November 2007 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 165800 : November 27, 2007] MAJ. GEN. CARLOS F. GARCIA V. COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL :
[G.R. No. 165800 : November 27, 2007]
MAJ. GEN. CARLOS F. GARCIA V. COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder; for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated November 27, 2007
G.R. No. 165800 (Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia v. Court of Appeals and Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council)
Petitioner Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia through this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks to set aside the October 14, 2004 Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), granting the Anti-Money Laundering Council's (AMLC's) ex-parte application for a freeze order. Petitioner also seeks to set aside the November 5, 2004 CA Resolution requiring petitioner to comment on the Urgent Motion for Extension of the Effectivity of the Freeze Order of respondent Republic of the Philippines, represented by the AMLC. Lastly, petitioner seeks to enjoin the CA from taking any further action in the case in relation to the assailed Resolutions.
On October 13, 2004, respondent Republic, through the AMLC, filed before the CA an Urgent Ex-Parte Application for the issuance of a freeze order against various bank accounts and properties of petitioner and members of his family, under Section 10 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9160 or the "Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001," as amended by RA 9194. On October 14, 2004, in CA-G.R. SP No. 86929, the appellate court issued a freeze order valid for 20 days on the disputed bank accounts and vehicles owned by and/or registered in the names of the members of petitioner's family.
The Compliance and Investigation Staff (CIS) of the AMLC conducted an investigation which revealed that petitioner; his wife, Clarita D. Garcia; and his sons, Ian Carl D. Garcia, Juan Paolo D. Garcia, and Timothy Mark D. Garcia, had accounts with several banking and financial institutions. The CIS investigation also revealed the following: On December 19, 2003, Ian Carl and Juan Paolo Garcia were investigated by the United States (US) Department of Homeland Security, Immigration, and Customs Enforcement for failure to declare possession of approximately USD 100,000 upon entry into the US. There had been at least three outward dollar remittances made by petitioner, with his wife as beneficiary, within the same period when the purchase of their Park Avenue condominium was consummated. Certain Currency Monetary Instruments Reports filed with the US Customs and Border patrol, pertaining to an amount of foreign currency in excess of USD 10,000 brought into the US, and the Currency Transaction Reports obtained from US authorities, indicated that the Garcias brought into the US USD 660,230 or PhP 36,960,080. The Garcias had no application for the issuance of authority to bring foreign currency in excess of USD 10,000 out of the Philippines, as required under Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 308 dated November 15, 2001.
The CIS investigation also showed that the Garcias acquired real properties in the US; that petitioner had USD 674,286.43 and PhP 44,590,291.14 in one bank alone; that in 2000 and 2002, petitioner's gross compensation incomes were PhP 635,695.29 and PhP 965,708.47, respectively; and that as of April 27, 2004, petitioner invested PhP 6,500,000 with the Armed Forces and Police Savings and Loan Association, Inc. and withdrew PhP 600,000 on March 15, 2004. In addition, petitioner, his wife, and his son, Ian Carl had several vehicles registered in their names with the Land Transportation Office (LTO); petitioner's statements of assets and liabilities reflected his net worth was PhP 1,760,000 as of December 31, 2001; PhP 2,080,000 as of December 31, 2002; and PhP 2,765,000 as of December 31, 2003; and petitioner's sons did not have any known or documented income.[2]
Based on the findings of the CIS, the CA concluded that there was probable cause for it to issue the freeze order.
The CA ordered the following accounts frozen:
Table 1: Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) Greenhills Branch
Table 2: LBP Camp Aguinaldo Branch Table 3: Allied Banking Corporation Table 4: Armed Forces and Police Savings and Loan Association, Inc. Table 5: Banco De Oro Universal Bank Table 7: United Coconut Planters Bank Table 8: Planters Development Bank
Table 10: Vehicles in the Names of Carlos and Clarita
3200115800001583004197
3200115800001580017693
3200115800001585004584
3200115400001543008444
320011540000545006332
32001154000015461707
3200215400000001548001084
200215400000001548001378
3200215400000001548001386
3200215400000001548001394
�3200215400000001548001505
3200215400000001548001491
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The CA also directed the LTO to freeze and take necessary action to prevent the disposition of the following vehicles:
Table 9: Vehicles in the Name of Ian Carl
On October 29, 2004, prior to the expiration of the effectivity of the freeze order, respondent Republic filed before the CA an Urgent Motion for Extension of Effectivity of Freeze Order[5] until the termination of all the investigations and/or proceedings being conducted against petitioner. In its November 5, 2004 Resolution, the CA directed petitioner and the members of his family to comment on the motion for extension within 10 days from notice. Before petitioner filed the comment, he had filed this Petition for Certiorari with this Court. Subsequently, petitioner filed the comment[6] on the motion for extension with the CA, wherein he raised the same arguments contained in the present petition, and stated that he had filed the instant petition with the Court. In its December 1, 2004 Resolution,[7] the CA held in abeyance, action on the motion for extension pending resolution by this Court of the instant petition. On December 23, 2004, respondent Republic filed a motion for reconsideration,[8] but the motion remained unresolved by the CA. Petitioner interposes the following issues before us:
IN PROMULGATING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION, DATED 14 OCTOBER, 2004, WITHOUT AN INDEPENDENT INQUIRY ON THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE, PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN PROMULGATING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION, DATED 14 OCTOBER, 2004, DESPITE THE FACT THAT NO COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION FOR VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING LAW HAD BEEN FILED, PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.[9]The petition has no merit. We note that petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the CA Resolutions dated October 14, 2004 and November 5, 2004 before filing this petition. The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite for the filing of a petition for certiorari. A petitioner must exhaust all other available remedies before resorting to the remedy of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Petitioner's recourse to a petition for prohibition is not proper. As held in Vergara v. Rugue:
The office of the extraordinary remedy of prohibition is not to correct errors of judgment but to prevent or restrain usurpation by inferior tribunals and to compel them to observe the limitation of their jurisdictions. It is a preventive remedy. Its function is to restrain the doing of some act to be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished. This remedy will lie only to "prevent an encroachment; excess, usurpation, or improper assumption of jurisdiction on the part of an inferior court or tribunal, or to prevent some great outrage upon the settled principles of law and procedure; but, if the inferior court or tribunal has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter of the controversy, the writ will not lie to correct errors and irregularities in procedure, or to prevent an erroneous decision or an enforcement of an erroneous judgment, or even in cases of encroachment, usurpation, and abuse of judicial power or the improper assumption of jurisdiction, where an adequate and applicable remedy of appeal, writ of error, certiorari, or other prescribed methods or review are available."[10]The availability of other remedies like the motion for reconsideration precludes recourse to a petition for prohibition. Moreover, under Sec. 10 of RA 9160, as amended by RA 9194, the CA clearly has jurisdiction over the application for the issuance of the freeze order. In issuing the freeze order, the CA correctly held that probable cause exists on the basis of the verified allegations in the ex-parte application which are supported by documents submitted by the AMLC. The documents consist of initial investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman and AMLC, which show the existence of probable cause that the disputed monetary instruments and properties are related to petitioner's unlawful acts violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and constituting plunder. We held in Enrile v. Salazar that it is not the unavoidable duty of judges to make a personal examination, it being sufficient that they follow established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor.[11] It is for the CA to determine the sufficiency of the presented documents for a determination of probable cause. Petitioner fails to raise a convincing argument for the CA to adopt his suggested procedure in determining probable cause for the issuance of the freeze order. The CA has the discretion to determine probable cause, and petitioner, while casting aspersions on how the appellate court conducted itself, fails to prove any grave abuse of discretion on its part. There is no showing that the CA abdicated its responsibility to determine probable cause. Nothing in RA 9160 requires that a case for violation of anti-money laundering laws must be filed before the issuance of a freeze order. Sec. 10 of RA 9160, as amended by RA 9194, reads:
SEC. 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property.- The Court of Appeals, upon application ex parte by the AMLC and after determination that probable cause exists that any monetary instrument or property is in any way related to an unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof, may issue a freeze order which shall be effective immediately. The freeze order shall be for a period of twenty (20) days unless extended by the court.There are only two requisites under the law for the issuance of the freeze order: (1) the application ex-parte by the AMLC and (2) the determination of probable cause by the CA. As these two requisites are present, the absence of a previous complaint has no effect or implication on the CA's determination of probable cause for the issuance of a freeze order. Thus, petitioner has failed to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in issuing the questioned freeze order or any sufficient ground to enjoin the CA from holding further proceedings on the application for extension of the freeze order. We must note, however, that the CA in its December 1, 2004 Resolution held in abeyance further action on the motion for the extension of the freeze order. This act was in deference to the Supreme Court due to the filing of this Petition for Certiorari. The CA should not have done this. The correct action was to proceed with the case, as this Court had not issued a temporary restraining order enjoining further proceedings in CA-G.R. SP No. 86929.�As we held in Santiago v. Vasquez [12] and reiterated in Diaz v.Diaz:[13]
The original and special civil action filed with this Court is, for all intents and purposes, an invocation for the exercise of its supervisory powers over the lower courts. It does not have the effect of divesting the inferior courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case pending before them. It is elementary that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court, does not even interrupt the course of the latter when there is no writ of injunction restraining it. The inevitable conclusion is that for as long as no writ of injunction or restraining order is issued in the special civil action for certiorari, no impediment exists and there is nothing to prevent the lower court from exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case pending before it. And, even if such injunctive writ or order is issued, the lower court nevertheless continues to retain its jurisdiction over the principal action.
Moreover, the CA should have been guided by the second sentence of Sec. 7 of Rule 65, under which this Petition for Certiorari was filed, which states, "The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case." Its desistance from proceeding with CA-G.R. SP No. 86929 was clearly unwarranted, and its delay may even have rendered the motion for extension of the freeze order moot, as any funds in the questioned accounts may have already been moved. The CA is reminded to take swift and decisive action when faced with the question of issuing freeze orders under RA 9160, as delays may result in the questioned funds or properties being disposed of and cases being lost because of the necessary evidence already unearthed, being hidden again, and probably this time, never to be seen again. The Court is of the mind that this Petition for Certiorari is dilatory and filed merely for the purpose of delay, wasting our time and effort. Despite the availability of other remedies, petitioner chose the one that halted the CA, and achieved his goal of restraining it, even without this Court granting the petition for prohibition. Thus, without the extension of the freeze order, the accounts and properties in question became free and clear. As per Sec. 3 of Rule 142, "Where an action or an appeal is found to be frivolous, double or treble costs may be imposed on the plaintiff or appellant, which shall be paid by his attorney, if so ordered by the court." We find this petition frivolous, and it is but just that treble costs be assessed against petitioner. The CA, in its turn, must complete its own role in this act, as ineffectual as it may be at this juncture, and resolve respondent Republic's motion for extension without further delay. WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition for being patently without merit and prosecuted mainly for delay. We order the CA to resolve with dispatch the October 29, 2004 Urgent Motion for Extension of Effectivity of Freeze Order in CA-G.R. SP No. 86929.�Treble costs against petitioner. Very truly yours, (Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario L. Guarina III and Santiago Javier Ranada.
[2] Rollo, pp. 31-32.
[3] Id. at 34-37.
[4] Id. at 37-38.
[5] Id. at 302-313.
[6] Id. at 354-61.
[7] Id. at 364-366.
[8] Id. at 367-374.
[9] Id. at 15.
[10] No. L-32984, August 26, 1977, 78 SCRA 312, 329-330.
[11] G.R. Nos. 92163-64, June 5, 1990, 186 SCRA 217, 230.
[12] G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA 633, 647-648. [13] G.R. No. 135885, April 28, 2000, 331 SCRA 302, 319.
