January 2011 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. No. 194830 : January 18, 2011]
DOROTEO M. SALAZAR, JESUS PELAYO, AND SALVADOR VILLARUEL, JR. V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 61, BOGO, CEBU; SALVADOR S. DELA FUENTE; RECLINE S. ASENTISTA; AMELITA M. GABITO; AND RANDOLPH G. RIVERA
"G.R. No. 194830 (Doroteo M. Salazar, Jesus Pelayo, and Salvador Villaruel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections; Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Bogo, Cebu; Salvador S. dela Fuente; Recline S. Asentista; Amelita M. Gabito; and Randolph G. Rivera). - Petitioners Doroteo M. Salazar (Salazar), Jesus Pelayo (Pelayo), and Salvador Villaruel, Jr. (Villaruel) filed this petition for declaratory relief, asking this Court to declare as unconstitutional Section 6(e), Rule 10 of A.M. No. 10-4-1 SC, otherwise known as the 2010 Rules of Procedure for Municipal Election Contests. The questioned provision of the Rules reads:
Section 6. Conduct of revision. - The revision of the votes on the ballots shall be done manually and visually and through the use of appropriate PCOS machines, according to the procedure below:
x x x x
(e) Prior to the actual revision, the revision committee must authenticate each and every ballot to make sure that it was the same ballots cast and fed to the PCOS machine during the voting. The authentication shall be through the use of PCOS machines actually used during the elections in the subject precinct, or by another device certified by the Commission to be capable of performing the desired authentication requirement through the use of the bar codes and the ultra-violet ray code detection mechanism.
The antecedents.
Petitioners were candidates in the May 10, 2010 elections. Salazar was a candidate for mayor of Madridejos, Cebu, while Pelayo and Villaruel were candidates for members of Sangguniang Bayan.
Petitioners lost in the election. Refusing to concede defeat, they filed their respective protests with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bogo, Cebu. Their protests were correspondingly docketed as Election Cases No. 02347 and No. 02349, and both were raffled to Branch 6.
To authenticate the contested ballots and accordingly commence the revision, the RTC requested from the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) one (1) Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machine, including the primary compact flash cards and i-buttons.[1]
In a letter dated October 20, 2010 to the Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 6, Director Betty B. Pizana of the COMELEC Electoral Contests Adjudication Department stated that the COMELEC, in its Minute Resolution No. 10-0665 dated July 20, 2010, had held in abeyance all requests by courts for PCOS machines until after the issues on costs for the use of the PCOS machines shall have been resolved.[2] Thus, the RTC cannot start the authentication and the revisions of the ballots.
Petitioners fault Section 6(e), Rule 10 of A.M. No. 10-4-1 SC for this predicament. Hence, they came to this Court via this petition for declaratory relief, assailing its constitutionality. Petitioners claim that the procedure for authentication of ballots set forth in Section 6(e) is highly discriminatory and violates judicial independence. They describe the procedure and manner of revision as highly and entirely dependent upon the whims and caprices of the public respondent COMELEC. Petitioners add that the assailed provision violates their right to speedy disposition because the protests cannot be acted upon while awaiting the availability of the PCOS machine. They further contend that, if the assailed provision will not be declared unconstitutional, their right to due process of law will be abridged as their petition will be considered as moot and academic after the expiration of the term of office of protestees. Petitioners urge us to declare unconstitutional Section 6(e), Rule 10 of A.M. No. 10-4-1 SC; and, thereafter, to promulgate a new rule on authentication and revision of ballots.
We dismiss the petition.
Section 1, Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. � Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule.
The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are:
1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, contract or other written instrument, statute, an executive order or regulation, or an ordinance;
2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction;
3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question;
4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse;
5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
6) the adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.[3]
Petitioners failed to meet the above-mentioned requisites.
First, they failed to show any statutory or jurisprudential basis that a rule promulgated by this Court can be a subject matter of a petition for declaratory relief.
The first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 63 enumerates the subject matter to be inquired upon in a declaratory relief, namely: deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or any government regulation.[4] The enumeration is exclusive that other matters not mentioned cannot be the subject of an action for declaratory relief:
[T]he subject matter must refer to a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or to a statute or ordinance, to warrant declaratory relief. Any other matter not mentioned therein is deemed excluded. This is under the principle of expressio unius est exclussio alterius.[5]
Indubitably, the rules promulgated by this Court are not included in the enumeration; and petitioners failed to provide any jurisprudential pronouncement wherein the rules promulgated by this Court may be made subject matter of a declaratory relief. Therefore, the instant petition must fail.
Second, the issue raised by petitioners is clearly not yet ripe for judicial determination.
Nowhere in the COMELEC Resolution does it show that the COMELEC had denied the request for PCOS machine with finality. What appears therefrom is that the request was held in abeyance pending resolution of the issues on costs for the use of the PCOS machines.
In Honesto V. Ferrer, Jr. and Romeo E. Espera v. Mayor Sulpicio S. Roco, Jr., in his capacity as Mayor of Naga City, Sangguniang Panglungsod of the City of Naga, and Pe�afrancia Memorial Park,[6] we explained:
Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. In other words, if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction.
Third, petitioners failed to furnish the Office of the Solicitor General with a copy of their petition, in utter disregard of the provisions of Rule 63, viz.:
SEC. 3. Notice on Solicitor General. - In any action which involves the validity of a statute, executive order or regulation, or any other governmental regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party assailing the same and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question.
SEC. 4. Local government ordinances. - In any action involving the validity of a local government ordinance, the corresponding prosecutor or attorney of the local governmental unit involved shall be similarly notified and entitled to be heard. If such ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Solicitor General shall also be notified and entitled to be heard.
Thus, even assuming that A.M. No. 10-4-1 SC can be the proper subject of an action for declaratory relief, still, the petition will fail.
Finally, there is no statutory or jurisprudential basis for according to this Court original and exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory relief.[7] Thus, this recourse by petitioners is lodged with the wrong court, and, thus, it cannot be countenanced.
In fine, the Supreme Court is bestowed by the Constitution with the power and prerogative, inter alia, to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice, and procedure in all courts, as well as to review rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies, which, however, shall remain in force until disapproved by the Supreme Court. This power is constitutionally enshrined to enhance the independence of the Supreme Court.[8]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED."
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA E. VIDAL
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Annex "B"; rollo, pp. 12-13.[2] See Annex "A"; id. at 11.
[3] Honesto V. Ferrer, Jr. and Romeo E. Espera v. Mayor Sulpicio S. Roco, Jr., in his capacity as Mayor of Naga City, Sangguniang Panglungsod of the City of Naga, and Pe�afrancia Memorial Park Corporation, G.R. No. 174129, July 5, 2010.
[4] Erlinda Reyes and Rosemarie Matienzo v. Hon. Judge Belen B. Ortiz, Presiding, Branch 49, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City; Spouses Bernard and Florencia Perl, represented by Attorney-in-Fact Benjamin Mucio; Hon. Judge Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, Presiding, Branch 124, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City and Segundo Bautista; and Sps. Alberto Embores and Lourdes Embores, Sps. Roberto and Evelyn Palad, Dennis Henosa and Corazon Laurente v. Hon. Raymundo G. Vallega, Presiding Judge, Branch 52, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City; Hon. Eleanor R. Kwong, Presiding Judge, Branch 51, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City; Hon. Judge Belen B. Ortiz, Presiding Judge, Branch 49, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City; Victoria C. Salire-Albis, represented by her Attorney-in Fact Mr. Menelio C. Salire; Ma. Fe R. Roco, Alfredo Tan, Manuelito Estrella; and Hon. Judge Antonio Fineza, Presiding Judge, Branch 131, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, G.R. Nos. 137794 & 149664, August 11, 2010.
[5] Id.
[6] Supra note 3.
[7] Erlinda Reyes and Rosemarie Matienzo v. Hon. Judge Belen B. Ortiz, Presiding, Branch 49, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City; Spouses Bernard and Florencia Perl, represented by Attorney-in-Fact Benjamin Much; Hon. Judge Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, Presiding, Branch 124, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City and Segundo Bautista; and Sps. Alberto Embores and Lourdes Embores, Sps. Roberto and Evelyn Palad, Dennis Henosa and Corazon Laurente v. Hon. Raymundo G. Vallega, Presiding Judge, Branch 52, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City; Hon. Eleanor R. Kwong, Presiding Judge, Branch 51, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City; Hon. Judge Belen B. Ortiz, Presiding Judge, Branch 49, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City; Victoria C. Salire-Albis, represented by her Attorney-in Fact Mr. Menelio C. Salire; Ma. Fe R. Roco, Alfredo Tan, Manuelito Estrella; and Hon. Judge Antonio Fineza, Presiding Judge, Branch 131, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, supra note 4.
[8] Metro Construction, Inc. v. Chatham Properties, Inc., 418 Phil. 176, 205 (2001).
