January 2009 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 185394 : January 12, 2009] FRANCISO I. CHAVEZ V. THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, REPRESENTED BY CUSTOMS COMMISSIONER NAPOLEON MORALES; THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY MARGARITO V. TEVES; THE LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, REPRESENTED BY ALBERT SUANSING; DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY LEANDRO R. MENDOZA; THE CAGAYAN ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, REPRESENTED BY CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER JOSE MARI PONCE; AND THE AUTOMOTIVE REBUILDING INDUSTRIES OF CAGAYAN, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, JAIME VICENTE :
[G.R. No. 185394 : January 12, 2009]
FRANCISO I. CHAVEZ V. THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, REPRESENTED BY CUSTOMS COMMISSIONER NAPOLEON MORALES; THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY MARGARITO V. TEVES; THE LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, REPRESENTED BY ALBERT SUANSING; DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY LEANDRO R. MENDOZA; THE CAGAYAN ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, REPRESENTED BY CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER JOSE MARI PONCE; AND THE AUTOMOTIVE REBUILDING INDUSTRIES OF CAGAYAN, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, JAIME VICENTE
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 12 January 2009:
G.R. No. 185394 - FRANCISO I. CHAVEZ v. THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, represented by Customs Commissioner Napoleon Morales; THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, represented by Secretary Margarito V. Teves; THE LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, represented by Albert Suansing; DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, represented by Secretary Leandro R. Mendoza; THE CAGAYAN ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, represented by Chief Executive Officer Jose Mari Ponce; and THE AUTOMOTIVE REBUILDING INDUSTRIES OF CAGAYAN, represented by its President, Jaime Vicente
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, invoking his right as a taxpaying citizen o' the Philippines, seeks to compel by mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Bureau of Customs, Department of Finance, Land Transportation Office, Department of Transportation and Communications, the Cagayan Economic Zone Authority, and the Automotive Rebuilding Industries of Cagayan, lo faithfully enforce and comply with Executive Order No. 156 (EO 156), entitled "Providing for a Comprehensive Industrial Policy and Directions for the Motor Vehicle Development Program and its Implementing Guidelines".
He alleges that the continued importation of used vehicles to the Cagayan Economic Zone (CEZ) at Port Irene, Cagayan, and their subsequent sale oulside of the CEZ violates Executive Order No. 156 (EO 156) and undermines the motor sales industry outside the CEZ. While he acknowledges his lack of legal standing to bring the case before the Court, he posits that the enforcement of laws, particularly of the prohibition in EO 156 against the importation of used vehicles, is a public right and a public duty, hence is a matter of transcendental importance that may excuse his apparent lack of interest in bringing the mandamus suit.
We resolve to dismiss the petition for the petitioner's lack of standing to bring the suit and for violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
The petitioner's attempt to justify his direct resort to this Court by reason of the transcendental importance of the issue raised fails to convince us. The need for the enforcement of laws, without more, does not raise the petitioner's issue to the level of transcendental importance. The petition does not even show that the alleged government inaction (with respect to the importation of used vehicles into the CEZ and their sale outside of the CEZ) is of such interest or injury to him and to the general public as to qualify it as an issue of transcendental importance. We note that in the petitioner's cited case of Executive Secretary vs. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc.,[1] that the petition was initiated by vehicle importers of the Subic freeport themselves who had the direct interest and standing to sue because EO 156 adversely affected their businesses.
An equally weighty reason for the dismissal of [he present petition is the violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. While this Court shares concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts over the extraordinary petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, it was never the intent to give petitioners unbridled freedom in the choice of tribunals. A direct recourse to the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs is allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set forth in the petition.[2] This policy is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon this Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and to cases pending in its docket.[3] We fail to see in the petition the compelling reason that would justify the disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts; hence, the dismissal of the petition is in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185394 - FRANCISO I. CHAVEZ v. THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, represented by Customs Commissioner Napoleon Morales; THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, represented by Secretary Margarito V. Teves; THE LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, represented by Albert Suansing; DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, represented by Secretary Leandro R. Mendoza; THE CAGAYAN ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, represented by Chief Executive Officer Jose Mari Ponce; and THE AUTOMOTIVE REBUILDING INDUSTRIES OF CAGAYAN, represented by its President, Jaime Vicente
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, invoking his right as a taxpaying citizen o' the Philippines, seeks to compel by mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Bureau of Customs, Department of Finance, Land Transportation Office, Department of Transportation and Communications, the Cagayan Economic Zone Authority, and the Automotive Rebuilding Industries of Cagayan, lo faithfully enforce and comply with Executive Order No. 156 (EO 156), entitled "Providing for a Comprehensive Industrial Policy and Directions for the Motor Vehicle Development Program and its Implementing Guidelines".
He alleges that the continued importation of used vehicles to the Cagayan Economic Zone (CEZ) at Port Irene, Cagayan, and their subsequent sale oulside of the CEZ violates Executive Order No. 156 (EO 156) and undermines the motor sales industry outside the CEZ. While he acknowledges his lack of legal standing to bring the case before the Court, he posits that the enforcement of laws, particularly of the prohibition in EO 156 against the importation of used vehicles, is a public right and a public duty, hence is a matter of transcendental importance that may excuse his apparent lack of interest in bringing the mandamus suit.
We resolve to dismiss the petition for the petitioner's lack of standing to bring the suit and for violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
The petitioner's attempt to justify his direct resort to this Court by reason of the transcendental importance of the issue raised fails to convince us. The need for the enforcement of laws, without more, does not raise the petitioner's issue to the level of transcendental importance. The petition does not even show that the alleged government inaction (with respect to the importation of used vehicles into the CEZ and their sale outside of the CEZ) is of such interest or injury to him and to the general public as to qualify it as an issue of transcendental importance. We note that in the petitioner's cited case of Executive Secretary vs. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc.,[1] that the petition was initiated by vehicle importers of the Subic freeport themselves who had the direct interest and standing to sue because EO 156 adversely affected their businesses.
An equally weighty reason for the dismissal of [he present petition is the violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. While this Court shares concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts over the extraordinary petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, it was never the intent to give petitioners unbridled freedom in the choice of tribunals. A direct recourse to the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs is allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set forth in the petition.[2] This policy is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon this Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and to cases pending in its docket.[3] We fail to see in the petition the compelling reason that would justify the disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts; hence, the dismissal of the petition is in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] G.R. No. 164171. February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 673.
[2] Mangahas, et al. v. Parades. G.R. No. 157866. February. 14,2007. 515 SCRA 709.
[3] Cabarles , Maceda. at al., G.R. 161330, February 20, 2007, 516 SCRA 303. citing Page-Tenorio v. Tenorio 443 SCRA 560. 567-568 (2004).
