIS FOUNDATION.chanrobles virtual law library
38. The CHARIS
FOUNDATION was established in VADUZ on December 27, 1971. Walter
Fessler
and Ernst Scheller of SKA and Dr. Peter
Ritter
were named as directors. Dr. Theo Bertheau, SKA legal
counsel,
acted as founding director in behalf of FM by virtue of the mandate and
agreement dated November 12, 1971. FM himself was named the first
beneficiary and Xandy Foundation as second beneficiary in accordance
with
the handwritten instructions of FM on November 12, 1971 and the
Regulations.
FM gave a power of attorney to Roberto S. Benedicto on February 15,
1972
to act in his behalf with regard to Charis Foundation.cralaw:red
39. On December
13, 1974, Charis Foundation was renamed Scolari Foundation but the
directors
remained the same. On March 11, 1981 FM ordered in writing that the
Valamo
Foundation be liquidated and all its assets be transferred to Bank
Hofmann,
AG in favor of Fides Trust Company under the account "Reference OMAL".
The Board of Directors decided on the immediate dissolution of Valamo
Foundation
on June 25, 1981.cralaw:red
40 The SPINUS
FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Atty. Ivo Beck
and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust Co., as
members of the Foundation’s Board of Directors. The account was
officially
opened with SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner of the
foundation
was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust Co. acted as
fiduciary.
However, the list of securities in the safe deposit register of Valamo
Foundation as of December 31, 1980 are practically the same with those
listed in the safe deposit register of Spinus Foundation as of December
31, 1981. Under the circumstances, it is certain that the Spinus
Foundation is the beneficial successor of the Valamo Foundation.cralaw:red
41. On September
6, 1982, there was a written instruction from Spinus Foundation to SKA
to close its Swiss Franc account and transfer the balance to Avertina
Foundation.
In July/August, 1982, several transfers from the foundation’s German
marks
and US dollar accounts were made to Avertina Category CAR totaling DM
29.5-M
and $58-M, respectively. Moreover, a comparison of the list of
securities
of the Spinus Foundation as of February 3, 1982 with the safe deposit
slips
of the Avertina Foundation Category CAR as of August 19, 1982 shows
that
all the securities of Spinus were transferred to Avertina.
J.
TRINIDAD-RAYBY-PALMY
FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
42. The Trinidad
Foundation was organized on August 26, 1970 in Vaduz with C.W. Fessler
and E. Scheller of SKA and Dr. Otto Tondury as the foundation’s
directors.
Imelda issued a written mandate to establish the foundation to Markus
Geel
on August 26, 1970. The regulations as well as the agreement, both
dated
August 28, 1970 were likewise signed by Imelda. Imelda was named
the first beneficiary and her children Imelda (Imee), Ferdinand, Jr.
(Bongbong)
and, Irene were named as equal second beneficiaries.
43. Rayby Foundation
was established on June 22, 1973 in Vaduz with Fessler, Scheller and
Ritter
as members of the board of directors. Imelda issued a written
mandate
to Dr. Theo Bertheau to establish the foundation with a note that the
foundation’s
capitalization as well as the cost of establishing it be debited
against
the account of Trinidad Foundation. Imelda was named the first
and
only beneficiary of Rayby foundation. According to written
information
from SKA dated November 28, 1988, Imelda apparently had the intention
in
1973 to transfer part of the assets of Trinidad Foundation to another
foundation,
thus the establishment of Rayby Foundation. However, transfer of
assets never took place. On March 10, 1981, Imelda issued a written
order
to transfer all the assets of Rayby Foundation to Trinidad Foundation
and
to subsequently liquidate Rayby. On the same date, she issued a written
order to the board of Trinidad to dissolve the foundation and transfer
all its assets to Bank Hofmann in favor of Fides Trust Co. Under the
account
"Reference Dido," Rayby was dissolved on April 6, 1981 and Trinidad was
liquidated on August 3, 1981.chanrobles virtual law library
44. The PALMY
FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Dr. Ivo Beck
and
Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust Co, as
members
of the Foundation’s Board of Directors. The account was
officially
opened with the SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner was not
made known to the bank since Fides Trust Co. acted as fiduciary.
However,
when one compares the listing of securities in the safe deposit
register
of Trinidad Foundation as of December 31,1980 with that of the Palmy
Foundation
as of December 31, 1980, one can clearly see that practically the same
securities were listed. Under the circumstances, it is certain that the
Palmy Foundation is the beneficial successor of the Trinidad Foundation.cralaw:red
45. As of December
31, 1989, the ending balance of the bank accounts of Palmy Foundation
under
General Account No. 391528 is $17,214,432.00.cralaw:red
46. Latest documents
received from Swiss Authorities included a declaration signed by Dr.
Ivo
Beck stating that the beneficial owner of Palmy Foundation is Imelda.
Another
document signed by Raber shows that the said Palmy Foundation is owned
by "Marcos Familie".
K.
ROSALYS-AGUAMINA
FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
47. Rosalys Foundation
was established in 1971 with FM as the beneficiary. Its Articles of
Incorporation
was executed on September 24, 1971 and its By-Laws on October 3, 1971.
This foundation maintained several accounts with Swiss Bank Corporation
(SBC) under the general account 51960 where most of the bribe monies
from
Japanese suppliers were hidden.cralaw:red
48. On December
19, 1985, Rosalys Foundation was liquidated and all its assets were
transferred
to Aguamina Corporation’s (Panama) Account No. 53300 with SBC. The
ownership
by Aguamina Corporation of Account No. 53300 is evidenced by an opening
account documents from the bank. J. Christinaz and R.L. Rossier, First
Vice-President and Senior Vice President, respectively, of SBC, Geneva
issued a declaration dated September 3, 1991 stating that the by-laws
dated
October 3, 1971 governing Rosalys Foundation was the same by-law
applied
to Aguamina Corporation Account No. 53300. They further confirmed that
no change of beneficial owner was involved while transferring the
assets
of Rosalys to Aguamina. Hence, FM remains the beneficiary of Aguamina
Corporation
Account No. 53300.cralaw:red
As of August 30, 1991,
the ending balance of Account No. 53300 amounted to $80,566,483.00.
L. MALER
FOUNDATION
ACCOUNTS
49. Maler was
first created as an establishment. A statement of its rules and
regulations
was found among Malacañang documents. It stated, among others,
that
50% of the Company’s assets will be for sole and full right disposal of
FM and Imelda during their lifetime, which the remaining 50% will be
divided
in equal parts among their children. Another Malacañang document
dated October 19,1968 and signed by Ferdinand and Imelda pertains to
the
appointment of Dr. Andre Barbey and Jean Louis Sunier as attorneys of
the
company and as administrator and manager of all assets held by the
company.
The Marcos couple, also mentioned in the said document that they bought
the Maler Establishment from SBC, Geneva. On the same date, FM and
Imelda
issued a letter addressed to Maler Establishment, stating that all
instructions
to be transmitted with regard to Maler will be signed with the word
"JOHN
LEWIS". This word will have the same value as the couple’s own personal
signature. The letter was signed by FM and Imelda in their signatures
and
as John Lewis.cralaw:red
50. Maler Establishment
opened and maintained bank accounts with SBC, Geneva. The opening bank
documents were signed by Dr. Barbey and Mr. Sunnier as authorized
signatories.chanrobles virtual law library
51. On November
17, 1981, it became necessary to transform Maler Establishment into a
foundation.
Likewise, the attorneys were changed to Michael Amaudruz, et. al.
However,
administration of the assets was left to SBC. The articles of
incorporation
of Maler Foundation registered on November 17, 1981 appear to be the
same
articles applied to Maler Establishment. On February 28, 1984, Maler
Foundation
cancelled the power of attorney for the management of its assets in
favor
of SBC and transferred such power to Sustrust Investment Co., S.A.cralaw:red
52. As of June
6, 1991, the ending balance of Maler Foundation’s Account Nos. 254,508
BT and 98,929 NY amount SF 9,083,567 and SG 16,195,258, respectively,
for
a total of SF 25,278,825.00. GM only until December 31, 1980.
This
account was opened by Maler when it was still an establishment which
was
subsequently transformed into a foundation.cralaw:red
53. All the five
(5) group accounts in the over-all flow chart have a total balance of
about
Three Hundred Fifty Six Million Dollars ($356,000,000.00) as shown by
Annex
"R-5" hereto attached as integral part hereof.cralaw:red
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x.[27]
Respondents Imelda R.
Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand Marcos,
Jr., in their answer, stated the following:
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
4.
Respondents ADMIT paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Petition.cralaw:red
5.
Respondents specifically deny paragraph 5 of the Petition in so far as
it states that summons and other court processes may be served on
Respondent
Imelda R. Marcos at the stated address the truth of the matter being
that
Respondent Imelda R. Marcos may be served with summons and other
processes
at No. 10-B Bel Air Condominium 5022 P. Burgos Street, Makati, Metro
Manila,
and ADMIT the rest.cralaw:red
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
10. Respondents ADMIT
paragraph 11 of the Petition.cralaw:red
11. Respondents specifically
DENY paragraph 12 of the Petition for lack of knowledge sufficient to
form
a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents were not
privy
to the transactions and that they cannot remember exactly the truth as
to the matters alleged.chanrobles virtual law library
12. Respondents specifically
DENY paragraph 13 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since
Respondents
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs and
Balance
Sheet.cralaw:red
13. Respondents specifically
DENY paragraph 14 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since
Respondents
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.cralaw:red
14. Respondents specifically
DENY paragraph 15 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since
Respondents
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.cralaw:red
15. Respondents specifically
DENY paragraph 16 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since
Respondents
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.cralaw:red
16. Respondents specifically
DENY paragraph 17 of the Petition insofar as it attributes willful
duplicity
on the part of the late President Marcos, for being false, the same
being
pure conclusions based on pure assumption and not allegations of fact;
and specifically DENY the rest for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents
cannot
remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs or the
attachments
thereto.cralaw:red
17. Respondents specifically
DENY paragraph 18 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since
Respondents
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.cralaw:red
18. Respondents specifically
DENY paragraph 19 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since
Respondents
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs and
that
they are not privy to the activities of the BIR.cralaw:red
19. Respondents specifically
DENY paragraph 20 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since
Respondents
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.cralaw:red
20. Respondents specifically
DENY paragraph 21 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since
Respondents
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.cralaw:red
21. Respondents specifically
DENY paragraph 22 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since
Respondents
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.cralaw:red
22. Respondents specifically
DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that Respondents clandestinely
stashed the country’s wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under
layers
and layers of foundation and corporate entities for being false, the
truth
being that Respondents aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.cralaw:red
23. Respondents specifically
DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Petition for lack
of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
of the allegation since Respondents were not privy to the transactions
regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except that
as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the
funds
involved were lawfully acquired.chanrobles virtual law library
24. Respondents specifically
DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,37, 38, 39, 40, and 41 of the
Petition
for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of the allegations since Respondents are not privy to the
transactions
and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with
exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to
Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds
involved
were lawfully acquired.cralaw:red
25. Respondents specifically
DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46, of the Petition for lack of
knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations
since Respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such
transaction
they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same having
occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos
she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired.cralaw:red
26. Respondents specifically
DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52, of the Petition for lack of
knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations
since Respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such
transaction
they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same having
occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos
she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired.cralaw:red
Upon careful perusal
of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent Mrs. Marcos and the
Marcos
children indubitably failed to tender genuine issues in their answer to
the petition for forfeiture. A genuine issue is an issue of fact
which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an
issue
which is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently
lacking
in substance so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.
Respondents’
defenses of "lack of knowledge for lack of privity" or "(inability to)
recall because it happened a long time ago" or, on the part of Mrs.
Marcos,
that "the funds were lawfully acquired" are fully insufficient to
tender
genuine issues. Respondent Marcoses’ defenses were a sham and evidently
calibrated to compound and confuse the issues.cralaw:red
The following
pleadings filed by respondent Marcoses are replete with indications of
a spurious defense:
(a)
Respondents' Answer dated October 18, 1993;
(b)
Pre-trial Brief dated October 4, 1999 of Mrs. Marcos, Supplemental
Pre-trial
Brief dated October 19, 1999 of Ferdinand, Jr. and Mrs. Imee
Marcos-Manotoc
adopting the pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, and Manifestation dated
October
19, 1999 of Irene Marcos-Araneta adopting the pre-trial briefs of her
co-
respondents;
(c)
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 21, 2000, filed
by
Mrs. Marcos which the other respondents (Marcos children) adopted;
(d)
Demurrer to Evidence dated May 2, 2000 filed by Mrs. Marcos and adopted
by the Marcos children;chanrobles virtual law library
(e)
Motion for Reconsideration dated September 26, 2000 filed by Mrs.
Marcos;
Motion for Reconsideration dated October 5, 2000 jointly filed by Mrs.
Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr., and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
dated October 9, 2000 likewise jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and
Ferdinand,
Jr.;
(f)
Memorandum dated December 12, 2000 of Mrs. Marcos and Memorandum dated
December 17, 2000 of the Marcos children;
(g)
Manifestation dated May 26, 1998; and
(h)
General/Supplemental Agreement dated December 23, 1993.cralaw:red
An examination of the
foregoing pleadings is in order.cralaw:red
*
Respondents’ Answer dated October 18, 1993.cralaw:red
In their answer, respondents
failed to specifically deny each and every allegation contained in the
petition for forfeiture in the manner required by the rules. All
they gave were stock answers like "they have no sufficient knowledge"
or
"they could not recall because it happened a long time ago," and, as to
Mrs. Marcos, "the funds were lawfully acquired," without stating the
basis
of such assertions.cralaw:red
Section 10, Rule 8 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
A defendant must specify
each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit
and,
whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon
which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to
deny
only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true
and
material and shall deny the remainder. Where a defendant is without
knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a
material
averment made in the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have
the effect of a denial.[28]
The purpose of requiring
respondents to make a specific denial is to make them disclose facts
which
will disprove the allegations of petitioner at the trial, together with
the matters they rely upon in support of such denial. Our jurisdiction
adheres to this rule to avoid and prevent unnecessary expenses and
waste
of time by compelling both parties to lay their cards on the table,
thus
reducing the controversy to its true terms. As explained in
Alonso
vs. Villamor,[29]
A litigation is not
a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled
in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the
other.
It is rather a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly
lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as
wholly
trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of
procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike
duels, are not to be won by a rapier’s thrust.cralaw:red
On the part of Mrs.
Marcos, she claimed that the funds were lawfully acquired. However, she
failed to particularly state the ultimate facts surrounding the lawful
manner or mode of acquisition of the subject funds. Simply put, she
merely
stated in her answer with the other respondents that the funds were
"lawfully
acquired" without detailing how exactly these funds were supposedly
acquired
legally by them. Even in this case before us, her assertion that the
funds
were lawfully acquired remains bare and unaccompanied by any factual
support
which can prove, by the presentation of evidence at a hearing, that
indeed
the funds were acquired legitimately by the Marcos family.chanrobles virtual law library
Respondents’ denials
in their answer at the Sandiganbayan were based on their alleged lack
of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations of the petition.cralaw:red
It is true that one
of the modes of specific denial under the rules is a denial through a
statement
that the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to
form
a belief as to the truth of the material averment in the
complaint.
The question, however, is whether the kind of denial in respondents’
answer
qualifies as the specific denial called for by the rules. We do
not
think so. In Morales vs. Court of Appeals,[30]
this Court ruled that if an allegation directly and specifically
charges
a party with having done, performed or committed a particular act which
the latter did not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical and
express
denial must be made.cralaw:red
Here, despite the serious
and specific allegations against them, the Marcoses responded by simply
saying that they had no knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief
as to the truth of such allegations. Such a general, self-serving
claim of ignorance of the facts alleged in the petition for forfeiture
was insufficient to raise an issue. Respondent Marcoses should have
positively
stated how it was that they were supposedly ignorant of the facts
alleged.[31]
To elucidate, the allegation
of petitioner Republic in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture
stated:
23. The following presentation
very clearly and overwhelmingly show in detail how both respondents
clandestinely
stashed away the country’s wealth to Switzerland and hid the same under
layers upon layers of foundations and other corporate entities to
prevent
its detection. Through their dummies/nominees, fronts or agents who
formed
those foundations or corporate entities, they opened and maintained
numerous
bank accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the impossibility
of detecting and documenting all those secret accounts as well as the
enormity
of the deposits therein hidden, the following presentation is confined
to five identified accounts groups, with balances amounting to about
$356-M
with a reservation for the filing of a supplemental or separate
forfeiture
complaint should the need arise.[32]
Respondents’ lame denial
of the aforesaid allegation was:chanrobles virtual law library
22. Respondents specifically
DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that Respondents clandestinely
stashed the country’s wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under
layers
and layers of foundations and corporate entities for being false, the
truth
being that Respondents’ aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.[33]
Evidently, this particular
denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on pleadings as a
negative
pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the
substantial
facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied.
It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at.[34]
Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression
which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some
kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with
an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a
fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of
the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has
been
held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact
itself is admitted.[35]
In the instant case,
the material allegations in paragraph 23 of the said petition were not
specifically denied by respondents in paragraph 22 of their
answer.
The denial contained in paragraph 22 of the answer was focused on the
averment
in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture that "Respondents
clandestinely
stashed the country’s wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under
layers
and layers of foundations and corporate entities." Paragraph 22 of the
respondents’ answer was thus a denial pregnant with admissions of the
following
substantial facts:
(1)
the Swiss bank deposits existed and
(2)
that the estimated sum thereof was US$356 million as of December, 1990.cralaw:red
Therefore, the allegations
in the petition for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank
deposits
in the sum of about US$356 million, not having been specifically denied
by respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted by them pursuant
to
Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure:
Material averment in
the complaint, xxx shall be deemed admitted when not specifically
denied.
xxx.[36]
By the same token, the
following unsupported denials of respondents in their answer were
pregnant
with admissions of the substantial facts alleged in the Republic’s
petition
for forfeiture:
23. Respondents specifically
DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Petition for
lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegation since respondents were not privy to the
transactions
regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except
that,
as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the
funds involved were lawfully acquired.cralaw:red
24. Respondents specifically
DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 of the
Petition
for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to the
transactions
and as to such transactions they were privy to, they cannot remember
with
exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except as to
respondent
Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved
were
lawfully acquired.chanrobles virtual law library
25. Respondents
specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 45, and 46 of the petition for
lack
of knowledge or information sufficient to from a belief as to the truth
of the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions
and as to such transaction they were privy to, they cannot remember
with
exactitude, the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to
respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds
involved were lawfully acquired.cralaw:red
26. Respondents specifically
DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52 of the petition for lack of knowledge
and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations
since respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such
transaction
they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same having
occurred a long time ago, except that as to respondent Imelda R.
Marcos,
she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired.cralaw:red
The matters referred
to in paragraphs 23 to 26 of the respondents’ answer pertained to the
creation
of five groups of accounts as well as their respective ending balances
and attached documents alleged in paragraphs 24 to 52 of the Republic’s
petition for forfeiture. Respondent Imelda R. Marcos never
specifically
denied the existence of the Swiss funds. Her claim that "the funds
involved
were lawfully acquired" was an acknowledgment on her part of the
existence
of said deposits. This only reinforced her earlier admission of the
allegation
in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture regarding the existence
of the US$356 million Swiss bank deposits.cralaw:red
The allegations in paragraphs
47[37]
and 48[38]
of the petition for forfeiture referring to the creation and amount of
the deposits of the Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation as well as the averment
in paragraph 52-a[39]
of the said petition with respect to the sum of the Swiss bank deposits
estimated to be US$356 million were again not specifically denied by
respondents
in their answer. The respondents did not at all respond to the issues
raised
in these paragraphs and the existence, nature and amount of the Swiss
funds
were therefore deemed admitted by them. As held in Galofa vs. Nee
Bon Sing,[40]
if a defendant’s denial is a negative pregnant, it is equivalent to an
admission.cralaw:red
Moreover, respondents’
denial of the allegations in the petition for forfeiture "for lack of
knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations
since respondents were not privy to the transactions" was just a
pretense.
Mrs. Marcos’ privity to the transactions was in fact evident from her
signatures
on some of the vital documents[41]
attached to the petition for forfeiture which Mrs. Marcos
failed
to specifically deny as required by the rules.[42]
It is worthy to note
that the pertinent documents attached to the petition for forfeiture
were
even signed personally by respondent Mrs. Marcos and her late husband,
Ferdinand E. Marcos, indicating that said documents were within their
knowledge.
As correctly pointed out by Sandiganbayan Justice Francisco Villaruz,
Jr.
in his dissenting opinion:
The pattern of: 1) creating
foundations, 2) use of pseudonyms and dummies, 3) approving regulations
of the Foundations for the distribution of capital and income of the
Foundations
to the First and Second beneficiary (who are no other than FM and his
family),
4) opening of bank accounts for the Foundations, 5) changing the names
of the Foundations, 6) transferring funds and assets of the Foundations
to other Foundations or Fides Trust, 7) liquidation of the Foundations
as substantiated by the Annexes U to U-168, Petition [for forfeiture]
strongly
indicate that FM and/or Imelda were the real owners of the assets
deposited
in the Swiss banks, using the Foundations as dummies.[43]
How could respondents
therefore claim lack of sufficient knowledge or information regarding
the
existence of the Swiss bank deposits and the creation of five groups of
accounts when Mrs. Marcos and her late husband personally masterminded
and participated in the formation and control of said
foundations?
This is a fact respondent Marcoses were never able to explain.chanrobles virtual law library
Not only that.
Respondents' answer also technically admitted the genuineness and due
execution
of the Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and the balance sheets of the late
Ferdinand
E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos attached to the petition for forfeiture,
as well as the veracity of the contents thereof.cralaw:red
The answer again premised
its denials of said ITRs and balance sheets on the ground of lack of
knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
contents
thereof. Petitioner correctly points out that respondents' denial was
not
really grounded on lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief but was based on lack of recollection. By reviewing their own
records, respondent Marcoses could have easily determined the
genuineness
and due execution of the ITRs and the balance sheets. They also
had
the means and opportunity of verifying the same from the records of the
BIR and the Office of the President. They did not.cralaw:red
When matters regarding
which respondents claim to have no knowledge or information
sufficient
to form a belief are plainly and necessarily within their
knowledge,
their alleged ignorance or lack of information will not be considered a
specific denial.[44]
An unexplained denial of information within the control of the pleader,
or is readily accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to
constitute
an effective denial.[45]
The form of denial adopted
by respondents must be availed of with sincerity and in good faith, and
certainly not for the purpose of confusing the adverse party as to what
allegations of the petition are really being challenged; nor should it
be made for the purpose of delay.[46]
In the instant case, the Marcoses did not only present unsubstantiated
assertions but in truth attempted to mislead and deceive this Court by
presenting an obviously contrived defense.cralaw:red
Simply put, a profession
of ignorance about a fact which is patently and necessarily within the
pleader’s knowledge or means of knowing is as ineffective as no denial
at all.[47]
Respondents’ ineffective denial thus failed to properly tender an issue
and the averments contained in the petition for forfeiture were deemed
judicially admitted by them.cralaw:red
As held in J.P. Juan
& Sons, Inc. vs. Lianga Industries, Inc.:
Its "specific denial"
of the material allegation of the petition without setting forth the
substance
of the matters relied upon to support its general denial, when such
matters
were plainly within its knowledge and it could not logically pretend
ignorance
as to the same, therefore, failed to properly tender on issue.[48]
Thus, the general denial
of the Marcos children of the allegations in the petition for
forfeiture
"for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of the allegations since they were not privy to the
transactions"
cannot rightfully be accepted as a defense because they are the legal
heirs
and successors-in-interest of Ferdinand E. Marcos and are therefore
bound
by the acts of their father vis-a-vis the Swiss funds.cralaw:red
*
PRE-TRIAL BRIEF DATED OCTOBER 18, 1993
The pre-trial brief
of Mrs. Marcos was adopted by the three Marcos children. In said
brief, Mrs. Marcos stressed that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired.
But, as in their answer, they failed to state and substantiate how
these
funds were acquired lawfully. They failed to present and attach even
a
single document that
would
show and prove the truth of their
allegations.
Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:chanrobles virtual law library
The parties shall file
with the court and serve on the adverse party, x x x their respective
pre-trial
briefs which shall contain, among others:
x
x x
(d) the documents or
exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof;
x
x x
(f) the number and names
of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective testimonies.[49]chanrobles virtual law library
It is unquestionably
within the court’s power to require the parties to submit their
pre-trial
briefs and to state the number of witnesses intended to be called to
the
stand, and a brief summary of the evidence each of them is expected to
give as well as to disclose the number of documents to be submitted
with
a description of the nature of each. The tenor and character of
the
testimony of the witnesses and of the documents to be deduced at the
trial
thus made known, in addition to the particular issues of fact and law,
it becomes apparent if genuine issues are being put forward
necessitating
the holding of a trial. Likewise, the parties are obliged not only to
make
a formal identification and specification of the issues and their
proofs,
and to put these matters in writing and submit them to the court within
the specified period for the prompt disposition of the action.[50]
The pre-trial brief
of Mrs. Marcos, as subsequently adopted by respondent Marcos children,
merely stated:
x
x x
WITNESSES
4.1 Respondent Imelda
will present herself as a witness and reserves the right to present
additional
witnesses as may be necessary in the course of the trial.cralaw:red
x
x x
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
5.1 Respondent Imelda
reserves the right to present and introduce in evidence documents as
may
be necessary in the course of the trial.cralaw:red
Mrs. Marcos did not
enumerate and describe the documents constituting her evidence. Neither
the names of witnesses nor the nature of their testimony was stated.
What
alone appeared certain was the testimony of Mrs. Marcos only who in
fact
had previously claimed ignorance and lack of knowledge. And even
then, the substance of her testimony, as required by the rules, was not
made known either. Such cunning tactics of respondents are totally
unacceptable
to this Court. We hold that, since no genuine issue was raised,
the
case became ripe for summary judgment.chanrobles virtual law library
*
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DATED MARCH 21, 2000
The opposition filed
by Mrs. Marcos to the motion for summary judgment dated March 21, 2000
of petitioner Republic was merely adopted by the Marcos children as
their
own opposition to the said motion. However, it was again not
accompanied
by affidavits, depositions or admissions as required by Section 3, Rule
35 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure:
x x x The adverse party
may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least
three
(3) days before hearing. After hearing, the judgment sought shall be
rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and
admissions
on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.[51]
The absence of opposing
affidavits, depositions and admissions to contradict the sworn
declarations
in the Republic’s motion only demonstrated that the averments of such
opposition
were not genuine and therefore unworthy of belief.cralaw:red
* Demurrer
to Evidence dated May 2, 2000;[52]
Motions for
Reconsideration;[53]
and Memoranda of Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children[54]chanrobles virtual law library
All these pleadings
again contained no allegations of facts showing their lawful
acquisition
of the funds. Once more, respondents merely made general denials
without
alleging facts which would have been admissible in evidence at the
hearing,
thereby failing to raise genuine issues of fact.cralaw:red
Mrs. Marcos insists
in her memorandum dated October 21, 2002 that, during the pre-trial,
her
counsel stated that his client was just a beneficiary of the funds,
contrary
to petitioner Republic’s allegation that Mrs. Marcos disclaimed
ownership
of or interest in the funds.cralaw:red
This is yet another
indication that respondents presented a fictitious defense because,
during
the pre-trial, Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children denied ownership of
or interest in the Swiss funds:
PJ Garchitorena:
Make of record that
as far as Imelda Marcos is concerned through the statement of Atty.
Armando
M. Marcelo that the US$360 million more or less subject matter of the
instant
lawsuit as allegedly obtained from the various Swiss Foundations do not
belong to the estate of Marcos or to Imelda Marcos herself.
That’s
your statement of facts?chanrobles virtual law library
Atty. MARCELO:
Yes, Your Honor.cralaw:red
PJ Garchitorena:
That’s it. Okay. Counsel
for Manotoc and Manotoc, Jr. What is your point here? Does
the estate of Marcos own anything of the $360 million subject of this
case.cralaw:red
Atty. TECSON:
We joined the Manifestation
of Counsel.cralaw:red
PJ Garchitorena:
You do not own anything?
Atty. TECSON:
Yes, Your Honor.cralaw:red
PJ Garchitorena:
Counsel for Irene Araneta?
Atty. SISON:
I join the position
taken by my other compañeros here, Your Honor.cralaw:red
xxx
Atty. SISON:
Irene Araneta as heir
do (sic) not own any of the amount, Your Honor.[55]
We are convinced that
the strategy of respondent Marcoses was to confuse petitioner Republic
as to what facts they would prove or what issues they intended to pose
for the court's resolution. There is no doubt in our mind that they
were
leading petitioner Republic, and now this Court, to perplexity, if not
trying to drag this forfeiture case to eternity.chanrobles virtual law library
* Manifestation
dated May 26, 1998 filed by Mrs. Marcos; General/Supplemental
Compromise
Agreement dated December 28, 1993
These pleadings of respondent
Marcoses presented nothing but feigned defenses. In their earlier
pleadings,
respondents alleged either that they had no knowledge of the existence
of the Swiss deposits or that they could no longer remember anything as
it happened a long time ago. As to Mrs. Marcos, she remembered
that
it was lawfully acquired.cralaw:red
In her Manifestation
dated May 26, 1998, Mrs. Marcos stated that:
COMES NOW undersigned
counsel for respondent Imelda R. Marcos, and before this Honorable
Court,
most respectfully manifests:
That respondent Imelda
R, Marcos owns 90% of the subject matter of the above-entitled case,
being
the sole beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of the various
foundations alleged in the case;
That in fact only 10%
of the subject matter in the above-entitled case belongs to the estate
of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.cralaw:red
In the Compromise/Supplemental
Agreements, respondent Marcoses sought to implement the agreed
distribution
of the Marcos assets, including the Swiss deposits. This was, to us, an
unequivocal admission of ownership by the Marcoses of the said deposits.cralaw:red
But, as already pointed
out, during the pre-trial conference, respondent Marcoses denied
knowledge
as well as ownership of the Swiss funds.cralaw:red
Anyway we look at it,
respondent Marcoses have put forth no real defense. The "facts" pleaded
by respondents, while ostensibly raising important questions or issues
of fact, in reality comprised mere verbiage that was evidently wanting
in substance and constituted no genuine issues for trial.cralaw:red
We therefore rule that,
under the circumstances, summary judgment is proper.cralaw:red
In fact, it is the law
itself which determines when summary judgment is called for. Under the
rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues
of fact requiring the presentation of evidence in a full-blown
trial.
Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issue, if the
affidavits,
depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then
summary judgment as prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter of
law.[56]
In sum, mere denials,
if unaccompanied by any fact which will be admissible in evidence at a
hearing, are not sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and will
not
defeat a motion for summary judgment.[57]
A summary judgment is one granted upon motion of a party for an
expeditious
settlement of the case, it appearing from the pleadings, depositions,
admissions
and affidavits that there are no important questions or issues of fact
posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law. A motion for summary judgment is premised on the
assumption
that the issues presented need not be tried either because these are
patently
devoid of substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any
pertinent
fact. It is a method sanctioned by the Rules of Court for the
prompt
disposition of a civil action where there exists no serious controversy.[58]
Summary judgment is a procedural device for the prompt disposition of
actions
in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as
to any material fact. The theory of summary judgment is that, although
an answer may on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if
it
is established by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those
issues
are not genuine but fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing
with
the trial and rendering summary judgment for petitioner.[59]chanrobles virtual law library
In the various annexes
to the petition for forfeiture, petitioner Republic attached sworn
statements
of witnesses who had personal knowledge of the Marcoses' participation
in the illegal acquisition of funds deposited in the Swiss accounts
under
the names of five groups or foundations. These sworn statements
substantiated
the ill-gotten nature of the Swiss bank deposits. In their answer and
other
subsequent pleadings, however, the Marcoses merely made general denials
of the allegations against them without stating facts admissible in
evidence
at the hearing, thereby failing to raise any genuine issues of fact.cralaw:red
Under these circumstances,
a trial would have served no purpose at all and would have been totally
unnecessary, thus justifying a summary judgment on the petition for
forfeiture.
There were no opposing affidavits to contradict the sworn declarations
of the witnesses of petitioner Republic, leading to the inescapable
conclusion
that the matters raised in the Marcoses’ answer were false.cralaw:red
Time and again, this
Court has encountered cases like this which are either only
half-heartedly
defended or, if the semblance of a defense is interposed at all, it is
only to delay disposition and gain time. It is certainly not in
the
interest of justice to allow respondent Marcoses to avail of the
appellate
remedies accorded by the Rules of Court to litigants in good faith, to
the prejudice of the Republic and ultimately of the Filipino people.
From
the beginning, a candid demonstration of respondents’ good faith should
have been made to the court below. Without the deceptive
reasoning
and argumentation, this protracted litigation could have ended a long
time
ago.cralaw:red
Since 1991, when the
petition for forfeiture was first filed, up to the present, all
respondents
have offered are foxy responses like "lack of sufficient knowledge or
lack
of privity" or "they cannot recall because it happened a long time ago"
or, as to Mrs. Marcos, "the funds were lawfully acquired." But,
whenever
it suits them, they also claim ownership of 90% of the funds and allege
that only 10% belongs to the Marcos estate. It has been an
incredible
charade from beginning to end.cralaw:red
In the hope of convincing
this Court to rule otherwise, respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc
and
Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. contend that "by its positive acts and express
admissions prior to filing the motion for summary judgment on March 10,
2000, petitioner Republic had bound itself to go to trial on the basis
of existing issues. Thus, it had legally waived whatever right it had
to
move for summary judgment."[60]
We do not think so.
The alleged positive acts and express admissions of the petitioner did
not preclude it from filing a motion for summary judgment.cralaw:red
Rule 35 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Rule 35
Summary Judgment
Section 1. Summary judgment
for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim,
or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after
the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting
affidavits,
depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all
or any part thereof.cralaw:red
Section 2. Summary judgment
for defending party. - A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim
is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move
with
supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment
in his favor as to all or any part thereof. (Emphasis ours)[61]
Under the rule, the
plaintiff can move for summary judgment "at any time after the pleading
in answer thereto (i.e., in answer to the claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim)
has been served." No fixed reglementary period is provided by the
Rules. How else does one construe the phrase "any time after the answer
has been served?"
This issue is actually
one of first impression. No local jurisprudence or authoritative work
has
touched upon this matter. This being so, an examination of foreign laws
and jurisprudence, particularly those of the United States where many
of
our laws and rules were copied, is in order.cralaw:red
Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party seeking to recover upon
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim may move for summary judgment at
any
time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the
action
or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party,
and that a party against whom a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is
asserted
may move for summary judgment at any time.chanrobles virtual law library
However, some rules,
particularly Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New York,
specifically
provide that a motion for summary judgment may not be made until issues
have been joined, that is, only after an answer has been served.[62]
Under said rule, after issues have been joined, the motion for summary
judgment may be made at any stage of the litigation.[63]
No fixed prescriptive period is provided.cralaw:red
Like Rule 113 of the
Rules of Civil Practice of New York, our rules also provide that a
motion
for summary judgment may not be made until issues have been joined,
meaning,
the plaintiff has to wait for the answer before he can move for summary
judgment.[64]
And like the New York rules, ours do not provide for a fixed
reglementary
period within which to move for summary judgment.cralaw:red
This being so, the New
York Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil
Practice
can be applied by analogy to the interpretation of Section 1, Rule 35,
of our 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.cralaw:red
Under the New York rule,
after the issues have been joined, the motion for summary judgment may
be made at any stage of the litigation. And what exactly does the
phrase
"at any stage of the litigation" mean? In Ecker vs. Muzysh,[65]
the New York Supreme Court ruled:
"PER CURIAM.cralaw:red
Plaintiff introduced
her evidence and the defendants rested on the case made by the
plaintiff.
The case was submitted. Owing to the serious illness of the trial
justice,
a decision was not rendered within sixty days after the final
adjournment
of the term at which the case was tried. With the approval of the trial
justice, the plaintiff moved for a new trial under Section 442 of the
Civil
Practice Act. The plaintiff also moved for summary judgment under Rule
113 of the Rules of Civil Practice. The motion was opposed mainly on
the
ground that, by proceeding to trial, the plaintiff had waived her right
to summary judgment and that the answer and the opposing affidavits
raised
triable issues. The amount due and unpaid under the contract is not in
dispute. The Special Term granted both motions and the defendants have
appealed.cralaw:red
The Special Term properly
held that the answer and the opposing affidavits raised no triable
issue.
Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice and the Civil Practice Act
prescribe
no limitation as to the time when a motion for summary judgment must be
made. The object of Rule 113 is to empower the court to summarily
determine
whether or not a bona fide issue exists between the parties, and there
is no limitation on the power of the court to make such a determination
at any stage of the litigation." (emphasis ours)
On the basis of the
aforequoted disquisition, "any stage of the litigation" means that
"even
if the plaintiff has proceeded to trial, this does not preclude him
from
thereafter moving for summary judgment."[66]
In the case at bar,
petitioner moved for summary judgment after pre-trial and before its
scheduled
date for presentation of evidence. Respondent Marcoses argue that, by
agreeing
to proceed to trial during the pre-trial conference, petitioner
"waived"
its right to summary judgment.cralaw:red
This argument must fail
in the light of the New York Supreme Court ruling which we apply by
analogy
to this case. In Ecker,[67]
the defendant opposed the motion for summary judgment on a ground
similar
to that raised by the Marcoses, that is, "that plaintiff had waived her
right to summary judgment" by her act of proceeding to trial. If,
as correctly ruled by the New York court, plaintiff was allowed to move
for summary judgment even after trial and submission of the case for
resolution,
more so should we permit it in the present case where petitioner moved
for summary judgment before trial.cralaw:red
Therefore, the phrase
"anytime after the pleading in answer thereto has been served" in
Section
1, Rule 35 of our Rules of Civil Procedure means "at any stage of the
litigation."
Whenever it becomes evident at any stage of the litigation that no
triable
issue exists, or that the defenses raised by the defendant(s) are sham
or frivolous, plaintiff may move for summary judgment. A contrary
interpretation
would go against the very objective of the Rule on Summary Judgment
which
is to "weed out sham claims or defenses thereby avoiding the expense
and
loss of time involved in a trial."[68]chanrobles virtual law library
In cases with political
undertones like the one at bar, adverse parties will often do almost
anything
to delay the proceedings in the hope that a future administration
sympathetic
to them might be able to influence the outcome of the case in their
favor.
This is rank injustice we cannot tolerate.cralaw:red
The law looks with disfavor
on long, protracted and expensive litigation and encourages the speedy
and prompt disposition of cases. That is why the law and the rules
provide
for a number of devices to ensure the speedy disposition of cases.
Summary
judgment is one of them.cralaw:red
Faithful therefore to
the spirit of the law on summary judgment which seeks to avoid
unnecessary
expense and loss of time in a trial, we hereby rule that petitioner
Republic
could validly move for summary judgment any time after the respondents’
answer was filed or, for that matter, at any subsequent stage of the
litigation.
The fact that petitioner agreed to proceed to trial did not in any way
prevent it from moving for summary judgment, as indeed no genuine issue
of fact was ever validly raised by respondent Marcoses.cralaw:red
This interpretation
conforms with the guiding principle enshrined in Section 6, Rule 1 of
the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that the "[r]ules should be liberally
construed
in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding."[69]
Respondents further
allege that the motion for summary judgment was based on respondents'
answer
and other documents that had long been in the records of the case.
Thus,
by the time the motion was filed on March 10, 2000, estoppel by laches
had already set in against petitioner.cralaw:red
We disagree. Estoppel
by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained
length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the person
has abandoned his right or declined to assert it.[70]
In effect, therefore, the principle of laches is one of estoppel
because
"it prevents people who have slept on their rights from prejudicing the
rights of third parties who have placed reliance on the inaction of the
original parties and their successors-in-interest".[71]
A careful examination
of the records, however, reveals that petitioner was in fact never
remiss
in pursuing its case against respondent Marcoses through every remedy
available
to it, including the motion for summary judgment.cralaw:red
Petitioner Republic
initially filed its motion for summary judgment on October 18, 1996.
The
motion was denied because of the pending compromise agreement between
the
Marcoses and petitioner. But during the pre-trial conference, the
Marcoses
denied ownership of the Swiss funds, prompting petitioner to file
another
motion for summary judgment now under consideration by this Court. It
was
the subsequent events that transpired after the answer was filed,
therefore,
which prevented petitioner from filing the questioned motion. It was
definitely
not because of neglect or inaction that petitioner filed the (second)
motion
for summary judgment years after respondents' answer to the petition
for
forfeiture.cralaw:red
In invoking the doctrine
of estoppel by laches, respondents must show not only unjustified
inaction
but also that some unfair injury to them might result unless the action
is barred.[72]
This, respondents
failed to bear out. In fact, during the pre-trial conference, the
Marcoses
disclaimed ownership of the Swiss deposits. Not being the owners, as
they
claimed, respondents did not have any vested right or interest which
could
be adversely affected by petitioner's alleged inaction.cralaw:red
But even assuming for
the sake of argument that laches had already set in, the doctrine of
estoppel
or laches does not apply when the government sues as a sovereign or
asserts
governmental rights.[73]
Nor can estoppel validate an act that contravenes law or public policy.[74]chanrobles virtual law library
As a final point, it
must be emphasized that laches is not a mere question of time but is
principally
a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim
to be enforced or asserted.[75]
Equity demands that petitioner Republic should not be barred from
pursuing
the people's case against the Marcoses.cralaw:red
(2) The Propriety of
Forfeiture
The matter of summary
judgment having been thus settled, the issue of whether or not
petitioner
Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with
the
requisites of Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379 now takes center stage.cralaw:red
The law raises the prima
facie presumption that a property is unlawfully acquired, hence subject
to forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to
the official salary and other lawful income of the public officer who
owns
it. Hence, Sections 2 and 6 of RA 1379[76]
provide:
x
x
x
x x x
Section 2. Filing of
petition. - Whenever any public officer or employee has
acquired
during his incumbency an amount or property which is manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his
other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property,
said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully
acquired.cralaw:red
x
x
x
x x x
Sec. 6. Judgment
- If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the
court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the
court shall declare such property in question, forfeited in favor of
the
State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall
become
the property of the State. Provided, That no judgment
shall be rendered within six months before any general election or
within
three months before any special election. The Court may, in
addition,
refer this case to the corresponding Executive Department for
administrative
or criminal action, or both.cralaw:red
From the above-quoted
provisions of the law, the following facts must be established in order
that forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits may be effected:
(1)
ownership by the public officer of money or property
acquired
during his incumbency, whether it be in his name or otherwise, and
(2)
the extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds, i.
e.,
is grossly disproportionate to, the legitimate income of the public
officer.cralaw:red
That spouses Ferdinand
and Imelda Marcos were public officials during the time material to the
instant case was never in dispute. Paragraph 4 of respondent Marcoses'
answer categorically admitted the allegations in paragraph 4 of the
petition
for forfeiture as to the personal circumstances of Ferdinand E. Marcos
as a public official who served without interruption as Congressman,
Senator,
Senate President and President of the Republic of the Philippines from
December 1, 1965 to February 25, 1986.[77]
Likewise, respondents admitted in their answer the contents of
paragraph
5 of the petition as to the personal circumstances of Imelda R. Marcos
who once served as a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa from 1978
to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor, concurrently Minister of Human
Settlements,
from June 1976 to February 1986.[78]chanrobles virtual law library
Respondent Mrs. Marcos
also admitted in paragraph 10 of her answer the allegations of
paragraph
11 of the petition for forfeiture which referred to the accumulated
salaries
of respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.[79]
The combined accumulated salaries of the Marcos couple were reflected
in
the Certification dated May 27, 1986 issued by then Minister of Budget
and Management Alberto Romulo.[80]
The Certification showed that, from 1966 to 1985, Ferdinand E. Marcos
and
Imelda R. Marcos had accumulated salaries in the amount of P1,570,000
and
P718,750, respectively, or a total of P2,288,750:
Ferdinand E. Marcos,
as President
1966-1976 at P60,000/year
P660,000
1977-1984 at P100,000/year
800,000
1985 at
P110,000/year
110,000
P1,570,000
Imelda R. Marcos, as
Minister
June 1976-1985 at P75,000/year
P718,000
In addition to their
accumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985 are the Marcos couple’s combined
salaries from January to February 1986 in the amount of
P30,833.33.
Hence, their total accumulated salaries amounted to P2,319,583.33.
Converted
to U.S. dollars on the basis of the corresponding peso-dollar exchange
rates prevailing during the applicable period when said salaries were
received,
the total amount had an equivalent value of $304,372.43.cralaw:red
The dollar equivalent
was arrived at by using the official annual rates of exchange of the
Philippine
peso and the US dollar from 1965 to 1985 as well as the official
monthly
rates of exchange in January and February 1986 issued by the Center for
Statistical Information of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.cralaw:red
Prescinding from the
aforesaid admissions, Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
provides
that:
Section 4. -
Judicial admissions - An admission, verbal or written, made
by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not
require
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it
was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.[81]
It is settled that judicial
admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the
parties;
(b) in the course of the trial either by verbal or written
manifestations
or stipulations; or (c) in other stages of judicial proceedings,
as in the pre-trial of the case.[82]
Thus, facts pleaded in the petition and answer, as in the case at bar,
are deemed admissions of petitioner and respondents, respectively, who
are not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position
contrary
to or inconsistent with such admissions.[83]
The sum of $304,372.43
should be held as the only known lawful income of respondents since
they
did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required
by law, from which their net worth could be determined. Besides,
under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not
receive "any other emolument from the Government or any of its
subdivisions
and instrumentalities".[84]
Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President
could "not receive during his tenure any other emolument from the
Government
or any other source."[85]
In fact, his management of businesses, like the administration of
foundations
to accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973
Constitution:
Article VII, Sec. 4(2)
- The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their
tenure,
hold any other office except when otherwise provided in this
Constitution,
nor may they practice any profession, participate directly or
indirectly
in the management of any business, or be financially interested
directly
or indirectly in any contract with, or in any franchise or special
privilege
granted by the Government or any other subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality
thereof, including any government owned or controlled corporation.cralaw:red
Article VII, Sec. 11
- No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel
before
any court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x x
x.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in
any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by
the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof
including any government owned or controlled corporation during his
term
of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any
office of the government for his pecuniary benefit.cralaw:red
Article IX, Sec. 7
- The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be subject
to the provision of Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear
as counsel before any court or administrative body, or manage any
business,
or practice any profession, and shall also be subject to such other
disqualification
as may be provided by law.chanrobles virtual law library
Their only known lawful
income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis
for
determining the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the
Swiss
funds.chanrobles virtual law library
Respondents argue that
petitioner was not able to establish a prima facie case for the
forfeiture
of the Swiss funds since it failed to prove the essential elements
under
Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of RA 1379. As the Act is
a penal statute, its provisions are mandatory and should thus be
construed
strictly against the petitioner and liberally in favor of respondent
Marcoses.cralaw:red
We hold that it was
not for petitioner to establish the Marcoses’ other lawful income or
income
from legitimately acquired property for the presumption to apply
because,
as between petitioner and respondents, the latter were in a better
position
to know if there were such other sources of lawful income.
And if indeed there was such other lawful income, respondents should
have
specifically stated the same in their answer. Insofar as
petitioner
Republic was concerned, it was enough to specify the known lawful
income
of respondents.cralaw:red
Section 9 of the PCGG
Rules and Regulations provides that, in determining prima facie
evidence
of ill-gotten wealth, the value of the accumulated assets, properties
and
other material possessions of those covered by Executive Order Nos. 1
and
2 must be out of proportion to
the
known lawful income of such persons. The
respondent Marcos couple did not file any Statement of Assets and
Liabilities
(SAL) from which their net worth could be determined. Their
failure
to file their SAL was in itself a violation of law and to allow them to
successfully assail the Republic for not presenting their SAL would
reward
them for their violation of the law.cralaw:red
Further, contrary to
the claim of respondents, the admissions made by them in their various
pleadings and documents were valid. It is of record that
respondents
judicially admitted that the money deposited with the Swiss banks
belonged
to them.cralaw:red
We agree with petitioner
that respondent Marcoses made judicial admissions of their ownership of
the subject Swiss bank deposits in their answer, the
General/Supplemental
Agreements, Mrs. Marcos' Manifestation and Constancia dated May 5,
1999,
and the Undertaking dated February 10, 1999. We take note of the
fact that the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan were unanimous in
holding that respondents had made judicial admissions of their
ownership
of the Swiss funds.cralaw:red
In their answer, aside
from admitting the existence of the subject funds, respondents likewise
admitted ownership thereof. Paragraph 22 of respondents' answer
stated:
22. Respondents
specifically DENY PARAGRAPH 23 insofar as it alleges that respondents
clandestinely
stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under
layers
and layers of foundations and corporate entities for being false, the
truth
being that respondents' aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.
(emphasis
supplied)
By qualifying their
acquisition of the Swiss bank deposits as lawful, respondents
unwittingly
admitted their ownership thereof.cralaw:red
Respondent Mrs. Marcos
also admitted ownership of the Swiss bank deposits by failing to deny
under
oath the genuineness and due execution of certain actionable documents
bearing her signature attached to the petition. As discussed earlier,
Section
11, Rule 8[86]
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that material averments
in
the complaint shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.cralaw:red
The General[87]
and Supplemental[88]
Agreements executed by petitioner and respondents on December 28, 1993
further bolstered the claim of petitioner Republic that its case for
forfeiture
was proven in accordance with the requisites of Sections 2 and 3 of RA
1379. The whereas clause in the General Agreement declared that:
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY
has obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21,
1990, that the $356 million belongs in principle to the Republic of the
Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met, but even after 7
years, the FIRST PARTY has not been able to procure a final judgment of
conviction against the PRIVATE PARTY.cralaw:red
While the Supplemental
Agreement warranted, inter alia, that:
In consideration of
the foregoing, the parties hereby agree that the PRIVATE PARTY shall be
entitled to the equivalent of 25% of the amount that may be eventually
withdrawn from said $356 million Swiss deposits.cralaw:red
The stipulations set
forth in the General and Supplemental Agreements undeniably indicated
the
manifest intent of respondents to enter into a compromise with
petitioner.
Corollarily,
respondents’ willingness to agree to an amicable settlement with the
Republic
only affirmed their ownership of the Swiss deposits for the simple
reason
that no person would acquiesce to any concession over such huge dollar
deposits if he did not in fact own them.cralaw:red
Respondents make much
capital of the pronouncement by this Court that the General and
Supplemental
Agreements were null and void.[89]
They insist that nothing in those agreements could thus be admitted in
evidence against them because they stood on the same ground as an
accepted
offer which, under Section 27, Rule 130[90]
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that "in civil cases, an
offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability and is not
admissible
in evidence against the offeror."
We find no merit in
this contention. The declaration of nullity of said agreements was
premised
on the following constitutional and statutory infirmities: (1) the
grant
of criminal immunity to the Marcos heirs
was against the law; (2) the PCGG’s commitment to exempt from all forms
of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs was
against
the Constitution; and (3) the government’s undertaking to cause the
dismissal
of all cases filed against the Marcoses pending before the
Sandiganbayan
and other courts encroached on the powers of the judiciary.
The reasons relied upon by the Court never in the least bit even
touched
on the veracity and truthfulness of respondents’ admission with respect
to their ownership of the Swiss funds. Besides, having made
certain
admissions in those agreements, respondents cannot now deny that they
voluntarily
admitted owning the subject Swiss funds, notwithstanding the fact that
the agreements themselves were later declared null and void.chanrobles virtual law library
The following observation
of Sandiganbayan Justice Catalino Castañeda, Jr. in the decision
dated September 19, 2000 could not have been better said:
x x x The declaration
of nullity of the two agreements rendered the same without legal
effects
but it did not detract from the admissions of the respondents contained
therein. Otherwise stated, the admissions made in said
agreements,
as quoted above, remain binding on the respondents.[91]
A written statement
is nonetheless competent as an admission even if it is contained in a
document
which is not itself effective for the purpose for which it is made,
either
by reason of illegality, or incompetency of a party thereto, or by
reason
of not being signed, executed or delivered. Accordingly,
contracts
have been held as competent evidence of admissions, although they may
be
unenforceable.[92]
The testimony of respondent
Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. during the hearing on the motion for the approval
of the Compromise Agreement on April 29, 1998 also
lent
credence to the allegations of petitioner Republic that respondents
admitted
ownership of the Swiss bank accounts. We quote the salient
portions of Ferdinand Jr.’s formal declarations in open court:
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Mr. Marcos, did you
ever have any meetings with PCGG Chairman Magtanggol C. Gunigundo?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
Yes. I have had
very many meetings in fact with Chairman.cralaw:red
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Would you recall when
the first meeting occurred?
PJ GARCHITORENA:chanrobles virtual law library
In connection with what?
ATTY. FERNANDO:
In connection with the
ongoing talks to compromise the various cases initiated by PCGG against
your family?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
The nature of our meetings
was solely concerned with negotiations towards achieving some kind of
agreement
between the Philippine government and the Marcos family. The
discussions
that led up to the compromise agreement were initiated by our then
counsel
Atty. Simeon Mesina x x x.[93]
x x
x
x
x
x
x x x
ATTY. FERNANDO:
What was your reaction
when Atty. Mesina informed you of this possibility?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
My reaction to all of
these approaches is that I am always open, we are always open, we are
very
much always in search of resolution to the problem of the family and
any
approach that has been made us, we have entertained. And so my
reaction
was the same as what I have always … why not? Maybe this is the
one
that will finally put an end to this problem.[94]
x x
x x
x
x
x x x
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Basically, what were
the true amounts of the assets in the bank?
PJ GARCHITORENA:
So, we are talking about
liquid assets here? Just Cash?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
Well, basically, any
assets. Anything that was under the Marcos name in any of the
banks
in Switzerland which may necessarily be not cash.[95]
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
PJ GARCHITORENA:
x x x What did
you do in other words, after being apprised of this contract in
connection
herewith?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
I assumed that we are
beginning to implement the agreement because this was forwarded through
the Philippine government lawyers through our lawyers and then,
subsequently,
to me. I was a little surprised because we hadn’t really
discussed
the details of the transfer of the funds, what the bank accounts, what
the mechanism would be. But nevertheless, I was happy to see that
as far as the PCGG is concerned, that the agreement was perfected and
that
we were beginning to implement it and that was a source of satisfaction
to me because I thought that finally it will be the end.[96]
Ferdinand Jr.'s pronouncements,
taken in context and in their entirety, were a confirmation of
respondents’
recognition of their ownership of the Swiss bank deposits.
Admissions
of a party in his testimony are receivable
against
him. If a party, as a witness, deliberately concedes a fact, such
concession has the force of a judicial admission.[97]
It is apparent from Ferdinand Jr.’s testimony that the Marcos
family
agreed to negotiate with the Philippine
government
in the hope of finally putting an end to the problems besetting the
Marcos
family regarding the Swiss accounts. This was doubtlessly an
acknowledgment
of ownership on their part. The rule is that the testimony on the
witness stand partakes of the nature of a formal judicial admission
when
a party testifies clearly and unequivocally to a fact which is
peculiarly
within his own knowledge.[98]chanrobles virtual law library
In her Manifestation[99]
dated May 26, 1998, respondent Imelda Marcos furthermore revealed the
following:
That respondent Imelda
R. Marcos owns 90% of the subject matter of the above-entitled case,
being
the sole beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of the various
foundations alleged in the case;
That in fact only 10%
of the subject matter in the above-entitled case belongs to the estate
of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos;
x x
x
x x
x
x x x
Respondents’ ownership
of the Swiss bank accounts as borne out by Mrs. Marcos' manifestation
is
as bright as sunlight. And her claim that she is merely a
beneficiary
of the Swiss deposits is belied by her own signatures on the appended
copies
of the documents substantiating her ownership of the funds in the name
of the foundations. As already mentioned, she failed to
specifically
deny under oath the authenticity of such documents, especially those
involving
"William Saunders" and "Jane Ryan" which actually referred to Ferdinand
Marcos and Imelda Marcos, respectively. That failure of Imelda
Marcos
to specifically deny the existence, much less the genuineness and due
execution,
of the instruments bearing her signature, was tantamount to a judicial
admission of the genuineness and due execution of said instruments, in
accordance with Section 8, Rule 8[100]
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.cralaw:red
Likewise, in her Constancia[101]
dated May 6, 1999, Imelda Marcos prayed for the approval of the
Compromise
Agreement and the subsequent release and transfer of the $150 million
to
the rightful owner. She further made the following manifestations:
x x
x
x x
x
x x x
2. The Republic’s
cause of action over the full amount is its forfeiture in favor of the
government if found to be ill-gotten. On the other hand, the
Marcoses
defend that it is a legitimate asset. Therefore, both parties
have
an inchoate right of ownership over the account. If it turns out
that the account is of lawful origin, the Republic may yield to the
Marcoses.
Conversely, the Marcoses must yield to the Republic.
(Underscoring
supplied)
x x
x
x x
x
x x xchanrobles virtual law library
3. Consistent
with the foregoing, and the Marcoses having committed themselves to
helping
the less fortunate, in the interest of peace, reconciliation and unity,
defendant MADAM IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, in firm abidance thereby,
hereby
affirms her agreement with the Republic for the release and transfer of
the US Dollar 150 million for proper disposition, without prejudice to
the final outcome of the litigation respecting the ownership of the
remainder.cralaw:red
Again, the above statements
were indicative of Imelda’s admission of the Marcoses’ ownership of the
Swiss deposits as in fact "the Marcoses defend that it (Swiss deposits)
is a legitimate (Marcos) asset."
On the other hand, respondents
Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. and Maria Irene
Marcos-Araneta
filed a motion[102]
on May 4, 1998 asking the Sandiganbayan to place the res (Swiss
deposits)
in custodia legis:
7. Indeed, the
prevailing situation is fraught with danger! Unless the aforesaid
Swiss deposits are placed in custodia legis or within the Court’s
protective
mantle, its dissipation or misappropriation by the petitioner looms as
a distinct possibility.cralaw:red
Such display of deep,
personal interest can only come from someone who believes that he has a
marked and intimate right over the considerable dollar deposits.
Truly, by filing said motion, the Marcos children revealed their
ownership
of the said deposits.cralaw:red
Lastly, the Undertaking[103]
entered into by the PCGG, the PNB and the Marcos foundations on
February
10, 1999, confirmed the Marcoses’ ownership of the Swiss bank
deposits.
The subject Undertaking brought to light their readiness to pay the
human
rights victims out of the funds held in escrow in the PNB. It
stated:
WHEREAS, the Republic
of the Philippines sympathizes with the plight of the human rights
victims-plaintiffs
in the aforementioned litigation through the Second Party, desires to
assist
in the satisfaction of the judgment awards of said human rights
victims-plaintiffs,
by releasing, assigning and or waiving US$150 million of the funds held
in escrow under the Escrow Agreements dated August 14, 1995, although
the
Republic is not obligated to do so under final judgments of the Swiss
courts
dated December 10 and 19, 1997, and January 8, 1998;
WHEREAS, the Third Party
is likewise willing to release, assign and/or waive all its rights and
interests over said US$150 million to the aforementioned human rights
victims-plaintiffs.cralaw:red
All told, the foregoing
disquisition negates the claim of respondents that "petitioner failed
to
prove that they acquired or own the Swiss funds" and that "it was only
by arbitrarily isolating and taking certain statements made by private
respondents out of context that petitioner was able to treat these as
judicial
admissions." The Court is fully aware of the relevance,
materiality
and implications of every pleading and document submitted in this
case.
This Court carefully scrutinized the proofs presented by the parties.
We
analyzed, assessed and weighed them to ascertain if each piece of
evidence
rightfully qualified as an admission. Owing to the far-reaching
historical
and political implications of this case, we considered and examined,
individually
and totally, the evidence of the parties, even if it might have
bordered
on factual adjudication which, by authority of the rules and
jurisprudence,
is not usually done by this Court. There is no doubt in our mind
that respondent Marcoses admitted ownership of the Swiss bank deposits.cralaw:red
We have always adhered
to the familiar doctrine that an admission made in the pleadings cannot
be controverted by the party making such admission and becomes
conclusive
on him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or
inconsistent
therewith should be ignored, whether an objection is interposed by the
adverse party or not.[104]
This doctrine is embodied in Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court:chanrobles virtual law library
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions.
- An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
admission
may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake
or that no such admission was made.[105]
In the absence of a
compelling reason to the contrary, respondents’ judicial admission of
ownership
of the Swiss deposits is definitely binding on them.cralaw:red
The individual and separate
admissions of each respondent bind all of them pursuant to Sections 29
and 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 29. Admission
by co-partner or agent. - The act or declaration of a partner or agent
of the party within the scope of his authority and during the existence
of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such
party
after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such
act
or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration
of
a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with
the
party.[106]
SEC. 31. Admission
by privies. - Where one derives title to property from another, the
act,
declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in
relation
to the property, is evidence against the former.[107]
The declarations of
a person are admissible against a party whenever a "privity of estate"
exists between the declarant and the party, the term "privity of
estate"
generally denoting a succession in rights.[108]
Consequently, an admission of one in privity with a party to the record
is competent.[109]
Without doubt, privity exists among the respondents in this case.
And where several co-parties to the record are jointly interested in
the
subject matter of the controversy, the admission of one is competent
against
all.[110]
Respondents insist that
the Sandiganbayan is correct in ruling that petitioner Republic has
failed
to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss
deposits.cralaw:red
We disagree. The sudden
turn-around of the Sandiganbayan was really strange, to say the least,
as its findings and conclusions were not borne out by the voluminous
records
of this case.cralaw:red
Section 2 of RA
1379 explicitly states that "whenever any public officer or employee
has
acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is
manifestly
out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and
to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property,
said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully
acquired.
x x x"
The elements which must
concur for this prima facie presumption to apply are:
(1) the
offender is a public officer or employee;
(2) he must
have acquired a considerable amount of money or property during his
incumbency;
and
(3) said
amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer
or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately
acquired property.cralaw:red
It is undisputed that
spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were former public officers.
Hence, the first element is clearly extant.chanrobles virtual law library
The second element deals
with the amount of money or property acquired by the public officer
during
his incumbency. The Marcos couple indubitably acquired and owned
properties during their term of office. In fact, the five groups
of Swiss accounts were admittedly owned by them. There is proof
of
the existence and ownership of these assets and properties and it
suffices
to comply with the second element.cralaw:red
The third requirement
is met if it can be shown that such assets, money or property is
manifestly
out of proportion to the public officer’s salary and his other lawful
income.
It is the proof of this third element that is crucial in determining
whether
a prima facie presumption has been established in this case.cralaw:red
Petitioner Republic
presented not only a schedule indicating the lawful income of the
Marcos
spouses during their incumbency but also evidence that they had huge
deposits
beyond such lawful income in Swiss banks under the names of five
different
foundations. We believe petitioner was able to establish the
prima
facie presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the
Marcoses
were manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate
salaries
as public officials. Otherwise stated, petitioner presented
enough
evidence to convince us that the Marcoses had dollar deposits amounting
to US $356 million representing the balance of the Swiss accounts of
the
five foundations, an amount way, way beyond their aggregate legitimate
income of only US$304,372.43 during their incumbency as government
officials.cralaw:red
Considering, therefore,
that the total amount of the Swiss deposits was considerably out of
proportion
to the known lawful income of the Marcoses, the presumption that said
dollar
deposits were unlawfully acquired was duly established. It was
sufficient
for the petition for forfeiture to state the approximate amount of
money
and property acquired by the respondents, and their total government
salaries.
Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations states:chanrobles virtual law library
Prima Facie Evidence.
- Any accumulation of assets, properties, and other material
possessions
of those persons covered by Executive Orders No. 1 and No. 2, whose
value
is out of proportion to their known lawful income is prima facie deemed
ill-gotten wealth.cralaw:red
Indeed, the burden of
proof was on the respondents to dispute this presumption and show by
clear
and convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired
and that they had other legitimate sources of income. A presumption is
prima facie proof of the fact presumed and, unless the fact thus prima
facie established by legal presumption is disproved, it must stand as
proved.[111]
Respondent Mrs. Marcos
argues that the foreign foundations should have been impleaded as they
were indispensable parties without whom no complete determination of
the
issues could be made. She asserts that the failure of petitioner
Republic
to implead the foundations rendered the judgment void as the joinder of
indispensable parties was a sine qua non exercise of judicial
power.
Furthermore, the non-inclusion of the foreign foundations violated the
conditions prescribed by the Swiss government regarding the deposit of
the funds in escrow, deprived them of their day in court and denied
them
their rights under the Swiss constitution and international law.[112]
The Court finds that
petitioner Republic did not err in not impleading the foreign
foundations.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,[113]
taken from Rule 19b of the American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
provides
for the compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Generally, an
indispensable
party must be impleaded for the complete determination of the suit.
However,
failure to join an indispensable party does not divest the court of
jurisdiction
since the rule regarding indispensable parties is founded on equitable
considerations and is not jurisdictional. Thus, the court is not
divested
of its power to render a decision even in the absence of indispensable
parties, though such judgment is not binding on the non-joined party.[114]chanrobles virtual law library
An indispensable party[115]
has been defined as one:
[who] must have a direct
interest in the litigation; and if this interest is such that it cannot
be separated from that of the parties to the suit, if the court cannot
render justice between the parties in his absence, if the decree will
have
an injurious effect upon his interest, or if the final determination of
the controversy in his absence will be inconsistent with equity and
good
conscience.cralaw:red
There are two essential
tests of an indispensable party: (1) can relief be afforded the
plaintiff
without the presence of the other party? and (2) can the case be
decided
on its merits without prejudicing the rights of the other party?[116]
There is, however, no fixed formula for determining who is an
indispensable
party; this can only be determined in the context and by the facts of
the
particular suit or litigation.cralaw:red
In the present case,
there was an admission by respondent Imelda Marcos in her May 26, 1998
Manifestation before the Sandiganbayan that she was the sole
beneficiary
of 90% of the subject matter in controversy with the remaining 10%
belonging
to the estate of Ferdinand Marcos.[117]
Viewed against this admission, the foreign foundations were not
indispensable
parties. Their non-participation in the proceedings did not prevent the
court from deciding the case on its merits and according full relief to
petitioner Republic. The judgment ordering the return of the $356
million
was neither inimical to the foundations’ interests nor inconsistent
with
equity and good conscience. The admission of respondent Imelda Marcos
only
confirmed what was already generally known: that the foundations
were established precisely to hide the money stolen by the Marcos
spouses
from petitioner Republic. It negated whatever illusion there was, if
any,
that the foreign foundations owned even a nominal part of the assets in
question.chanrobles virtual law library
The rulings of the Swiss
court that the foundations, as formal owners, must be given an
opportunity
to participate in the proceedings hinged on the assumption that
they
owned a nominal share of the assets.[118]
But this was already refuted by no less than Mrs. Marcos herself. Thus,
she cannot now argue that the ruling of the Sandiganbayan violated the
conditions set by the Swiss court. The directive given by the Swiss
court
for the foundations to participate in the proceedings was for the
purpose
of protecting whatever nominal interest they might have had in the
assets
as formal owners. But inasmuch as their ownership was
subsequently
repudiated by Imelda Marcos, they could no longer be considered as
indispensable
parties and their participation in the proceedings became unnecessary.cralaw:red
In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan,[119]
this Court ruled that impleading the firms which are the res of the
action
was unnecessary:
"And as to corporations
organized with ill-gotten wealth, but are not themselves guilty of
misappropriation,
fraud or other illicit conduct - in other words, the
companies
themselves are not the object or thing involved in the action, the res
thereof - there is no need to implead them either. Indeed,
their impleading is not proper on the strength alone of their having
been
formed with ill-gotten funds, absent any other particular wrongdoing on
their part…
Such showing of having
been formed with, or having received ill-gotten funds, however strong
or
convincing, does not, without more, warrant identifying the
corporations
in question with the person who formed or made use of them to give the
color or appearance of lawful, innocent acquisition to illegally
amassed
wealth - at the least, not so as place on the Government
the
onus of impleading the former with the latter in actions to recover
such
wealth. Distinguished in terms of juridical personality and legal
culpability
from their erring members or stockholders, said corporations are not
themselves
guilty of the sins of the latter, of the embezzlement, asportation,
etc.,
that gave rise to the Government’s cause of action for recovery; their
creation or organization was merely the result of their members’ (or
stockholders’)
manipulations and maneuvers to conceal the illegal origins of the
assets
or monies invested therein. In this light, they are simply the res in
the
actions for the recovery of illegally acquired wealth, and there is, in
principle, no cause of action against them and no ground to implead
them
as defendants in said actions."
Just like the corporations
in the aforementioned case, the foreign foundations here were set up to
conceal the illegally acquired funds of the Marcos spouses. Thus, they
were simply the res in the action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and
did not have to be impleaded for lack of cause of action or ground to
implead
them.cralaw:red
Assuming arguendo, however,
that the foundations were indispensable parties, the failure of
petitioner
to implead them was a curable error, as held in the previously cited
case
of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan:[120]chanrobles virtual law library
"Even in those cases
where it might reasonably be argued that the failure of the Government
to implead the sequestered corporations as defendants is indeed a
procedural
abberation, as where said firms were allegedly used, and actively
cooperated
with the defendants, as instruments or conduits for conversion of
public
funds and property or illicit or fraudulent obtention of favored
government
contracts, etc., slight reflection would nevertheless lead to the
conclusion
that the defect is not fatal, but one correctible under applicable
adjective
rules - e.g., Section 10, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court
[specifying
the remedy of amendment during trial to authorize or to conform to the
evidence]; Section 1, Rule 20 [governing amendments before trial], in
relation
to the rule respecting omission of so-called necessary or indispensable
parties, set out in Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. It is
relevant
in this context to advert to the old familiar doctrines that the
omission
to implead such parties "is a mere technical defect which can be cured
at any stage of the proceedings even after judgment"; and that,
particularly
in the case of indispensable parties, since their presence and
participation
is essential to the very life of the action, for without them no
judgment
may be rendered, amendments of the complaint in order to implead them
should
be freely allowed, even on appeal, in fact even after rendition of
judgment
by this Court, where it appears that the complaint otherwise indicates
their identity and character as such indispensable parties."[121]
Although there are decided
cases wherein the non-joinder of indispensable parties in fact led to
the
dismissal of the suit or the annulment of judgment, such cases do not
jibe
with the matter at hand. The better view is that non-joinder is
not
a ground to dismiss the suit or annul the judgment. The rule on joinder
of indispensable parties is founded on equity. And the spirit of
the law is reflected in Section 11, Rule 3[122]
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It prohibits the dismissal
of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties and
allows
the amendment of the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, through
motion or on order of the court on its own initiative.[123]
Likewise, jurisprudence
on the Federal Rules of Procedure, from which our Section 7, Rule 3[124]
on indispensable parties was copied, allows the joinder of
indispensable
parties even after judgment has been entered if such is needed to
afford
the moving party full relief.[125]
Mere delay in filing the joinder motion does not necessarily result in
the waiver of the right as long as the delay is excusable.[126]
Thus, respondent Mrs. Marcos cannot correctly argue that the judgment
rendered
by the Sandiganbayan was void due to the non-joinder of the foreign
foundations.
The court had jurisdiction to render judgment which, even in the
absence
of indispensable parties, was binding on all the parties before it
though
not on the absent party.[127]
If she really felt that she could not be granted full relief due to the
absence of the foreign foundations, she should have moved for their
inclusion,
which was allowable at any stage of the proceedings. She never
did.
Instead she assailed the judgment rendered.chanrobles virtual law library
In the face of undeniable
circumstances and the avalanche of documentary evidence against them,
respondent
Marcoses failed to justify the lawful nature of their acquisition of
the
said assets. Hence, the Swiss deposits should be considered
ill-gotten
wealth and forfeited in favor of the State in accordance with Section 6
of RA 1379:
SEC. 6. Judgment.- If
the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that
he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall
declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of
such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State
x x x.
THE FAILURE TO
PRESENT
AUTHENTICATED TRANSLATIONS OF THE SWISS DECISIONS
Finally, petitioner
Republic contends that the Honorable Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice
Francis
Garchitorena committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing himself
on
the ground that the original copies of the authenticated Swiss
decisions
and their authenticated translations were not submitted to the court a
quo. Earlier PJ Garchitorena had quoted extensively from the
unofficial
translation of one of these Swiss decisions in his ponencia dated July
29, 1999 when he denied the motion to release US$150 Million to the
human
rights victims.chanrobles virtual law library
While we are in reality
perplexed by such an incomprehensible change of heart, there might
nevertheless
not be any real need to belabor the issue. The presentation of
the
authenticated translations of the original copies of the Swiss decision
was not de rigueur for the public respondent to make findings of fact
and
reach its conclusions. In short, the Sandiganbayan’s decision was not
dependent
on the determination of the Swiss courts. For that matter, neither is
this
Court’s.cralaw:red
The release of the Swiss
funds held in escrow in the PNB is dependent solely on the decision of
this jurisdiction that said funds belong to the petitioner Republic.
What
is important is our own assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence
to
rule in favor of either petitioner Republic or respondent Marcoses. In
this instance, despite the absence of the authenticated translations of
the Swiss decisions, the evidence on hand tilts convincingly in favor
of
petitioner Republic.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the petition
is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated
January
31, 2002 is SET ASIDE. The Swiss deposits which were transferred to and
are now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the
estimated
aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002, plus
interest,
are hereby forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo,
Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo,
Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ.,
concur.
Puno, and Vitug,
JJ.,
in the result
Quisumbing,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
J., on official leave.
Carpio, J., no part.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property To Have
Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and
Providing
For the Procedure Therefor.
[2]
E.O. No. 1 - promulgated on February 28, 1986, only two (2) days after
the Marcoses fled the country, creating the PCGG which was primarily
tasked
to assist the President in the recovery of vast government resources
allegedly
amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
and
close associates, both here and abroad.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
E.O. No. 2 - issued twelve (12) days later, warning all
persons
and entities who had knowledge of possession of ill-gotten assets and
properties
under pain of penalties prescribed by law, prohibiting them from
concealing,
transferring or dissipating them or from otherwise frustrating or
obstructing
the recovery efforts of the government.chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
E.O. No. 14 - Series of 1986, as amended by E.O. No. 14-A.chanrobles virtual law library
[5]
Also series of 1986, vested Sandiganbayan the exclusive and original
jurisdiction
over cases, whether civil or criminal, to be filed by the PCGG with the
assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General. The law also
declared
that the civil actions for the recovery of unlawfully acquired property
under Republic Act No. 1379 or for restitution, reparation of damages,
or indemnification for consequential and other damages or any other
civil
action under the Civil Code or other existing laws filed with the
Sandiganbayan
against Ferdinand Marcos et. al., may proceed independently of any
criminal
proceedings and may be proved by preponderance of evidence.chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
Declared null and void by this Court on December 9, 1998 in the case of
"Francisco I. Chavez vs. PCGG and Magtanggol Gunigundo", docketed as
G.R.
No. 130716.chanrobles virtual law library
[7]
In April 1986, pursuant to E.O. No. 2, the Republic of the Philippines
through the PCGG filed a request for mutual assistance with the Swiss
Federal
Police Department, under the procedures of the International Mutual
Assistance
in Criminal Proceedings (IMAC) to freeze the bank deposits of the
Marcoses
located in Switzerland.chanrobles virtual law library
IMAC
is a domestic statute of Switzerland which generally affords relief to
the kind of request from foreign governments or entities as authorized
under E.O. No. 2.chanrobles virtual law library
The
various Swiss local authorities concerned granted the request of
petitioner
Republic, and ordered the Swiss deposits to be "blocked" until the
competent
Philippine court could decide on the matter.
[8]
Volume III, Rollo, p. 2195.
[9]
Penned by Justice Catalino R. Castañeda, Jr. and concurred in by
Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena and Associate Justice Gregory
S. Ong.
[10]
Volume III, Rollo, p. 2218.chanrobles virtual law library
[11]
Penned by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena with the separate
concurring
opinions of Associate Justice Nicodemo T. Ferrer and Associate Justice
Gregory S. Ong. Associate Justices Catalino R. Castañeda,
Jr. and Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr. both wrote their respective
dissenting
opinions.chanrobles virtual law library
[12]
Volume I, Rollo, pp. 145-146.chanrobles virtual law library
[13]
Volume I, Rollo, pp. 60-62.chanrobles virtual law library
[14]
Volume IV, Rollo, p. 2605.chanrobles virtual law library
[15]
Sec. 3 - the petition shall contain the following
information
x
x xchanrobles virtual law library
(c)
The approximate amount of property he has acquired during his
incumbency
in his past and present offices and employments.
[16]
(d) A description of said property, or such thereof as has been
identified
by the Solicitor General.chanrobles virtual law library
[17]
(e) The total amount of his government salary and other proper earnings
and incomes from legitimately acquired property xxx.
[18]
Volume IV, Rollo, pp. 2651-2654.chanrobles virtual law library
[19]
Same as Section 1, Rule 65 of the old Rules of Court.
[20]
Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222 [1996].
[21]
Central Bank vs. Cloribel, 44 S 307, 314 [1972].
[22]
240 SCRA 376 [1995].chanrobles virtual law library
[23]
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 316 [1997].
[24]
69 SCRA 524 [1976].chanrobles virtual law library
[25]
Substantially the same as Section 1, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court.
[26]
Agcanas vs. Nagum, L-20707, 143 Phil 177 [1970].chanrobles virtual law library
[27]
Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 22-37.chanrobles virtual law library
[28]
Substantially the same as Section 10, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court.
[29]
16 Phil., 315, 321-322 [1910].chanrobles virtual law library
[30]
197 SCRA 391 [1991].chanrobles virtual law library
[31]
Philippine Advertising vs. Revilla, 52 SCRA 246 [1973].
[32]
Petition, Annex C, Volume I, Rollo, p. 236.chanrobles virtual law library
[33]
Answer, Annex D, Volume II, Rollo, p. 1064.
[34]
61A Am. Jur., 172-173.chanrobles virtual law library
[35]
Blume vs. MacGregor, 148 P. 2d. 656 [see p.428, Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1995 ed.].
[36]
Substantially the same as Section 1, Rule 9 of the old Rules of Court.chanrobles virtual law library
[37]
Supra.chanrobles virtual law library
[38]
Supra.chanrobles virtual law library
[39]
"All the five (5) group accounts in the over-all flow chart have a
total
balance of about Three Hundred Fifty Six Million Dollars
($356,000,000.00)
as shown by Annex ‘R-5’ hereto attached as integral part hereof."chanrobles virtual law library
[40]
22 SCRA 48 [1968]chanrobles virtual law library
[41]
XANDY-WINTROP-AVERTINA FOUNDATION: (a) Contract for opening of deposit
dated March 21, 1968; (b) Handwritten instruction; (c) Letter dated
March
3, 1970; (d) Handwritten regulation of Xandy dated February 13, 1970;
(e)
Letter of instruction dated March 10, 1981; (f) Letter of Instructions
dated March 10, 1991.chanrobles virtual law library
TRINIDAD-RAYBY-PALMY
FOUNDATION: (a) Management agreement dated August 28, 1990; (b) Letter
of instruction dated August 26, 1970 to Markers Geel of Furich; (c)
Approval
of Statutes and By-laws of Trinidad Foundation dated August 26,
1990;
(d) Regulations of the Trinidad Foundation dated August 28, 1970; (e)
Regulations
of the Trinidad Foundation prepared by Markers Geel dated August
28, 1970; (f) Letter of Instructions to the Board of Rayby Foundation
dated
March 10, 1981; (g) Letter of Instructions to the Board of Trinidad
Foundation
dated March 10, 1981.
MALER
ESTABLISHMENT FOUNDATION: (a) Rules and Regulations of Maler dated
October
15, 1968; (b) Letter of Authorization dated October 19, 1968 to Barbey
d Suncir; (c) Letter of Instruction to Muler to Swiss Bank dated
October
19, 1968.chanrobles virtual law library
[42]
"Where an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument,
copied
in or attached to the corresponding pleading xxx, the genuineness and
due
execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse
party under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he
claims
to be the facts xxx."
[43]
Annex A-F, Volume I, Rollo, pp. 193-194.chanrobles virtual law library
[44]
Ice Plant Equipment vs. Martocello, D.C.P., 1941, 43 F. Supp. 281.
[45]
Phil. Advertising Counselors, Inc. vs. Revilla, L- 31869, Aug. 8, 1973.
[46]
Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd. vs. Reyes, et. al., 55 O.G. 3109-3111.
[47]
Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 567
[1991].
[48]
28 SCRA 807, 812 [1969].chanrobles virtual law library
[49]
Rule 20 of the old Rules of Court was amended but the change(s) had no
adverse effects on the rights of private respondents.
[50]
Development Bank of the Phils. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-49410, 169 SCRA 409
[1989].chanrobles virtual law library
[51]
Substantially the same as Section 3, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court.chanrobles virtual law library
[52]
adopted by the Marcos children.chanrobles virtual law library
[53]
dated September 26, 2000 as filed by Mrs. Marcos; dated October 5, 2000
as jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.; supplemental
motion
for reconsideration dated October 9, 2000 jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc
and Ferdinand, Jr.;chanrobles virtual law library
[54]
dated December 12, 2000 and December 17, 2000 as filed by the Marcos
children.
[55]
TSN, pp. 47-48, October 28, 1999.chanrobles virtual law library
[56]
Evadel Realty and Development Corp. vs. Spouses Antera and Virgilio
Soriano,
April 20, 2001.
[57]
Plantadosi vs. Loew’s, Inc., 7 Fed. Rules Service, 786, June 2, 1943.chanrobles virtual law library
[58]
Rabaca vs. Velez, 341 SCRA 543 [2000].chanrobles virtual law library
[59]
Carcon Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 348 [1989].
[60]
Rollo, pp. 2659-70.chanrobles virtual law library
[61]
Substantially the same as Sections 1 and 2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of
Court.chanrobles virtual law library
[62]
Rule 113. Summary Judgment. - When an answer is served in an
action
to recover a debt or a liquidated demand arising,
1.
on a contract, express or implied, sealed or not sealed; orchanrobles virtual law library
2.
on a judgment for a stated sum;chanrobles virtual law library
the
answer may be struck out and judgment entered thereon on motion, and
the
affidavit of the plaintiff or of any other person having knowledge of
the
facts, verifying the cause of action and stating the amount claimed,
and
his belief that there is no defense to the action; unless the defendant
by affidavit or other proof, shall show such facts as may be deemed, by
the judge hearing the motion, sufficient to entitle him to defend.
(emphasis
ours)chanrobles virtual law library
[63]
73 Am Jur 2d 733, §12; 49 C.J.S. 412, § 224.chanrobles virtual law library
[64]
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II. (1996), pp. 183-184.
[65]
19 NYS2d 250 [1940].chanrobles virtual law library
[66]
73 Am Jur 2d 733, §12; 49 C.J.S. 412, § 224.
[67]
Supra.chanrobles virtual law library
[68]
Gregorio Estrada vs. Hon. Fracisco Consolacion, et. al., 71 SCRA 523
[1976].
[69]
Substantially the same as Section 2, Rule 1 of the old Rules of Court.
[70]
Madeja vs. Patcho, 123 SCRA 540 [1983].chanrobles virtual law library
[71]
Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277 [1956].chanrobles virtual law library
[72]
Diaz vs. Gorricho, 103 Phil. 261 [1958].chanrobles virtual law library
[73]
Collado vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.107764, October 4, 2002; Section
15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
[74]
Go Tian An vs. Republic of the Philippines, 124 Phil. 472 [1966].chanrobles virtual law library
[75]
Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 [1968].chanrobles virtual law library
[76]
"An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State any Property Found
to
Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and
Providing
for the Proceedings Therefor", approved on June 18, 1955.chanrobles virtual law library
[77]
Petition, Annex D, Volume II, p. 1081.
[78]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[79]
Id., p. 1062.
[80]
Exhibit "S."chanrobles virtual law library
[81]
Substantially the same as Section 2, Rule 129 of the old Rules of
Court.
[82]
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 1997 ed., p. 650.
[83]
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Volume V, 1980 ed., p. 64.
[84]
Section 9, Article VII.chanrobles virtual law library
[85]
Section 4(1), Article VII.chanrobles virtual law library
[86]
Substantially the same as Section 1, Rule 9 of the old Rules of Court.
[87]
Annex F-1, Volume II, Rollo, pp. 1095-1098.chanrobles virtual law library
[88]
Annex F-2, Volume II, Rollo, pp.1099-1100.
[89]
Chavez vs. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744, [1998].chanrobles virtual law library
[90]
Substantially the same as Section 24, Rule 130 of the old Rules of
Court.
[91]
Annex HH, Volume III, Rollo, p. 2205.chanrobles virtual law library
[92]
31A C.J.S., Par. 284, p.721.chanrobles virtual law library
[93]
Annex I, Volume II, Rollo, pp. 1177-1178.
[94]
Ibid, p. 1181.chanrobles virtual law library
[95]
Ibid, p. 1188.
[96]
Ibid, p. 1201.chanrobles virtual law library
[97]
29A Am. Jur., Par. 770, p. 137.chanrobles virtual law library
[98]
31A C.J.S., Par. 311, p.795.chanrobles virtual law library
[99]
Annex M, Volume II, Rollo, pp.1260-1261.chanrobles virtual law library
[100]
Substantially the same as Section 8, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court.
[101]
Annex S, Volume II, Rollo, pp.1506-1507.chanrobles virtual law library
[102]
Annex L, Volume II, Rollo, p. 1256.chanrobles virtual law library
[103]
Annex P-1, Volume II, Rollo, p. 1289.chanrobles virtual law library
[104]
Santiago vs. de los Santos, 61 SCRA 146 [1974].chanrobles virtual law library
[105]
Substantially the same as Section 2, Rule 129 of the old Rules of Court.
[106]
Substantially the same as Section 26, Rule 130 of the old Rules of
Court.
[107]
Substantially the same as Section 28, Rule 130 of the old Rules of
Court.
[108]
29 Am Jur 2d Par. 824, p. 211.chanrobles virtual law library
[109]
31A C.J.S., Par. 322, p. 817.chanrobles virtual law library
[110]
Ibid, p. 814.chanrobles virtual law library
[111]
Miriam Defensor Santiago, Rules of Court Annotated, 1999 ed., p. 857.
[112]
Rollo, pp. 2255-2265.chanrobles virtual law library
[113]
Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties in
interest
without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be
joined
either as plaintiffs or defendants. The same as Section 7, Rule 3
of the old Rules of Court.chanrobles virtual law library
[114]
59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties §97 (2000).
[115]
Supra note 3 § 13 (2000).chanrobles virtual law library
[116]
Supra note 3 citing Picket vs. Paine, 230 Ga 786, 199 SE2d 223.
[117]
Rollo, p. 1260. Manifestation:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
"Comes
now undersigned counsel for the respondent Imelda R. Marcos, and before
this Honorable Court, most respectfully manifests:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That
respondent Imelda R. Marcos owns 90% of the subject-matter of the
above-entitled
case, being the sole beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of
the various Foundations alleged in the case;
That
in fact only 10% of the subject-matter in the above-entitled case
belongs
to the Estate of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos;"
[118]
Rollo, p. 2464, quoted from the December 18, 2000 memorandum of
respondent
Mrs. Marcos:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
"On
the other hand, the opponent to the appeal, formally the owner of the
assets
to be seized and restituted, has not been involved in the collecting
procedure
pending in the Philippines. Even though such opponent is nothing but a
legal construction to hide the true ownership to the assets of the
Marcos
family, they nevertheless are entitled to a hearing as far as the
proceedings
are concerned with accounts which are nominally theirs. The guarantees
of the Republic of the Philippines therefore must include the process
rights
not only of the defendants but also of the formal owners of the assets
to be delivered."
[119]
240 SCRA 376, 469 [1995].chanrobles virtual law library
[120]
Supra.chanrobles virtual law library
[121]
Id. at 470-471.
[122]
Substantially the same as Section 11, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court.chanrobles virtual law library
[123]
Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. - Neither
misjoinder
nor non-joinder of parties is ground for the dismissal of an action.
Parties
may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or
on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as
are
just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded
with separately.
[124]
Same as Section 7, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court.chanrobles virtual law library
[125]
Supra note 3 § 265 (2000)chanrobles virtual law library
[126]
Id citing Gentry vs. Smith (CA5 Fla) 487 F2d 571, 18 FR Serv 2d 221,
later
app (CA5 Fla) 538 F2d 1090, on reh (CA5 Fla) 544 F2d 900, holding that
a failure to request the joinder of a defendant was excused where the
moving
party’s former counsel, who had resisted the joinder, abruptly withdrew
his appearance and substitute counsel moved promptly to join the
corporation.
[127]
Supra note 3. |