SECOND DIVISION
RIZAL COMMERCIAL
BANKING CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
152878
May 5, 2003
-versus-
MAGWIN MARKETING
CORPORATION, NELSON
TIU,
BENITO SY AND
ANDERSON
UY,
Respondents.
D E C I S I
O N
BELLOSILLO,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We are perturbed that this
case should drag this Court in the banal attempts to decipher the hazy
and confused intent of the trial court in proceeding with what would
have
been a simple, straightforward and hardly arguable collection
case.
Whether the dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute was
unconditionally
reconsidered, reversed and set aside to reinstate the civil case and
have
it ready for pre-trial are matters which should have been clarified and
resolved in the first instance by the court a quo. Unfortunately,
this feckless imprecision of the trial court became the soup stock of
the
parties and their lawyers to further delay the case below when they
could
have otherwise put things in proper order efficiently and effectively.
On 4 March 1999 petitioner
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) filed a complaint for
recovery
of a sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment
against
respondents Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu, Benito Sy and
Anderson
Uy.[1]
On 26 April 1999, the trial court issued a writ of attachment.[2]
On 4 June 1999 the writ was returned partially satisfied since only a
parcel
of land purportedly owned by defendant Benito Sy was attached.[3]
In the meantime, summons was served on each of the defendants,
respondents
herein, who filed their respective answers, except for defendant
Gabriel
Cheng who was dropped without prejudice as party-defendant as his
whereabouts
could not be located.[4]
On 21 September 1999 petitioner moved for an alias writ of attachment
which
on 18 January 2000 the court a quo denied.[5]
Petitioner did not cause
the case to be set for pre-trial.[6]
For about six (6) months thereafter, discussions between petitioner and
respondents Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu, Benito Sy and
Anderson
Uy, as parties in Civil Case No. 99-518, were undertaken to restructure
the indebtedness of respondent Magwin Marketing Corporation.[7]
On 9 May 2000 petitioner approved a debt payment scheme for the
corporation
which on 15 May 2000 was communicated to the latter by means of a
letter
dated 10 May 2000 for the conformity of its officers, i.e., respondent
Nelson Tiu as President/General Manager of Magwin Marketing Corporation
and respondent Benito Sy as Director thereof.[8]
Only respondent Nelson Tiu affixed his signature on the letter to
signify
his agreement to the terms and conditions of the restructuring.[9]chanrobles virtual law library
On 20 July 2000 the
RTC of Makati City, on its own initiative, issued an Order dismissing
without
prejudice Civil Case No. 99-518 for failure of petitioner as plaintiff
therein to "prosecute its action for an unreasonable length of time
x
x x."[10]
On 31 July 2000 petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Order by
informing
the trial court of respondents’ unremitting desire to settle the case
amicably
through a loan restructuring program.[11]
On 22 August 2000 petitioner notified the trial court of the
acquiescence
thereto of respondent Nelson Tiu as an officer of Magwin Marketing
Corporation
and defendant in the civil case.[12]
On 8 September 2000
the court a quo issued an Order reconsidering the dismissal without
prejudice
of Civil Case No. 99-518 -
Acting on plaintiff’s
"Motion for Reconsideration" of the Order dated 20 July 2000 dismissing
this case for failure to prosecute, it appearing that there was already
conformity to the restructuring of defendants’ indebtedness with
plaintiff
by defendant Nelson Tiu, President of defendant corporation per
"Manifestation
and Motion" filed by plaintiff on 22 August 2000, there being
probability
of settlement among the parties, as prayed for, the Order dated 20 July
2000 is hereby set aside.cralaw:red
Plaintiff is directed
to submit the compromise agreement within 15 days from receipt
hereof.
Failure on the part of plaintiff to submit the said agreement shall
cause
the imposition of payment of the required docket fees for re-filing of
this case.[13]
On 27 July 2000 petitioner
filed in Civil Case No. 99-518 a Manifestation and Motion to Set Case
for
Pre-Trial Conference alleging that "[t]o date, only defendant Nelson
Tiu
had affixed his signature on the May 10, 2000 letter which informed the
defendants that plaintiff [herein petitioner] already approved
defendant
Magwin Marketing Corporation’s request for restructuring of its loan
obligations
to plaintiff but subject to the terms and conditions specified in said
letter."[14]
This motion was followed on 5 October 2000 by petitioner’s Supplemental
Motion to Plaintiff’s Manifestation and Motion to Set Case for
Pre-Trial
Conference affirming that petitioner "could not submit a compromise
agreement
because only defendant Nelson Tiu had affixed his signature on the May
10, 2000 letter x x x."[15]
Respondent Anderson Uy opposed the foregoing submissions of petitioner
while respondents Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu and Benito
Sy
neither contested nor supported them.[16]
The trial court, in
an undated Order (although a date was later inserted in the Order),
denied
petitioner’s motion to calendar Civil Case No. 99-518 for pre-trial
stating
that -
Acting on plaintiff’s
[herein petitioner] "Manifestation and Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial
Conference," the "Opposition" filed by defendant Uy and the subsequent
"Supplemental Motion" filed by plaintiff; defendant Uy’s "Opposition,"
and plaintiff’s "Reply;" for failure of the plaintiff to submit a
compromise
agreement pursuant to the Order dated 8 September 2000 plaintiff’s
motion
to set case for pre-trial conference is hereby denied.[17]
On 15 November 2000
petitioner filed its Notice of Appeal from the 8 September 2000 Order
of
the trial court as well as its undated Order in Civil Case No.
99-518.
On 16 November 2000 the trial court issued two (2) Orders, one of which
inserted the date "6 November 2000" in the undated Order rejecting
petitioner’s
motion for pre-trial in the civil case, and the other denying due
course
to the Notice of Appeal on the ground that the "Orders dated 8
September
2000 and 6 November 2000 are interlocutory orders and therefore, no
appeal
may be taken x x x."[18]
On 7 December 2000 petitioner
elevated the Orders dated 8 September 2000, 6 November 2000 and 16
November
2000 of the trial court to the Court of Appeals in a petition for
certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.[19]
In the main, petitioner argued that the court a quo had no authority to
compel the parties in Civil Case No. 99-518 to enter into an amicable
settlement
nor to deny the holding of a pre-trial conference on the ground that no
compromise agreement was turned over to the court a quo.[20]chanrobles virtual law library
On 28 September 2001
the appellate court promulgated its Decision dismissing the petition
for
lack of merit and affirming the assailed Orders of the trial court[21]
holding that:
x x
x although the language of the September 8, 2000 Order may not be
clear,
yet, a careful reading of the same would clearly show that the setting
aside of the Order dated July 20, 2000 which dismissed petitioner’s
complaint
x x x for failure to prosecute its
action for an unreasonable length of time is dependent on the following
conditions, to wit: a) The submission of the compromise agreement by
petitioner
within fifteen (15) days from notice; and b) Failure of petitioner to
submit
the said compromise agreement shall cause the imposition of the payment
of the required docket fees for the re-filing of the case; so much so
that
the non-compliance by petitioner of condition no. 1 would make
condition
no. 2 effective, especially that petitioner’s manifestation and motion
to set case for pre-trial conference and supplemental motion x x x
[were]
denied by the respondent judge in his Order dated November 6, 2000,
which
in effect means that the Order dated July 20, 2000 was ultimately not
set
aside considering that a party need not pay docket fees for the
re-filing
of a case if the original case has been revived and reinstated.[22]
On 2 April 2002 reconsideration
of the Decision was denied; hence, this petition.cralaw:red
In the instant case,
petitioner
maintains that the trial court cannot coerce the parties in Civil Case
No. 99-518 to execute a compromise agreement and penalize their failure
to do so by refusing to go forward with the pre-trial conference.
To hold otherwise, so petitioner avers, would violate Art. 2029 of the
Civil Code which provides that "[t]he court shall endeavor to persuade
the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair compromise," and
this Court’s ruling in Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[23]
where it was held that the trial court cannot dismiss a complaint for
failure
of the parties to submit a compromise agreement.cralaw:red
On the other hand, respondent
Anderson Uy filed his comment after several extensions asserting that
there
are no special and important reasons for undertaking this review.
He also alleges that petitioner’s attack is limited to the Order dated
8 September 2000 as to whether it is conditional as the Court of
Appeals
so found and the applicability to this case of the ruling in Goldloop
Properties,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals. Respondent Uy claims that the Order
reconsidering
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 99-518 without prejudice is on its face
contingent upon the submission of the compromise agreement which in the
first place was the principal reason of petitioner to justify the
withdrawal
of the Order declaring his failure to prosecute the civil case.
He
further contends that the trial court did not force the parties in the
civil case to execute a compromise agreement, the truth being that it
dismissed
the complaint therein for petitioner’s dereliction.cralaw:red
Finally, respondent
Uy contests the relevance of Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,
and refers to its incongruence with the instant case, i.e., that the
complaint
of petitioner was dismissed for failure to prosecute and not for its
reckless
disregard to present an amicable settlement as was the situation in
Goldloop
Properties, Inc., and that the dismissal was without prejudice, in
contrast
with the dismissal with prejudice ordered in the cited case. For
their part, respondents Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu and
Benito
Sy waived their right to file a comment on the instant petition and
submitted
the same for resolution of this Court.[24]chanrobles virtual law library
The petition of Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation is meritorious. It directs our
attention
to questions of substance decided by the courts a quo plainly in a way
not in accord with applicable precedents as well as the accepted and
usual
course of judicial proceedings; it offers special and important reasons
that demand the exercise of our power of supervision and review.
Furthermore, petitioner’s objections to the proceedings below encompass
not only the Order of 8 September 2000 but include the cognate Orders
of
the trial court of 6 and 16 November 2000. This is evident from
the
prayer of the instant petition which seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision of the appellate court and to direct the trial court to
proceed
with the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. 99-518.
Evidently,
the substantive issue involved herein is whether the proceedings in the
civil case should progress, a question which at bottom embroils all the
Orders affirmed by the Court of Appeals.cralaw:red
On the task at hand,
we see no reason why RTC-Br. 135 of Makati City should stop short of
hearing
the civil case on the merits. There is no substantial policy
worth
pursuing by requiring petitioner to pay again the docket fees when it
has
already discharged this obligation simultaneously with the filing of
the
complaint for collection of a sum of money. The procedure for
dismissed
cases when re-filed is the same as though it was initially lodged,
i.e.,
the filing of answer, reply, answer to counter-claim, including other
foot-dragging
maneuvers, except for the rigmarole of raffling cases which is
dispensed
with since the re-filed complaint is automatically assigned to the
branch
to which the original case pertained.[25]
A complaint that is re-filed leads to the re-enactment of past
proceedings
with the concomitant full attention of the same trial court exercising
an immaculate slew of jurisdiction and control over the case that was
previously
dismissed,[26]
which in the context of the instant case is a waste of judicial time,
capital
and energy.cralaw:red
What judicial benefit
do we derive from starting the civil case all over again, especially
where
three (3) of the four (4) defendants, i.e., Magwin Marketing
Corporation,
Nelson Tiu and Benito Sy, have not contested petitioner’s plea before
this
Court and the courts a quo to advance to pre-trial
conference?
Indeed, to continue hereafter with the resolution of petitioner’s
complaint
without the usual procedure for the re-filing thereof, we will save the
court a quo invaluable time and other resources far outweighing the
docket
fees that petitioner would be forfeiting should we rule otherwise.cralaw:red
Going over the specifics
of this petition and the arguments of respondent Anderson Uy, we rule
that
the Order of 8 September 2000 did not reserve conditions on the
reconsideration
and reversal of the Order dismissing without prejudice Civil Case No.
99-518.
This is quite evident from its text which does not use words to signal
an intent to impose riders on the dispositive portion:chanrobles virtual law library
Acting on plaintiff’s
"Motion for Reconsideration" of the Order dated 20 July 2000 dismissing
this case for failure to prosecute, it appearing that there was already
conformity to the restructuring of defendants’ indebtedness with
plaintiff
by defendant Nelson Tiu, President of defendant corporation per
"Manifestation
and Motion" filed by plaintiff on 22 August 2000, there being
probability
of settlement among the parties, as prayed for, the Order dated 20 July
2000 is hereby set aside.cralaw:red
Plaintiff is directed
to submit the compromise agreement within 15 days from receipt
hereof.
Failure on the part of plaintiff to submit the said agreement shall
cause
the imposition of payment of the required docket fees for re-filing of
this case.[27]
Contrary to respondent
Uy’s asseverations, the impact of the second paragraph upon the first
is
simply to illustrate what the trial court would do after setting aside
the dismissal without prejudice: submission of the compromise agreement
for the consideration of the trial court. Nothing in the second
paragraph
do we read that the reconsideration is subject to two (2)
qualifications.
Certainly far from it, for in Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals[28]
a similar directive, i.e., "[t]he parties are given a period of fifteen
(15) days from today within which to submit a Compromise Agreement,"
was
held to mean that "should the parties fail in their negotiations the
proceedings
would continue from where they left off." Goldloop Properties, Inc.
further
said that its order, or a specie of it, did not constitute an agreement
or even an expectation of the parties that should they fail to settle
their
differences within the stipulated number of days their case would be
dismissed.cralaw:red
The addition of the
second sentence in the second paragraph does not change the absolute
nullification
of the dismissal without prejudice decreed in the first
paragraph.
The sentence "[f]ailure on the part of plaintiff to submit the said
agreement
shall cause the imposition of payment of the required docket fees for
re-filing
of this case" is not a directive to pay docket fees but only a
statement
of the event that may result in its imposition. The reason for
this
is that the trial court could not have possibly made such payment
obligatory
in the same civil case, i.e., Civil Case No. 99-518, since docket fees
are defrayed only after the dismissal becomes final and executory and
when
the civil case is re-filed.cralaw:red
It must be emphasized
however that once the dismissal attains the attribute of finality, the
trial court cannot impose legal fees anew because a final and executory
dismissal although without prejudice divests the trial court of
jurisdiction
over the civil case as well as any residual power to order anything
relative
to the dismissed case; it would have to wait until the complaint is
docketed
once again.[29]
On the other hand, if we are to concede that the trial court retains
jurisdiction
over Civil Case No. 99-518 for it to issue the assailed Orders, a
continuation
of the hearing thereon would not trigger a disbursement for docket fees
on the part of petitioner as this would obviously imply the setting
aside
of the order of dismissal and the reinstatement of the complaint.cralaw:red
Indubitably, it is speculative
to reckon the effectivity of the Order of dismissal without prejudice
to
the presentation of the compromise agreement. If we are to admit
that the efficacy of the invalidation of the Order of dismissal is
dependent
upon this condition, then we must inquire: from what date do we count
the
fifteen (15)-day reglementary period within which the alleged revival
of
the order of dismissal began to run? Did it commence from the
lapse
of the fifteen (15) days provided for in the Order of 8 September
2000?
Or do we count it from the 6 November 2000 Order when the trial court
denied
the holding of a pre-trial conference? Or must it be upon
petitioner’s
receipt of the 16 November 2000 Order denying due course to its Notice
of Appeal? The court a quo could not have instituted an Order
that
marked the proceedings before it with a shadow of instability and chaos
rather than a semblance of constancy and firmness.chanrobles virtual law library
The subsequent actions
of the trial court also belie an intention to revive the Order of
dismissal
without prejudice in the event that petitioner fails to submit a
compromise
agreement. The Orders of 6 and 16 November 2000 plainly manifest
that it was retaining jurisdiction over the civil case, a fact which
would
not have been possible had the dismissal without prejudice been
resuscitated.
Surely, the court a quo could not have denied on 6 November 2000
petitioner’s
motion to calendar Civil Case No. 99-518 for pre-trial if the dismissal
had been restored to life in the meantime. By then the dismissal
without prejudice would have already become final and executory so as
to
effectively remove the civil case from the docket of the trial court.cralaw:red
The same is true with
the Order of 16 November 2000 denying due course to petitioner’s Notice
of Appeal. There would have been no basis for such exercise of
discretion
because the jurisdiction of the court a quo over the civil case would
have
been discharged and terminated by the presumed dismissal
thereof.
Moreover, we note the ground for denying due course to the
appeal:
the "Orders dated 8 September 2000 and 6 November 2000 are
interlocutory
orders and therefore, no appeal may be taken from x
x
x."[30]
This declaration strongly suggests that something more was to be
accomplished
in the civil case, thus negating the claim that the Order of dismissal
without prejudice was resurrected upon the parties’ failure to yield a
compromise agreement. A "final order" issued by a court has
been defined as one which disposes of the subject matter in its
entirety
or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else
to
be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the
court,
while an "interlocutory order" is one which does not dispose of a case
completely but leaves something more to be decided upon.[31]
Besides the semantic
and consequential improbabilities of respondent Uy’s argument, our
ruling
in Goldloop Properties, Inc., is decisive of the instant case. In
Goldloop Properties, Inc., we reversed the action of the trial court in
dismissing the complaint for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute its
case, which was in turn based on its inability to forge a compromise
with
the other parties within fifteen (15) days from notice of the order to
do so and held -
Since there is nothing
in the Rules that imposes the sanction of dismissal for failing to
submit
a compromise agreement, then it is obvious that the dismissal of the
complaint
on the basis thereof amounts no less to a gross procedural infirmity
assailable
by certiorari. For such submission could at most be directory and
could not result in throwing out the case for failure to effect a
compromise.
While a compromise is encouraged, very strongly in fact, failure to
consummate
one does not warrant any procedural sanction, much less an authority to
jettison a civil complaint worth P4,000,000.00 x x x Plainly,
submission
of a compromise agreement is never mandatory, nor is it required by any
rule.[32]
As also explained therein,
the proper course of action that should have been taken by the court a
quo, upon manifestation of the parties of their willingness to discuss
a settlement, was to suspend the proceedings and allow them reasonable
time to come to terms (a) If willingness to discuss a possible
compromise
is expressed by one or both parties; or (b) If it appears that one of
the
parties, before the commencement of the action or proceeding, offered
to
discuss a possible compromise but the other party refused the offer,
pursuant
to Art. 2030 of the Civil Code. If despite efforts exerted by the
trial court and the parties the negotiations still fail, only then
should
the action continue as if no suspension had taken place.[33]
Ostensibly, while the
rules allow the trial court to suspend its proceedings consistent with
the policy to encourage the use of alternative mechanisms of dispute
resolution,
in the instant case, the trial court only gave the parties fifteen (15)
days to conclude a deal. This was, to say the least, a passive
and
paltry attempt of the court a quo in its task of persuading litigants
to
agree upon a reasonable concession.[34]
Hence, if only to inspire confidence in the pursuit of a middle ground
between petitioner and respondents, we must not interpret the trial
court’s
Orders as dismissing the action on its own motion because the parties,
specifically petitioner, were anxious to litigate their case as
exhibited
in their several manifestations and motions.cralaw:red
We reject respondent
Uy’s contention that Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals is
irrelevant
to the case at bar on the dubious reasoning that the complaint of
petitioner
was dismissed for failure to prosecute and not for the non-submission
of
a compromise agreement which was the bone of contention in that case,
and
that the dismissal imposed in the instant case was without prejudice,
in
contrast to the dismissal with prejudice decreed in the cited
case.
To begin with, whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice if
grievously
erroneous is detrimental to the cause of the affected party; Goldloop
Properties,
Inc. does not tolerate a wrongful dismissal just because it was without
prejudice. More importantly, the facts in Goldloop Properties,
Inc.
involve, as in the instant case, a dismissal for failure to prosecute
on
the ground of the parties’ inability to come up with a compromise
agreement
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the court’s order
therein.
All told, the parallelism between them is unmistakable.chanrobles virtual law library
Even if we are to accept
on face value respondent’s understanding of Goldloop Properties, Inc.
as
solely about the failure to submit a compromise agreement, it is
apparent
that the present case confronts a similar problem. Perhaps
initially the issue was one of failure to prosecute, as can be observed
from the Order dated 20 July 2000, although later reversed and set
aside.
But thereafter, in the Order of 6 November 2000, the trial court
refused
to proceed to pre-trial owing to the "failure of the plaintiff to
submit
a compromise agreement pursuant to the Order dated 8 September 2000."
When
the civil case was stalled on account of the trial court’s refusal to
call
the parties to a pre-trial conference, the reason or basis therefor was
the absence of a negotiated settlement - a circumstance that takes the
case at bar within the plain ambit of Goldloop Properties, Inc.
In
any event, given that the instant case merely revolves around the
search
for a reasonable interpretation of the several Orders of the trial
court,
i.e., as to whether the dismissal without prejudice was revived upon
petitioner’s
helplessness to perfect an out-of-court arrangement, with more reason
must
we employ the ruling in Goldloop Properties, Inc. to resolve the
parties’
differences of opinion.cralaw:red
We also find nothing
in the record to support respondent Uy’s conclusion that petitioner has
been mercilessly delaying the prosecution of Civil Case No. 99-518 to
warrant
its dismissal. A complaint may be dismissed due to plaintiff’s
fault:
(a) if he fails to appear during a scheduled trial, especially on the
date
for the presentation of his evidence in chief, or when so required at
the
pre-trial; (b) if he neglects to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable
length of time; or (c) if he does not comply with the rules or any
order
of the court. None of these was obtaining in the civil case.cralaw:red
While there was a lull
of about six (6) months in the prosecution of Civil Case No. 99-518, it
must be remembered that respondents themselves contributed largely to
this
delay. They repeatedly asked petitioner to consider
re-structuring
the debt of respondent Magwin Marketing Corporation to which petitioner
graciously acceded. Petitioner approved a new debt payment scheme
that was sought by respondents, which it then communicated to
respondent
Corporation through a letter for the conformity of the latter’s
officers,
i.e., respondent Nelson Tiu as President/General Manager and respondent
Benito Sy as Director thereof. Regrettably, only respondent
Nelson
Tiu affixed his signature on the letter to signify his concurrence with
the terms and conditions of the arrangement. The momentary lag in
the civil case was aggravated when respondent Benito Sy for unknown and
unexplained reasons paid no heed to the adjustments in the indebtedness
although curiously he has not opposed before this Court or the courts a
quo petitioner’s desire to go ahead with the pre-trial conference.cralaw:red
Admittedly, delay took
place in this case but it was not an interruption that should have
entailed
the dismissal of the complaint even if such was designated as without
prejudice.
To constitute a sufficient ground for dismissal, the inattention of
plaintiff
to pursue his cause must not only be prolonged but also be unnecessary
and dilatory resulting in the trifling of judicial processes. In
the instant case, the adjournment was not only fleeting as it lasted
less
than six (6) months but was also done in good faith to accommodate
respondents’
incessant pleas to negotiate. Although the dismissal of a case
for
failure to prosecute is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of
the
court, that judgment however must not be abused. The availability
of this recourse must be determined according to the procedural history
of each case, the situation at the time of the dismissal, and the
diligence
of plaintiff to proceed therein.[35]
Stress must also be laid upon the official directive that courts must
endeavor
to convince parties in a civil case to consummate a fair settlement,[36]
and to mitigate damages to be paid by the losing party who has shown a
sincere desire for such give-and-take.[37]
All things considered, we see no compelling circumstances to uphold the
dismissal of petitioner’s complaint regardless of its characterization
as being without prejudice.chanrobles virtual law library
In fine, petitioner
cannot be said to have lost interest in fighting the civil case to the
end. A court may dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur
but the real test of the judicious exercise of such power is whether
under
the circumstances plaintiff is chargeable with want of fitting
assiduousness
in not acting on his complaint with reasonable promptitude.
Unless
a party’s conduct is so indifferent, irresponsible, contumacious or
slothful
as to provide substantial grounds for dismissal, i.e., equivalent to
default
or non-appearance in the case, the courts should consider lesser
sanctions
which would still amount to achieving the desired end.[38]
In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the
case
or of a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the
rules
on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should
decide
to dispense rather than wield their authority to dismiss.[39]
Clearly, another creative
remedy was available to the court a quo to attain a speedy disposition
of Civil Case No. 99-518 without sacrificing the course of
justice.
Since the failure of petitioner to submit a compromise agreement was
the
refusal of just one of herein respondents, i.e., Benito Sy, to sign his
name on the conforme of the loan restructure documents, and the common
concern of the courts a quo was dispatch in the proceedings, the
holding
of a pre-trial conference was the best-suited solution to the problem
as
this stage in a civil action is where issues are simplified and the
dispute
quickly and genuinely reconciled. By means of pre-trial,
the
trial court is fully empowered to sway the litigants to agree upon some
fair compromise.cralaw:red
Dismissing the civil
case and compelling petitioner to re-file its complaint is a dangerous,
costly and circuitous route that may end up aggravating, not resolving,
the disagreement. This case management strategy is frighteningly
deceptive because it does so at the expense of petitioner whose cause
of
action, perhaps, may have already been admitted by its adverse parties
as shown by three (3) of four (4) defendants not willing to contest
petitioner’s
allegations, and more critically, since this approach promotes the
useless
and thankless duplication of hard work already undertaken by the trial
court. As we have aptly observed, "[i]nconsiderate dismissals,
even
if without prejudice, do not constitute a panacea nor a solution to the
congestion of court dockets. While they lend a deceptive aura of
efficiency to records of individual judges, they merely postpone the
ultimate
reckoning between the parties. In the absence of clear lack of
merit
or intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief continuance,
trial on the merits, and final disposition of the cases before the
court."[40]chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the Petition
for Review is GRANTED. The Decision dated 28 September 2001 and
Resolution
dated 2 April 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62102 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.cralaw:red
The Orders dated 8 September
2000, 6 November 2000 and 16 November 2000 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 135, of Makati City, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-518, are also
REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as these Orders are interpreted to
impose
upon and collect anew from petitioner RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING
CORPORATION
docket or legal fees for its complaint, or to dismiss without prejudice
Civil Case No. 99-518, or to preclude the trial court from calling the
parties therein to pre-trial conference, or from proceeding thereafter
with dispatch to resolve the civil case.cralaw:red
Civil Case No. 99-518
is deemed REINSTATED in, as it was never taken out from, the dockets of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 135, of Makati City. The
trial
court is ORDERED to exercise its jurisdiction over Civil Case No.
99-518,
to CONDUCT the pre-trial conference therein with dispatch, and to
UNDERTAKE
thereafter such other proceedings as may be relevant, without
petitioner
being charged anew docket or other legal fees in connection with its
reinstatement.
Costs against respondents.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Quisumbing,
Austria-Martinez,
and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Docketed as Civil Case No. 99-518, Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
v. Magwin Marketing Corporation, et al., which was raffled to RTC-Br.
135,
Makati City; Rollo, p. 4.
[2]
CA Record, p. 234.
[3]
Id. at 237.
[4]
Id. at 7.
[5]
Id. at 237.
[6]
Id. at 234.chanrobles virtual law library
[7]
Rollo, p. 6; CA Record, p. 136.
[8]
Id. at 6; id. at 42-43.
[9]
Rollo, p. 7.
[10]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[11]
CA Record, p. 242.
[12]
Rollo, p. 7.chanrobles virtual law library
[13]
Order issued by Judge Francisco B. Ibay; CA Record, p. 24.
[14]
Rollo, p. 8.chanrobles virtual law library
[15]
Ibid.
[16]
Id. at 9.chanrobles virtual law library
[17]
Order issued by Judge Francisco B. Ibay; CA Record, p. 25.
[18]
CA Record, pp. 32- 33.chanrobles virtual law library
[19]
Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62102, Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
v. Hon. Judge Francisco B. Ibay, et al.
[20]
Id. at 11-13.chanrobles virtual law library
[21]
Decision penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and concurred
in by then Presiding Justice (now Associate Justice of this Court) Ma.
Alicia Austria-Martinez and Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio Jr.; Rollo,
pp. 26-35.chanrobles virtual law library
[22]
Id. at 34.chanrobles virtual law library
[23]
G.R. No. 99431, 11 August 1992, 212 SCRA 498.
[24]
Resolution dated 18 September 2002; Rollo, p. 43.
[25]
The 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Courts, Vol. I, p. 223.
[26]
Bañares II v. Balising, G.R. No. 132624, 13 March 2000, 328 SCRA
36.
[27]
Issued by Judge Francisco B. Ibay; CA Record, p. 24.
[28]
See Note 22 at 506.chanrobles virtual law library
[29]
Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, G.R. No. 109645,
25 July 1994, 234 SCRA 455; Aquizap v. Basilio, No. L-21293, 29
December
1967, 21 SCRA 1434.
[30]
CA Record, pp. 32-33.chanrobles virtual law library
[31]
See Note 26.chanrobles virtual law library
[32]
See Note 22 at 506.
[33]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[34]
Civil Code, art. 2029; see SC Adm. Order No. 21-01; see also A.M. No.
99-6-01-SC.
[35]
Calalang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103185, 22 January 1993, 217
SCRA
462.
[36]
See Note 34.chanrobles virtual law library
[37]
Civil Code, art. 2031.
[38]
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117385, 11
February 1999, 303 SCRA 19.
[39]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[40]
Macasa v. Herrera, 101 Phil. 44, 48 (1957). |