SECOND DIVISION
COSMO
ENTERTAINMENT
MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
152801
August 20, 2004
-versus-
LA VILLE COMMERCIAL
CORPORATION,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO,
SR., J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Before the court is the
Petition for Review on
Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed
by Cosmo Entertainment Management, Inc. for the reversal of the
Resolution[1]
dated September 26, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
59819,
which dismissed its petition for review for being filed out of
time.
Likewise, sought to be reversed and set aside is the appellate court’s
Resolution dated March 22, 2002 denying the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The case stemmed from
the following factual backdrop:
The respondent, La Ville
Commercial Corporation, is the registered owner of a parcel of land
covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 174250 of the Registry of
Deeds
of Makati City together with the commercial building thereon situated
at
the corner of Kalayaan and Neptune Streets in Makati City. On
March
17, 1993, it entered into a Contract of Lease with petitioner Cosmo
Entertainment
Management, Inc. over the subject property for a period of seven years
with a monthly rental of P250 per square meter of the floor area of the
building and a security deposit equivalent to three monthly rentals in
the amount of P447,000 to guarantee the faithful compliance of the
terms
and conditions of the lease agreement. Upon execution of the
contract,
the petitioner took possession of the subject property.cralaw:red
The petitioner, however,
suffered business reverses and was constrained to stop operations in
September
1996. Thereafter, the petitioner defaulted in its rental
payments.
Consequently, on February 1, 1997, the respondent made a demand on the
petitioner to vacate the premises as well as to pay the accrued rentals
plus interests which, as of January 31, 1997, amounted to
P740,478.91.
In reply to the demand, the petitioner averred that its unpaid rentals
amounted to P698,500 only and since it made a security deposit of
P419,100
with the respondent, the said amount should be applied to the unpaid
rentals;
hence, the outstanding accounts payable would only be
P279,400.
The respondent requested that the interest charges be waived and it be
given time to find a solution to its financial problems.cralaw:red
After negotiations between
the parties failed, the respondent, on May 27, 1997, reiterated its
demand
on the petitioner to pay the unpaid rentals as well as to vacate and
surrender
the premises to the respondent. When the petitioner refused to
comply
with its demand, the respondent filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 62, a complaint for illegal detainer,
docketed
as Civil Case No. 58875.chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner, in its
answer to the complaint, raised the defense that, under the contract,
it
had the right to sublease the premises upon prior written consent by
the
respondent and payment of transfer fees. However, the respondent,
without any justifiable reason, refused to allow the petitioner to
sublease
the premises.cralaw:red
After due proceedings,
the MeTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent holding that the
petitioner was bound by the terms of the contract that it could only
sublease
the premises upon the respondent’s consent. The latter, as owner
of the premises and not having waived its right under the contract, had
the exclusive right to determine to whom it would sublease the
same.
Since the petitioner had indisputably failed to pay the monthly rentals
beginning September 1996, in clear breach of the contract of lease, the
respondent rightfully rescinded the same and sought judicial eviction
of
the petitioner. The dispositive portion of the MeTC Decision
dated
July 20, 1999 reads:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is rendered ordering the defendant Cosmo Entertainment
Management,
Inc. and all persons/entities claiming rights under it to vacate the
Property
in question and turn its possession as well as all the improvements
found
thereon to the plaintiff [the respondent]; to pay the accrued rentals
including
interest and taxes due in the amount of P2,918,568.58 as of November
30,
1997 minus the deposit equivalent to three (3) monthly rentals and the
subsequent amount of P159,000.00 commencing December, 1997 and the same
amount every month thereafter as reasonable compensation for the
continued
and illegal use and occupancy of the Property until finally restituted
to the plaintiff [the respondent]; to pay the sum of P10,000.00 for
[sic]
as attorney’s fees plus cost of suit.chanrobles virtual law library
The compulsory
counter-claim
of the defendant [the petitioner] is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The payment of subsequent rental starting December, 1997, until the
full
restitution of the Property to the plaintiff [the respondent] is with
interest
at the legal rate reckoned from even date.
SO ORDERED.[2]
The petitioner appealed
the decision to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati City,
which
rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the court a quo.[3]
In its decision dated June 26, 2000, the RTC concurred with the court a
quo’s findings that, under the terms of the contract, the respondent,
as
the owner-lessor of the premises, had reserved its right to approve the
sublease of the same. The petitioner, having voluntarily given
its
consent thereto, was bound by this stipulation under the principle of
mutuality
of contracts.[4]
Further, the petitioner is deemed to have violated the terms of the
contract
upon its failure to pay the monthly rentals. Consequently, its
ejectment
from the leased premises was justified.
The petitioner received
a copy of the RTC decision on July 6, 2000. On July 21, 2000, the
last day to file its petition for review on certiorari of the RTC
decision,
the petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Motion for
Extension
to File Petition for Review. Acting thereon, the CA, in its
Resolution
dated August 2, 2000, granted the same in this wise:chanrobles virtual law library
Subject to
the timeliness of the petition, the petitioner is hereby GRANTED a
non-extendible
period of fifteen (15) days from 21 July 2000 or until 5 August 2000
within
which to file a petition for review.chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.[5]
Notwithstanding the
clear
tenor of the said resolution, the petitioner filed, on August 4, 2000,
a second Motion for Extension to File Petition for Review asking that
it
be given another fifteen (15) days from August 5, 2000, or until August
20, 2000, within which to file the said pleading.
On August 18, 2000,
the petitioner filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari with the
CA.
On September 26, 2000, the CA issued the assailed Resolution denying
due
course to the petition for review on certiorari for having been filed
out
of time. The assailed resolution reads in full:
As observed by this
Court the Petition for Review was filed beyond the extended period
granted
to the petitioner.cralaw:red
On 5 [should read 2]
August 2000, as prayed for by the petitioner, a resolution was issued
granting
an inextendible period of fifteen (15) days from 21 July 2000 or until
5 August 2000 within which to file a petition for review.
However,
on 4 August 2000, petitioner filed a second motion for extension of
time
for fifteen (15) days instead of its announced petition for
review.
The petitioner filed the petition for review on 18 August 2000 which is
thirteen (13) days beyond the extended period granted.chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing premises, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 42 of
the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE
and is accordingly DISMISSED.chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.[6]
A motion for
reconsideration
of the said resolution was filed by the petitioner, but the CA, in the
assailed Resolution of March 22, 2002, denied the same as it found “no
cogent reason to reverse the aforesaid Resolution.”[7]
Hence, the recourse
to this Court by the petitioner. It maintains that the filing of
a second motion for extension of time is allowed under Section 1, Rule
42 of the 1997 Rules of Court; the CA thus erred in denying its
petition
for review for being filed out of time. The petitioner asserts
that
technical rules on procedure ought to be relaxed to obtain substantial
justice.cralaw:red
The petition is devoid
of merit.cralaw:red
Rule 42 of the 1997
Rules of Court governs the filing of the petition for review with the
CA
from a decision of the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction.
Section 1 thereof reads:
Sec. 1. How
appeal taken; time for filing. – A party desiring to appeal from a
decision
of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction
may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals,
paying
at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket
and
other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and
furnishing
the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the
petition.
The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from
notice
of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s
motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after
judgment.
Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and
other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of
the
reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional
period
of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for
review.
No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling
reason
and in no case to extend fifteen (15) days.chanrobles virtual law library
A plain reading of the
above provision shows that a party is given fifteen (15) days from
notice
of the adverse RTC decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration
within which to file a petition for review with the CA and pay at the
same
time the required appellate docket and other lawful fees.
Further,
the said provision provides that the CA, upon filing of a motion for
extension
and payment of the appellate docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary
period, may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within
which to file the petition for review. As a general rule, no
further
extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in
no case to extend fifteen (15) days.
In this case, the CA
did grant the petitioner an extension of fifteen (15) days within which
to file its petition for review. However, the appellate court
expressly
qualified that the additional period shall be a “non-extendible period
of fifteen (15) days from 21 July 2000 or until 5 August 2000.” It thus
behooved the petitioner, through its counsel, to comply with such
directive
and file its petition for review within the said period.cralaw:red
Motions for extensions
are not granted as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the
court, and lawyers should never presume that their motions for
extensions
or postponement will be granted or that they will be granted the length
of time they pray for.[8]
With more reason in this case where the petitioner, or its counsel,
asked
for a second motion for extension of time, which, as a general rule, is
not granted except for the most compelling reason.chanrobles virtual law library
Reasons such as “pressure
of work on equally important cases” are addressed to the sound
discretion
of the CA.[9]
Obviously, in this case, the reason advanced by the petitioner’s
counsel
in asking for a second motion for extension of time, i.e. “heavy volume
of work and equally urgent filings in courts and administrative
agencies,”[10]
was not considered a compelling reason by the CA as it subsequently
denied
the petition for review for being filed out of time. The CA could
not be faulted for this. In fact, this Court had held that
pressure
and large volume of work do not excuse a party for filing the petition
for certiorari out of time.[11]
When the petitioner thus filed its petition for review on certiorari
beyond
the extended period, the CA had the reason to deny the same outright.cralaw:red
While, exceptionally,
the Court had adopted a liberal stance in the application of the rules
of procedure, the circumstances obtaining in the present case, as
earlier
discussed, do not convince this Court to take exception. The
following
pronouncement, on the other hand, is quite apropos:
While
petitioner
pleads that a liberal, not literal, interpretation of the rules should
be our policy guidance, nevertheless procedural rules are not to be
disdained
as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the
convenience
of a party. Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement of
substantive
rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice.
Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate
litigation.
But they help provide for a vital system of justice where suitors may
be
heard in the correct form and manner, at the prescribed time in a
peaceful
though adversarial confrontation before a judge whose authority
litigants
acknowledge. Public order and our system of justice are well
served
by a conscientious observance of the rules of procedure.[12]chanrobles virtual law library
In any case, the Court
is convinced that the findings and conclusions of the court a quo and
the
RTC are in order. These courts uniformly found that, under the
terms
of the contract of lease, the respondent, as the owner-lessor of the
premises,
had reserved its right to approve the sublease of the same. The
petitioner,
having voluntarily given its consent thereto, was bound by this
stipulation.
And, having failed to pay the monthly rentals, the petitioner is deemed
to have violated the terms of the contract, warranting its ejectment
from
the leased premises. The Court finds no cogent reason to depart
from
this factual disquisition of the courts below in view of the rule that
findings of facts of the trial courts are, as a general rule, binding
on
this Court.[13]
WHEREFORE, the petition
is DENIED. The Resolutions dated September 26, 2000 and March 22,
2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59819 are AFFIRMED in
toto.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.
Puno, J., (Chairman),
Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate
Justices
Cancio C. Garcia and Romeo A. Brawner, concurring.
[2]
CA Rollo, p. 196.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
Id. at 42.chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
The RTC cited Article 1306 of the Civil Code which reads: “The
contracting
parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions
as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law,
morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy.”
[5]
CA Rollo, p. 7. (Underscoring ours.)chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
Rollo, pp. 91-92.chanrobles virtual law library
[7]
Id. at 107.chanrobles virtual law library
[8]
Ramos v. Dajoyag, Jr., 378 SCRA 229 (2002).
[9]
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 436
(2001).
[10]
CA Rollo, p. 8.chanrobles virtual law library
[11]
Ramos v. Dajoyag, Jr., supra.chanrobles virtual law library
[12]
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[13]
Silverio v. Court of Appeals, 407 SCRA 240 (2003). |