February 2012 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R. No. 185498 : February 15, 2012]
PROGRESSIVE MASON CLUB, INC. AND/OR JAMES GO LEE, PETITIONERS, VERSUS MYRNA DIAZ MAGSINO, RESPONDENT.
"G.R. No. 185498- PROGRESSIVE MASON CLUB, INC. and/or JAMES GO LEE, petitioners, versus MYRNA DIAZ MAGSINO, respondent. - Before us is a Rule 45 petition assailing the August 22, 2008 Decision[1] and November 11, 2008 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 95723. The CA affirmed with modification the Decision[3] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which declared respondent Myrna Diaz Magsino a regular employee of petitioner Progressive Mason Club, Inc.
The facts of the case are uncomplicated.
An amended complaint[4] for illegal dismissal was filed by respondent Myrna Diaz Magsino against petitioners Progressive Mason Club, Inc. (Progressive) and James Go Lee, the club's incumbent president at the time. She alleged that on June 15, 1988, petitioners engaged her services as janitress/maintenance personnel with a monthly salary of P6,000. Apart from maintaining the cleanliness and orderliness of the club premises, she was also assigned to collect the monthly membership dues and contributions from the members, pay the monthly electric and water bills, run errands for club members such as buying wreaths for dead club members or their family, mimeographing of documents and papers, buying "mahjong" pads, and even buying food and snacks when club members were playing "mahjong" at night.
On December 16, 1994, respondent rented a stall on the ground floor of the building at P5,000 per month for her RTW business. On September 7, 2004, she received a handwritten note from Lee asking her to vacate the ground floor to pave the way for the building's renovation.[5] Later, on November 7, 2004, Lee told respondent not to report for work anymore. When she reported for work the following day, she was barred from entering the building.[6] Thus, on November 18, 2004, respondent filed an amended complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners before the Department of Labor and Employment. She prayed for reinstatement, payment of 13th month pay, allowances, refund of water and electric bills, damages and attorney's fees.[7]
On the other hand, petitioner Progressive averred that it is a nonprofit association created for the leisure and recreation of its members. It owns a two-storey building in Fernandez Street, Dagupan City, where members hold meetings on the second floor, usually once a month. At the ground floor of the building is a stall, which respondent leased for her RTW business. Petitioners requested respondent to look after the club premises and to remind the members to pay their dues. They also requested her to pay for the club's electric and water bills. On September 7, 2004, as the entire building needed renovation, Lee, the incumbent president of Progressive, wrote respondent a letter advising her to vacate the premises. Because of her refusal, the matter was referred to the Office of the Barangay, where they agreed that she could stay until the end of December 2004.[8]
On May 10, 2005, Labor Arbiter Ni�a Fe S. Lazaga-Rafols rendered a Decision[9] dismissing the case for lack of merit. The reimbursement claim for payment of water and electric bills were likewise dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Not convinced, respondent appealed[10] to the NLRC arguing that the Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing her case.
On March 31, 2006, the NLRC rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are hereby ordered to reinstate complainant to her former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, with full backwages from date of the promulgation of this decision until actually reinstated.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In reversing the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC found that respondent was an employee of Progressive, thus:
x x x The fact that complainant was doing the tasks assigned to her, i.e., paying respondents' electric and water bills, doing errands to buy food and other things needed during the club's activities (Annexes "B" to "D-4") as well as the admitted fact that she is in-charge of the upkeep of the building and reminding and collecting from members club dues, which, obviously, were activities necessary and beneficial to respondents' existence, undoubtedly rendered complainant [a] regular employee under the law, her being a lessee [later] on, being merely an incidental consideration to [her] being regular employee of respondent club. Such being the case, in the absence of any showing, as in this case, that complainant's separation from [her] employment preceded from substantial and procedural due process of law, her dismissal should be declared illegal. Concomitantly, the twin reliefs provided by law to an illegally dismissed employee should be awarded to her.[12]
Both petitioners and respondent filed their respective motions for reconsideration. The NLRC, however, was not persuaded and resolved to deny both motions in its Resolution dated June 15, 2006.[13] On August 17, 2006, respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 95723.[14]
On August 22, 2008, the appellate court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us AFFIRMING the assailed decision of the NLRC dated March 31, 2006 with the MODIFICATION as to the award of backwages, separation pay and other monetary claims as computed above.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration[16] was denied in a Resolution[17] dated November 11, 2008. Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari[18] alleging that the CA committed serious errors in law because:
I
THERE IS NO EMPLOYER-EMPLOYE[E] RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PETITIONERS AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT. THE ALLEGED CERTIFICATE OF EMPLOYMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE PROOF OR CRITERIA IN ORDER TO CREATE AN EMPLOYEE-EMPLOYER RELATIONSHIP.
II
PRIVATE RESPONDENT JS A MERE LESSEE/OCCUPANT OF THE PORTION OF PETITIONERS' BUILDING AND TOOK ADVANTAGE AND ABUSED THE GENEROSITY OF THE PETITIONERS IN ALLOWING HER TO LEASE THE GROUND FLOOR BUILDING OF PETITIONERS.[19]
Essentially, petitioners argue that no employer-employee relationship existed between them and respondent, and therefore, they cannot be held liable for illegal dismissal. They aver that respondent was just a lessee of the ground floor of their building who took advantage of their generosity.
The petition must be denied.
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari.[20] There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence presented. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on a given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to one another, the issue in that query is factual.[21]
Likewise, factual findings of administrative agencies that are affirmed by the CA are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court. This is so because of the special knowledge and expertise gained by these quasi-judicial agencies from presiding over matters falling within their jurisdiction. So long as these factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, this Court will not disturb the same.[22]
However, a disharmony between the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC opens the door to a review thereof by this Court. Factual findings of administrative agencies are not infallible and will be set aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness. Moreover, when the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the Labor Arbiter, this Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may look into the records of the case and reexamine the questioned findings.[23]
In the present case, the Labor Arbiter concluded that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties. The NLRC, however, disagreed with the Labor Arbiter and reversed the latter�s findings. The CA, for its part, concurred with the findings of the NLRC. In view of the discordance between the findings of the Labor Arbiter, on the one hand, and the NLRC and the CA, on the other, there is a need for the Court to review the factual findings and the conclusions based on the said findings.
It is worthy to stress that in labor cases as in other administrative proceedings, substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion is required.[24] After carefully examining the records of the case, we find that respondent was able to establish by substantial evidence that she was indeed an employee of Progressive. The Certificate of Employment issued by Progressive's former president, Mr. Tecson Lim, states:
Certificate of Employment
Know All Men By These Presents:
That Miss Myrna D. Diaz, of legal age[,] Filipino, single and [a] resident of Brgy. Talospatang, Malasiqui, Pangasinan[,] has been working in Progressive Mason Club, Inc., Dagupan City Chapter, in-charged with the cleanliness and maintenance of the Club house and collection/remittance of Recreation Fund Contribution from the club members, receiving a monthly salary in the amount of Six thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) Philippine Currency since June 15, 1988 to date.
This Certification is issued upon [the] request of Miss Myrna D. Diaz this 1st day of March 2001 at Dagupan City, for general purposes.[25]
In order to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the Court has frequently applied the four-fold test: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee's conduct, or the so called "control test," which is considered the most important element.[26] A perusal of the certificate reveals that respondent was hired by petitioners on June 15, 1988 to maintain the cleanliness of the clubhouse and to collect contributions from its club members. It also stated that she was receiving a monthly salary of P6,000. More importantly, petitioners enjoy the prerogative to control respondent's conduct in undertaking her assigned work, particularly the nature and situs of her work, thereby establishing the existence of an employer-employee relationship between them.
The CA was therefore correct in holding that the Certificate of Employment issued by Progressive's former president was concrete proof of the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Moreover, both the NLRC and the appellate court found that respondent was performing other duties for petitioners such as paying electric and water bills, buying food and other things needed during club activities. Since respondent worked at the company premises and performed tasks that inured to the benefit of the latter, it cannot be denied she was an employee of Progressive.
Lastly, in its assailed decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the NLRC and adopted as its own the latter's factual findings. Long-established is the doctrine that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are accorded respect, even finality, if supported by substantial evidence. When passed upon and upheld by the CA, they are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court and will not normally be disturbed." Though this doctrine is not without exceptions, the Court finds that none are applicable to the present case.
All told, we find no reversible error to modify or reverse the assailed CA Decision.cralaw
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The August 22, 2008 Decision and the November 11, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 95723 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners."
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA
Division Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, pp. 31-41. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias Dicdican with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Marlene Gonzales-Sison concurring.[2] Id. at 48-49.
[3] CA rollo, pp. 23-28.
[4] NLRC Records, p. 4.
[5] CA rollo, p. 50.
[6] Id. at 42-43.
[7] Supra note 4.
[8] CA rollo, pp. 65-67.
[9] Id. at 84-87.
[10] Id. at 88-108.
[11] Id. at 27.
[12] Id. at 26-27.
[13] Id. at 29-30
[14] Id. at 2-22.
[15] Rollo, pp. 40-41.
[16] Id. at 42-47.
[17] Id. at 48-49.
[18] Id. at 11-30.
[19] Id. at 20-21.
[20] Rule 45, Section 1.
[21] Juaban v. Espina, G.R. No. 170049, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 588, 608-609, citing Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp. Inc., G.R. No. 140946, September 13, 2004, 438 SCRA 224, 231 and Morales v. Skills International Company, G.R. No. 149285. August 30, 2006, 500 SCRA 186, 194.
[22] Morales v. Skills International Company, id. at 195; see Cosmos Bottling Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 146397, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA 258, 262-263.
[23] Diamond Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151981, December 1, 2003, 417 SCRA 46, 50.
[24] UST Faculty Union v. University of Santo Tomas, G.R. No. 180892, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 648, 656.
[25] CA rollo, p. 49.
[26] Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. v. Climaco, G.R. No. 146881, February 5, 2007, 514 SCRA 164, citing Philippine Global Communications, Inc. v. De Vera, G.R. No. 157214, June 7, 2005, 459 SCRA 260, 268.
[27] San Juan De Dios Educational Foundation Employees Union-Alliance of Filipino Workers v. San Juan De Dios Educational Foundation, Inc., G.R. No. 143341, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 193, 205-206.