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ACESITE
CORPORATION, HOLIDAY INN,
JOHANN ANGERBAUER and PHIL KENNEDY,
Petitioner,
-versus-
G.R.
No. 152308
January 26, 2005
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
(Second Division) and LEO A. GONZALES,
Respondents.
LEO A.
GONZALES,
Petitioner,
-versus-
G.R. No.
152321
January 26, 2005
ACESITE
(PHILIPPINES) HOTEL CORPORATION,
HOLIDAY INN MANILA, JOHANN ANGERBAUER
and PHIL KENNEDY,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO
MORALES, J.:
Before this Court are two consolidated
Petitions for Review on
Certiorari
challenging the Court of Appeals Decision of October 12, 2001 and
Resolution of February 19, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 65406, “Acesite
(Philippines) Hotel Corporation, Holiday Inn Manila, Johann Angerbauer
and Phil Kennedy v. National Labor Relations Commission and Leo A.
Gonzales.”
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
Leo A. Gonzales (Gonzales) was hired on
October 18, 1993 as Chief of Security of Manila Pavillion Hotel.
[1] On January 1, 1995, Acesite Corporation
(Acesite) took over the operations of Manila Pavillion and renamed it
Holiday Inn Manila (the hotel). Acesite retained Gonzales as
Chief of Security of the hotel.
On March 25, 1998, Gonzales took a 4-day
sick leave and took emergency leave on March 30, 1998. On April
16-29, 1998, he again took a 12-day vacation leave, thereby using up
all leaves that he was entitled for the year.
Before the expiration of his 12-day vacation
leave or on April 23, 1998, Gonzales filed an application
[2] for
emergency leave for 10 days commencing on April 30 up to May 13,
1998. The application was not, however, approved. By
Acesite’s claim, he received a telegram
[3]
informing him of the
disapproval and asking him to report back for work on April 30, 1998.
Gonzales did not report for work on April
30, 1998. On even date, he received a telegram
[4]
from Acesite
advising him that he was on unauthorized leave and asking him to
provide a written explanation within the next 24 hours why he was not
reporting for work. At the same time, he was required to report
for work the following day or on May 1, 1998.
On May 2, 1998, Gonzales’ father Anacleto
sent a telegram
[5]
to Acesite stating that he was still recovering from
severe stomach disorder and would report back for work on May 4,
1998. A medical certificate
[6]
dated May 3, 1998 issued by a Dr.
Laureano C. Gonzales, Jr. stating that Gonzales was under his care from
April 30 – May 3, 1998 was presented to prove that he indeed was
treated from such sickness.
On May 4, 1998, around lunchtime, Gonzales
reported for work and presented himself to Johann Angerbauer, then
Resident Manager of the hotel. Angerbauer claims that when
Gonzales went to him, he asked him to explain why he had been absent
despite orders for him to report back for work to which he (Gonzales)
replied that it was necessary for him to go home to his province in
Abra.
Gonzales, on the other hand, claims that
when he conferred with Angerbauer, he requested for leave without pay
from May 5-9, 1998 which was provisionally approved on condition that
he (Gonzales) would be sending his explanation through e-mail behind
his absences on April 30, 1998 and May 2, 1998 so that Angerbauer could
send it to the hotel General Manager Phil Kennedy who was then out of
the country.
Around 5:33 pm of May 4, 1998, Gonzales sent
his explanation
[7]
to Angerbauer through e-mail, to wit, quoted
verbatim:
This has reference with your verbal
instruction that I will submit my written explanation regarding my
absences on April 30,1998 and May 2, 1998.
At the outset, my profound apologies for the
above-stated absences. As you are fully aware of, on April 27,
1998, I formally requested your office that my official leave [which]
will expire on April 29, 1998 shall be extended up to May 15,
1998. Inasmuch that I was in the province (ABRA) at that time, I
was not aware that my request was disapproved until such time that I
received your telegram two days later. Likewise, when I received
your telegram, I was sick at that time and this was duly communicated
to your office thru telegram. This was the reason I failed to
report for work also on May 2, 1998.
As exhaustively discussed to you today, there
is a great necessity for me to go home tonight in the province.
Once again, I am asking your kind understanding that I shall be allowed
to go on leave effective tomorrow and rest assured that I will report
for work after the election. At any rate, the training of our new
guards will start on May 18, 1998.
Thank you for this and for the past favors.
In the evening
Gonzales left for Abra.
Also on May 4, 1998 Angerbauer sent the
following inter-office memo
[8]
to Gonzales, allegedly received at
around 7:55 pm by the security staff:
As
discussed during our meeting, you are advised to submit an explanation
within 24 hours why you did not report to work 1st May 1998? And why
you came in late today 4th of May 1998, as we had a 10:30 AM scheduled
communication meeting with the incoming Security Agency.
We
will be having another meeting tomorrow regarding the turnover of the
outgoing Security Agency. I will be expecting your presence
during the said meeting.
For your compliance.
Gonzales claims
that he got hold of a copy of the above-quoted memo only on May 8, 1998.
Gonzales not having reported for work on May
5, 1998, Angerbauer sent him on even date the following telegram
[9]
at
his provincial address in Abra:
THIS
IS TO REITERATE OUR ADVICE FOR YOU TO REPORT BACK TO WORK IMMEDIATELY
UPON RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE DUE TO VERY URGENT MATTERS INVOLVING
SECURITY DEPARTMENT’S CONCERNS WHICH IMPERATIVELY REQUIRE YOUR PERSONAL
ATTENTION. PLEASE CONSIDER THIS AS OUR FINAL ADVICE.
Gonzales, who claims to have received the
May 5, 1998 telegram only in the afternoon of May 7, 1998, immediately
repaired back to Manila on May 8, 1998 only to be “humiliatingly and
ignominiously barred by the guard (a subordinate of [Gonzales]) from
entering the premises.”
It appears that on May 7, 1998, Angerbauer
issued the following Notice of Termination
[10]
through an inter-office
memo:
As you continuously
disregard our several
advices for you to report back to work to attend to very urgent matters
involving Security Department’s concerns which, as categorically made
clear to you, imperatively required your personal presence and
attention considering that you are its Department Head, thus adversely
affecting the operations of said department, we are left with no
recourse but to terminate your services from the Hotel effective
immediately for violations of rule no. 27, Type C, of the House Code of
Discipline – “Acts of gross disobedience or insubordination” and
provisions of the Labor Code, specifically Art. 282. Termination by
Employer, par. (a) x x x willful disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his
work.
Please be guided
accordingly. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Gonzales thus filed on May 27, 1998 a
complaint
[11]
against Acesite, Angerbauer and Kennedy for illegal
dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of full backwages,
service incentive leave, 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees. Gonzales, however, failed to appear in 2
consecutive hearings despite notice, meriting the dismissal by the
Labor Arbiter of his complaint by Order
[12]
of September 17, 1998.
Gonzales refiled on July 13, 1999 his
complaint for illegal dismissal
[13]
against Angerbauer and Kennedy,
which he amended
[14]
on September 20, 1999, by impleading Acesite as
respondent.
After the filing of their respective
position papers, pleadings and documentary evidence, the Labor Arbiter,
by Decision of February 7, 2000, dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit, it holding that Gonzales was dismissed for just cause and was
not denied of due process.
Gonzales appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), he faulting the Labor Arbiter as follows:
I
The
Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
complaint for lack of merit.
II
The
Labor Arbiter seriously erred in the finding of facts, which caused
grave or irreparable damage or injury to the complainant/appellant.
III
The
Labor Arbiter seriously erred in the finding that there was absence of
due process in the dismissal of the complaint.
[15]
By Decision
[16]
of December 29, 2000, the
NLRC reversed that of the Labor Arbiter, the dispositive portion of
which is quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES
CONSIDERED, the decision
of Labor Arbiter Geobel A. Bartolabac dated February 7, 2000 is hereby,
REVERSED. Respondents are hereby ordered:
1) to
immediately reinstate complainant
to his former position without loss of seniority rights;
2) to pay
complainant backwages
beginning for the period May 16, 1998, until he is actually reinstated,
inclusive of all his other fringe benefits or their monetary equivalent;
3) to pay
complainant the sum of
P800,000.00 pesos as moral damages and the equal amount of P800,000.00
as and for exemplary damages;
4) to pay
ten (10) per cent attorney’s
fees. (Underscoring supplied)
Acesite thereupon filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals anchored on the following
grounds:
I. THE
NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REVERSED THE
FINDING OF THE LABOR ARBITER THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS LEGALLY DISMISSED
FOR JUST CAUSE[.]
II. THE NLRC
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REVERSED THE
FINDING OF THE LABOR ARBITER THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS AFFORDED
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS[.]
III. THE
NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REVERSED THE
FINDING OF THE LABOR ARBITER THAT THE RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO HIS
MONEY CLAIMS[.]
IV. THE NLRC
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT INCLUDED PETITIONERS PHIL
KENNEDY AND JOHANN ANGERBAUER LIABLE TO THE RESPONDENT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE FACT THEY ARE MERE EMPLOYEES OF THE HOTEL[.]
[17]
By Decision
[18]
of October 12, 2001, the
Court of Appeals, finding that Gonzales was illegally dismissed,
affirmed with modification the NLRC decision:
After a careful
study of the evidence on
record and of the allegations of both parties, this Court is convinced
that private respondent Gonzales was illegally dismissed.
The parties hereto
contest the receipt by
private respondent Gonzales of the first telegram sent by petitioner
Angerbauer. Since the evidence of petitioners is merely a piece
of paper supposedly containing the contents of the telegram sent to the
former, We cannot accept the same as proof that indeed a telegram was
sent and was thereafter received by private respondent Gonzales.
The burden of proof is upon petitioners to show that indeed the latter
received the same.
Insofar as private
respondent Gonzales’
failure to report for work on May 1, 1998, we give credence to the
medical certificate he submitted to prove that he was indeed indisposed
during the period in controversy especially in the light of the fact
that the same was issued by his rival in the political arena, Dr.
Laureano C. Gonzales, Jr., We do not think Dr. Gonzales who likewise
ran for the same elective position as herein private respondent
Gonzales would help him cover up his absences if he really did not
treat the latter and had him under his care. Thus, his failure to
report for work on May 1, 1998 was justified.
As to the third
telegram, the final notice by
petitioners to private respondent Gonzales, which directed him to
report for work immediately upon receipt thereof, was complied with by
the latter when he reported to the hotel on May 8, 1998 but was refused
entry. Petitioners insist that he did not report to work. Private
respondent Gonzales however submitted an official receipt of his
diesoline purchase to evidence the fact that he went to Manila on said
date.
And even granting
arguendo that private
respondent Gonzales did not heed the same, his immediate termination
was still unwarranted despite the provision on petitioner’s House Code
of Discipline.
Article 277 of the Labor Code, as amended,
provides:
ART. 277.
Miscellaneous provisions. – (a) x x
x.
(b)
Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure
and their right to be protected against dismissal except for just and
authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice
under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker
whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing
a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter
ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of
his representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules
and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the
Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer
shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the
validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the
regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The
burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized
cause shall rest on the employer. The Secretary of the Department
of Labor and Employment may certify the dispute in the event of a prima
facie finding by the appropriate official of the Department of Labor
and Employment before whom such dispute pending that the termination
may cause a serious labor dispute or is in implementation of a mass
lay-off.
x x x
In the present case, the records do not show
compliance by petitioners with the two (2)-notice rule prescribed in
the above provision of law. Although several telegrams were sent to
private respondent Gonzales, there is not one (1) telegram which
contains a statement of the cause for his termination. The
telegram and the meeting held on May 4, 1998 requiring him to submit a
written explanation as to his absences did not apprise him that he was
being considered for termination. Moreover, he was not informed
that an investigation was being conducted vis-à-vis his
continued absences and his non-disclosure of the fact that he was
running for public office.
In other words, no notice was sent by
petitioners to apprise private respondent Gonzales of the charges
against him nor was he given ample opportunity to contest said charges
with the assistance of counsel, if he so desired. What
petitioners did was to send him a notice of termination on the premise
that his immediate dismissal is authorized under their House Code of
Discipline. While it is recognized that company policies and
regulations, unless they are oppressive or contrary to law, are
generally valid and binding on the parties and must be complied with,
the same cannot be exercised for the purpose of defeating the rights of
the employees under the law.
Unfortunately for petitioners, their employees
are still entitled to the procedural requirements of notice and hearing
despite provisions in their code of discipline purportedly giving them
the right to immediately terminate their services. Employees
cannot bargain away this right notwithstanding their acquiescence to
the employer’s rules.
As to petitioners’ claim that private
respondent willfully disobeyed their orders, the Supreme Court in the
case of Lagatic vs. NLRC held:
In order that an
employer may dismiss an
employee on the ground of willful disobedience, there must be
concurrence of at least two (2) requisites: the employee’s assailed
conduct must have been willful or intentional, the willingness being
characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and that the order
violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee
and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.
The present case
does not show the presence of
the first requisite. As private respondent Gonzales’ failure to
comply with petitioners’ orders were not characterized by a perverse
attitude. At most he can only be suspended from service for assuming
that his leaves of absence would be approved by management. The
penalty of dismissal is too harsh considering that private respondent
Gonzales has been with the company for almost five (5) years and has
rendered unblemished service until the period in controversy. For
his unauthorized absences, We hereby rule that a suspension of one (1)
week is commensurate to his violation of Type C, House Code of
Discipline rule on unauthorized absences.
Anent the alleged willful non-disclosure by
private respondent Gonzales of his candidacy for public office, We find
the same to be unsupported by evidence. The tenor of private
respondent Gonzales’ internal email to petitioner Angerbauer reveals
that the latter was aware that the reason for the former’s prolonged
absences was his ongoing campaign as Board Member of the Province of
Abra. Considering the same, We are inclined to believe private
respondent Gonzales’ version of the story.
Going now to the propriety of the monetary
awards to private respondent Gonzales, We find the amount P800,000.00
each as moral and exemplary damages unwarranted. The collective
amount of P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is just under the
circumstances. Public respondent NLRC’s award of ten (10) per
cent attorney’s fees is affirmed.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Decision
dated December 29, 2000 of public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
Petitioners are
hereby ordered:
1.
to
reinstate private respondent Leo A. Gonzales to his former position
without loss of seniority rights or privileges. If reinstatement
is no longer feasible, then payment of separation pay equivalent to
½ month pay for every year of service is hereby ordered;
2.
to pay
private respondent Leo A. Gonzales his full back wages commencing
on 14 May 1998 in view of his one (1) week suspension until he is
actually reinstated;
3.
to pay
P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; and
4.
to pay
10% of the total monetary award as and for attorney’s fees.
With costs
against the petitioners.
[19]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, the two separate petitions of Acesite
and Gonzales.
In its petition,
Acesite contends that:
I
THE
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT AFFIRM THE FINDING OF
THE LABOR ARBITER THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS LEGALLY DISMISSED FOR JUST
CAUSE.
II
THE
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED THE FINDING OF THE
LABOR ARBITER THAT RESPONDENT WAS AFFORDED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
III
THE
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED THE FINDING OF THE
LABOR ARBITER THAT THE RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO HIS MONEY
CLAIMS.
[20]
Gonzales, on the
other hand, posits in his
petition that:
I
[THE
COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY ERRED IN DELETING THE AWARDS OF FRINGE
BENEFITS OR THEIR MONETARY EQUIVALENTS WHICH THE NLRC ORDERED TO BE
GIVEN TO THE PETITIONER FROM THE TIME HE WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED UP TO
HIS ACTUAL REINSTATEMENT.
II
[THE
COURT OF APPEALS] SERIOUSLY ERRED IN BESTOWING TO THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS THE OPTION WHETHER TO REINSTATE THE PETITIONER OR NOT.
III
[THE
COURT OF APPEALS] ERRED IN SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCING THE AMOUNT OF AWARDS
OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES WHICH THE NLRC DESERVINGLY ADJUDGED TO
BE ACCORDED TO THE PETITIONER.
[21]
Acesite argues that there was just cause for
Gonzales’ termination under Article 282 of the Labor Code, the
pertinent provision of which reads:
ART. 282
TERMINATION BY EMPLOYER. – An
employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious
Misconduct of willful Disobedience
by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative
in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and
habitual Neglect by the employee
of his duties;
x
x x
For, so Acesite
claims, Gonzales “showed no respect for x x x [the] lawful orders for
him to report back to work and repeatedly ignored all telegrams sent to
him,”
[22]
and it merely exercised its legal right to dismiss him under
the House Code of Discipline which imposes dismissal as penalty for a
violation of Rule 27 thereof.
Acesite further claims that Gonzales cannot
feign ignorance of said rule because it is part of his job to implement
it;
[23]
and the medical certificate accomplished by a Dr. Gonzales who
“could very well be a relative,” was issued in Quezon City on May 3,
1998 whereas it stated that Gonzales was under the physician’s care in
Abra from April 30 to May 3, 1998.
Acesite furthermore claims that, as
correctly ruled by the Labor Arbiter, the facts by any standard suffice
to cause it to lose its trust and confidence in Gonzales especially his
concealment that he was seeking an elective post in Abra during the
1998 elections which would explain why he did not report for work as
directed;
[24]
and that Gonzales was afforded procedural due
process as the twin requirements of notice and hearing were complied
with through the numerous telegrams sent to both Gonzales’ city and
provincial addresses asking him to report for work and explain his
unauthorized absences.
[25]
This Court finds no reason to depart from
the findings of the Court of Appeals. Indeed, there appears to
have been no just cause to dismiss Gonzales from employment. As
correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Gonzales cannot be considered
to have willfully disobeyed his employer. Willful disobedience
entails the concurrence of at least two (2) requisites: the employee’s
assailed conduct has been willful or intentional, the willfulness being
characterized by a “wrongful and perverse attitude;” and the order
violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee
and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to
discharge.
[26]
In Gonzales’ case, his assailed conduct has
not been shown to have been characterized by a perverse attitude,
hence, the first requisite is wanting. His receipt of the
telegram disapproving his application for emergency leave starting
April 30, 1998 has not been shown. And it cannot be said that he
disobeyed the May 5, 1998 telegram since he received it only on May 7,
1998. On the contrary, that he immediately hied back to Manila
upon receipt thereof negates a perverse attitude.
As to Gonzales’ alleged concealment of his
candidacy (for provincial board member) as a ground for Acesite’s loss
of trust and confidence in him, the same is not impressed with
merit. It should be noted that Acesite’s ground for terminating
the services of Gonzales as stated in the Notice of Termination is his
alleged acts of insubordination/disobedience. The concealment of
candidacy angle harped upon by Acesite can only thus be considered as
mere afterthought to further justify his illegal dismissal.
With regards to Gonzales’ perceived feigning
of illness, the same is purely speculatory.
If there is anything that Gonzales can be
faulted for, it is his being too presumptuous that his application for
leave would be approved. For his unauthorized absences, this Court
finds that Gonzales violated paragraph 26, Rule 11 of Type B offenses
of the Company’s House Code of Discipline – unauthorized absence from
work for three consecutive days
[27]
– which is punishable by a
suspension of 3 days on the first offense – when he did not report for
work from May 5-7, 1998.
As for Gonzales’ petition before this Court,
he argues that the Court of Appeals, absent any reason, modified the
decision of the NLRC by deleting or eliminating the “other fringe
benefits or their monetary equivalent;”
[28]
that the said court should
not have given Acesite the option to reinstate him or not since the
case at bar does not fall under circumstances for which reinstatement
is no longer possible; that even assuming that his reinstatement
is not in the interest of labor, the severance pay of ½ month
pay ordered by the appellate court is not in accordance with law and
jurisprudence; and that the reduction of the moral and exemplary
damages awarded him by the NLRC was erroneous.
In illegal dismissal cases, reinstatement to
an illegally dismissed employee’s former position may be excused on the
ground of “strained relations.” This may be invoked against
employees whose positions demand trust and confidence, or whose
differences with their employer are of such nature or degree as to
preclude reinstatement.
[29]
In the case at bar, Gonzales was Chief of
Security, whose duty was to “manage the operation of the security
areas of the hotel to provide and ensure the safety and security of the
hotel guests, visitors, management, staff and their properties
according to company policies and local laws.”
[30]
It cannot be
gainsaid that Gonzales’ position is one of trust and confidence, he
being in charge of the over-all security of said hotel. Thus,
reinstatement is no longer possible. In lieu thereof, Acesite is
liable to pay separation pay of 1 month for every year of service.
As to the award of moral and exemplary
damages, this Court finds it unwarranted. Moral damages are
recoverable only where the dismissal of the employees was attended by
bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor or was
done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy. Exemplary damages on the other hand may be awarded only
if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent
manner.
[31]
Though these grounds have been alleged by Gonzales,
they were not sufficiently proven.
The appellate court affirmed the NLRC ruling
that Angerbauer and Kennedy are solidarily liable with Acesite. In the
case of Bogo-Medellin Sugarcane Planters Association, Inc. v. NLRC,
[32]
this Court ruled:
Unless they have
exceeded their authority,
corporate officers are, as a general rule, not personally liable for
their official acts, because a corporation, by legal fiction, has a
personality separate and distinct from its officers, stockholders and
members. However, this fictional veil may be pierced whenever the
corporate personality is used as a means of perpetuating fraud or an
illegal act, evading an existing obligation, or confusing a legitimate
issue. In cases of illegal dismissal, corporate directors and
officers are solidarily liable with the corporation, where terminations
of employment are done with malice or in bad faith. (Underscoring
supplied, citations omitted)
In holding Angerbauer and Kennedy solidarily
liable, the NLRC intended “to deter other foreign employer[s] from
repeating the inhuman treatment of their Filipino employees who should
be treated with equal respect especially in their own land and prevent
further violation of their human rights as employees.”
The records of the case do not, however,
show any inhuman treatment of Gonzales. His superiors just happen
to be foreigners. Moreover, as previously discussed, bad faith or
malice was not proven. Angerbauer, acting on behalf of Acesite, was,
like Gonzales, perhaps also too presumptuous in thinking that the
telegrams ordering the latter to report for work were all received on
time, drawing him to hastily conclude that Gonzales intentionally
disobeyed the orders contained therein.
As to the deletion of the “fringe benefits
or their monetary equivalent,” this Court agrees with Gonzales that it
is not in accord with law and jurisprudence. Article 279 of the Labor
Code provides:
ART. 279 SECURITY
OF TENURE. – In cases of
regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for just cause or when authorized by this Title. An
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and
to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As for the award of attorney’s fees, the
same is in order, Gonzales having been forced to litigate and incur
expenses to protect his rights and interest.
[33]
This Court, however,
reduces the award to P10,000.00.
In fine, this Court affirms the assailed
decision with modification in light of the foregoing discussions.
WHEREFORE,
as modified, the decision reads
as follows:
1) Acesite Corporation is hereby ordered to
pay Leo A. Gonzales:
a)
his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and his other benefits or
their monetary equivalent, to be computed from the time he was
illegally dismissed until the finality of this Decision less 3 days in
view of his suspension;
b)
separation pay equivalent to his 1 month salary for every year of
service computed from the time Gonzales was first employed by Acesite
until the finality of this Decision;
c) P10,000.00 as
attorney’s fees; and
2)
The complaint against Johann Angerbauer and Phil Kennedy is hereby DISMISSED.
No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, J., (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona, and Garcia, JJ.,
concur.
 .
[1] G.R. No.
152308 Rollo at 9; G.R.
No. 152321 Rollo at 14.
[2] Court of Appeals (CA) Rollo at 94.
[3] Id. at 95.
[4] Id. at 96.
[5] Id. at 97.
[6] Id. at 154.
[7] Id. at 99.
[8] Id. at 98.
[9] Id. at 100.
[10] Id. at 101.
[11] Id. at 103-104.
[12] Id. at 105.
[13] Id. at 63-64.
[14] Id. at 66.
[15] Id. at 168-169.
[16] Id. at 34-60.
[17] Id. at 10.
[18] G.R. No. 152308 Rollo at 36-44.
[19] Id. at 40-43.
[20] Id. at 16-28.
[21] G.R. No. 152321 Rollo at 19.
[22] G.R. No. 152308 Rollo at 17.
[23] Id. at 20.
[24] Id. at 22.
[25] Id. at 25.
[26] Procter and Gamble Phils. v. Bondesto, G.R. No. 139847,
March 5, 2004 citing Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. vs. NLRC,
189 SCRA 811 (1990).
[27] CA Rollo at 145.
[28] G.R. No. 152321 Rollo at 20-21.
[29] Maranaw Hotels and Resorts Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 215
SCRA 501, 507 (1992); Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs.
NLRC,
206 SCRA 701, 711-712 (1992); Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. vs.
Ople,
152 SCRA, 219, 227 (1987).
[30] Policy Manual, Holiday Inn Manila at 7; CA Rollo at 138.
[31] Garcia vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 234 SCRA
632, 638 (1994) (citations omitted).
[32] 296 SCRA 108, 126 (1998).
[33] Rasonable vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 253
SCRA 815, 819 (1996).
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