July 2011 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. No. 196917 : July 18, 2011]
HONG SUNG HA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 196917 (Hong Sung Ha v. People of the Philippines and Court of Appeals)
RESOLUTION
After review, this Court DISMISSES the petition. In essence, the petition questions the denial of petitioner's motion to reinstate bail on appeal stated in the Court of Appeals (CA) Resolution dated August 5, 2010 and its subsequent denial of the motion for reconsideration dated March 28, 2011. Petitioner, however, only attached the CA's resolution which does not discuss the bases for the denial of the motion to reinstate bail. On this ground alone, the Court is dismissing the petition.
Further, the operative phrase in the rules on bail for capital offense is 'discretionary upon the court,' in this case, the CA. Absent grave abuse of discretion, or such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, this Court respects the CA's decision to deny the motion to reinstate bail on appeal. The CA is merely following this Court's caveat to extend the privilege of bail 'with grave caution and for strong reasons.'[1] Lastly, it must be noted that, aside from insisting that he is not a flight risk, petitioner did not offer any other evidence to show that the CA issued the resolutions without any basis.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Yap v. Court of Appeals, G.R. no. 141529, June 6, 2001, 358 SCRA 564: In an earlier case, the Court adopted Senator Vicente J. Francisco's disquisition on why bail should be denied after judgment of conviction as a matter of wise discretion: thus: The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction. xxx