Appendix D to Part 154—Reporting of Nonderogatory Cases
Background Investigation (BI) and Special Background Investigation (SBI) shall be considered as devoid of significant adverse information unless they contain information listed below:
1. Incidents, infractions, offenses, charges, citations, arrests, suspicion or allegations of illegal use or abuse of drugs or alcohol, theft or dishonesty, unreliability, irresponsibility, immaturity, instability or recklessness, the use of force, violence or weapons or actions that indicate disregard for the law due to multiplicity of minor infractions.
2. All indications of moral turpitude, heterosexual promiscuity, aberrant, deviant, or bizarre sexual conduct or behavior, transvestitism, transsexualism, indecent exposure, rape, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, child molestation, wife-swapping, window-peeping, and similar situations from whatever source. Unlisted full-time employment or education; full-time education or employment that cannot be verified by any reference or record source or that contains indications of falsified education or employment experience. Records or testimony of employment, education, or military service where the individual was involved in serious offenses or incidents that would reflect adversely on the honesty, reliability, trustworthiness, or stability of the individual.
3. Foreign travel, education, visits, correspondence, relatives, or contact with persons from or living in a foreign country or foreign intelligence service.
4. Mental, nervous, emotional, psychological, psychiatric, or character disorders/behavior or treatment reported or alleged from any source.
5. Excessive indebtedness, bad checks, financial difficulties or irresponsibility, unexplained affluence, bankruptcy, or evidence of living beyond the individual's means.
6. Any other significant information relating to the criteria included in paragraphs (a) through (q) of §154.7 or Appendix H of this part.
[52 FR 11219, Apr. 8, 1987, as amended at 58 FR 61026, Nov. 19, 1993] Appendix E to Part 154—Personnel Security Determination Authorities
A. Officials authorized to grant, deny or revoke personnel security clearances (Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential):
1. Secretary of Defense and/or designee
2. Secretary of the Army and/or designee
3. Secretary of the Navy and/or designee
4. Secretary of the Air Force and/or designee
5. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and/or designee
6. Directors of the Defense Agencies and/or designee
7. Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands and/or designee
B. Officials authorized to grant Limited Access Authorizations:
1. Secretaries of the Military Departments and/or designee
2. Director, Washington Headquarters Service for OSD and/or designee
3. Chairman, JCS and/or designee
4. Directors of the Defense Agencies and/or designee
5. Commanders, Unified and Specified Commands and/or designee
C. Officials authorized to grant access to SCI:
Director, NSA—for NSA
Director, DIA—for OSD, OJCS, and Defense Agencies
Senior Officers of the Intelligence Community of the Army, Navy, and Air Force—for their respective Military Departments, or their single designee.
D. Officials authorized to certify personnel under their jurisdiction for access to Restricted Data (to include Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information): see enclosure to DoD Directive 5210.2.
E. Officials authorized to approve personnel for assignment to Presidential Support activities: The Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense or designee.
F. Officials authorized to grant access to SIOP-ESI:
1. Director of Strategic Target Planning
2. Director, Joint Staff, OJCS
3. Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
4. Chief of Naval Operations
5. Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
6. Commandant of the Marine Corps
7. Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands
8. The authority to grant access delegated above may be further delegated in writing by the above officials to the appropriate subordinates.
G. Officials authorized to designate sensitive positions:
1. Heads of DoD Components or their designees for critical-sensitive positions.
2. Organizational commanders for noncritical-sensitive positions.
H. Nonappropriated Fund Positions of Trust:
Officials authorized to designate nonappropriated fund positions of trust: Heads of DoD Components and/or their designees. Appendix F to Part 154—Guidelines for Conducting Prenomination Personal Interviews
A. Purpose. The purpose of the personal interview is to assist in determining the acceptability of an individual for nomination and further processing for a position requiring an SBI.
B. Scope. Questions asked during the course of a personal interview must have a relevance to a security determination. Care must be taken not to inject improper matters into the personal interview. For example, religious beliefs and affiliations, beliefs and opinions regarding racial matters, political beliefs and affiliations of a nonsubversive nature, opinions regarding the constitutionality of legislative policies, and affiliations with labor unions and fraternal organizations are not proper subjects for inquiry. Department of Defense representatives conducting personal interviews should always be prepared to explain the relevance of their inquiries. Adverse inferences shall not be drawn from the refusal of a person to answer questions the relevance of which has not been established.
C. The interviewer. Except as prescribed in paragraph B. above, persons conducting personal interviews normally will have broad latitude in performing this essential and important function and, therefore, a high premium must necessarily be placed upon the exercise of good judgment and common sense. To insure that personal interviews are conducted in a manner that does not violate lawful civil and private rights or discourage lawful political activity in any of its forms, or intimidate free expression, it is necessary that interviewers have a keen and well-developed awareness of and respect for the rights of interviewees. Interviewers shall never offer an opinion as to the relevance or significance of information provided by the interviewee to eligibility for access to SCI. If explanation in this regard is required, the interviewer will indicate that the sole function of the interview is to obtain information and that the determination of relevance or significance to the individual's eligibility will be made by other designated officials.
D. Interview procedures. 1. The Head of the DoD Component concerned shall establish uniform procedures for conducting the interview that are designed to elicit information relevant to making a determination of whether the interviewee, on the basis of the interview and other locally available information (DD 398, Personnel Security Investigation Questionnaire, personnel records, security file, etc.), is considered acceptable for nomination and further processing.
2. Such procedures shall be structured to insure the interviewee his full rights under the Constitution of the United States, the Privacy Act of 1974 and other applicable statutes and regulations.
E. Protection of interview results. All information developed during the course of the interview shall be maintained in personnel security channels and made available only to those authorities who have a need-to-know in connection with the processing of an individual's nomination for duties requiring access to SCI or those who need access to information either to conduct the required SBI or to adjudicate the matter of the interviewee's eligibility for access to SCI, or as otherwise authorized by Executive order or statute.
F. Acceptability determination. 1. The determination of the interviewee's acceptability for nomination for duties requiring access to sensitive information shall be made by the commander, or designee, of the DoD organization that is considering nominating the interviewee for such duties.
2. Criteria guidelines contained in DCID 1/14 upon which the acceptability for nomination determination is to be based shall be provided to commanders of DoD organizations who may nominate individuals for access to SCI and shall be consistent with those established by the Senior Officer of the Intelligence Community of the Component concerned with respect to acceptability for nomination to duties requiring access to SCI. Appendix G to Part 154 [Reserved]
Appendix H to Part 154—Adjudication Policy
General. The following adjudication policy has been developed to assist DoD adjudicators in making determinations with respect to an individual's eligibility for employment or retention in sensitive duties or eligibility for access to classified information. Adjudication policy relative to access to sensitive compartmented information is contained in DCID 1/14.
While reasonable consistency in reaching adjudicative determinations is desirable, the nature and complexities of human behavior preclude the development of a single set of guidelines or policies that is equally applicable in every personnel security case. Accordingly, the following adjudication policy is not intended to be interpreted as inflexible rules of procedure. The following policy requires dependence on the adjudicator's sound judgment, mature thinking, and careful analysis as each case must be weighed on its own merits, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, and prior experience in similar cases as well as the guidelines contained in the adjudication policy, which have been compiled from common experience in personnel security determinations.
Each adjudication is to be an overall common sense determination based upon consideration and assessment of all available information, both favorable and unfavorable, with particular emphasis being placed on the seriousness, recency, frequency and motivation for the individual's conduct; the extent to which conduct was negligent, willful, voluntary, or undertaken with knowledge of the circumstances or consequences involved; and, to the extent that it can be estimated, the probability that conduct will or will not continue in the future. The listed “Disqualifying Factors” and ”Mitigating Factors” in this set of Adjudication Policies reflect the consideration of those factors of seriousness, recency, frequency, motivation, etc., to common situations and types of behavior encountered in personnel security adjudications, and should be followed whenever an individual case can be measured against this policy guidance. Common sense may occasionally necessitate deviations from this policy guidance, but such deviations should not be frequently made and must be carefully explained and documented.
The “Disqualifying Factors” provided herein establish some of the types of serious conduct under the criteria that can justify a determination to deny or revoke an individual's eligibility for access to classified information, or appointment to, or retention in sensitive duties. The “Mitigating Factors” establish some of the types of circumstances that may mitigate the conduct listed under the “Disqualifying Factors”. Any determination must include a consideration of both the conduct listed under “Disqualifying Factors” and any circumstances listed under the appropriate or corresponding “Mitigating Factors”.
The adjudication policy is subdivided into sections appropriate to each of the criteria provided in §154.7 of this part, except §154.7(i) for which conduct under any of the “Disqualifying Factors” of the adjudication policy or any other types of conduct may be appropriately included, if it meets the definition of §154.7(i).
In all adjudications, the protection of the national security shall be the paramount determinant. In the last analysis, a final decision in each case must be arrived at by applying the standard that the issuance of the clearance or assignment to the sensitive position is “clearly consistent with the interests of national security.”
Loyalty
(See §154.7 (a) through (d)).
Basis: Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, anarchy, sedition, or attempts threat or preparation therefor, or conspiring with or aiding or abetting another to commit or attempt to commit any such act. Establishing or continuing a sympathetic association with a saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, terrorist, revolutionist, or with an espionage or other secret agent or similar representative of a foreign nation whose interests may be inimical to the interests of the United States, or with any person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States or to alter the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means. Advocacy or use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States or to alter the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means. Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or adherence to and active participation in any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons (hereafter referred to as organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State or which seeks to overthrow the Government of the United States or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means.
Disqualifying Factors (behavior falls within one or more of the following categories):
1. Furnishing a representative of a foreign government information or data which could damage the national security of the United States.
2. Membership in an organization that has been characterized by the Department of Justice as one which meets the criteria in the above cited “Basis.”
3. Knowing participation in acts that involve force or violence or threats of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or to overthrow or alter the form of government of the United States or of any State.
4. Monetary contributions, service, or other support of the organization defined in “Basis”, above, with the intent of furthering the unlawful objectives of the organization.
5. Participation, support, aid, comfort or sympathetic association with persons, groups, organizations involved in terrorist activities, threats, or acts.
6. Evidence of continuing sympathy with the unlawful aims and objectives of such an organization, as defined in the “Basis” above.
7. Holding a position of major doctrinal or managerial influence in an organization as defined in the “Basis” above.
Mitigating Factors (circumstances which may mitigate disqualifying information):
1. Lack of knowledge or understanding of the unlawful aims of the organization.
2. Affiliation or activity occurred during adolescent/young adult years (17–25), more than 5 years has passed since affiliation was severed, and affiliation was due to immaturity.
3. Affiliation for less than a year out of curiosity or academic interest.
4. Sympathy or support limited to the lawful objectives of the organization.
Foreign Preference
(See §154.7(f)).
Basis: Performing or attempting to one's perform duties, acceptance and active maintenance of dual citizenship, or other acts conducted in a manner which serve or which could be expected to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States.
Disqualifying Factors (behavior falls within one or more of the following categories):
1. The active maintenance of dual citizenship, by one or more of the following:
a. Possession of a passport issued by a foreign nation and use of this passport to obtain legal entry into any sovereign state in preference to use of a U.S. passport.
b. Military service in the armed forces of a foreign nation or the willingness to comply with an obligation to so serve, or the willingness to bear arms at any time in the future on behalf of the foreign state.
c. Exercise or acceptance of rights, privileges or benefits offered by the foreign state to its citizens, (e.g., voting in a foreign election; receipt of honors or titles; financial compensation due to employment/retirement, educational or medical or other social welfare benefits), in preference to those of the United States.
d. Travel to or residence in the foreign state for the purpose of fulfilling citizenship requirements or obligations.
e. Maintenance of dual citizenship to protect financial interests, to include property ownership, or employment or inheritance rights in the foreign state.
f. Registration for military service or registration with a foreign office, embassy or consulate to obtain benefits.
2. Employment as an agent or other official representative of a foreign government, or seeking or holding political office in a foreign state.
3. Use of a U.S. Government position of trust or responsibility to influence decisions in order to serve the interests of another government in preference to those of the United States.
Mitigating Factors (circumstances which may mitigate disqualifying information):
1. Claim of dual citizenship is with a foreign country whose interests are not inimical to those of the United States and is based solely on applicant's or applicant's parent(s)' birth, the applicant has not actively maintained citizenship in the last ten years and indicates he or she will not in the future act so as to pursue this claim.
2. Military service while a U.S. citizen was in the armed forces of a state whose interests are not inimical to those of the United States and such service was officially sanctioned by United States authorities.
3. Employment is as a consultant only and services provided is of the type sanctioned by the United States Government.
Security Responsibility Safeguards
(See §154.7 (g) and (e)).
Basis: Disregard of public law, Statutes, Executive Orders or Regulations, including violation of security regulations or practices, or unauthorized disclosure to any person of classified information, or of other information, disclosure of which is prohibited by Statute, Executive Order or Regulation.
Disqualifying Factors: (behavior falls within one or more of the following categories):
1. Deliberate or reckless disregard of security regulations, public law, statutes or Executive Orders which could have resulted in the loss or compromise of classified information.
2. Deliberate or reckless violations of security regulations, including, but not limited to, taking classified information home or carrying classified data while in a travel status without proper authorization, intentionally copying classified documents in order to obsure classification markings, disseminating classified information to cleared personnel who have no “need to know”, or disclosing classified information, or other information, disclosure of which is prohibited by Statute, Executive Order or Regulation, to persons who are not cleared or authorized to receive it.
3. Pattern of negligent conduct in handling or storing classified documents.
Mitigating Factors (circumstances which may mitigate disqualifying information):
1. Violation of security procedures was directly caused or significantly contributed to by an improper or inadequate security briefing, provided the individual reasonably relied on such briefing in good faith.
2. Individual is personally responsible for a large volume of classified information and the violation was merely administrative in nature.
3. Security violation was merely an isolated incident not involving deliberate or reckless violation of security policies, practices or procedures.
Criminal Conduct
(See §154.7(h)).
Basis: Criminal or dishonest conduct.
When it is determined that an applicant for a security clearance, or a person holding a clearance, has engaged in conduct which would constitute a felony under the laws of the United States, the clearance of such person shall be denied or revoked unless it is determined that there are compelling reasons to grant or continue such clearance. Compelling reasons can only be shown by clear and convincing evidence of the following:
(a) The felonious conduct (1) did not involve an exceptionally grave offense; (2) was an isolated episode; and (3) the individual has demonstrated trustworthiness and respect for the law over an extended period since the offense occurred; or
(b) The felonious conduct (1) did not involve an exceptionally grave offense; (2) was an isolated episode; (3) was due to the immaturity of the individual at the time it occurred; and (4) the individual has demonstrated maturity, trustworthiness, and respect for the law since that time; or
(c) In cases where the individual has committed felonious conduct but was not convicted of a felony, there are extenuating circumstances which mitigate the seriousness of the conduct such that it does not reflect a lack of trustworthiness or respect for the law.
The above criteria supersede all criteria previously used to adjudicate criminal conduct involving commission of felonies under the Laws of the United States. Involvement in criminal activities which does not constitute a felony under the laws of the United States shall be evaluated in accordance with the criteria set forth below. (For purposes of this paragraph, the term “felony” means any crime punishable by imprisonment for more than a year. The term “exceptionally grave offense” includes crimes against the Federal Government, its instrumentalities, officers, employees or agents; or involves dishonesty, fraud, bribery or false statement; or involves breach of trust or fiduciary duty; or involves serious threat to life or public safety.)
Disqualifying Factors: (behavior falls within one or more of the following categories):
1. Criminal conduct involving:
a. Commission of a State felony.
b. Force, coercion, or intimidation.
c. Firearms, explosives, or other weapons.
d. Dishonesty or false statements, e.g. fraud, theft, embezzlement, falsification of documents or statements.
e. Obstruction or corruption of government functions.
f. Deprivation of civil rights.
g. Violence against persons.
2. Criminal conduct punishable by confinement for one year or more.
3. An established pattern of criminal conduct, whether the individual was convicted or not.
4. Failure to complete a rehabilitation program resulting from disposition of a criminal proceeding or violation of probation, even if the violation did not result in formal revocation of probation. Rehabilitation should not be considered a success or failure while the individual is still on parole/probation.
5. Criminal conduct that is so recent in time as to preclude a determination that recurrence is unlikely.
6. Close and continuing association with persons known to the individual to be involved in criminal activities.
7. Criminal conduct indicative of a serious mental aberration, lack of remorse, or insufficient probability of rehabilitative success, (e.g., spouse or child abuse).
8. Disposition:
a. Conviction.
b. Disposition on a legal issue not going to the merits of the crime.
c. Arrest or indictment pending trial when there is evidence that the individual engaged in the criminal conduct for which arrested or indicted.
9. Arrest record. In evaluating an arrest record, information that indicates that the individual was acquitted, that the charges were dropped or the subject of a “stet” or “nolle prosequi”, that the record was expunged, or that the cause was dismissed due to error not going to the merits, does not negate the security significance of the underlying conduct. Personnel security determinations are to be made on the basis of all available information concerning a person's conduct and actions rather than the legal outcome of a criminal proceeding.
Mitigating Factors: (circumstances which may mitigate disqualifying information):
1. Immaturity attributable to the age of the individual at the time of the offense.
2. Extenuating circumstances surrounding the offense.
3. Circumstances indicating that the actual offense was less serious than the offense charged.
4. Isolated nature of the conduct.
5. Conduct occurring only in the distant past (such as more than 5 years ago) in the absence of subsequent criminal conduct.
6. Transitory conditions directly or significantly contributing to the conduct (such as divorce action, death in family, severe provocation) in the absence of subsequent criminal conduct.
Mental or Emotional Disorders
(See §154.7(j)).
Basis: Any behavior or illness, including any mental condition, which, in the opinion of competent medical authority, may cause a defect in judgment or reliability with due regard to the transient or continuing effect of the illness and the medical findings in such case.
Disqualifying Factors: (behavior or condition falls within one or more of the following categories):
1. Diagnosis by competent medical authority (board certified psychiatrist or clinical psychologist) that the individual has an illness or mental condition which may result in a significant defect in judgment or reliability.
2. Conduct or personality traits that are bizarre or reflect abnormal behavior or instability even though there has been no history of mental illness or treatment, but which nevertheless, in the opinion of competent medical authority, may cause a defect in judgment or reliability.
3. A diagnosis by competent medical authority that the individual suffers from mental or intellectual incompetence or mental retardation to a degree significant enough to establish or suggest that the individual could not recognize, understand or comprehend the necessity of security regulations, or procedures, or that judgment or reliability are significantly impaired, or that the individual could be influenced or swayed to act contrary to the national security.
4. Diagnosis by competent medical authority that an illness or condition that had affected judgment or reliability may recur even though the individual currently manifests no symptoms, or symptoms currently are reduced or in remission.
5. Failure to take prescribed medication or participate in treatment (including follow-up treatment or aftercare), or otherwise failing to follow medical advice relating to treatment of the illness or mental condition.
Mitigating Factors: (circumstances which may mitigate disqualifying information):
1. Diagnosis by competent medical authority that an individual's previous mental or emotional illness or condition that did cause significant defect in judgment or reliability is cured and has no probability of recurrence, or such a minimal probability of recurrence as to reasonably estimate there will be none.
2. The contributing factors or circumstances which caused the bizarre conduct or traits, abnormal behavior, or defect in judgment and reliability have been eliminated or rectified, there is a corresponding alleviation of the individual's condition and the contributing factors or circumstances are not expected to recur.
3. Evidence of the individual's continued reliable use of prescribed medication for a period of at least two years, without recurrence and testimony by competent medical authority that continued maintenance of prescribed medication is medically practical and likely to preclude recurrence of the illness or condition affecting judgment or reliability.
4. There has been no evidence of a psychotic condition, a serious or disabling neurotic disorder, or a serious character or personality disorder for the past 10 years.
Foreign Connections/Vulnerability to Blackmail or Coercion
(See paragraph §154.7(k)).
Basis: Vulnerability to coercion, influence, or pressure that may cause conduct contrary to the national interest. This may be (1) the presence of immediate family members or other persons to whom the applicant is bonded by affection or obligation in a nation (or areas under its domination) whose interests may be inimical to those of the United States, or (2) any other circumstances that could cause the applicant to be vulnerable.
Disqualifying Factors: (behavior falls within one or more of the following categories):
1. Indications that the individual now is being blackmailed, pressured or coerced by any individual, group, association, organization or government.
2. Indications that a vulnerable individual actually has been targeted and/or approached for possible blackmail, coercion or pressure by any individual, group, association, organization or government.
3. Indications that the individual has acted to increase the vulnerability for future possible blackmail, coercion or pressure by any individual, group, association, organization or governments, especially by foreign intelligence services. Indicators include, but are not limited to the following:
a. Failure to report to security officials any evidence, indication or suspicion that mail to relatives has been opened, unusually delayed or tampered with in any way, or that telephone calls have been monitored.
b. An increase in curiosity or official or quasi-official inquiries about the individual to relatives in the country where they reside occasioned by the receipt of mail, packages, telephone calls or visits from the individual.
c. Contact with, or visits by officials to the individual while visiting relatives in another country, to learn more about the individual, or the individual's employment or residence, etc.
d. Unreported attempts to obtain classified or other sensitive information or data by representatives of a foreign country.
4. Conduct or actions by the individual while visiting in a country hostile to the United States that increase the individual's vulnerability to be targeted for possible blackmail, coercion or pressure. These include, but are not limited to the following:
a. Violation of any laws of the foreign country where relatives reside during visits or through mailing letters or packages, (e.g., smuggling, currency exchange violations, unauthorized mailings, violations of postal regulations of the country, or any criminal conduct, including traffic violations) which may call the attention of officials to the individual.
b. Frequent and regular visits, correspondence, or telephone contact with relatives in the country where they reside, increasing the likelihood of official notice.
c. Failure to report to security officials those inquiries by friends or relatives for more than a normal level of curiosity concerning the individual's employment, sensitive duties, military service or access to classified information.
d. Repeated telephone or written requests to the foreign government officials for official favors, permits, visas, travel permission, or similar requests which increase the likelihood of official notice.
e. Reckless conduct, open or public misbehavior or commission of acts contrary to local customs or laws, or which violate the mores of the foreign country and increase the likelihood of official notice.
f. Falsification of documents, lying to officials, harassing or taunting officials or otherwise acting to cause an increase in the likelihood of official notice or to increase the individual's vulnerability because personal freedom could be jeopardized.
g. Commission of any illicit sexual act, drug purchase or use, drunkenness or similar conduct which increases the likelihood of official notice, or which increases the individual's vulnerability because personal freedom could be jeopardized.
5. Conduct or actions by the individual that increase the individual's vulnerability to possible coercion, blackmail or pressure, regardless of the country in which it occurred, including, but not limited to the following:
a. Concealment or attempts to conceal from an employer prior unfavorable employment history, criminal conduct, mental or emotional disorders or treatment, drug or alcohol use, sexual preference, or sexual misconduct described under that section below, or fraudulent credentials or qualifications for employment.
b. Concealment or attempts to conceal from immediate family members, or close associates, supervisors or coworkers, criminal conduct, mental or emotional disorders or treatment, drug or alcohol abuse, sexual preference, or sexual misconduct described under that section below.
Mitigating Factors (circumstances which may mitigate disqualifying infomration):
1. The individual:
a. Receives no financial assistance from and provides no financial assistance to persons or organizations in the designated country.
b. Has been in the United States for at least 5 years since becoming a U.S. citizen without significant contact with persons or organizations from the designated country (each year of active service in the United States military may be counted).
c. Has close ties of affection to immediate family members in the United States.
d. Has adapted to the life-style in the United States, established substantive financial or other associations with U.S. enterprises or community activities.
e. Prefers the way of life and form of government in the U.S. over the other country.
f. Is willing to defend the U.S. against all threats including the designated country in question.
g. Has not divulged the degree of association with the U.S. government or access to classified information to individuals in the designated country in question.
h. Has not been contacted or approached by anyone or any organization from a designated country to provide information or favors, or to otherwise act for a person or organization in the designated country in question.
i. Has promptly reported to proper authorities all attempted contacts, requests or threats from persons or organizations from the designated country.
j. The individual is aware of the possible vulnerability to attempts of blackmail or coercion and has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate such vulnerability.
Financial Matters
(See §154.7(1)).
Basis: Excessive indebtedness, recurring financial difficulties, or unexplained affluence.
Disqualifying Factors: (behavior falls within one or more of the following categories):
1. History of bad debts, garnishments, liens, repossessions, unfavorable judgments, delinquent or uncollectable accounts or debts written off by creditors as uncollectable losses with little or no apparent or voluntary effort by the individual to pay amounts owed.
2. Bankruptcy:
a. Due to financial irresponsibility, or
b. With continuing financial irresponsibility thereafter.
3. Indebtedness aggravated or caused by gambling, alcohol, drug abuse, or other factors indicating poor judgement or financial irresponsibility.
4. A history or pattern of living beyond the person's financial means or ability to pay, a lifestyle reflecting irresponsible expenditures that exceed income or assets, or a history or pattern of writing checks not covered by sufficient funds or on closed accounts.
5. Indication of deceit or deception in obtaining credit or bank accounts, misappropriation of funds, income tax evasion, embezzlement, fraud, or attempts to evade lawful creditors.
6. lndifference to or disregard of financial obligations or indebtedness or intention not to meet or satisfy lawful financial obligations or when present expenses exceed net income.
7. Unexplained affluence or income derived from illegal gambling, drug trafficking or other criminal or nefarious means.
8. Significant unexplained increase in an individual's net worth.
Mitigating Factors: (circumstances which may mitigate disqualifying information):
1. Scheduled program or systematic efforts demonstrated over a period of time (generally one year) to satisfy creditors, to acknowledge debts and arrange for reduced payments, entry into debt-consolidation program or seeking the advice and assistance of financial counselors or court supervised payment program.
2. Change to a more responsible lifestyle, reduction of credit card accounts, and favorable change in financial habits over a period of time (generally one year).
3. Stable employment record and favorable financial references.
4. Unforeseen circumstances beyond the individual's control (e.g. a major or catastrophic illness or surgery, accidental loss of property or assets not covered by insurance, decrease or cutoff of income, indebtedness resulting from court judgments not due to the individual's financial mismanagement), provided the individual demonstrates efforts to respond to the indebtedness in a reasonable and responsible fashion.
5. Indebtedness due to failure of legitimate business efforts or business-related bankruptcy without evidence of fault or financial irresponsibility on the part of the individual, irresponsible mismanagement of an individual's funds by another who had fiduciary control or access to them without the individual's knowledge, or loss of assets as a victim of fraud or deceit, provided the individual demonstrates efforts to respond to the indebtedness in a reasonable and responsible fashion.
6. Any significant increase in net worth was due to legitimate business interests, inheritance or similar legal explanation.
Alcohol Abuse
(See paragraph §154.7(m)).
Basis: Habitual or episodic use of intoxicants to excess.
Disqualifying Factors: (behavior falls within one or more of the following categories):
1. Habitual or episodic consumption of alcohol to the point of impairment or intoxication.
2. Alcohol-related incidents such as traffic violations, fighting, child or spouse abuse, non-traffic violation or other criminal incidents related to alcohol use.
3. Deterioration of the individual's health or physical or mental condition due to alcohol use or abuse.
4. Drinking on the job, reporting for work in an intoxicated or “hungover” condition, tardiness or absences caused by or related to alcohol abuse, and impairment or intoxication occurring during, and immediately following, luncheon breaks.
5. Refusal or failure to accept counseling or professional help for alcohol abuse or alcoholism.
6. Refusal or failure to follow medical advice relating to alcohol abuse treatment or to abstain from alcohol use despite medical or professional advice.
7. Refusal or failure to significantly decrease consumption of alcohol or to change life-style and habits which contributed to past alcohol related difficulties.
8. Indications of financial or other irresponsibility or unreliability caused by alcohol abuse, or discussing sensitive or classified information while drinking.
9. Failure to cooperate in or successfully complete a prescribed regimen of an alcohol abuse rehabilitation program.
Mitigating Factors (circumstances which may mitigate disqualifying information):
1. Successfully completed an alcohol awareness program following two or less alcohol-related incidents and has significantly reduced alcohol consumption, and made positive changes in life-style and improvement in job reliability.
2. Successfully completed an alcohol rehabilitation program after three or more alcohol-related incidents, has significantly reduced or eliminated alcohol consumption in accordance with medical or professional advice, regularly attended Alcoholics Anonymous or similar support organization for approximately one year after rehabilitation, and abstained from the use of alcohol for that period of time.
3. Whenever one of the situations listed below occurs, the individual must have successfully completed an alcohol rehabilitation or detoxification program and totally abstained from alcohol for a period of approximately two years:
a. The individual has had one previously failed rehabilitation program and subsequent alcohol abuse or alcohol related incidents.
b. The individual has been diagnosed by competent medical or health authority as an alcoholic, alcoholic dependent or chronic abuser of alcohol.
4. Whenever the individual has had repeated unsuccessful rehabilitation efforts and has continued drinking or has been involved in additional alcohol related incidents then the individual must have successfully completed an alcohol rehabilitation or detoxification program, totally abstained from alcohol for a period of at least three years and maintained regular and frequent participation in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or similar organizations.
5. If an individual's alcohol abuse was surfaced solely as a result of self referral to an alcohol abuse program and there have been no precipitating factors such as alcohol related arrests or incidents action will not normally be taken to suspend or revoke security clearance solely on the self referral for treatment.
Drug Abuse
(See §154.7(n)).
Basis: Illegal or improper use, possession, transfer, sale or addiction to any controlled or psychoactive substance, narcotic, cannabis, or other dangerous drug.
Disqualifying Factors (behavior falls within one or more of the following categories):
1. Abuse of cannabis only, not in combination with any other substance.
a. Experimental abuse, defined as an average of once every two months or less, but no more than six times.
b. Occasional abuse, defined as an average of not more than once a month.
c. Frequent abuse, defined as an average of not more than once a week.
d. Regular abuse, defined as an average of more than once a week.
e. Compulsive use, habitual use, physical or psychological dependency, or use once a day or more on the average.
2. Abuse of any narcotic, psychoactive substance or dangerous drug (to include prescription drugs), either alone, or in combination with another or cannabis, as follows:
a. Experimental abuse, defined as an average of once every two months or less, but no more than six times.
b. Occasional abuse, defined as an average of not more than once a month.
c. Frequent abuse, defined as an average of not more than once a week.
d. Regular abuse, defined as an average of more than once a week.
e. Compulsive use, habitual use, physical or psychological dependency, or use on an average of once a day or more on the average.
3. Involvement to any degree in the unauthorized trafficking, cultivation, processing, manufacture, sale, or distribution of any narcotic, dangerous drug, or cannabis or assistance to those involved in such acts whether or not the individual was arrested for such activity.
4. Involvement with narcotics, dangerous drugs or cannabis under the following conditions whether or not the individual engages in personal use:
a. Possession.
b. Possession of a substantial amount, more than could reasonably be expected for personal use.
c. Possession of drug paraphernalia for cultivating, manufacturing or distributing (e.g., possession of gram scales, smoking devices, needles for injecting intravenously, empty capsules or other drug production chemical paraphernalia.
d. Possession of personal drug paraphernalia such as needles for injecting, smoking devices and equipment, etc.
5. Information that the individual intends to continue to use (regardless of frequency) any narcotic, dangerous drug or cannabis. Note: There is no corresponding Mitigating Factor for this Disqualifying Factor because it is DoD policy that, as a general rule, if any individual expresses or implies any intent to continue use of any narcotic, dangerous drug, or other controlled substance, including marijuana and hashish, without a prescription, in any amount and regardless of frequency, it is to be considered contrary to the national interest and the interests of national security to grant or allow retention of a security clearance for access to classified information for that individual.)
Mitigating Factors (circumstances which may mitigate disqualifying information):
1. Abuse of cannabis only, as follows: (Use this to assess Disqualifying Factor 1)
a. Experimental abuse, which occurred more than six months ago and the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use cannabis or any other narcotic, psychoactive substance or dangerous drug in the future.
b. Occasional abuse of cannabis, which occurred more than 12 months ago, and the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use cannabis or any other narcotic, dangerous drug or psychoactive substance in the future.
c. Frequent abuse of cannabis occurred more than 18 months ago, and the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use cannabis or any other narcotic, dangerous drug or psychoactive substance in the future.
d. Regular abuse of cannabis occurred more than two years ago, and the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use cannabis or any other narcotic, dangerous drug or psychoactive substance in the future.
e. Compulsive, habitual use or physical or psychological dependency on cannabis occurred more than three years ago, the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use cannabis or any other narcotic, dangerous drug or psychoactive substance in the future and has demonstrated a stable life-style, with no indication of physical or psychological dependence.
2. For abuse other than cannabis alone. Use is considered cumulative and each separate substance must not be considered separately. (Use this to assess Disqualifying Factor 2).
a. Experimental abuse occurred more than 12 months ago, the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use any drugs or cannabis in the future and has successfully completed a drug rehabilitation program.
b. Occasional abuse occurred more than two years ago, the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use any drugs or cannabis in the future, has a stable lifestyle and satisfactory employment record and has successfully completed a drug rehabilitation program.
c. Frequent abuse occurred more than three years ago, the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use any drugs or cannabis in the future, has a stable lifestyle, including satisfactory employment record with no further indication of drug abuse, and has successfully completed a drug rehabilitation program.
d. Regular abuse occurred more than four years ago, the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use any drugs or cannabis in the future, has a stable lifestyle, including satisfactory employment record with no further indication of drug abuse, and has successfully completed a drug rehabilitation program.
e. Compulsive abuse occurred more than five years ago, the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use any drugs or cannabis in the future, has a stable lifestyle, including satisfactory employment record with no further indication of drug abuse, and has successfully completed a drug rehabilitation program.
3. Use this only to assess conduct under Disqualifying Factor 3.
a. Involvement in trafficking, cultivation, processing, manufacture, sale or distribution occurred more than five years ago, the individual has demonstrated an intent not to do so in the future, and has a stable lifestyle and satisfactory employment record and has not been involved in any other criminal activity.
b. Cultivation was for personnel use only, in a limited amount for a limited period and the individual has not been involved in similar activity or other criminal activity for more than three years and has demonstrated intent not to do so again in the future.
c. Illegal sale or distribution involved only the casual supply to friends of small amounts (not for profit or to finance a personal supply) and occurred on only a few occasions more than two years ago, and the individual has demonstrated an intent not to do so again in the future.
4. Use this only to assess conduct under Disqualifying Factor 4 in the corresponding subparagraphs.
a. No possession of drugs or other criminal activity in the last two years.
b. The individual has not possessed drugs in the last three years, has had no other criminal activity in the last three years and has demonstrated an intent not to be involved in such activity in the future.
c. The individual has not possessed drug paraphernalia used in processing, manufacture or distribution for the last five years, has had no other criminal activity in the last five years and has demonstrated an intent not to be involved in such activity in the future.
d. The individual has not possessed drug paraphernalia for personal use in the last year, has had no other criminal activity in the last two years and has demonstrated an intent not to be involved in such activity in the future.
1. Narcotic. Opium and opium derivatives or synthetic substitutes.
2. Dangerous Drug. Any of the nonnarcotic drugs which are habit forming or have a potential for abuse because of their stimulant, depressant or hallucinogenic effect.
3. Cannabis. The intoxicating products of the hemp plant, Cannabis Sativa, including but not limited to marijuana, hashish, and hashish oil.
Falsification
(See §154.7(o)).
Basis: Any knowing and willful falsification, cover-up, concealment, misrepresentation, or omission of a material fact from any written or oral statement, document, form or other representation or device used by the Department of Defense or any other Federal agency.
Disqualifying Factors (behavior falls within one or more of the following categories):
1. Deliberate omission, concealment, falsification or misrepresentation of relevant and material facts including, but not limited to information concerning arrests, drug abuse or treatment, alcohol abuse or treatment, treatment for mental or emotional disorders, bankruptcy, military service information, organizational affiliations, financial problems, employment, foreign travel, or foreign connections from any Personnel Security Questionnaire, Personal History Statement or similar form used by any Federal agency to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance or access eligibility, or award fiduciary responsibilities.
2. Deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning any of the relevant and material matters listed above to an investigator, employer, supervisor, security official or other official representative in connection with application for security clearance or access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties.
Mitigating Factors (circumstances which may mitigate disqualifying information):
1. The information was not relevant or material to reaching a security clearance or access determination.
2. The falsification was an isolated incident in the distant past (more than 5 years) and the individual subsequently had accurately provided correct information voluntarily during reapplication for clearance or access and there is no evidence of any other falsification misrepresentation or dishonest conduct by the individual.
3. The behavior was not willful.
4. The falsification was done unknowingly or without the individual's knowledge.
5. The individual made prompt, good faith efforts to correct the falsification before being confronted with the facts of falsification.
6. Omission of material fact was caused by or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of authorized personnel, provided the individual reasonably relied on such improper or inadequate advice in good faith, and when the requirement subsequently was made known to the individual, the previously omitted information was promptly and fully provided.
Refusal to Answer
(See §154.7(p)).
Basis: Failing or refusing to answer or to authorize others to answer questions or provide information required by a Congressional committee, court or agency in the course of an official inquiry whenever such answers or information concern relevant and material matters pertinent to an evaluation of the individual's trustworthiness, reliability and judgment.
Disqualifying Factors (behavior falls within one or more of the following categories):
1. Failure or refusal to provide full, frank and truthful answers or to authorize others to do so, in connection with any application for security clearance or access, to include required non-disclosure and security termination agreements.
2. Failure or refusal to provide appropriate investigative forms, including release forms, for use by investigators in obtaining information from medical institutions, agencies or personal physicians, therapists, psychologists, psychiatrists, counselors, rehabilitation treatment, agencies or personnel; from police or criminal agencies, probation agencies or officers, financial institutions, employers, Federal or State agencies, professional associations or any other organizations as required as part of an investigation for security clearance, access, appointment or assignment to sensitive duties.
3. Failure or refusal to authorize others to provide relevant and material information necessary to reach a security clearance determination.
4. Failure or refusal to answer questions or provide information required by a Congressional committee, court or agency when such answers or information concern relevant and material matters pertinent to evaluating the individual's trustworthiness, reliability and judgment.
Mitigating Factors (circumstances which may mitigate disqualifying information):
1. The individual was unable to provide the information despite good faith and reasonable efforts to do so.
2. The individual was unaware of the necessity to provide the information requested or of the possible consequences of such refusal or failure to provide the information, and, upon being made aware of this requirement, fully frankly and truthfully provided the requested information.
3. The individual sought and relied in good faith on information and advice from legal counsel or other officials that the individual was not required to provide the information requested, and, upon being made aware of the requirement, fully, frankly and truthfully provided the requested information.
Sexual Misconduct
(See §154.7(q)).
Basis: Acts of sexual misconduct or perversion indicative of moral turpitude, poor judgment, or lack of regard for the laws of society.
Disqualifying Factors (behavior falls within one or more of the following categories):
1. The conduct involves:
a. Acts performed or committed in open or public places.
b. Acts performed with a minor, or with animals.
c. Acts involving inducement, coercion, force, violence or intimidation of another person.
d. Prostitution, pandering or the commission of sexual acts for money or other remuneration or reward.
e. Sexual harassment.
f. Self mutilation, self punishment or degradation.
g. Conduct that involves spouse swapping, or group sex orgies.
h. Adultery that is recent, frequent and likely to continue and has an adverse effect on good order or discipline within the workplace (e.g., officer/enlisted, supervisor/subordinate, instructor/student).
i. Conduct determined to be criminal in the locale in which it occurred.
j. Deviant or perverted sexual behavior which may indicate a mental or personality disorder (e.g., transexualism, transvestism, exhibitionism, incest, child molestation, voyeurism, bestiality, or sodomy.)
2. The conduct has been recent.
3. The conduct increases the individual's vulnerability to blackmail, coercion or pressure.
4. Evidence that the applicant has intention or is likely to repeat the conduct in question.
Mitigating Factors (circumstances which may mitigate qualifying information):
1. Sexual misconduct occurred on an isolated basis during or preceding adolescence with no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature, and clear indication that the individual has no intention of participating in such conduct in the future.
2. Sexual misconduct was isolated, occurred more than 3 years ago, and there is clear indication that the individual has no intention of participating in such conduct in the future.
3. The individual was a minor or was the victim of force, or violence by another.
4. The individual has successfully completed professional therapy, has been rehabilitated and diagnosed by competent medical authority that misconduct is not likely to recur.
5. Demonstration that the individual's sexual misconduct can no longer form the basis for vulnerability to blackmail, coercion or pressure.
[52 FR 11219, Apr. 8, 1987, as amended at 58 FR 61026, Nov. 19, 1993] Appendix I to Part 154—Overseas Investigations
1. Purpose
The purpose of this appendix is to establish, within the framework of this part, 32 CFR part 361 and Defense Investigative Service Manual 20–1, standardized procedures for the military investigative agencies to follow when they perform administrative and investigative functions on behalf of DIS at overseas locations.
2. Type Investigation
This part describes in detail Background Investigations (BI) which are conducted for Limited Access Authorizations and those Special Investigative Inquiries conducted for post-adjudicative purposes. Hereafter they are referred to as LAA and Post-adjudicative cases and are briefly described in paragraphs a and b below:
a. Limited access authorization. A level of access to classified defense information that may be granted to a non-U.S. citizen under certain conditions, one of which is that a BI must have been completed with satisfactory results. §154.16(d) further describes LAA cases.
b. Post-adjudication investigation. A Personnel Security Investigation (PSI) predicated on new, adverse or questionable security, suitability or hostage information that arises and requires the application of investigation procedures subsequent to adjudicative action on a DoD-affiliated person's eligibility for continued access to classified information, assignment to or retention in sensitive duties or other designated duties requiring such investigation. While these cases are normally predicated on the surfacing of unfavorable information subsequent to favorable adjudication, they may also be opened when favorable information is offered to counter a previous unfavorable adjudication. §154.9(c)(3) further describes these cases.
3. General
a. As a rule, investigative activity in most PSIs occurs in the U.S. even when the Subject is at an overseas location. Therefore, the submission of requests for investigation to the Personnel Investigation Center (PIC) at Baltimore is a required procedure as it ensures uniform application of DoD PSI policy and the efficient dispatch and coordination of leads.
b. When the purpose of the investigation is for an LAA or post-adjudication on a Subject overseas, much, if not all of the leads are at an overseas location. While these cases also may be submitted directly to PIC for action, there is an inherent delay in the mailing of the request, the exchange of leads and reports with PIC, and transmittal of the reports back to the requester. To avoid this delay, the military investigative agencies, when acting for DIS overseas in accordance with 32 CFR part 361 may, with their Headquarters approval, accept these requests for investigations, initiate them and disseminate the results from the same level as they open, close, and disseminate their own cases. Usually this will greatly improve response time to the requester.
c. Under the procedures in paragraph b., above, DIS will not often be in a position to directly exercise its responsibility for control and direction until the case or lead is in progress or even completed; therefore, adherence to the policy stated in referenced documents, and as modified herein, is mandatory. When the policy of the military investigative agency is at variance with the above, the matter will be referred to the respective headquarters for resolution.
d. Since DIS is ultimately responsible for the personnel security product, it must be kept informed of all such matters referred to in this appendix. For instance, when the investigative agency overseas receives a DD Form 1879, Request for Personnel Security Investigation, which sets forth an issue outside DIS jurisdiction, it will reject the request, inform the requester of the reason and furnish an information copy of the DD Form 1879 and rejection letter to PIC. When the issue/jurisdiction is unclear to the investigative agency, the DD Form 1879 and the perceived jurisdictional question should be promptly forwarded to DIS for action and, if appropriate, to the component's headquarters for information. Questions on the interpretation of DIS or DoD policy and Directives pertaining to individual PSI cases can usually be resolved through direct communications with PIC.
e. 32 CFR part 361 establishes the supporting relationship of the military investigative agencies to DIS in overseas areas, and DIS provides these agencies with copies of relevant policy and interpretive guidance. For these reasons, the investigative agency vice the requester, is responsible for evaluating the request, processing it, collecting and evaluating the results within their jurisdiction for sufficiency, and forwarding the completed product to the appropriate activity.
f. The magnitude of operations at PIC requires that methods of handling LAA and post-adjudicative cases be consistent to the maximum extent possible. For this reason, the procedures for LAA cases are nearly identical to those for post-adjudicative cases. Briefly, the main exceptions are:
(1) The notification to PIC that a post-adjudication case has been opened will be by message, since an issue is present at the outset, whereas notification of an LAA case should normally be by mail.
(2) The scope of the LAA investigation is 10 years or since the person's 18th birthday, whichever is shortest, whereas the leads in a post-djudication case are limited to resolving the issue.
4. Jurisdiction
a. As set-forth in 32 CFR part 361 DIS is responsible for conducting all DoD PSIs in the 50 States, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, and will request the military departments to accomplish investigative requirements elsewhere. The military investigative agencies in overseas locations routinely respond to personnel security investigative leads for DIS.
b. DIS jurisdiction also includes investigation of subversive affiliations, suitability information, and hostage situations when such inquiries are required for personnel security purposes; however, jurisdiction will rest with the military investigative agencies, FBI and/or civil authorities as appropriate when the alleged subversion or suitability issue represents a violation of law or, in the case of a hostage situation, there is an indication that the person concerned is actually being pressured, coerced, or influenced by interests inimical to the United States, or that hostile intelligence is taking action specifically directed against that person. Specific policy guidance on the applicability of these procedures and the jurisdictional considerations are stated in §154.9.
5. Case Opening
a. A request for investigation must be submitted by using DD Form 1879 and accompanied by supporting documentation unless such documentation is not immediately available, or the obtaining of documentation would compromise a sensitive investigation. Upon receipt of the request, the military investigative component will identify the issue(s), scope the leads, and ensure that the proposed action is that which is authorized for DIS as delineated in this part, 32 CFR part 361 and Defense Investigative Service Manual 201–1.
b. Upon such determination, the Component will prepare an Action Lead Sheet (ALS) which fully identifies the Subject and the scope of the case, and specifies precisely the leads which each investigative component (including DIS/PIC when appropriate) is to conduct.
c. Case opening procedures described above are identical for LAA and post-adjudication cases except with respect to notification of case opening to PIC:
(1) Post-adjudication Cases. These cases, because they involve an issue, are potentially sensitive and must be examined as early as possible by PIC for conformity to the latest DoD policy. Accordingly, the initial notification to PIC of case openings will always be by message. The message will contain at a minimum:
(a) Full identification of the subject;
(b) A narrative describing the allegation/facts in sufficient detail to support opening of the case; and
(c) A brief listing of the leads that are planned.
The DD Form 1879 and supporting documents, along with the agency's ALS, should be subsequently mailed to PIC.
(2) LAA Cases. The notification to PIC of case opening will normally be accomplished by mailing the DD Form 1879, DD Form 398 (Personal History Statement), a copy of the ALS, and any other supporting documents to PIC. Message notification to PIC in LAA cases will only be required if there is a security or suitability issue apparent in the DD Form 1879 or supporting documents.
(d) Beyond initial actions necessary to test allegation for investigative merit and jurisdiction, no further investigative action should commence until the notification of case opening to PIC has been dispatched.
(e) PIC will promptly respond to the notification of case opening by mail or message specifying any qualifying remarks along with a summary of previously existing data. PIC will also provide a DIS case control number (CCN). This number must be used by all components on all case related paperwork/reports.
(The investigating agency may assign its unique service CCN for interim internal control; however, the case will be processed, referenced, and entered into the DCII by the DIS case control number.) The first five digits of the DIS CCN will be the Julian date of the case opening when received at DIS.
6. Case Processing
a. The expected completion time for leads in LAA cases is 50 calendar days and for post-adjudication cases, 30 days, as computed from the date of receipt of the request. If conditions preclude completion in this time period, a pending report of the results to date, along with an estimated date of completion will be submitted to PIC.
b. Copies of all ALSs will be furnished to PIC. In addition, PIC will be promptly notified of any significant change in the scope of the case, or the development of an investigative issue.
c. The procedures for implementing the Privacy Act in PSI cases are set in DIS Manual 20–1–M 1. Any other restrictions on the release of information imposed by an overseas source or by regulations of the country where the inquiry takes place will be clearly stated in the report.
d. The report format for these cases will be that used by the military investigative agency.
e. Investigative action outside the jurisdictional area of an investigative component office may be directed elsewhere by ALS as needed in accordance with that agency's procedures and within the following geographical considerations:
(1) Leads will be sent to PIC if the investigative action is in the United States, District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Bahama Islands, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the following islands in the Pacific: Wake, Midway, Kwajalin, Johnston, Carolines, Marshalls, and Eniwetok.
(2) Leads to areas not listed above may be dispatched to other units of the investigative agency or even to another military agency's field units if there is an agreement or memorandum of understanding that provides for such action. For case accountability purposes, copies of such “lateral” leads must be sent to the PIC.
(3) Leads that cannot be dispatched as described in paragraph (2) above, and those that must be sent to a non-DoD investigative agency should be sent to PIC for disposition.
f. The Defense Investigative Manual calls for obtaining PIC approval before conducting a Subject interview on a post-adjudicative investigation. To avoid the delay that compliance with this procedure would create, a military investigative component may conduct the interview provided:
(1) All other investigative leads have been completed and reviewed.
(2) The CCN has been received, signifying DIS concurrence with the appropriateness of the investigation.
(3) Contrary instructions have not been received from the PIC.
(4) The interview is limited to the resolution of the relevant issues disclosed by the investigation.
g. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs f.(1) through (4) of this Appendix, if time is of the essence due to imminent transfer of the subject, a subject interview may be conducted at the discretion of the investigative agency.
7. Case Responsibility LAA and PA
Paragraph 3, above, describes the advantages of timely handling which accrue when the military investigative components act for DIS overseas. These actions for DIS may, however, be limited by the component's staffing and resource limitations, especially since some cases require more administration and management than others. Post-adjudication case leads, for instance, will normally be within the geographical jurisdiction of the component that accepted the request for investigation; therefore, relatively little case management is required. In contrast, LAA cases may require leads world-wide, and, therefore, create more complex case management and administration, especially in the tracking, monitoring and reviewing of leads outside the component's geographical area. Accordingly, an investigative component will accept the case from the requester, but only assign itself the appropriate leads within its own geographical jurisdiction and send the balance to PIC for appropriate disposition in accordance with the following:
a. The investigative agency will accept the request for investigation (thereby saving time otherwise lost in mailing to PIC) but limit its involvement in case management by extracting only those leads it will conduct or manage locally.
b. The agency should then prepare an ALS that shows clearly what leads it will cover and send PIC a copy of this ALS, along with the request for investigation and any other appropriate documentation. It must be clear in the ALS that PIC is to act on all those leads that the unit has not assigned to itself.
c. PIC, as case manager, will assume responsibility for the complete investigative package and, upon receipt of the last lead, will send the results to the appropriate activity.
d. The agency that accepted the case and assigned itself leads may send a copy of its report to the activity in the “Results to” block at the same time it sends the originals to PIC. If so, the letter of transmittal must inform the recipient that these reports are only a portion of the investigation, and that the balance will be forthcoming from PIC. Similarly, PIC must be informed of which investigative reports were disseminated. (This is normally done by sending PIC a copy of the letter of transmittal.)
8. Scope
a. LAA. The scope of investigation is 10 years or from age 18, whichever is the shortest period.
b. Post-Adjudication Cases. There is no standard scope. The inquiries conducted will be limited to those necessary to resolve the issue(s).
9. Case Closing: LAA and PA
a. Whether the investigative component or PIC closes out an investigation, there are three key elements to consider:
(1) The investigative results must be reviewed for quality and conformance to policy.
(2) The results must be sent to the activity listed in the “Results to” block of the DD Form 1879.
(3) PIC must be informed whether or not any dissemination was made by the investigative agency and, if so, what reports were furnished.
b. Investigative results may also be sent to a requester or higher level activity that makes a statement of need for the results. In such instances, a copy of the letter requesting the results and the corresponding letter of transmittal must be sent to PIC for retention.
c. When an investigative agency disseminates reports for PIC, it may use the transmittal documents, letters, or cover sheets it customarily uses for its own cases.
d. The material that is to be provided to PIC will consist of: The originals of all reports, and all other case documentation such as original statements, confidential source sheets, interview logs, requests for investigation, letters of transmittal to adjudicaters/requesters, or communications with the requester, such as those that modify the scope of the investigation.
e. For DIS to fulfill its responsibilities under DoD 5220.22–R and the Privacy Act of 1974 all inquiries conducted in its behalf must be set forth in an ROI for the permanent file, whether the case is completed, terminated early, or referred to another agency.
10. Referral
A case may require premature closing at any time after receipt of the DD Form 1879 by the investigative component if the information accompanying the request, or that which is later developed, is outside DIS jurisdiction. For example, alleged violations of law, a counterintelligence matter, or actual coercion/influence in a hostage situation (see paragraph 4.b. of this Appendix ) must be referred to the appropriate agency, and DIS involvement terminated. The requester will be informed by letter or indorsement to the DD Form 1879 of the information developed that, due to jurisdictional consideration, the case was referred to (fill in appropriate address) and that the DIS case is closed. The agency to which referral was made and PIC will be furnished with the results of all investigations conducted under DIS auspices. DIS, however, has an interest in the referral agency's actions and no information should be solicited from that agency. Appendix J to Part 154—ADP Position Categories and Criteria for Designating Positions
OMB Circular A–71 (and Transmittal Memo #B1), July 1978 OMB Circular A–130, December 12, 1985, and FPM Letter 732, November 14, 1978 contain the criteria for designating positions under the existing categories used in the personnel security program for Federal civilian employees as well as the criteria for designating ADP and ADP related positions. This policy is outlined below:
ADP Position Categories
1. Critical-Sensitive Positions
ADP-I positions. Those positions in which the incumbent is responsible for the planning, direction, and implementation of a computer security program; major responsibility for the direction, planning and design of a computer system, including the hardware and software; or, can access a system during the operation or maintenance in such a way, and with a relatively high risk for causing grave damage, or realize a significant personal gain.
2. Noncritical-Sensitive Positions
ADP-II positions. Those positions in which the incumbent is responsible for the direction, planning, design, operation, or maintenance of a computer system, and whose work is technically reviewed by a higher authority of the ADP-I category to insure the integrity of the system.
3. Nonsensitive Positions
ADP-III positions. All other positions involved in computer activities.
In establishing the categories of positions, other factors may enter into the determination, permitting placement in higher or lower categories based on the agency's judgement as to the unique characteristics of the system or the safeguards protecting the system.
Criteria for Designating Positions
Three categories have been established for designating computer and computer-related positions—ADP-I, ADP-II, and ADP-III. Specific criteria for assigning positions to one of these categories is as follows:
|
