March 2007 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[A.C. No. 6973 : March 12, 2007] ROBERT FRANCIS F. MARONILLA AND ROMMEL F. MARONILLA V. ATTY. EFREN N. JORDA AND ATTY. IDA MAY J. LA'O :
[A.C. No. 6973 : March 12, 2007]
ROBERT FRANCIS F. MARONILLA AND ROMMEL F. MARONILLA V. ATTY. EFREN N. JORDA AND ATTY. IDA MAY J. LA'O
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated March 12, 2007.
A.C. No. 6973 - (ROBERT FRANCIS F. MARONILLA and ROMMEL F. MARONILLA v. ATTY. EFREN N. JORDA and ATTY. IDA MAY J. LA'O)
This treats of the following pending incidents:
a) Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment dated 14 August 2006, asking for five (5) days from 14 August 2006 or until 21 August 2006 to comment on respondent Jorda's motion for reconsideration, filed by counsel for complainants;
b) Comment dated 21 August 2006 on respondent Jorda's motion for reconsideration, filed by complainants;
c) Manifestation dated 7 August 2006, filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) requesting copy of respondent Jorda's motion for reconsideration to enable the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to comment thereon; and
d) Urgent Manifestation dated 27 December 2006, with prayer for reconsideration of Resolution dated 30 October 2006 granting respondent Jorda's Motion for Reconsideration, filed by complainants.
A preliminary matter warrants some clarification. The Resolution dated 30 October 2006, which granted respondent's motion for reconsideration, stated: "The complainants and the IBP were required to comment on the Motion for Reconsideration. They failed to do so within the period set by the Court; hence they are deemed to have waived the opportunity to so comment."[1] The Court made said statements based on the information it had on hand at the time. However, three (3) months after the promulgation of the Resolution, or in January of 2007, the members of the Division were informed for the first time of the filing of complainants' motion for extension, as well as the aforementioned Comment. While it appears that the motion for extension and the Comment were both duly filed, the fact was such time was not properly recorded in the internal record-filing system of the Court. The matter is presently the subject of an on-going internal investigation by the Court. The investigation may be conducted without the participation of the parties to this case.
Likewise, it also appears that the IBP also duly filed a Manifestation In Lieu Of Comment, requesting a copy of respondent Jorda's motion for reconsideration. At this point, the Court no longer finds the need for the Comments of the IBP on respondents' motion for reconsideration and accordingly dispenses with the same.
Still, to effectuate a prompt and final disposition of this case, the Court shall duly consider the Comment filed by complainant, especially as it relates to the Motion for Reconsideration relative to the Court's Resolution of 20 October 2006.
It may be recalled that the Court, in its 20 October 2006 Resolution, ultimately concluded that respondent Jorda could not be held accountable for "gross ignorance of the law" when he filed an appeal from the subject decision of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal, owing to the authority of the President of the University of the Philippines under Article 50 of the University Code "to modify or disapprove any action or resolution of any college or school, faculty or administrative body, if in his judgment the larger interests of the University System so requires."[2] In concluding that respondent could not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the Court observed that the appeal undertaken, even if not expressly sanctioned, was neither expressly barred and indeed permissible within the discretion of the U.P. President to recognize under Art. 50 of the University Code.[3]
Both in their Comment and their present Motion for Reconsideration, complainants argue that the Rules and Regulations re Fraternities, Sororities and other Student Organizations (RRFSO), adopted by the U.P. Board of Regents on 24 October 1995, does not afford the right of appeal to the University or the University Prosecutors from a SDT resolution ordaining the dismissal of a complaint filed against a university student. They contend that the RRFSO is a "special law" which applies in particular to fraternities and sororities, whereas the University Code is a general law applicable to the university community at large. It is proposed that as a special law of later enactment, the RRFSO effected "a partial repeal" of the University Code insofar as the former is inconsistent with the latter.[4]
The arguments of complainant are not tenable. They may, had there been provision in the RRFSO that explicitly bars an appeal to the U.P. President from a decision of the SDT dismissing a disciplinary case against a student. But there is none. There is a rule that expressly prohibits "motions for reconsideration of SDT rulings and/or resolutions."[5] That is irrelevant to the matter at hand. As for Rule V of the RRFSO, which governs appeals from SDT decisions, true it does not expressly authorize appeals to the U.P. President from SDT decisions acquitting or dismissing the case against a student-defendant but it does not categorically prohibit such appeal either.
Yet ultimately, the fact that complainants have to rely on a roundabout argument that hinges on a novel proposition, the implied repeal of Article 50 of the University Code, all but highlights the conclusion that respondent could not have been guilty of "gross ignorance of the law" when he wrote the letter-appeal to the U.P. President. The standard of "gross ignorance of the law" has been held to extend to errors so gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad faith, or for acts not only contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but also motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption.[6]
The first predicate to a finding of gross ignorance of the law is of course an act that stands contrary to existing law or jurisprudence. As we held in the 30 October 2006 Resolution, in view of Article 50, the steps taken by respondent Jorda are permitted, not even interdicted, within the University systems legal framework regarding appeals from SDT decisions.
Even assuming arguendo that the Court, in the context of this disciplinary case, had cast prudence aside and gone as far as to declare that Article 50 was superseded by the RRFSO, or that Article 50 is somehow legally infirm, still such pronouncement would be one of first instance that could not have guided prior acts such as those complained of respondent Jorda.
Complainants also argue, rather belatedly, that the IBP Resolution under which respondent Jorda was reprimanded could no longer be the subject of a motion for reconsideration or appeal, as the case was already "terminated." This argument is based on the fact that respondent filed a motion for the reconsideration thereof instead of appealing the same before this Court, pursuant to Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Complainant claims that under said Rule, if the sanction imposed by the IBP is less than suspension or disbarment, such as the reprimand imposed in this case, the case will be deemed terminated unless a petition challenging the same were filed with this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof.
We ruled in Halimao v. Villanueva[7] that "nothing in [the] text [of Section 12] or in its history suggests that such motion [for reconsideration] is prohibited [and i]t may therefore be filed within 15 days from notice x x x."[8] Following Halimao and the cases that affirmed its doctrine, no error may be attributed to respondent Jorda in filing the motion for reconsideration, certainly no error which would render the IBP Resolution beyond the pale of the Court's review. And once the Court has rendered its ultimate decision based on the IBP decision, a party aggrieved certainly has the right to seek reconsideration of that decision before the Court.
It should be stressed that no decision of the IBP may become final and executory simply with the lapse of the 15-day period under Section 12, even if there is no petition filed with this Court assailing the decision. Such decision takes effect only upon its affirmation or modification by the Court, or as ordained by the Court. This is so because the inherent power to discipline members of the Bar belongs to the Court, not the IBP. It is in fact a matter of routine that even decisions of the IBP Board of Governors, imposing sanctions less than suspension or disbarment are automatically elevated to the Court for review. There is no need for a petition filed with the Court within 15 days from notice in order that the Court may acquire jurisdiction over the matter.
Concededly, complainants are careful enough to refrain from asserting that the IBP Resolution had already become "final and executory" consequent to respondent Jorda's failure to file a petition challenging the same before the Court. Hewing to the language of Section 12, Rule 139-B, they contended instead that the case was "terminated." Still, it must be made clear that even as Section 12, Rule 139-B may operate to terminate the case at the level of the IBP, no such operative effect bears on the Court as it reviews the IBP Resolution.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DENY complainants' Urgent Manifestation with Prayer for the Court to Reconsider its Resolution Dated 30 October 2006 Granting Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 December 2006. In view thereof, the Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment dated 14 August 2006; the Comment dated 21 August 2006; and the Manifestation dated 7 August 2006, are NOTED WITHOUT ACTION.
A.C. No. 6973 - (ROBERT FRANCIS F. MARONILLA and ROMMEL F. MARONILLA v. ATTY. EFREN N. JORDA and ATTY. IDA MAY J. LA'O)
This treats of the following pending incidents:
a) Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment dated 14 August 2006, asking for five (5) days from 14 August 2006 or until 21 August 2006 to comment on respondent Jorda's motion for reconsideration, filed by counsel for complainants;
b) Comment dated 21 August 2006 on respondent Jorda's motion for reconsideration, filed by complainants;
c) Manifestation dated 7 August 2006, filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) requesting copy of respondent Jorda's motion for reconsideration to enable the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to comment thereon; and
d) Urgent Manifestation dated 27 December 2006, with prayer for reconsideration of Resolution dated 30 October 2006 granting respondent Jorda's Motion for Reconsideration, filed by complainants.
A preliminary matter warrants some clarification. The Resolution dated 30 October 2006, which granted respondent's motion for reconsideration, stated: "The complainants and the IBP were required to comment on the Motion for Reconsideration. They failed to do so within the period set by the Court; hence they are deemed to have waived the opportunity to so comment."[1] The Court made said statements based on the information it had on hand at the time. However, three (3) months after the promulgation of the Resolution, or in January of 2007, the members of the Division were informed for the first time of the filing of complainants' motion for extension, as well as the aforementioned Comment. While it appears that the motion for extension and the Comment were both duly filed, the fact was such time was not properly recorded in the internal record-filing system of the Court. The matter is presently the subject of an on-going internal investigation by the Court. The investigation may be conducted without the participation of the parties to this case.
Likewise, it also appears that the IBP also duly filed a Manifestation In Lieu Of Comment, requesting a copy of respondent Jorda's motion for reconsideration. At this point, the Court no longer finds the need for the Comments of the IBP on respondents' motion for reconsideration and accordingly dispenses with the same.
Still, to effectuate a prompt and final disposition of this case, the Court shall duly consider the Comment filed by complainant, especially as it relates to the Motion for Reconsideration relative to the Court's Resolution of 20 October 2006.
It may be recalled that the Court, in its 20 October 2006 Resolution, ultimately concluded that respondent Jorda could not be held accountable for "gross ignorance of the law" when he filed an appeal from the subject decision of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal, owing to the authority of the President of the University of the Philippines under Article 50 of the University Code "to modify or disapprove any action or resolution of any college or school, faculty or administrative body, if in his judgment the larger interests of the University System so requires."[2] In concluding that respondent could not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the Court observed that the appeal undertaken, even if not expressly sanctioned, was neither expressly barred and indeed permissible within the discretion of the U.P. President to recognize under Art. 50 of the University Code.[3]
Both in their Comment and their present Motion for Reconsideration, complainants argue that the Rules and Regulations re Fraternities, Sororities and other Student Organizations (RRFSO), adopted by the U.P. Board of Regents on 24 October 1995, does not afford the right of appeal to the University or the University Prosecutors from a SDT resolution ordaining the dismissal of a complaint filed against a university student. They contend that the RRFSO is a "special law" which applies in particular to fraternities and sororities, whereas the University Code is a general law applicable to the university community at large. It is proposed that as a special law of later enactment, the RRFSO effected "a partial repeal" of the University Code insofar as the former is inconsistent with the latter.[4]
The arguments of complainant are not tenable. They may, had there been provision in the RRFSO that explicitly bars an appeal to the U.P. President from a decision of the SDT dismissing a disciplinary case against a student. But there is none. There is a rule that expressly prohibits "motions for reconsideration of SDT rulings and/or resolutions."[5] That is irrelevant to the matter at hand. As for Rule V of the RRFSO, which governs appeals from SDT decisions, true it does not expressly authorize appeals to the U.P. President from SDT decisions acquitting or dismissing the case against a student-defendant but it does not categorically prohibit such appeal either.
Yet ultimately, the fact that complainants have to rely on a roundabout argument that hinges on a novel proposition, the implied repeal of Article 50 of the University Code, all but highlights the conclusion that respondent could not have been guilty of "gross ignorance of the law" when he wrote the letter-appeal to the U.P. President. The standard of "gross ignorance of the law" has been held to extend to errors so gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad faith, or for acts not only contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but also motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption.[6]
The first predicate to a finding of gross ignorance of the law is of course an act that stands contrary to existing law or jurisprudence. As we held in the 30 October 2006 Resolution, in view of Article 50, the steps taken by respondent Jorda are permitted, not even interdicted, within the University systems legal framework regarding appeals from SDT decisions.
Even assuming arguendo that the Court, in the context of this disciplinary case, had cast prudence aside and gone as far as to declare that Article 50 was superseded by the RRFSO, or that Article 50 is somehow legally infirm, still such pronouncement would be one of first instance that could not have guided prior acts such as those complained of respondent Jorda.
Complainants also argue, rather belatedly, that the IBP Resolution under which respondent Jorda was reprimanded could no longer be the subject of a motion for reconsideration or appeal, as the case was already "terminated." This argument is based on the fact that respondent filed a motion for the reconsideration thereof instead of appealing the same before this Court, pursuant to Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Complainant claims that under said Rule, if the sanction imposed by the IBP is less than suspension or disbarment, such as the reprimand imposed in this case, the case will be deemed terminated unless a petition challenging the same were filed with this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof.
We ruled in Halimao v. Villanueva[7] that "nothing in [the] text [of Section 12] or in its history suggests that such motion [for reconsideration] is prohibited [and i]t may therefore be filed within 15 days from notice x x x."[8] Following Halimao and the cases that affirmed its doctrine, no error may be attributed to respondent Jorda in filing the motion for reconsideration, certainly no error which would render the IBP Resolution beyond the pale of the Court's review. And once the Court has rendered its ultimate decision based on the IBP decision, a party aggrieved certainly has the right to seek reconsideration of that decision before the Court.
It should be stressed that no decision of the IBP may become final and executory simply with the lapse of the 15-day period under Section 12, even if there is no petition filed with this Court assailing the decision. Such decision takes effect only upon its affirmation or modification by the Court, or as ordained by the Court. This is so because the inherent power to discipline members of the Bar belongs to the Court, not the IBP. It is in fact a matter of routine that even decisions of the IBP Board of Governors, imposing sanctions less than suspension or disbarment are automatically elevated to the Court for review. There is no need for a petition filed with the Court within 15 days from notice in order that the Court may acquire jurisdiction over the matter.
Concededly, complainants are careful enough to refrain from asserting that the IBP Resolution had already become "final and executory" consequent to respondent Jorda's failure to file a petition challenging the same before the Court. Hewing to the language of Section 12, Rule 139-B, they contended instead that the case was "terminated." Still, it must be made clear that even as Section 12, Rule 139-B may operate to terminate the case at the level of the IBP, no such operative effect bears on the Court as it reviews the IBP Resolution.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DENY complainants' Urgent Manifestation with Prayer for the Court to Reconsider its Resolution Dated 30 October 2006 Granting Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 December 2006. In view thereof, the Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment dated 14 August 2006; the Comment dated 21 August 2006; and the Manifestation dated 7 August 2006, are NOTED WITHOUT ACTION.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, p. 252.
[2] Id. at 251.
[3] Id. at 257.
[4] Id. at 268, 386.
[5] Rule IV, Section 7(G), RRFSO.
[6] See, e.g., Ora v. Almajar, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1599, 14 October 2005, 473 SCRA 17. While this jurisprudential standard may have been exacted consistently in administrative cases against judges, we do not doubt that the same standard applies to lawyers as well, especially those such as respondent who, as an official counsel employed by a state university, performs official duties as functionary of the State.
[7] 323 Phil. 1 (1996).
[8] Id. at 8.
