EN BANC
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
G.R.
No.
152289
January 14, 2004
-versus-
MARLON JUAN Y LESTE,
Appellant.
D E C I S I
O N
CORONA,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Before us for automatic
review is the decision[1]
of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 8, Second
Judicial
Region, finding the appellant, Marlon Juan, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt
of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the supreme
penalty
of death.
The information dated
July 24, 2001 charged appellant with the crime of parricide as follows:
That on or about April
23, 2001, in the municipality of Aparri, province of Cagayan, and
within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed
with a knife and a [sic] "asador," with intent to kill, did then and
there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab one
Yolanda
Juan y Leste, his legitimate mother, inflicting upon her multiple stab
wounds which caused her death.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment on
September 17, 2001, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio,
pleaded
guilty to the crime charged.[3]
During the pre-trial
conference on October 11, 2001, appellant admitted the following facts
presented by the prosecution:
1. identity of the accused
– that whenever the name Marlon Juan was mentioned, it referred to the
accused;
2. identity of the victim
– Yolanda Juan;
3. that accused Marlon
Juan was the son of the victim and that the victim was the legitimate
mother
of the accused;
4. that the accused
killed the victim on April 23, 2001 inside the victim’s house at
Barangay
Punta, Aparri, Cagayan with the use of a pointed iron bar; and
5. that the victim died
of multiple stab wounds as shown by the medical certificate and the
post
mortem report issued and signed by Dr. Robert Ogalino.[4]
Thereafter, trial on
the merits ensued.cralaw:red
On January 9, 2002,
the trial court promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of
which
read:
WHEREFORE, the Court
finds accused Marlon Juan y Leste "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of
the
crime of "Parricide" for killing his mother and is hereby sentence
[sic]
to suffer the supreme penalty of "DEATH."
SO ORDERED.[5]
The facts follow.cralaw:red
On April 23, 2001, around
10:00 p.m., Yolanda Juan opened the door of their house to let her son,
herein appellant Marlon Juan, in. Deogracias Juan (Yolanda’s husband
and
appellant’s father) who was resting inside their bedroom could hear his
wife and son’s voice. Appellant who was high on drugs demanded
delicious
food for dinner. Moments after, Deogracias heard the throwing and
breaking
of plates. Then he heard Marvin (appellant’s brother) yelling "Ni
Nanang
natayen" ("Mother is dead already"). Deogracias immediately proceeded
to
the porch where Marvin’s voice came from and saw appellant in the act
of
stabbing Marvin. Deogracias grabbed the asador (pointed iron bar) from
the appellant and they wrestled for its possession. Eventually,
Deogracias
got control of the asador. Appellant then drew a knife from his waist
and
tried to stab Deogracias but the latter was able to wrest the knife
away
from the appellant. Appellant ran away. When Deogracias finally turned
his attention to his wife, only then did he realize that indeed she was
already dead. Yolanda was lying face down on the floor, no longer
breathing.
Deogracias nevertheless still brought her to the hospital where she was
pronounced dead on arrival.[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The statement of Marvin
Juan to the effect that "he was the brother of the accused and that he
saw the accused kill their mother" was no longer heard by the trial
court
because the appellant admitted the truth of such testimony.[7]
The prosecution formally
offered the following documentary evidences: (1) death certificate
(Exhibit
"A") and postmortem examination report (Exhibit "B") to prove the death
of the victim and (2) birth certificate of appellant Marlon Juan to
prove
that he was the legitimate son of the victim.[8]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The defense waived the
presentation of appellant’s evidence.[9]
On the basis of the
evidence presented by the prosecution which was not refuted by the
defense,
the trial court ruled that it was "clear as the snow of the Alps" that
appellant was guilty of the crime of parricide and sentenced him to
suffer
the supreme penalty of death.[10]
Appellant is before
us, not to question his conviction for the crime of parricide by the
trial
court but to question the death penalty imposed on him. Appellant
contends
that the proper penalty imposable on him is reclusion perpetua, not
death.[11]
The appeal is meritorious.cralaw:red
Under Article 246 of
the Revised Penal Code (hereafter the Code), the crime of parricide is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Since the penalty for the
crime
of parricide is composed of two indivisible penalties (reclusion
perpetua
to death), the imposition of the proper indivisible penalty on
appellant
is governed by Article 63 of the Code which provides:
Article 63. Rules for
the application of indivisible penalties.cralaw:red
x x
x
x x x x x x
In all cases in which
the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. When in the commission
of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the
greater
penalty shall be applied.cralaw:red
2. When there are neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed,
the lesser penalty shall be applied.cralaw:red
3. When the commission
of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.cralaw:red
4. When both mitigating
and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the
courts
shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of
their
number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in
accordance
with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Based on the above provision,
the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances must first
be determined for the imposition of the proper penalty.cralaw:red
In this case, no aggravating
circumstances were alleged in the information. Thus, no aggravating
circumstances
can be appreciated against the appellant. With regard to the presence
of
any mitigating circumstances, we find that appellant is entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession of guilt.cralaw:red
Article 13 (7) of the
Revised Penal Code provides that an accused is entitled to the
mitigating
circumstance of voluntary confession of guilty if "he had voluntarily
confessed
his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of evidence by the
prosecution." The following requisites must concur: (1) the accused
spontaneously
confessed his guilt; (2) the confession of guilt was made in open
court,
that is, before a competent court trying the case; and (3) the
confession
of guilt was made prior to the presentation of evidence by the
prosecution.[12]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In this case, appellant
made his confession of guilt before the presentation of evidence by the
prosecution since he pleaded guilty during the arraignment. The
appellant
also confessed voluntarily and spontaneously despite knowing the
serious
nature of the charge against him.[13]
Lastly, appellant made his confession openly, that is, before the judge
and the parties in a hearing. Clearly therefore, all the requisites of
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession were present.cralaw:red
With one mitigating
circumstance (voluntary confession of guilt) and no aggravating
circumstance,
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "in cases in which
the
law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties[the
lesser penalty shall be applied] when the [crime] is attended by some
mitigating
circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstances." Thus, since
the
crime of parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, the
lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua should have been imposed by the trial
court
on appellant, not the penalty of death.cralaw:red
Other than the penalty
imposed, we find no error in the ruling of the trial court that the
appellant
was guilty of the crime of parricide since it was clear that appellant
killed his mother. As discussed by the trial court, all the elements of
the crime of parricide were clearly and sufficiently proved by the
prosecution:
As to the first element
which is, that a person is killed, there is an overwhelming evidence
both
testimonial and documentary that absolutely show that Yolanda Juan was
killed and died due to stab wounds. The death certificate, Exhibit "A"
(p. 6 rec.) lucidly and clearly show that Yolanda Juan died and the
cause
of death is cardio-respiratory arrest due to multiple stab wounds.
Moreover,
the accused through his counsel de oficio during the pre-trial
conference
admitted that the victim died of multiple stab wounds..Finally,
the
proffered testimony of Marvin Juan, brother of the accused that he saw
the accused killed [sic] the victim was admitted by the accused through
his counsel.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x x
x
x x x x x x
As to the existence
of the second element, which is, that the deceased is the mother of the
accused, there is no iota of doubt on the part of the court to conclude
that the victim is indeed the mother of the accused. Exhibit "C," the
Birth
Certificate of accused Marlon Juan (p. 39 rec).indubitably show
with
clarity that Yolanda Leste Juan is indeed the mother of.the
herein
accused. Further, the accused through his counsel de oficio admitted
during
the pre-trial conference that, [he] is the son of the deceased.cralaw:red
x x
x
x x x x x x
As to the presence of
the third element [the last element] which is, the deceased is killed
by
the accused, the court again is very certain that the accused is the
author
of the crimenot only because he pleaded "GUILTY" to the crime of
"Parricide" but because of the overwhelming evidence that positively
identify
him as the perpetrator of the offense. Again, during the pre-trial of
the
case, the accused admitted through his counsel that "he killed the
victim
on April 23, 2001 at the victim’s residence at Punta, Aparri, Cagayan
with
the use of a pointed iron bar" (par. 4, Stipulation of Facts, Order
dated
October 11, 201; pp 30-31 rec). Also, the proffered testimony of Marvin
Juan, brother of the accused, that "he saw the accused killed the
victim"
was admitted by the counsel for the accused (Order dated November 21,
2001;
pp 36-37 rec). Finally, the open court testimony of accused’s father,
Deogracias
Juan, that when his son Marvin shouted "Mother is already dead," he
immediately
rose up from where he was lying and proceeded to the place where Marlon
was and saw the latter on motion to stab Marvin and saw his wife
Yolanda
already sprawled on the floor speaks eloquently of the fact that
accused
Marlon Juan was in the process of a stabbing frenzy. In fact, he was
able
to injure his brother Marvin after stabbing successively to death his
own
mother. Thus, the accused having admitted his guilt coupled by the
overwhelming
evidence positively showing and identifying him to be the killer of his
mother; the third element is therefore present.[14]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We affirm the above
ruling of the trial court for being in accordance with the law and the
evidence on record. Consequently, although we uphold the conviction of
appellant Marlon Juan of the crime of parricide, the proper penalty is
reclusion perpetua, not death.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 8, in Criminal
Case
No. 08-1318, finding the appellant, Marlon Juan, guilty beyond
reasonable
doubt of the crime of parricide is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION
that appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua
instead of death.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno,
Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Judge Conrado F. Manauis, Rollo, pp. 7-15.
[2]
Rollo, p. 4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
The trial court read the information to the appellant in Ilocano, the
dialect
appellant speaks and understands. Records, p. 26.
[4]
Records, p. 30.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Rollo, p. 15.
[6]
TSN, November 20, 2001, pp. 2-9.
[7]
Records, p. 36-37.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Ibid.
[9]
Id.
[10]
Id., pp. 5-9.
[11]
Rollo, pp. 31-36.
[12]
People vs. Crisostomo, 160 SCRA 47 [1988]; People vs. Bueza, 188 SCRA
683
[1990].
[13]
The trial court read to the appellant the information in Ilocano, the
dialect
he speaks and understands. Records, p. 26.
[14]
Rollo, pp. 11-14.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |