32 C.F.R. § 505.5 Exemptions.
Title 32 - National Defense
(a) Exempting systems of records. The Secretary of the Army may exempt Army systems of records from certain requirements of the Privacy Act. There are two kinds of exemptions: General and specific. The general exemption relieves systems of records from most requirements of the Act; the specific exemptions from only a few. See appendix C to this part. (b) General exemptions. Only Army activities actually engaged in the enforcement of criminal laws as their primary function may claim the general exemption. To qualify for this exemption, a system must consist of: (1) Information compiled to identify individual criminals and alleged criminals, which consists only of identifying data and arrest records; type and disposition of charges; sentencing, confinement, and release records; and parole and probation status; (2) Information compiled for the purpose of criminal investigation including efforts to prevent, reduce, or control crime and reports of informants and investigators associated with an identifiable individual; or (3) Reports identifiable to an individual, compile at any stage of the process of enforcement of the criminal laws, from arrest or indictment through release from supervision. (c) Specific exemptions. The Secretary of the Army has exempted all properly classified information and a few systems of records that have the following kinds of information, from certain parts of the Privacy Act. The Privacy Act exemption cite appears in parentheses after each category. (1) Classified information in every Army system of records. This exemption is not limited to the systems listed in Sec. 505.5(d). Before denying as individual access to classified information, the Access and Amendment Refusal Authority must make sure that it was properly classified under the standards of Executive Orders 11652, 12065, or 12958 and that it must remain so in the interest of national defense of foreign policy. (5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1).) (2) Investigatory data for law enforcement purposes (other than that claimed under the general exemption). However, if this information has been used to deny someone a right, privilege or benefit to which the individual is entitled by Federal law, it must be released, unless doing so would reveal the identity of a confidential source. (5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2).) (3) Records maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or other individuals protected pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C., section 3056. (5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(3).) (4) Statistical data required by statute and used only for statistical purposes and not to make decisions on the rights, benefits, or entitlements of individuals, except for census records which may be disclosed under Title 13 U.S.C., section 8. (5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(4).) (5) Data compiled to determine suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal service, Federal contracts, or access to classified information. This information may be withheld only to the extent that disclosure would reveal the identify of a confidential source. (5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5).) (6) Testing material used to determine if a person is qualified for appointment or promotion in the Federal service. This information may be withheld only if disclosure would compromise the objectivity or fairness of the examination process. (5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(6).) (7) Information to determine promotion potential in the Armed Forces. Information may be withheld, but only to the extent that disclosure would reveal the identity of a confidential source. (5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(7).) (d) Procedures. When a system manager seeks an exemption for a system of records, the following information will be furnished to the Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications and Computers, Washington, DC 20310–0107; applicable system notice, exemptions sought, and justification. After appropriate staffing and approval by the Secretary of the Army, a proposed rule will be published in the (e) Exempt Army records. The following records may be exempt from certain parts of the Privacy Act: (1) System identifier: A0020–1a SAIG (i) System name: Inspector General Records. (ii) Exemptions: (A) Investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2). However, if an individual is denied any right, privilege, or benefit for which he would otherwise be entitled by Federal law or for which he would otherwise be eligible, as a result of the maintenance of such information, the individual will be provided access to such information except to the extent that disclosure would reveal the identity of a confidential source. (B) Investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for federal civilian employment, military service, federal contracts, or access to classified information may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5), but only to the extent that such material would reveal the identity of a confidential source. (C) Therefore, portions of the system of records may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I), and (f). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2) and (k)(5). (iv) Reason: (A) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of the disclosure accounting, for disclosures pursuant to the routine uses published for this system, would permit the subject of a criminal investigation or matter under investigation to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation which will present a serious impediment to law enforcement. (B) From subsection (d) because access to the records contained in this system would inform the subject of a criminal investigation of the existence of that investigation, provide the subject of the investigation with information that might enable him to avoid detection or apprehension, and would present a serious impediment to law enforcement. (C) From subsection (e)(1) because in the course of criminal investigations information is often obtained concerning the violations of laws or civil obligations of others not relating to an active case or matter. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary that this valuable information is retained since it can aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide valuable leads for other agencies and future cases that may be brought. (D) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (e)(4)(H) because this system of records is exempt from individual access pursuant to subsection (k)(2) of the Privacy Act of 1974. (E) From subsection (e)(4)(I) because of the identity of specific sources must be withheld in order to protect the confidentiality of the sources of criminal and other law enforcement information. This exemption is further necessary to protect the privacy and physical safety of witnesses and informants. (F) From subsection (f) because this system of records has been exempted from the access provisions of subsection (d). (G) Consistent with the legislative purpose of the Privacy Act of 1974, the Department of the Army will grant access to nonexempt material in the records being maintained. Disclosure will be governed by the Department of the Army's Privacy Regulation, but will be limited to the extent that the identity of confidential sources will not be compromised; subjects of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal violation will not be alerted to the investigation; the physical safety of witnesses, informants and law enforcement personnel will not be endangered, the privacy of third parties will not be violated; and that the disclosure would not otherwise impede effective law enforcement. Whenever possible, information of this nature will be deleted from the requested documents and the balance made available. The controlling principle behind this limited access is to allow disclosures except those indicated in this paragraph. The decisions to release information from these systems will be made on a case-by-case basis. (2) [Reserved] (3) A0025–55 TAPC. (i) System name: Freedom of Information Act Program Files. (ii) Exemption: During the processing of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests exempt materials from other systems of records may in turn become part of the case record in this system. To the extent that copies of exempt records from those “other” systems of records are entered into this system, the Department of the Army claims the same exemptions for the records from those “other” systems that are entered into this system, as claimed for the original primary system of which they are a part. (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(1), (k)(2), (k)(3), (k)(4), (k)(5), (k)(6), and (k)(7). (iv) Reasons: Records are only exempt from pertinent provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a to the extent such provisions have been identified and an exemption claimed for the original record and the purposes underlying the exemption for the original record still pertain to the record which is now contained in this system of records. In general, the exemptions were claimed in order to protect properly classified information relating to national defense and foreign policy, to avoid interference during the conduct of criminal, civil, or administrative actions or investigations, to ensure protective services provided the President and others are not compromised, to protect the identity of confidential sources incident to Federal employment, military service, contract, and security clearance determinations, to preserve the confidentiality and integrity of Federal testing materials, and to safeguard evaluation materials used for military promotions when furnished by a confidential source. The exemption rule for the original records will identify the specific reasons why the records are exempt from specific provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a. (4) A0027–1DAJA. (i) System name: General Legal Files. (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), (k)(5), (k)(6), and (k)(7) may be exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), and (f). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), (k)(5), (k)(6), and (k)(7). (iv) Reasons: Various records from other exempted systems of records are sometimes submitted for legal review or other action. A copy of such records may be permanently incorporated into the General Legal Files system of records as evidence of the facts upon which a legal opinion or review was based. Exemption of the General Legal Files system of records is necessary in order to ensure that such records continue to receive the same protection afforded them by exemptions granted to the systems of records in which they were originally filed. (5) System identifier: A0027–10a DAJA (i) System name: Prosecutorial Files. (ii) Exemptions: Parts of this system may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) if the information is compiled and maintained by a component of the agency which performs as its principle function any activity pertaining to the enforcement of criminal laws. Therefore, portions of the system of records may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(1), (e)(2), (e) (3), (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f), and (g). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). (iv) Reason: (A) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of the disclosure accounting, for disclosures pursuant to the routine uses published for this system, would permit the subject of a criminal investigation or matter under investigation to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation which will present a serious impediment to law enforcement. (B) From subsection (c)(4) because an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d), this subsection will not be applicable. (C) From subsection (d) because access to the records contained in this system would inform the subject of a criminal investigation of the existence of that investigation, provide the subject of the investigation with information that might enable him to avoid detection or apprehension, and would present a serious impediment to law enforcement. (D) From subsection (e)(1) because in the course of criminal investigations information is often obtained concerning the violation of laws or civil obligations of others not relating to an active case or matter. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary that this valuable information be retained since it can aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide valuable leads for other agencies and future cases that may be brought. (E) From subsection (e)(2) because in a criminal investigation the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent possible from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that the subject of the investigation would be placed on notice of the existence of the investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection. (F) From subsection (e)(3) because the requirement that individuals supplying information be provided with a form stating the requirements of subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation, reveal the identity of confidential sources of information and endanger the life and physical safety of confidential informants. (G) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) because this system of records is exempt from individual access pursuant to subsection (j)(2) of the Privacy Act of 1974. (H) From subsection (e)(4)(I) because the identity of specific sources must be withheld in order to protect the confidentiality of the sources of criminal and other law enforcement information. This exemption is further necessary to protect the privacy and physical safety of witnesses and informants. (I) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light and the accuracy of such information can only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions of subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability of trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment reporting on investigations and impede the development of intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement. (J) From subsection (e)(8) because the individual notice requirements of subsection (e)(8) could present a serious impediment to law enforcement as this could interfere with the ability to issue search authorizations and could reveal investigative techniques and procedures. (K) From subsection (f) because this system of records has been exempted from the access provisions of subsection (d). (L) From subsection (g) because this system of records is compiled for law enforcement purposes and has been exempted from the access provisions of subsections (d) and (f). (M) Consistent with the legislative purpose of the Privacy Act of 1974, the Department of the Army will grant access to nonexempt material in the records being maintained. Disclosure will be governed by the Department of the Army's Privacy Regulation (this part 505), but will be limited to the extent that the identity of confidential sources will not be compromised; subjects of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal violation will not be alerted to the investigation; the physical safety of witnesses, informants and law enforcement personnel will not be endangered, the privacy of third parties will not be violated; and that the disclosure would not otherwise impede effective law enforcement. Whenever possible, information of this nature will be deleted from the requested documents and the balance made available. The controlling principle behind this limited access is to allow disclosures except those indicated in this paragraph. The decisions to release information from these systems will be made on a case-by-case basis. (6) System identifier: A0027–10b DAJA (i) System name: Courts-Martial Records and Reviews. (ii) Exemptions: Parts of this system may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) if the information is compiled and maintained by a component of the agency which performs as its principle function any activity pertaining to the enforcement of criminal laws. Therefore, portions of this system of records may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) from the following subsection of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f), and (g). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). (iv) Reason: (A) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of the disclosure accounting, for disclosures pursuant to the routine uses published for this system, would permit the subject of a criminal investigation or matter under investigation to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation which will present a serious impediment to law enforcement. (B) From subsection (c)(4) because an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d), this subsection will not be applicable. (C) From subsection (d) because access to the records contained in this system would inform the subject of a criminal investigation of the existence of that investigation, provide the subject of the investigation with information that might enable him to avoid detection or apprehension, and would present a serious impediment to law enforcement. (D) From subsection (e)(1) because in the course of criminal investigations information is often obtained concerning the violation of laws or civil obligations of others not relating to an active case or matter. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary that this information be retained since it can aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide valuable leads for other agencies and future cases that may be brought. (E) From subsection (e)(2) because in a criminal investigation the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent possible from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that the subject of the investigation would be placed on notice of the existence of the investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection. (F) From subsection (e)(3) because the requirement that individuals supplying information be provided with a form stating the requirements of subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation, reveal the identity of confidential sources of information and endanger the life and physical safety of confidential informants. (G) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) because this system of records is exempt from individual access pursuant to subsection (j)(2) of the Privacy Act of 1974. (H) From subsection (e)(4)(I) because the identity of specific sources must be withheld in order to protect the confidentiality of the sources of criminal and other law enforcement information. This exemption is further necessary to protect the privacy and physical safety of witnesses and informants. (I) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light and the accuracy of such information can only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions of subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability of trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in reporting on investigations and impede the development of intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement. (J) From subsection (e)(8) because the individual notice requirements of subsection (e)(8) could present a serious impediment to law enforcement as this could interfere with the ability to issue search authorizations and could reveal investigative techniques and procedures. (K) From subsection (f) because this system of records has been exempted from the access provisions of subsection (d). (L) From subsection (g) because this system of records is compiled for law enforcement purposes and has been exempted from the access provisions of subsections (d) and (f). (M) Consistent with the legislative purpose of the Privacy Act of 1974, the Department of the Army will grant access to nonexempt material in the records being maintained. Disclosure will be governed by the Department of the Army's Privacy Regulation (this part 505), but will be limited to the extent that the identity of confidential sources will not be compromised; subjects of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal violation will not be alerted to the investigation; the physical safety of witnesses, informants and law enforcement personnel will not be endangered, the privacy of third parties will not be violated; and that the disclosure would not otherwise impede effective law enforcement. Whenever possible, information of this nature will be deleted from the requested documents and the balance made available. The controlling principle behind this limited access is to allow disclosures except those indicated in this paragraph. The decisions to release information from these systems will be made on a case-by-case basis. (7) A0190–5DAMO. (i) System name: Vehicle Registration System (VRS). (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) may be exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(8), (f), and (g). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsections (c)(4), (d), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (f) and (g) because granting individuals access to information collected and maintained by this component relating to the enforcement of laws could interfere with proper investigations and the orderly administration of justice. Disclosure of this information could result in the concealment, alteration or destruction of evidence, the identification of offenders or alleged offenders, nature and disposition of charges; and jeopardize the safety and well-being of informants, witnesses and their families, and law enforcement personnel and their families. Disclosure of this information could also reveal and render ineffectual investigative techniques, sources and methods used by this component, and could result in the invasion of the privacy of individuals only incidentally related to an investigation. Exemption from access necessarily includes exemption from other requirements. (B) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of accounting of disclosure would place the subject of an investigation on notice that he is under investigation and provide him with significant information concerning the nature of the investigation, thus resulting in a serious impediment to law enforcement investigations. (C) From subsection (e)(2) because in a criminal or other law enforcement investigation, the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent practicable from the subject individual would alert the subject as to the nature or existence of the investigation and thereby present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement. (D) From subsection (e)(3) because compliance would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation or reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants. (E) From subsection (e)(8) because compliance with this provision would provide an impediment to law enforcement by interfering with the ability to issue warrants or subpoenas and by revealing investigative techniques, procedures or evidence. (8) A0190–9DAMO. (i) System name: Absentee Case Files. (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) may be exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(8), (f), and (g). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsection (c)(4), (d), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (f) and (g) because granting individuals access to information collected and maintained by this component relating to the enforcement of laws could interfere with proper investigations and the orderly administration of justice. Disclosure of this information could result in the concealment, alteration or destruction of evidence, the identification of offenders or alleged offenders, nature and disposition of charges; and jeopardize the safety and well-being of informants, witnesses and their families, and law enforcement personnel and their families. Disclosure of this information could also reveal and render ineffectual investigative techniques, sources and methods used by this component, and could result in the invasion of the privacy of individuals only incidentally related to an investigation. Exemption from access necessarily includes exemption from other requirements. (B) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of accounting of disclosure would place the subject of an investigation on notice that he is under investigation and provide him with significant information concerning the nature of the investigation, thus resulting in a serious impediment to law enforcement investigations. (C) From subsection (e)(2) because in a criminal or other law enforcement investigation, the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent practicable from the subject individual would alert the subject as to the nature or existence of the investigation and thereby present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement. (D) From subsection (e)(3) because compliance would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation or reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants. (E) From subsection (e)(8) because compliance with this provision would provide an impediment to law enforcement by interfering with the ability to issue warrants or subpoenas and by revealing investigative techniques, procedures or evidence. (9) A0190–14DAMO. (i) System name: Registration and Permit Files. (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2) may be exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2). (iv) Reasons: From subsection (c)(3) because the release of accounting of disclosures would place the subject of an investigation on notice that he or she is under investigation and provide him or her with significant information concerning the nature of the investigation thus resulting in a serious impediment to criminal law enforcement investigations, activities or the compromise of properly classified material. (10) A0190–30DAMO. (i) System name: Military Police Investigator Certification Files. (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), (k)(5), and (k)(7) may be exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), (k)(5) and (k)(7). (iv) Reasons: From subsections (d), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f) because disclosure of portions of the information in this system of records would seriously impair selection and management of these uniquely functioning individuals; hamper the inclusion of comments, reports and evaluations concerning the performance, qualifications, character, actions, and propensities of the agency; and prematurely compromise investigations which either concern the conduct of the agent himself or herself, or investigations wherein he or she is integrally or only peripherally involved. Additionally, the exemption from access necessarily includes exemptions from the amendment and the agency procedures that would otherwise be required to process these types of requests. (11) A0190–40DAMO. (i) System name: Serious Incident Reporting Files. (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) may be exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(8), (f), and (g). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsection (c)(4), (d), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (f) and (g) because granting individuals access to information collected and maintained by this component relating to the enforcement of laws could interfere with proper investigations and the orderly administration of justice. Disclosure of this information could result in the concealment, alteration or destruction of evidence, the identification of offenders or alleged offenders, nature and disposition of charges, and jeopardize the safety and well-being of informants, witnesses and their families, and law enforcement personnel and their families. Disclosure of this information could also reveal and render ineffectual investigative techniques, sources, and methods used by this component, and could result in the invasion of the privacy of individuals only incidentally related to an investigation. Exemption from access necessarily includes exemption from the other requirements. (B) From subsection (c)(3) because of the release of accounting of disclosure would place the subject of an investigation on notice that he is under investigation and provide him with significant information concerning the nature of the investigation, thus resulting in a serious impediment to law enforcement investigations. (C) From subsection (e)(2) because in a criminal or other law enforcement investigation, they require that information be collected to the greatest extent practicable from the subject individual would alert the subject as to the nature or existence of the investigation and thereby present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement. (D) From subsection (e)(3) because compliance would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation or reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants. (E) From subsection (e)(8) because compliance with this provision would provide an impediment to law enforcement by interfering with the ability to issue warrants or subpoenas and be revealing investigative techniques, procedures or evidence. (12) System identifier: A0190–45 DAMO (i) System name: Offense Reporting System (ORS) (ii) Exemptions: Parts of this system may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) if the information is compiled and maintained by a component of the agency which performs as its principle function any activity pertaining to the enforcement of criminal laws. Therefore, portions of the system of records may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f), and (g). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). (iv) Reason: (A) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of the disclosure accounting, for disclosures pursuant to the routine uses published for this system, would permit the subject of a criminal investigation or matter under investigation to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation which will present a serious impediment to law enforcement. (B) From subsection (c)(4) because an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d), this subsection will not be applicable. (C) From subsection (d) because access to the records contained in this system would inform the subject of a criminal investigation of the existence of that investigation, provide the subject of the investigation with information that might enable him to avoid detection or apprehension, and would present a serious impediment to law enforcement. (D) From subsection (e)(1) because in the course of criminal investigations information is often obtained concerning the violation of laws or civil obligations of others not relating to an active case or matter. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary that this valuable information be retained since it can aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide valuable leads for other agencies and future cases that may be brought. (E) From subsection (e)(2) because in a criminal investigation the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent possible from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that the subject of the investigation would be placed on notice of the existence of the investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection. (F) From subsection (e)(3) because the requirement that individuals supplying information be provided with a form stating the requirements of subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation, reveal the identity of confidential sources of information and endanger the life and physical safety of confidential informants. (G) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) because this system of records is exempt from individual access pursuant to subsection (j)(2) of the Privacy Act of 1974. (H) From subsection (e)(4)(I) because the identity of specific sources must be withheld in order to protect the confidentiality of the sources of criminal and other law enforcement information. This exemption is further necessary to protect the privacy and physical safety of witnesses and informants. (I) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light and the accuracy of such information can only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions of subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability of trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment reporting on investigations and impede the development of intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement. (J) From subsection (e)(8) because the individual notice requirements of subsection (e)(8) could present a serious impediment to law enforcement as this could interfere with the ability to issue search authorizations and could reveal investigative techniques and procedures. (K) From subsection (f) because this system of records has been exempted from the access provisions of subsection (d). (L) From subsection (g) because this system of records is compiled for law enforcement purposes and has been exempted from the access provisions of subsections (d) and (f). (M) Consistent with the legislative purpose of the Privacy Act of 1974, the Department of the Army will grant access to nonexempt material in the records being maintained. Disclosure will be governed by the Department of the Army's Privacy Regulation, but will be limited to the extent that the identity of confidential sources will not be compromised; subjects of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal violation will not be alerted to the investigation; the physical safety of witnesses, informants and law enforcement personnel will not be endangered, the privacy of third parties will not be violated; and that the disclosure would not otherwise impede effective law enforcement. Whenever possible, information of the above nature will be deleted from the requested documents and the balance made available. The controlling principle behind this limited access is to allow disclosures except those indicated above. The decisions to release information from these systems will be made on a case-by-case basis. (13) System identifier: A0190-47 DAMO. (i) System name: Correctional Reporting System (CRS). (ii) Exemption. Parts of this system may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) if the information is compiled and maintained by a component of the agency which performs as its principle function any activity pertaining to the enforcement of criminal laws. All portions of this system of records which fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) may be exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f), and (g). Consistent with the legislative purpose of the Privacy Act of 1974, the Department of the Army will grant access to nonexempt material in the records being maintained. Disclosure will be governed by the Department of the Army's Privacy Regulation, but will be limited to the extent that the identity of confidential sources will not be compromised; subjects of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal violation will not be alerted to the investigation; the physical safety of witnesses, informants and law enforcement personnel will not be endangered, the privacy of third parties will not be violated; and that the disclosure would not otherwise impede effective law enforcement. Whenever possible, information of the above nature will be deleted from the requested documents and the balance made available. The controlling principle behind this limited access is to allow disclosures except those indicated above. The decisions to release information from these systems will be made on a case-by-case basis necessary for effective law enforcement. (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of the disclosure accounting, or disclosures pursuant to the routine uses published for this system, would permit the subject of a criminal investigation or matter under investigation to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation which will present a serious impediment to law enforcement. (B) From subsection (c)(4) because an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d), this subsection will not be applicable. (C) From subsection (d) because access to the records contained in this system would inform the subject of a criminal investigation of the existence of that investigation, provide the subject of the investigation with information that might enable him to avoid detection or apprehension, and would present a serious impediment to law enforcement. (D) From subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation, reveal the identity of confidential sources of information and endanger the life and physical safety of confidential informants. (E) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) because this system of records is exempt from individual access pursuant to subsections (j)(2) of the Privacy Act of 1974. (F) From subsection (e)(4)(I) because the identity of specific sources must be withheld in order to protect the confidentiality of the sources of criminal and other law enforcement information. This exemption is further necessary to protect the privacy and physical safety of witnesses and informants. (G) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light and the accuracy of such information can only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions of subsection (e) (5) would restrict the ability of trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment reporting on investigations and impede the development of intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement. (H) From subsection (e)(8) because the individual notice requirements of subsection (e)(8) could present a serious impediment to law enforcement as this could interfere with the ability to issue search authorizations and could reveal investigative techniques and procedures. (I) From subsection (f) because this system of records has been exempted from the access provisions of subsection (d). (J) From subsection (g) because this system of records compiled for lawenforcement purposes and has been exempted from the access provisions of subsections (d) and (f). (14) A0195–2aUSACIDC. (i) System name: Source Register. (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) may be exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f), and (g). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsection (c)(3) because release of accounting of disclosures would provide the informant with significant information concerning the nature of a particular investigation, the internal methods and techniques involved in criminal investigation, and the investigative agencies (state, local or foreign) involved in a particular case resulting in a serious compromise of the criminal law enforcement processes. (B) From subsection (c)(4), (d), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (f), and (g) because disclosure of portions of the information in this system of records would seriously impair the prudent and efficient handling of these uniquely functioning individuals; hamper the inclusion of comments and evaluations concerning the performance qualification, character, identity, and propensities of the informant; and prematurely compromise criminal investigations which either concern the conduct of the informant himself or investigations wherein he/she is intergrally or only peripherally involved. Additionally, the exemption from access necessarily includes exemption from amendment, certain agency requirements relating to access and amendment of records and civil liability predicated upon agency compliance with specific provisions of the Privacy Act. (C) From subsection (d), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f) are also necessary to protect the security of information properly classified in the interest of national defense and foreign policy. (D) From subsection (e)(1) because the nature of the criminal investigative function creates unique problems in prescribing what information concerning informants is relevant or necessary. Due to close liaison and existing relationships with other Federal, state, local and foreign law enforcement agencies, information about informants may be received which may relate to a case then under the investigative jurisdiction of another Government agency but it is necessary to maintain this information in order to provide leads for appropriate law enforcement purposes and to establish patterns of activity which may relate to the jurisdiction of both the USACIDC and other agencies. Additionally, the failure to maintain all known information about informants could affect the effective utilization of the individual and substantially increase the operational hazards incumbent in the employment of an informant in very compromising and sensitive situations. (E) From subsection (e)(2) because collecting information from the information would potentially thwart both the crminal investigtive process and the required management control over these individuals by appraising the informant of investigations or management actions concerning his involvement in criminal activity or with USACIDC personnel. (F) From subsection (e)(3) because supplying an informant with a form containing the information specified could result in the compromise of an investigation, tend to inhibit the cooperation of the informant, and render ineffectual investigative techniques and methods utilized by USACIDC in the performance of its criminal law enforcement duties. (G) From subsection (e)(5) because this requirement would unduly hamper the criminal investigative process due to type of records maintained and necessity for rapid information retrieval and dissemination. Also, in the collection of information about informants, it is impossible to determine what information is then accurate, relevant, timely and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrevelant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation or contact brings new details to light. In the criminal investigative process, accuracy and relevance of information concerning informants can only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability of trained investigators to exercise their judgment in reporting information relating to informant's actions and would impede the development of criminal intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement. (H) From subsection (e)(8) because the notice requirements of this provision could present a serious impediment to criminal law enforcement by revealing investigative techniques, procedures, and the existence of confidential investigations. (15)A0195–2bUSACIDC. (i) System name: Criminal Investigation and Crime Laboratory Files. (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) may be exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f), and (g). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552(j)(2). (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of accounting of disclosures would place the subject of an investigation on notice that he is under investigation and provide him with significant information concerning coordinated investigative effort and techniques and the nature of the investigation, resulting in a serious impediment to criminal law enforcement activities or the compromise of properly classified material. (B) From subsections (c)(4), (d), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (f), and (g) because access might compromise on-going investigations, reveal classified information, investigatory techniques or the identity of confidential informants, or invade the privacy of persons who provide information in connection with a particular investigation. The exemption from access necessarily includes exemption from amendment, certain agency requirements relating to access and amendment of records, and civil liability predicated upon agency compliance with those specific provisions of the Privacy Act. The exemption from access necessarily includes exemption from other requirements. (C) From subsection (e)(1) because the nature of the investigative function creates unique problems in prescribed specific perimeters in a particular case as to what information is relevant or necessary. Also, due to close liaisons and working relationships with other Federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies, information may be received which may relate to a case then under the investigative jurisdiction of another Government agency but it is necessary to maintain this information in order to provide leads for appropriate law enforcement purposes and to establish patterns of activity which may relate to the jurisdiction of both the USACIDC and other agencies. (D) From subsection (e)(2) because collecting information from the subject of criminal investigations would thwart the investigative process by placing the subject of the investigation on notice thereof. (E) From subsection (e)(3) because supplying an individual with a form containing the information specified could result in the compromise of an investigation, tend to inhibit the cooperation of the individual queried, and render ineffectual investigation techniques and methods utilized by USACIDC in the performance of their criminal law enforcement duties. (F) From subsection (e)(5) because this requirment would unduly hamper the criminal investigative process due to the great volume of records maintained and the necessity for rapid information retrieval and dissemination. Also, in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it is impossible to determine what information is then accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light. In the criminal investigation process, accuracy and relevance of information can only be determine in a court of law. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability of trained investigators to exercise their judgment in reporting on investigations and impede the development of criminal intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement. (G) From subsection (e)(8) because the notice requirements of this provision could present a serious impediment to criminal law enforcement by revealing investigative techniques, procedures, and the existence of confidential investigations. (16) A0195–6USACIDC. (i) System name: Criminal Investigation Accreditation and Polygraph Examiner Evaluation Files. (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), (k)(5), or (k)(7) may be exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), (k)(5), and (k)(7). (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsections (d), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f) because disclosure of portions of the information in this system of records would seriously impair the selection and management of these uniquely functioning individuals; hamper the inclusion of comments, reports and evaluations concerning the performance, qualifications, character, action and propensities of the agent; and prematurely compromise investigations with either concern the conduct of the agent himself or investigations wherein he or she is integrally or only peripherally involved. Additionally, the exemption from access necessarily includes exemptions from the amendment and the agency procedures which would otherwise be required to process these types of requests. (B) From subsection (e)(1) because the failure to maintain all known information about agents could affect the effective utilization of the individual and substantially increase the operational hazards incumbent in the employment of agents in very compromising and sensitive situations. (17) A0210–7DAMO. (i) System name: Expelled or Barred Person Files. (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) may be exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(8), (f), and (g). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsection (c)(4), (d), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (f) and (g) because granting individuals access to information collected and maintained by this component relating to the enforcement of laws could interfere with proper investigations and the orderly administration of justice. Disclosure of this information could result in the concealment, alteration or destruction of evidence, the identification of offenders or alleged offenders, nature and disposition of charges, and jeopardize the safety and well-being of informants, witnesses and their families, and law enforcement personnel and their families. Disclosure of this information could also reveal and render ineffectual investigative techniques, sources, and methods used by this component, and could result in the invasion of the privacy of individuals only incidentally related to an investigation. Exemption from access necessarily includes exemption from the other requirements. (B) From subsection (c)(3) because of the release of accounting of disclosure would place the subject of an investigation on notice that he is under investigation and provide him with significant information concerning the nature of the investigation, thus resulting in a serious impediment to law enforcement investigations. (C) From subsection (e)(2) because in a criminal or other law enforcement investigation, they require that information be collected to the greatest extent practicable from the subject individual would alert the subject as to the nature or existence of the investigation and thereby present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement. (D) From subsection (e)(3) because compliance would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation or reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants. (E) From subsection (e)(8) because compliance with this provision would provide an impediment to law enforcement by interfering with the ability to issue warrants or subpoenas and be revealing investigative techniques, procedures or evidence. (18) System identifier: A0025 JDIM (i) System name: HQDA Correspondence and Control/Central Files System. (ii) Exemptions: Documents within this system of records are generated by other elements of the Department of the Army or are received from other agencies and individuals. Because of the broad scope of the contents of this system of records, and since the introduction of documents is largely unregulatable, specific portions or documents that may require an exemption can not be predetermined. Therefore, and to the extent that such material is received and maintained, selected individual documents may be exempt. (A) Information specifically authorized to be classified under E.O. 12958, as implemented by DoD 5200.1–R, may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1). (B) Investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2). However, if an individual is denied any right, privilege, or benefit for which he would otherwise be entitled by Federal law or for which he would otherwise be eligible, as a result of the maintenance of such information, the individual will be provided access to such information except to the extent that disclosure would reveal the identity of a confidential source. (C) Records maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President and other individuals under 18 U.S.C. 3506, may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(3). (D) Records maintained solely for statistical research or program evaluation purposes and which are not used to make decisions on the rights, benefits, or entitlement of an individual except for census records which may be disclosed under 13 U.S.C. 8, may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(4). (E) Investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for federal civilian employment, military service, federal contracts, or access to classified information may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5), but only to the extent that such material would reveal the identity of a confidential source. (F) Testing or examination material used solely to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in the Federal service may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(6), if the disclosure would compromise the objectivity or fairness of the test or examination process. (G) Evaluation material used to determine potential for promotion in the Military Services may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(7), but only to the extent that the disclosure of such material would reveal the identity of a confidential source. (H) Portions of this system of records may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a (k)(1) through (k)(7) from subsections (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G) and (H), and (f). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) through (k)(7). (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of the disclosure accounting could alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the investigation and the fact that they are subjects of the investigation. It could permit the subject of an investigation or matter under investigation to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation which will present a serious impediment to law enforcement. (B) From subsection (d) because access to the records contained in this system would inform the subject of an investigation of the existence of that investigation, provide the subject of the investigation with information that might enable him to avoid detection of apprehension, and would present a serious impediment to law enforcement. (C) From subsection (e)(1) because in the course of criminal investigations information is often obtained concerning the violation of laws or civil obligations of others not relating to active case or matter. In the interest of effective law enforcement, it is necessary that this information be retained since it can aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide valuable leads for other agencies and future cases that may be brought. (D) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) because this system of records is exempt from individual access pursuant to subsections (k)(2) of the Privacy Act of 1974. (E) From subsection (f) because this system of records has been exempted from the access provisions of subsection (d). (19) System identifier: A0340–21 TAPC (i) System name: Privacy Case Files. (ii) Exemption: During the processing of a Privacy Act request (which may include access requests, amendment requests, and requests for review for initial denials of such requests), exempt materials from other systems of records may in turn become part of the case record in this system. To the extent that copies of exempt records from those ‘other’ systems of records are entered into this system, the Department of the Army hereby claims the same exemptions for the records from those ‘other’ systems that are entered into this system, as claimed for the original primary system of which they are a part. (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(1), (k)(2), (k)(3), (k)(4), (k)(5), (k)(6), and (k)(7). (iv) Records are only exempt from pertinent provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a to the extent such provisions have been identified and an exemption claimed for the original record and the purposes underlying the exemption for the original record still pertain to the record which is now contained in this system of records. In general, the exemptions were claimed in order to protect properly classified information relating to national defense and foreign policy, to avoid interference during the conduct of criminal, civil, or administrative actions or investigations, to ensure protective services provided the President and others are not compromised, to protect the identity of confidential sources incident to Federal employment, military service, contract, and security clearance determinations, and to preserve the confidentiality and integrity of Federal evaluation materials. The exemption rule for the original records will identify the specific reasons why the records are exempt from specific provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a. (20) System identifier and name: A0195–2c USACIDC DoD, DoD Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF) Files. (i) Exemption: Parts of this system may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) if the information is compiled and maintained by a component of the agency, which performs as its principle function any activity pertaining to the enforcement of criminal laws. Any portion of this system of records which falls within the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) may be exempt from the following subsections of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f), and (g). (ii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). (iii) Reasons: (A) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of accounting of disclosure would inform a subject that he or she is under investigation. This information would provide considerable advantage to the subject in providing him or her with knowledge concerning the nature of the investigation and the coordinated investigative efforts and techniques employed by the cooperating agencies. This would greatly impede criminal law enforcement. (B) From subsection (c)(4) and (d), because notification would alert a subject to the fact that an open investigation on that individual is taking place, and might weaken the on-going investigation, reveal investigative techniques, and place confidential informants in jeopardy. (C) From subsection (e)(1) because the nature of the criminal and/or civil investigative function creates unique problems in prescribing a specific parameter in a particular case with respect to what information is relevant or necessary. Also, information may be received which may relate to a case under the investigative jurisdiction of another agency. The maintenance of this information may be necessary to provide leads for appropriate law enforcement purposes and to establish patterns of activity that may relate to the jurisdiction of other cooperating agencies. (D) From subsection (e)(2) because collecting information to the fullest extent possible directly from the subject individual may or may not be practical in a criminal and/or civil investigation. (E) From subsection (e)(3) because supplying an individual with a form containing a Privacy Act Statement would tend to inhibit cooperation by many individuals involved in a criminal and/or civil investigation. The effect would be somewhat adverse to established investigative methods and techniques. (F) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) because this system of records is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d). (G) From subsection (e)(5) because the requirement that records be maintained with attention to accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness would unfairly hamper the investigative process. It is the nature of law enforcement for investigations to uncover the commission of illegal acts at diverse stages. It is frequently impossible to determine initially what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and least of all complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light. (H) From subsection (e)(8) because the notice requirements of this provision could present a serious impediment to law enforcement by revealing investigative techniques, procedures, and existence of confidential investigations. (I) From subsection (f) because the agency's rules are inapplicable to those portions of the system that are exempt and would place the burden on the agency of either confirming or denying the existence of a record pertaining to a requesting individual might in itself provide an answer to that individual relating to an on-going investigation. The conduct of a successful investigation leading to the indictment of a criminal offender precludes the applicability of established agency rules relating to verification of record, disclosure of the record to that individual, and record amendment procedures for this record system. (J) From subsection (g) because this system of records should be exempt to the extent that the civil remedies relate to provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a from which this rule exempts the system. (K) Consistent with the legislative purpose of the Privacy Act of 1974, the Department of the Army will grant access to nonexempt material in the records being maintained. Disclosure will be governed by the Department of the Army's Privacy regulation, but will be limited to the extent that the identity of confidential sources will not be compromised; subjects of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal violation will not be alerted to the investigation; the physical safety of witnesses, informants and law enforcement personnel will not be endangered, the privacy of third parties will not be violated; and that the disclosure would not otherwise impede effective law enforcement. Whenever possible, information of the above nature will be deleted from the requested documents and the balance made available. The controlling principle behind this limited access is to allow disclosures except those indicated above. The decisions to release information from these systems will be made on a case-by-case basis necessary for effective law enforcement. (21) A0351–12DAPE. (i) System name: Applicants/Students, U.S. Military Academy Prep School. (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5) and (k)(7) may be exempt from the following provision of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5) and (k)(7). (iv) Reasons: It is imperative that the confidential nature of evaluation material on individuals, furnished to the US Military Academy Preparatory School under an express promise of confidentiality, be maintained to ensure the candid presentation of information necessary in determinations involving admission to or retention at the United States Military Academy and suitability for commissioned military service. (22) A0351–17aUSMA. (i) System name: U.S. Military Academy Candidate Files. (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5), (k)(6), or (k)(7) may be exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5), (k)(6) and (k)(7). (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsection (d) because access might reveal investigatory and testing techniques. The exemption from access necessarily includes exemption from amendment, certain agency requirements relating to access and amendment of records, and civil liability predicated upon agency compliance with those specific provisions of the Privacy Act. (B) Exemption is necessary to protect the identity of individuals who furnished information to the United States Military Academy which is used in determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for military service and which was provided under an express promise of confidentiality. (C) Exemption is needed for the portion of records compiled within the Academy which pertain to testing or examination material used to rate individual qualifications, the disclosure of which would compromise the objectivity or fairness of the testing or examination process. (D) Exemption is required for evaluation material used by the Academy in determining potential for promotion in the Armed Services, to protect the identity of a source who furnished information to the Academy under an express promise of confidentiality. (23) A0351–17bUSMA. (i) System name: U.S. Military Academy Personnel Cadet Records. (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5) or (k)(7) may be exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5) and (k)(7). (iv) Reasons: It is imperative that the confidential nature of evaluation and investigatory material on candidates, cadets, and graduates, furnished to the United States Military Academy under promise of confidentiality be maintained to insure the candid presentation of information necessary in determinations involving admissions to the Military Academy and suitability for commissioned service and future promotion. (24) A0380–13DAMO. (i) System name: Local Criminal Intelligence Files. (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) may be exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(8), (f), and (g). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (f), and (g) because granting individuals access to information collected and maintained by this component relating to the enforcement of laws could interfere with proper investigations and the orderly administration of justice. Disclosure of this information could result in the concealment, alteration or destruction of evidence, the identification of offenders or alleged offenders, nature and disposition of charges; and jeopardize the safety and well-being of informants, witnesses and their families, and law enforcement personnel and their families. Disclosure of this information could also reveal and render ineffectual investigative techniques, sources and methods used by this component and could result in the invasion of the privacy of individuals only incidentally related to an investigation. Exemption from access necessarily includes exemption from the other requirements. (B) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of accounting of disclosure would place the subject of an investigation on notice that he is under investigation and provide him with significant information concerning the nature of the investigation, thus resulting in a serious impediment to law enforcement investigations. (C) From subsection (e)(2) because, in a criminal or other law enforcement investigation, the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent practicable from the subject individual would alert the subject as to the nature or existence of the investigation and thereby present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement. (D) From subsection (e)(3) because compliance would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation or reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants. (E) From subsection (e)(8) because compliance with this provision would provide an impediment to law enforcement by interfering with the ability to issue warrants or subpoenas and by revealing investigative techniques, procedures or evidence. (25) A0380–67DAMI. (i) System name: Personnel Security Clearance Information Files. (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), or (k)(5) may be exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), or (k)(5). (iv) Reasons: The material contained in this record system contains data concerning sensitive sources and operational methods whose dissemination must be strictly controlled because of national security intelligence considerations. Disclosure of documents or the disclosure accounting record may compromise the effectiveness of the operation, and negate specialized techniques used to support intelligence or criminal investigative programs, or otherwise interfere with the orderly conduct of intelligence operations or criminal investigations. (26) A0381–20bDAMI. (i) System name: Counterintelligence/Security Files. (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5) may be exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d)(1) through (d)(5), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I), and (f). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5). (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsection (c)(3) because disclosing the agencies to which information from this system has been released could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal violation, or intelligence operation or investigation; or the existence of that investigation or operation; of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to his/her activities or of the identify of confidential sources, witnesses, and intelligence personnel and could provide information to enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. Granting access to such information could seriously impede or compromise an investigation; endanger the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, intelligence personnel, and their families; lead to the improper influencing of witnesses; the destruction of evidence or the fabrication of testimony and disclose investigative techniques and procedures. In addition, granting access to such information could disclose classified and sensitive sources, information, and operational methods and could constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of others. (B) From subsection (d)(1) through (d)(5) because granting access to records in this system of records could inform the subject of a counterintelligence operation or investigation of an actual or potential criminal violation or the existence of that operation or investigation; of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to his/her activities; or of the identity of confidential sources, witnesses and intelligence personnel and could provide information to enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. Granting access to such information could seriously impede or compromise an operation or investigation; endanger the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, intelligence personnel and their families; lead to the improper influencing of witnesses; the destruction of evidence or the fabrication of testimony and disclose investigative techniques and procedures. In addition, the agency is required to protect the confidentiality of sources who furnished information to the Government under an expressed promise of confidentiality or, prior to September 27, 1975, under an implied promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence. This confidentiality is needed to maintain the Government's continued access to information from persons who otherwise might refuse to give it. (C) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to detect the relevance or necessity of specific information in the early stages of an investigation or operation. Relevance and necessity are often questions of judgement and timing, an it is only after the information is evaluated that the relevance and necessity of such information can be established. In addition, during the course of the investigation or operation, the investigator may obtain information which is incidental to the main purpose of the investigative jurisdiction of another agency. Such information cannot readily be segregated. Furthermore, during the course of the investigation or operation, the investigator may obtain information concerning violations of laws other than those which are within the scope of his/her jurisdiction. In the interest of effective intelligence operations and law enforcement, military intelligence agents should retain information, since it an aid in establishing patterns of criminal or intelligence activity and provide valuable leads for other law enforcement or intelligence agencies. (D) From subsection (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f) because this system or records is being exempt from subsections (d) of the Act, concerning access to records. These requirements are inapplicable to the extent that this system of records will be exempt from subsections (d)(1) through (d)(5) of the Act. Although the system would be exempt from these requirements, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence has published information concerning its notification, access, and contest procedures because under certain circumstances, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence could decide it is appropriate for an individual to have access to all or a portion os his/her records in this system of records. (E) From subsection (e)(4)(I) because it is necessary to protect the confidentiality of the sources of information, to protect the privacy and physical safety of confidential sources and witnesses and to avoid the disclosure of investigative techniques and procedures. Although the system will be exempt from this requirement, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence has published such a notice in broad, generic terms. (27) A0381–100aDAMI. (i) System name: Intelligence/Counterintelligence Source Files. (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records that fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), or (k)(5) may be exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d)(1) through (d)(5), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I), and (f). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5). (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsection (c)(3)because disclosing the agencies to which information from this system has been released could reveal the subject's involvement in a sensitive intelligence or counterintelligence operation or investigation of an actual or potential criminal violation, or intelligence operation or investigation; or the existence of that investigation or operation. Granting access to such information could seriously impede or compromise an investigation or operation; endanger the physical safety of participants and their families, confidential sources, witnesses, intelligence personnel, and their families; and lead to the improper influencing of witnesses; the destruction of evidence or the fabrication of testimony and disclose investigative techniques and procedures. (B) From subsection (d)(1) through (d)(5) because granting access to records could inform the subject of an intelligence or counterintelligence operation or investigation of an actual or potential criminal violation or the existence of that operation or investigation; or the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained, or of the identity of confidential sources, witnesses and intelligence personnel. Granting access to such information could seriously impede or compromise an operation or investigation; endanger the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, intelligence personnel and their families; lead to the improper influencing of witnesses; the destruction of evidence or the fabrication of testimony; disclose investigative techniques and procedures; invade the privacy of those individuals involved in intelligence programs and their families; compromise and thus negate specialized techniques used to support intelligence programs; and interfere with and negate the orderly conduct of intelligence and counterintelligence operations and investigations. In addition, the agency is required to protect the confidentiality of sources who furnished information to the Government under an expressed promise of confidentiality or, prior to September 27, 1975, under an implied promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence. This confidentiality is needed to maintain the Government's continued access to information from persons who otherwise might refuse to give it. (C) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to detect the relevance or necessity of specific information in the early stages of an investigation or operation. Relevance and necessity are often questions of judgment and timing, and it is only after the information is evaluated that the relevance and necessity of such information can be established. In addition, during the course of the investigation or operation, the investigator or operative may obtain information which is incidental to the main purpose of the investigative jurisdiction of another agency. Such information cannot readily be segregated. Furthermore, during the course of the investigation or operation, the investigator may obtain information concerning violations of law other than those which are within the scope of his/her jurisdiction. In the interest of effective intelligence operations and law enforcement, military intelligence agents should retain information, since it is an aid in establishing patterns of criminal or intelligence activity and provides valuable leads for other law enforcement or intelligence agencies. (D) From subsection (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f) because this system of records is being exempt from subsection (d) of the Act concerning access to records. These requirements are inapplicable to the extent that this system of records will be exempt from subsections (d)(1) through (d)(5) of the Act. Although the system would be exempt from these requirements, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence has published information concerning its notification, access, and contest procedures because under certain circumstances, the Deputy Chief of staff for Intelligence could decide it is appropriate for an individual to have access to all or a portion of his/her records in this system of records. (E) From subsection (e)(4)(I) because it is necessary to protect the confidentiality of sources of information, to protect the privacy and physical safety of participants and their families, confidential sources, and witnesses and to avoid the disclosure of specialized techniques and procedures. Although the system will be exempt from this requirement, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence has published such a notice in broad generic terms. (28) A0381–100bDAMI (i) System name: Technical Surveillance Index. (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5) may be exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d)(1) through (d)(5), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2) or (k)(5). (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsection (c)(3) because disclosing the identities of agencies to which information from this system has been released could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal violation or intelligence operation; of the existence of that investigation or operation; of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to his/her activities or of the identify of confidential sources, witnesses, and intelligence or law enforcement personnel and could provide information to enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. Granting access to such information could seriously impede or compromise an investigation; endanger the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, intelligence or law enforcement personnel, and their families; lead to the improper influencing of witnesses; the destruction of evidence or the fabrication of testimony and disclose investigative techniques and procedures. In addition, granting access to such information could disclose classified and sensitive sources and operational methods and could constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of others. (B) From subsection (d)(1) through (d)(5) because granting access to records in this system of records could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal violation; of the existence of that investigation; of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to his/her activities; or of the identity of confidential sources, witnesses and intelligence or law enforcement personnel and could provide information to enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. Granting access to such information could seriously impede or compromise an investigation; endanger the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, intelligence or law enforcement personnel and their families; lead to the improper influencing of witnesses; the destruction of evidence or the fabrication of testimony and disclose investigative techniques and procedures. In addition, granting access to such information could disclose classified, sensitive sources and operational methods and could constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of others. (C) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to detect the relevance or necessity of specific information in the early stages of an investigation or operation. Relevance and necessity are often questions of judgment and timing, and it is only after the information is evaluated that the relevance and necessity of such information can be established. In addition, during the course of the investigation or operation, the investigator may obtain information which is incidental to the main purpose of the investigative jurisdiction of another agency. Such information cannot readily be segregated. Furthermore, during the course of the investigation or operation, the investigator may obtain information concerning violation of laws other than those which are within the scope of his/her jurisdiction. In the interest of effective intelligence operations and law enforcement, criminal law enforcement investigators and military intelligence agents should retain this information, since it can aid in establishing patterns of criminal or intelligence activity and can provide valuable leads for other law enforcement or intelligence agencies. (D) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (e)(4)(H) because this system of records is being exempt from subsections (d) of the Act, concerning access to records, these requirements are inapplicable to the extent that this system of records will be exempt from subsections (d)(1) through (d)(5) of the Act. Although the system would be exempt from these requirements, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command have published information concerning its notification, access, and contest procedures for their respective areas because, under certain circumstances, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence or the U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command could decide it is appropriate for an individual to have access to all or a portion of his/her records in this system of records. (E) From subsection (e)(4)(I) because it is necessary to protect the confidentiality of the sources of information, to protect the privacy and physical safety of confidential sources and witnesses and to avoid the disclosure of investigative techniques and procedures. Although the system will be exempt from this requirement, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command have published such a notice in broad, generic terms. (29) System identifier: A0601–141 DASG. (i) System name: Applications for Appointment to Army Medical Department. (ii) Exemption: Investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for federal civilian employment, military service, federal contracts, or access to classified information may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5), but only to the extent that such material would reveal the identity of a confidential source. Therefore, portions of the system of records may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(d). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5). (iv) Reasons: It is imperative that the confidential nature of evaluations and investigatory material on applicants applying for enlistment furnished to the US Army Recruiting Command under an express promise of confidentiality, be maintained to insure the candid presentation of information necessary in determinations of enlistment and suitability for enlistment into the United States Army. (30) A0601–210aUSAREC. (i) System name: Enlisted Eligibility Files. (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5) may be exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5). (iv) Reasons: It is imperative that the confidential nature of evaluations and investigatory material on applicants applying for enlistment furnished to the US Army Recruiting Command under an express promise of confidentiality, be maintained to insure the candid presentation of information necessary in determinations of enlistment and suitability for enlistment into the United States Army. (31) System identifier: A0601–222 USMEPCOM (i) System name: Armed Services Military Accession Testing (ii) Exemption: Testing or examination material used solely to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in the Federal service or military service may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(6), if the disclosure would compromise the objectivity or fairness of the test or examination process. Therefore, portions of the system of records may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(d). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(6). (iv) Reasons: An exemption is required for those portions of the Skill Qualification Test system pertaining to individual item responses and scoring keys to prelude compromise of the test and to insure fairness and objectivity of the evaluation system. (32) System identifier: A0608–18 DASG. (i) System name: Army Family Advocacy Program (FAP) Files (ii) Exemptions: (A) Investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2). However, if an individual is denied any right, privilege, or benefit for which he would otherwise be entitled by Federal law or for which he would otherwise be eligible, as a result of the maintenance of such information, the individual will be provided access to such information except to the extent that disclosure would reveal the identity of a confidential source. (B) Investigative material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for federal civilian employment, military service, federal contracts, or access to classified information may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5), but only to the extent that such material would reveal the identity of a confidential source. (C) Therefore, portions of the system of records may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H), and (I) and (f). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2) and (k)(5). (iv) Reason: (A) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of the disclosure accounting, for disclosures pursuant to the routine uses published for this system, would permit the subject of a criminal investigation or matter under investigation to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation which will present a serious impediment to law enforcement. (B) From subsection (d) because access to the records contained in this system would inform the subject of a criminal investigation of the existence of that investigation, provide the subject of the investigation with information that might enable him to avoid detection or apprehension, and would present a serious impediment to law enforcement. (C) From subsection (e)(1) because in the course of criminal investigations, information is often obtained concerning the violation of laws or civil obligations of others not relating to an active case or matter. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary that this valuable information be retained since it can aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide valuable leads for other agencies and future cases that may be brought. (D) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) because this system of records is exempt from individual access pursuant to subsections (k)(2) and (k)(5) of the Privacy Act of 1974. (E) From subsection (e)(4)(I) because the identity of specific sources must be withheld in order to protect the confidentiality of the sources of criminal and other law enforcement information. This exemption is further necessary to protect the privacy and physical safety of witnesses and informants. (F) From subsection (f) because this system of records has been exempted from the access provisions of subsection (d). (G) Consistent with the legislative purpose of the Privacy Act of 1974, the Department of the Army will grant access to nonexempt material in the records being maintained. Disclosure will be governed by the Department of the Army's Privacy Regulation, but will be limited to the extent that the identity of confidential sources will not be compromised; subjects of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal violation will not be alerted to the investigation; the physical safety of witnesses, informants and law enforcement personnel will not be endangered, the privacy of third parties will not be violated; and that the disclosure would not otherwise impede effective law enforcement. Whenever possible, information of the above nature will be deleted from the requested documents and the balance made available. The controlling principle behind this limited access is to allow disclosures except those indicated above. The decisions to release information from these systems will be made on a case-by-case basis. (33) A0614–115DAMI. (i) System name: Department of the Army Operational Support Activities. (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records that fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), or (k)(5) may be exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d)(1) through (d)(5), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I), and (f). (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5). (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsection (c)(3)because disclosing the agencies to which information from this system has been released could reveal the subject's involvement in a sensitive intelligence or counterintelligence operation or investigation of an actual or potential criminal violation, or intelligence operation or investigation; or the existence of that investigation or operation. Granting access to such information could seriously impede or compromise an investigation or operation; endanger the physical safety of participants and their families, confidential sources, witnesses, intelligence personnel, and their families; and lead to the improper influencing of witnesses; the destruction of evidence or the fabrication of testimony and disclose investigative techniques and procedures. (B) From subsection (d)(1) through (d)(5) because granting access to records could inform the subject of an intelligence or counterintelligence operation or investigation of an actual or potential criminal violation or the existence of that operation or investigation; of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained, or of the identity of confidential sources, witnesses and intelligence personnel. Granting access to such information could seriously impede or compromise an operation or investigation; endanger the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, intelligence personnel and their families; lead to the improper influencing of witnesses; the destruction of evidence or the fabrication of testimony; disclose investigative techniques and procedures; invade the privacy of those individuals involved in intelligence programs and their families; compromise and thus negate specialized techniques used to support intelligence programs; and interfere with and negate the orderly conduct of intelligence and counterintelligence operations and investigations. In addition, the agency is required to protect the confidentiality of sources who furnished information to the Government under an expressed promise of confidentiality or, prior to September 27, 1975, under an implied promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence. This confidentiality is needed to maintain the Government's continued access to information from persons who otherwise might refuse to give it. (C) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to detect the relevance of specific information in the early stages of an investigation or operation. Relevance and necessity are often questions of judgment and timing, and it is only after the information is evaluated that the relevance and necessity of such information can be established. In addition, during the course of the investigation or operation, the investigator or operative may obtain information which is incidental to the main purpose of the investigative jurisdiction of another agency. Such information cannot readily be segregated. Furthermore, during the course of the investigation or operation, the investigator may obtain information concerning violations of law other than those which are within the scope of his/her jurisdiction. In the interest of effective intelligence operations and law enforcement, military intelligence agents should retain information, since it is an aid in establishing patterns of criminal or intelligence activity and provides valuable leads for other law enforcement or intelligence agencies. (D) From subsection (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f) because this system or records is being exempt from subsections (d) of the Act, concerning access to records. These requirements are inapplicable to the extent that this system of records will be exempt from subsections (d)(1) through (d)(5) of the Act. Although the system would be exempt from these requirements, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence has published information concerning its notification, access, and contest procedures because under certain circumstances, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence could decide it is appropriate for an individual to have access to all or a portion os his/her records in this system of records. (E) From subsection (e)(4)(I) because it is necessary to protect the confidentiality of sources of information, to protectthe privacy and physical safety of participants and their families, confidential sources, and witnesses and to avoid the disclosure of specialized techniques and procedures. Although the system will be exempt from this requirement, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence has published such a notice in broad, generic terms. (f) Exempt OPM records. Three Office of Personnel Management systems of records apply to Army employees, except for nonappropriated fund employees. These systems, the specific exemptions determined to be necessary and proper, the records exempted, provisions of the Privacy Act from which exempt, and justification are set forth below: (1) Personnel Investigations Records (OPM/CENTRAL–9). All material and information in these records that meets the criteria stated in 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), (k)(3), (k)(5), and (k)(6) is exempt from the requirements of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (d). These provisions of the Privacy Act relate to making accountings of disclosures available to the data subject and access to and amendment of records. The specific applicability of the exemptions to this system and the reasons for the exemptions are as follows: (i) Personnel investigations may obtain from another Federal agency properly classified information which pertains to national defense and foreign policy. Application of exemption (k)(1) may be necessary to preclude the data subject's access to and amendment of such classified information under 5 U.S.C. 552a(d). (ii) Personnel investigations may contain investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes other than material within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), e.g., investigations into the administration of the merit system. Application of exemption (k)(2) may be necessary to preclude the data subject's access to or amendment of such records, under 552a(c)(3) and (d). (iii) Personnel investigations may obtain from another Federal agency information that relates to providing protective services to the President of the United States or other individuals pursuant to section 3056 of title 18. Application of exemption (k)(3) may be necessary to preclude the data subject's access to and amendment of such records under 5 U.S.C. 552a(d). (iv) All information about individuals in these records that meets the criteria stated in 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5) is exempt from the requirements of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4). These provisions of the Privacy Act relate to making accountings of disclosures available to the data subject, and access to and amendment of records. These exemptions are claimed because this system contains investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, and qualifications for Federal civilian employment. To the extent that the disclosure of material would reveal the identity of source who furnished information to the Government under an express promise that the identity of the source would held in confidence, or, prior to September 27, 1975, under an implied promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence, the application of exemption (k)(5) will be required to honor such a promise should the data subject request access to or amendment of the record, or access to the accounting of disclosures of the record. (v) All material and information in the records that meets the criteria stated in 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(6) is exempt from the requirements of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d), relating to access to and amendment of records by the data subject. This exemption is claimed because portions of this system relate to testing or examination materials used solely to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in the Federal service. Access to or amendment of this information by the data subject would compromise the objectivity and fairness of the testing or exemption process. (2) Recruiting, Examining, and Placement Records (OPM/GOVT–5). (i) All information about individuals in these records that meets the criteria stated in 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5) is exempt from the requirements of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (d). These provisions of the Privacy Act relate to making accountings of disclosures available to the data subject and access to and amendment of records. These exemptions are claimed because this system contains investigative material compiled solely for the purpose of determining the appropriateness of a request for approval of an objection to an eligible's qualification for employment in the Federal service. To the extent that the disclosure of such material would reveal the identity of a source who furnished information to the Government under an express promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence, the application of exemption (k)(5) will be required to honor such a promise should the data subject request access to the accounting of disclosures of the record. (ii) All material and information in these records that meets the criteria stated in 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(6) are exempt from the requirements of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d), relating to access to and amendment of records by the subject. The exemption is claimed because portions of this system relate to testing or examination materials used solely to determine individual qualification for appointment or promotion in the Federal service and access to or amendment of this information by the data subject would compromise the objectivity and fairness of the testing or examining process. (3) Personnel Research Test Validation Records (OPM/GOVT–6). All material and information in these records that meets the criteria stated in 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(6) is exempt from the requirements of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d), relating to access to and amendment of the records by the data subject. This exemption is claimed because portions of this system relate to testing or examination materials used solely to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in the Federal service. Access to or amendment of this information by the data subject would compromise the objectivity and fairness of the testing or examination process. [61 FR 43657, Aug. 26, 1996, as amended at 62 FR 48480, Sept. 16, 1997; 64 FR 45877, Aug. 23, 1999; 65 FR 6895, Feb. 11, 2000; 66 FR 55876, Nov. 5, 2001; 67 FR 17618, Apr. 11, 2002; 68 FR 25817, May 14, 2003; 70 FR 49487, Aug. 24, 2005]
Title 32: National Defense
PART 505—THE ARMY PRIVACY PROGRAM
§ 505.5 Exemptions.
